# COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 

APPEALS COURT

No. 2012-P-0260

MARIA KITRAS, TRUSTEE, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.

TOWN OF AQUINNAH, et al., Defendants-Appellees

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT
OF THE LAND COURT

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Volume: I of II Days 1 to 6 of 11 Pages: 1 - 315 Exhibits: None

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DUKES, SS. DEPARTMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT LAND COURT DEPARTMENT

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MARIA A. KITRAS, as Trustee of *
BEAR REALTY TRUST et al., *
Plaintiffs *
* No. 97-MISC-238738
V.
TOWN OF AQUINNAH et al.,
Defendants * * *
CONFERENCES AND MOTIONS, POST-REMAND
BEFORE JUDGE LEON J. LOMBARDI

APPEARANCES
(See page following caption page for each date, for complete information)

Boston, Massachusetts
Courtrooms 1, 2, and 3
April 25, 2006, room 2 page 4 September 12,2006 , room 1 page 63 December 4, 2006, room 1 page 112 January 16, 2007, room 1 page 209 July 10, 2007, room 2 page 223 June 13, 2008, room 3 page 249

Ellen H. Dibble
Approved Court Transcriber

## I N D E X

PAGE:

April 25, 2006, room 2
4
Status conference (Decoulos, Cohen, Morse, Hall, Roberts, Lima, and Fabio; and Rappaport by phone

September 12, 2006, room 1
Status conference, post-remand: motion to dismiss plaintiffs Victoria and Gardner Brown; motion for reconsideration of bifurcation; motion for changes in parties; status conference on approach to matter of intent (changes in parties, etc.); issues of timing
(Decoulos, Cohen, Morse, Lima, Saltonstall, Roberts; and by phone, Rappaport and Hall)

December 4, 2006, room 1:
112
Motions (Decoulos, Morse, Lima, Margulis, Robert, Rappaport, Hall)

Motion to substitute Charles D. Harding, Jr., for Eleanor Harding (Attorney Morse)

Motion to add party (Commonwealth) (Attorney Morse) Motion of Thomas Seeman, to dismiss (Attorney Lima) Plaintiff's motion to dismiss certain parties (Attorney Decoulos)

Clarification by the Court as to Martha's Vineyard Land Bank substitution for Browns (at previous session) Motion of Vineyard Conservation Society to dismiss (Attorney Roberts)

Gossamer Wing Realty Trust's motion for leave to file late opposition to motion of Vineyard Conservation Society's motion to dismiss as to lots 1-188 (Attorney Hall)

Plaintiff's motion to dismiss certain parties (Attorney Decoulos)

January 16, 1007, room 1 209
(Decoulos, Morse, Roberts; and by phone: Rappaport, Hall; Donnelly observing)
Motion to establish summary judgment schedule (by
Attorney Morse, on behalf of Harding clients)
Notice of motion to amend, in preparation (by Attorney
Decoulos for Kitras clients)
Court date scheduled 2/12/07

I N D E X (continued)

July 10, 2007, room 2
Status conference
(Decoulos, Daniels, Tillotson, Donnelly, Morse; and by phone: Roberts, Wice, Rappaport, and Hall)
Motion for additional time to file response (by Martha's Vineyard Land Bank, Attorney Tillotson)

Scheduling as to motions to dismiss filed on behalf of Gossamer Wing Realty Trust and Baron Land Bank (Attorney Hall)

Status conference, as requested on behalf of the Kitras plaintiffs, the Third Amended Complaint having been filed

Discovery issues raised; presumptive date for conclusion of discovery set for September 30, 2007

Status conference scheduled for October 12, 2007
Commonwealth's motion to substitute party, Executive Office of Environmental Affairs

June 13, 2008, room 3 249
Motions (Donnelly, Roberts, Tillotson, Hall, Rappaport, Wice)

Motion of Vineyard Conservation Society to strike three interlocutory notices of appeal by plaintiff Kitras et al., Brian M. Hall, trustee of Baron's Land Trust and Benjamin L. Hall, Jr., trustee of Gossamer Wing Realty Trust

Cross-Motion to correct the order dated September 14, 2007 to now order amendment of the Cross-Claims, to allow the prior cross-motion of Gossamer Wing Realty Trust and Baron's Land Trust Filed August 30, 2007 to amend their Answers, Counterclaims and Cross-Claims, or, alternatively, to order a separate judgment under Rule 54(B) finally dismissing the Cross-Claims of Gossamer Wing Realty Trust and Baron's Land Trust pursuant to the September 14, 2007 order taken under advisement (by Attorney Hall on behalf of his clients)

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1
Volume: I of II Day 1 of 11 Pages: 4 - 62 Exhibits: None
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DUKES, SS.
DEPARTMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT LAND COURT DEPARTMENT
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MARIA A. KITRAS, as Trustee of * BEAR REALTY TRUST et al., * Plaintiffs *
* No. 97-MISC-238738
v.
TOWN OF AQUINNAH et al.,
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
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- 4 $\qquad$

STATUS CONFERENCE, POST-REMAND BEFORE JUDGE LEON J. LOMBARDI

APPEARANCES
(See page following caption page for each date)

Boston, Massachusetts Courtroom

Ellen H. Dibble
Approved Court Transcriber

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Appearances (continued):
Richard K. Fabio, pro se
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Withdrawing this date on behalf of Aurilla Fabio the appearance of:
Richard Erwin Burke, Jr., Esq.
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Ronald Rappaport, Esq. (Present by phone, 4/25/06)
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By: Ronald Rappaport, Esq.
For the Town of Aquinnah
(Time is 3:19:17 PM.)

THE CLERK: Today is Tuesday, April 25th, 2006, Land Court Miscellaneous Case Number 238738, Kitras versus Aquinnah.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, Counsel. Welcome back. If you would, please identify yourselves for the record, which is being recorded.

MR. DECOULOS: Nicholas Decoulos representing the plaintiffs Kitras and the Gorda Realty Trust, and James Decoulos of the Bear II Realty Trust.

MR. COHEN: H. Theodore Cohen. I represent Gardner and Victoria Brown.

MS. MORSE: Leslie-Ann Morse. I represent Mark Harding and the Eleanor P. Harding Realty Trust.

MR. HALL: Benjamin L. Hall, Jr.; I represent Gossamer Wing Realty Trust, and Baron's Land Realty Trust.

MS. ROBERTS: Jennifer Roberts for the defendant Vineyard Conservation Society, Inc.

MR. LIMA: David Lima for Thomas Seeman.

THE COURT: And I --

Yes, sir.

MR. FABIO: Richard Fabio, pro se; Aurilla Fabio is deceased, and my sister's pro se. We filed --

THE COURT: All right. We'll get to that in a minute. Because I did see some papers that recently came in today
on that.

And we do have counsel on the telephone; is that correct?

MR. RAPPAPORT: (On phone): Yes, Your Honor. It's Ronald Rappaport for the Town of Aquinnah.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Rappaport, I can hear you. Could you hear each of the people speaking in the courtroom?

MR. RAPPAPORT: I can hear them, although I would appreciate if they'd speak up a little bit, but I'm hard-pressed to make a request, 'cause I'm down here, and I -- but, whatever. I -- I -- I can hear.

THE COURT: Your request is heard by all of us, and we'll try to comply.

This is a status conference, requested, I believe, by the Vineyard Conservation Society.

And I'm sure that a number of parties have points they wish to discuss this afternoon, but first $I$ want to cover a few matters as well.

As we all know, the decision of the Appeals Court issued on August 18 of last year, and I'm sure it's given us a great deal to consider.

I'd like to read just a few passages from the decision, which $I$ believe constitutes direction and some guidance as to how the case is to proceed.

And I don't know if counsel have your copies of it handy, but I'm going to first start at page 289 of the slip opinion, and it seems that the panel of the Appeals Court shares some of the concerns that I think trial judges of this court have had throughout this case. And let me read what Justice Brown wrote.
"Before identifying the lots and interests most directly relevant here, we pause to note that it is sometimes difficult to determine from the pleadings what owners are claiming what easements for what lots, or even what parties remain interested in the case."

I just say that as a introduction, because I'm going to insist, now that it's clear that I'm going to be having control of this case going forward, that we're going to have this case organized, well-pled, and presented in a manner that we can all follow what's going on in this litigation.

Page 293. The Appeals Court wrote -- hold on, please?
"The titles for each of the lots numbered 1 through 188 or 189" -- the category, as you know, broke the various lots into two general groupings, those that were numbered, as indicated, 1 through 188 or 189, and then for 189 or 190 and above.

And for that first group, the Court said, "However title is described, each lot was owned by a different
individual, and the unity of title required to imply an easement by necessity fails."

And later on, $I$ believe, the Court again said that whatever easements may be established for lots with those higher numbers, it would not apply to those with the lower numbers.

The next point $I$ would make on that is that...

Let me move on. And I may not have the page numbers accurately jotted down, so let me just read from this earlier copy of the decision which did not have the page numbers.

The Court said, "We have no difficulty envisioning a multiplicity of intentions implied from the circumstances prevailing at the time of partition, including that the lots were to have access to whatever road was most convenient or might be constructed at some future date."

The Court also said that "we remain mindful of the nature of the easement claimed. Whereas a preexisting use might in some cases give rise to an implied easement, we imply an easement by necessity not from use but from a," quote, "'severance of rights once held in a unity ownership,'" end quote.

And I will share with all of you here that $I$ think that the Court does go back and forth at times between implied easements and easement by necessity.

And from my perspective, there is a perhaps mixing of legal standards involved with those two concepts, and that's something we're all going to have to deal with as we go forward, as to what type of easement we're dealing with and what are the elements necessary for the particular type of easement that is involved here.

Let me continue.
The Court said that they had "assumed" until that point in the decision, for the higher numbered lots - if I can call them that - "the intent to create easements." They had assumed the intent to create easements.

But they then said, "It is well established in this Commonwealth: Necessity alone does not an easement create. Neither does there exist a public policy favoring the creation of implied easements when needed to render land either accessible or productive."

The Court's "charge, then, is not to look simply at necessity, but to consider all," quote, "'the circumstances under which the severance was executed, and all the material conditions known to the parties at the time,'" end quote.

Those are some of the passages from the decision, which I think very clearly indicates where we need to go, going forward. And there are obviously burdens that have to be met by the parties with these various standards.

The Court, just before the final passage, saying that the earlier judgment was reversed, laid out a number of the other issues that will have to be addressed, saying that "Should the requisite intent be found for some or all of the partitioned common lots, that this will not end the inquiry," that there were "numerous" other questions that need to be addressed as well.

So we do have a fair amount on our respective plates as we go forward.

I'd like to just touch very briefly on other issues that $I$ think we can discuss today, and then of course to hear what the parties have in mind.

And that - talking about parties - is one of the primary concerns: The status of the parties: Who's in this case. Who used to be in the case but needs to come back into the case.

I'm also concerned that we have - whenever there's any filings by any one of you - an accurate service list.

I'm not going to be spending my time or the clerk's time going through these files each and every time there's a filing to check who has appeared or disappeared in this case. It's going to be up to all of you. And it's going to be your responsibility; if parties have not been served and they come in later on complaining that they haven't been served, then we'll have to deal with that.

So I do expect that when you file a motion or any other matter that requires a certificate of service, that the service list be attached, and not be merely a certification that "I have served all parties of record and counsel of record." I want that service list to be attached, and if there's changes of parties, it's going to be your responsibility to keep up on it.

MATTER OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE,

AS TO ESTATE OF AURILLA FABIO:

THE COURT: And that will, you know, bring up the matter of - I would just mention briefly - I received a withdrawal of appearance by Richard E. Burke, today, docketed today. He submitted his withdrawal for the estate of Aurilla -- is that correct? Aurilla?

MR. FABIO: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- Fabio, and said that the proper parties' interests are her two children, her only heirs, Richard Fabio and Sharon Nowell.

This actually is a motion that comes, of course, as far as a withdrawal, late in the process, without any successor counsel appointed. And the rules would require that the matter have to be allowed by the Court.

And so that -- the withdrawal is here but without a successor attorney to take over on behalf of the estate or to represent you; there's a question in my mind about
whether, you know, we need to have an attorney come in, present it to the Court, and then have it allowed.

It's not as though the estate is going to, in a sense, continue on as a party. You and -- your sister, is it?

MR. FABIO: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- are going to succeed to the interests. We don't have really much by way of documentation, that I'm aware of. Again, I haven't gone through the volumes here to see whether a, what's called a "suggestion of death" had ever been filed.

MR. FABIO: It is in there, Your Honor.

THE COURT: It is in there?

MR. FABIO: And if I may? We have a fractional
interest, my sister and myself. And if Attorney Burke suggested -- if... we are pro se. If I just, when I go back and see him, he may -- it may make sense for him to get back involved, and...

THE COURT: All right. Well, we'll hold on that for the time being. The other point that $I$ want to -- points I want to mention is that obviously part of our discussion this afternoon is going to be what future discovery is going to be necessary, with the issues that still have to be adjudicated here.

And as you think about doing discovery, it's going to be critical that you think ahead to the time when you're
going to be preparing a joint pretrial memorandum, which is going to identify the issues, who's claiming what, what the exhibits are going to be, who the witnesses are going to be -- because it's absolutely a prerequisite, before you get to trial, that there be a pretrial memo which puts everyone on notice what the other one is thinking about, that there's no element of surprise.

And it's been my practice to hold parties to the joint pretrial memo. If you don't have the witness on the list or you don't have the exhibit, you have a very difficult situation to try to get this witness or admitted at the time of trial if it hadn't been disclosed previously.

And then with the matter of future discovery would come deadlines, to say: How much time are we going to be spending on future discovery, and how soon you'll be ready for a pretrial conference.

Those are my initial comments and concerns as we begin.

MATTER OF STATUS CONFERENCE BEING REQUESTED BY VINEYARD CONSERVATION SOCIETY AS TO ISSUE OF BIFURCATION

THE COURT: And I would turn to the party who requested the status conference to ask if at this point, Ms. Roberts, that you would like to raise any particular matters.

MS. ROBERTS: On my list, Your Honor, I have a procedural issue of: Who are the parties now; what parties will be brought back in. So we obviously need to tackle that.

And there are some issues... well, I'm going to leave that for a moment.

When you get past the procedural issues and on to the merits, I'd like to suggest to the Court that we bifurcate this, because I think it would be more economical to do so.

THE COURT: Bifurcate on what basis? As far as what are the two parts?

MS. ROBERTS: It seems to me, from the Appeals Court decision, that this Court is going to need to make a determination as to whether there was an intent to create an easement or not.

And if the Court finds that there was such an intent, then you will get to the issue, the much messier issue, of where to locate these on the ground.

The defendants up until now have presented a pretty unified front because we have the same interest in preventing any easement at all.

Once -- if the Court decides that there is an easement and now we're getting down to "where is it going to be," then that unanimity among all the defendants $I$ think is
going to break down very rapidly.

And I also would tend to believe that with respect to the issue of whether an easement exists at all, that's something that could be presented to the Court fairly quickly.

I'm happy to hear if anybody has any discovery they think needs to be done on that issue. My sense of it is that we pretty much did all the discovery we needed to do before this case was presented to Judge Green.

So my suggestion, Your Honor, would be: Let's deal with whether there is an easement or not. And then if the -- I think that -- I can't believe there'll be any witnesses presented.

THE COURT: Well, $I$ mean, it is interesting to think what the witness list may be.

When Justice Brown said, speaking for the Appeals Court panel: "We have no difficulty envisioning a multiplicity of intentions implied from the circumstances prevailing at the time of the partition," um...

Well, "multiplicity of intentions" wouldn't mean that it's a fact-based inquiry as far as -- you know, intention is not something that ordinarily is resolvable on summary judgment. You need a trial: What were the intentions of the parties?

And: "At the time of the partition." I don't know
who you are calling for witnesses.

MS. ROBERTS: If I may, here, that's the issue, Your Honor.

We briefed all this. We did all the discovery on it before going, presenting the matter to Judge Green.

I don't have any more discovery to do on that issue, subject to what anybody else may come up with.

So far in the discussions I have had with plaintiff's counsel - and I haven't talked to everybody - I haven't heard anything from then that would lead me to believe that there's much if any discovery left.

And I can't frankly see that there are any witnesses that are going to testify on that issue of intent.

THE COURT: All right. Let's stop on this point, and that is: Your suggestion of bifurcation.

Does anyone want to take the other side of that argument and suggest that there shouldn't be bifurcation; that we're going to have a proceeding that's going to go to trial on everything, at the same time, as far as location of easement as well as whether the intention of the easement existed to create one, to whatever roads might be constructed at some future date?
(Pause.)

THE COURT: All right. I'm not hearing a lot of -MR. DECOULOS: I'd rather not have it bifurcated, Your

Honor, and the reason being, that $I$ think that we've got to take a fresh look at this case as a result of what the Appeals Court said.

THE COURT: Within the parameters of the Appeals Court decision.

MR. DECOULOS: And most of this case is documentary. And I've instructed my clients to -- I've got a list of over 100 items that $I$ want included in there. And that will include whatever records we can find on Martha's Vineyard.

So I'd rather not have it bifurcated, not at this particular point. I would rather wait --

THE COURT: Well, one of the -- your suggestion, Mr. Decoulos, is to not bifurcate it and to go forward.

But if we get to the point -- and this would have to get to the assumption that there was this intent to create easements. Then the question is: Where?

And if we are going to go down that road and have a trial and deal with the issue of the location of the easement, it's going to be incumbent upon those asserting the easement to be specific as to where that easement would lie and who would be affected by it.

MR. DECOULOS: Right.
THE COURT: So you're going to -- before we ever get to trial, and assume that we, you know, have it as one
matter - or bifurcate it and eventually get to it everyone who's asserting the easement is going to have to say where they think the intent was to create an easement and whose land would be burdened by it.

MR. DECOULOS: I've instructed my client to do that, Your Honor, so we've hired a surveyor and we're trying to locate the most feasible place to put that, in view of everything that's going to be in the record. But --

THE COURT: Well, is that just his desire, where he'd like to have an easement? Or --

MR. DECOULOS: No, I couldn't --

THE COURT: -- he believes the record would support that there was the intent to create an easement in a certain location?

MR. DECOULOS: I can't answer that question for you right now, Your Honor.

But I know where we'd like to put the road.

THE COURT: Mm-hmm?

MR. DECOULOS: And there has been a road there --

THE COURT: Okay?

MR. DECOULOS: -- that services lots. We've got evidence to that effect.

And we just want to get this all together and move it along, but you know, just picking up on where you left off about -- at the very beginning.

We don't -- I'm going to get a spreadsheet on this to find out which defendants were served, which defendants were not served, and which ones answered and which ones didn't answer.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. DECOULOS: So that we can find out where we're going, just so we can... there might be people who we can call to, who -- we can pick it up from there.

But I've got to find out exactly where the parties all are.

And we just can't -- I -- you know. I got the appeals, the record appendix, there were 290 entries or thereabouts. Of course they gave me the entries today, and it's over 390.

THE COURT: Yeah, 394, if anyone's counting.

MR. DECOULOS: Exactly. Yep.

THE COURT: Yep.

MR. DECOULOS: And that's just going to go on.

And a lot of that should not be in the record.

THE COURT: Well, perhaps you're right, but it's all here at the present time.

MR. DECOULOS: Well, what I'm saying is that the motions for summary judgment, those have to be set aside.

And what we ought to have is some kind of a record that says: "This is the amended complaint."

THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

MR. DECOULOS: "These are all the answers that are filed." And go from there, because otherwise, we're just going to be spinning our wheels trying to find out where we're going with this thing.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. DECOULOS: I think it can be done very quickly. THE COURT: All right. Mr. Cohen, you were rising, as well as Mr. Hall.

MR. COHEN: What I was rising for, Your Honor, is that I don't necessarily agree with your characterization that, assuming there was an intent to create an easement by necessity, that we have to determine where it was intended to go at the time of the partition.

I think the Appeals Court made it clear that an easement by necessity, having no determined physical location, may be located as circumstances of the parties later dictate.

So I think if we conclude that there was an intent, then we get to the issue of: Where does it go.

And maybe it goes where we could establish an intent in 1870; or maybe it goes somewhere totally different --

THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

MR. COHEN: -- as the Court indicates. Moshup's Trail, and Zack's Cliff Road came into existence much after
the partition, but maybe they are the appropriate places for the easement to run to.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Hall?

MR. HALL: I agree. That was one of the reasons why I was standing, Your Honor, is...

THE COURT: Mm-hmm? What about the bifurcation issue? What's your position? Ms. Roberts and Mr. Decoulos.

MR. HALL: As I read the Appeals Court decision, Your Honor, it's not absolutely clear to me that they have overruled Judge Green in finding that there was an intention to create easements to the lots that he specified.

I'm not sure that just because the Appeals Court has suggested, in dicta, that the matter of intent was one that had not yet been answered.. it was answered by Judge Green, and I'm not sure that it was overruled by the Appeals Court. They're making suggestions that -- that the intent may be.

And they have said, in the very beginning of their decision, that...

THE COURT: And keep your voice up for Mr. Rappaport.

MR. HALL: -- that: "Before identifying the lots and interests most directly relevant" hereto ... "on remand, it will be for the trial judge and the parties to resolve all" the "uncertainties."

So it seems like they've thrown the door wide open again.

But they -- they agree with Judge Green; they disagree with Judge Green. They say things that are contrary to Judge Green's decision without saying that they're finding it to be incorrect.

It's kind of hard to kind of follow through this meandering decision.

THE COURT: I'm aware -- I'm aware --

MR. HALL: However -- however --
THE COURT: -- of some of those problems.

MR. HALL: -- to point out one thing that the Court did say: You tried to draw a distinction between an implied easement and an easement by necessity.

THE COURT: Right.
MR. HALL: And in fact $I$ think the distinction that has been drawn and should be drawn is one that is the difference between an easement by necessity and an easement by implication, both of which are easements that are implied to have occurred by the Court.

So when one speaks of implied easements, one is including within that context both an easement by necessity and an easement by implication, as defined in the Restatement, differentiated by Powell --

THE COURT: Well, we'll have to sort that out a little
bit later, Mr. Hall, because, you know, there's already plenty of confusion in the whole arena of easements, and the terminology. And sometimes the courts at all levels, unfortunately, don't keep the terms separate where they need to be separate. And you're suggesting "implied easement" may be different than "easement by implication." You know, we'll have to see how your authorities play out on that. But whether it be Bedford versus Cerasuolo, which had a nice recitation of "implied easements"...

The general rule that I'm aware of is: An implied easement is one where there has been an underlying use that already occurred; and when there was a severance of ownership, it was implied that the grantee would still have the right to use the property as the grantor did, where there had been actual use.

An easement by necessity, as the court did say, there may not ever have been a use, but you've now landlocked a piece of property.

Now, if you then -- you know, sure, maybe that's a form of easement by implication. But $I$ think there is a distinction to be made. And to try to keep some sanity for all of us, we should try to follow as much of the traditional language - where clear - to keep following it.

But there's plenty of treatises on easements. And I do remember participating in a seminar not too many years
ago, and one of the presenters said, "If you haven't found an easement case that supports your theory or position, you haven't looked hard enough" -- because the cases are all over the lot.

So, enough said on that.

So I guess I would go back to you, and then to Mr. Cohen again. I'll get to the others here.

As far as your thoughts on bifurcation versus just going forward and trying the whole thing at once.

MR. HALL: Well, I can see justification for separating some of the lots. With respect to our lot, 302, it's so factually and geographically distinct from the balance of the lots, that I think that one should be resolved on an in-and-of-itself. I mean, it stands --

THE COURT: Have you identified, for let's say hypothetically lot 302 , which land would be burdened by a easement to service lot 302 ?

MR. HALL: There would be a potential for three different lots, one owned by Evans, one owned by Pratt, and one owned by Cammann.

THE COURT: All right. Have you ever reduced to writing your route, and who would be affected by that?

MR. HALL: We have not set forth a route, but we have suggested to the Court in the past which of the -- where -where, just geographically, looking at the map, where that
easement might go.

But it would require there to be quite a bit of engineering work, because there is a brook running near in the vicinity, so there'd be wetlands issues that need to be looked at.

Indeed, I'm not sure, given that this area is so full of wetlands, what and where easements might run. I think wetlands analysis is going to be part of this game plan, however you we cut it.

THE COURT: You said Pratt, Cammann, and who's the third?

MR. HALL: Evans, I believe.

MR. DECOULOS: How do they spell that second name, Your Honor?

THE COURT: $\mathrm{C}-\mathrm{A}-\mathrm{M}-\mathrm{M}-\mathrm{A}-\mathrm{N}-\mathrm{N}$.

And are they parties to the litigation?

MR. HALL: Pratt and Cammann are. I believe Evans may have been dismissed.

THE COURT: All right. Well, unless the parties come up with a different map or whatever -- I guess both Judge Green and the Appeals Court are using the same one, which the parties have previously produced. And that would be the one I'm going to go with.

But I think that as you go forward with your claims and your case, that whenever appropriate, that we, you
know, refer to this and show where it is that you suggest that this easement would arise.

All right. So your issue of bifurcation is not on the same basis as counsel's was -- Ms. Roberts'. Yours is on the particular property rather than the legal issue.

MR. HALL: Right. I think the Court would need to make a ruling as to Ms. Roberts whether or not this decision actually requires the court to go back and find an intent, because $I$ think Judge Green already did it.

And I'm not sure that was overruled. Heh.

THE COURT: Well, I know that there was requests for rehearings and FAR, and all of it was denied. So this is the last word.

MR. HALL: But what do those words mean when we apply it to what we're looking at? And how -- I mean, though this may recite what the law is, it doesn't necessarily say that Judge Green was wrong.

So I'm not sure that the Appeals Court is ordering this court to go back and make new findings of fact on that particular issue.

MS. ROBERTS: Could I just interject here, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes. Keep your voice up, Ms. Roberts.

MS. ROBERTS: It's my memory that Judge Green said that he would "assume without deciding" that there was an easement by necessity, because -- and he went on to find
that there were indispensable parties, so he couldn't ultimately adjudicate that issue.

That's my memory of the decision. So I don't think he decided it. I think the Appeals Court has now said that that issue is open for decision by this court.

MR. HALL: It may well be.

THE COURT: All right. And Mr. Cohen, did you opine on the issue of bifurcation?

MR. COHEN: I did not, Your Honor.

I knew it had been suggested before, and my initial reaction was that it would probably be more judicially and economical for all the parties not to bifurcate it.

However, I realize that leaves open or forces us to try and deal - perhaps in advance of it needing to be dealt with - the issue of whether the Wampanoags need to be a party to the proceeding, the Appeals Court having indicated, as I understand it, that if a determination were made that it didn't -- that an easement existed, and it didn't have to impact on the tribal lands, that they don't need to be parties.

And if we handle everything at once, $I$ don't quite know how we deal with that issue.

THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Morse?

MS. MORSE: I'm going to simple about this. I agree with Ms. Roberts. It's going to be much simpler to deal
with whether or not there was an intention to create an easement, and then deal with everything else later, because with so many parties in here, it's going to be bad enough just dealing with that.

Let's just keep it simple, deal with that issue, and then we can deal with everything else.

MR. DECOULOS: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Before you speak again, Mr. Decoulos, let me ask other counsel if they want to say anything.

Before I get to Mr. Rappaport: Mr. Lima.

MR. LIMA: Yes.

I have no objection to bifurcating. However, first thing I'd like to do is establish who the parties are.

My person was let out on a summary judgment motion, without any objection from anyone. I'd like to get out again, quite frankly --

THE COURT: Hmm.

MR. LIMA: -- because of that.

My person is as far to the south as you can go - I believe it's south - and as far away as any -- from any road that you can possibly get to.

THE COURT: Which lots are your client's?
MR. LIMA: My client is Thomas Seeman. If you look at the very bottom of that map?

THE COURT: Number 76?

MR. LIMA: And 75.

THE COURT: And 75?

MR. LIMA: Correct.

And if you look where they are located, they're further up to the right center and very far up, at top of the map.

Any logical route from their lots, the plaintiffs' lots, to any road --

MR. DECOULOS: Here's what I meant (indicating).

MR. LIMA: Any logical route that an easement could take would certainly not go through in that direction. It's just too far to go. It would impinge upon too many other lots.

Any logical route that an easement could take would certainly not go through in that direction. It's just too far to go; it would impinge upon too many other lots.

MS. ROBERTS: Your Honor, I think by virtue of the fact that the Appeals Court has said lots 1 through 189 do not have common ownership with lots 189 and above, that anything below 189 is not going to be a possible source of the location of an easement, so --

MR. LIMA: So --

MS. ROBERTS: -- so I would not object to lots that are below 189 being dismissed.

THE COURT: Well, the question is whether the lots
below 190 or 189 are going to be the dominant estate or the servient estate.

MS. ROBERTS: Well, I understand that, is that they can't -- because there's no common ownership, they can't be either.

THE COURT: Mm-hmm?

MS. ROBERTS: So I would say that the lots 189 and below are no longer in this fight. The lots above have a common owner, and therefore --

THE COURT: No, I unders- ... Yeah.

No, I understand. It's just a question of, I'm hearing the suggestion, by counsel who wish to get access to their lots, that they seem to say we'll find the route that makes the most sense for us to get access to our lots that are above 189 .

And I don't know what route that is and how it implicates anyone else.

I mean, that's why I think, you know, it would be nice if we could start to - even without the formality of a pretrial conference or something of that nature - the parties talk and come to some basic understandings as to what areas are involved here.

And if you have certain people - and I'm not saying that it's necessarily the case with Mr. Lima's clients but if you have some that under no stretch of the
imagination are going to be impacted, then it would be terrific to have an agreement to dismiss certain parties.

And if there can't be an agreement, then I take there could be a motion brought, and we'll have to deal with it on that basis.

Mr. Hall.
MR. HALL: I hear what the Court is saying, perhaps, about the lots 189 or 190 and below, that these lots may in fact have easements by necessity over the common lands, but remaining (time is 3:55:01 PM) higher numbered lots, and I don't think that the Appeals Court said that they did not. I think what they said was that an easement by necessity could not burden those lots, because they were held in severalty below.

But there is evidence to suggest -- and Judge Green, I think, had found the lot numbers had gone through 173 as opposed to 189, and there has been -- we just found in the Dukes County registry of deeds a document - that magically just appeared on a shelf - that dates back to 1870 that shows a plan for lots going through 173 and not to 189 and 190. It's dated October 1870.

So it's kind of interesting that new things are starting to kind of get pulled out of the racks or wherever this document was, and appeared.

But there is a suggestion that the easements could run
over the higher number lots, possibly the 174 and above. THE COURT: And you represent a party that owns 177; is that right?

MR. HALL: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. And Mr. Decoulos, 178 is one of your clients' lots; is that right?

MR. DECOULOS: That's right.
THE COURT: Yep. Okay.
MR. DECOULOS: Judge, I --
THE COURT: Mr. Rappaport -- then I'll get back to Mr. Decoulos.

Mr. Rappaport, did you have anything to add?
MR. RAPPAPORT: Yes. I'd just like to say several brief things.

First, that I know that Jennifer Roberts' reference that Judge Green did not find, necessarily, but just assumed that there was an easement by necessity. And that is correct; and that appears on page 14 of his decision. Second, I think that it only makes sense to bifurcate, because, for the reasons stated, we'll have different people claiming different possible routes over different people's lands. But we don't whether or not there's an easement that can be proven at all. And I think it only makes sense to bifurcate.

On the issue of the parties, and who is a party, I
think it would be good if we could go through an exercise and eliminate some people by agreement.

Not being an optimist on that: Perhaps there could be a mechanism where everyone who was formerly a party, and anybody who's a potential party, including the tribe, be given notice that this issue was going to be adjudicated and an invitation to come into court, and if they choose to ignore that, that the issue of whether or not there's an easement at all be adjudicated, and they run the risk of having that be adjudicated in their absence.

THE COURT: Well, one thing which - again, from my perspective - is so important is that the parties claiming easements sooner rather than later identify the route. And that way we know who's involved, who's going to be affected.

And I would entertain at some point, I suppose, some procedure and some process for that to be done so that we're all not running in circles on these various questions.

Now, that is separate and apart from the issue of: Was the intent -- again, this raises the issue whether intent is necessary to be proven here again.

And that question could be briefed by the parties.
But I am also wondering whether we're going to be dealing with different claims of intent, if we get into
that, for different lots.

For instance, using as an example, Mr. Hall's lot, 302. Are we going to be trying to determine whether there was an intent to create an easement for that particular lot as opposed to lot 177, that is owned -- well, I shouldn't use that one as an example today, because, you know, that one is below the 189.

But let's take lot 232.

MR. HALL: 242 .

THE COURT: Well, there's also -- don't I see Gorda as 232?

MR. HALL: That's not me, Your Honor. Gorda is Mr. Decoulos.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HALL: 242 would be...

THE COURT: Or 710? Is that one of yours?

MR. HALL: 710, yes.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

But the point is, what I'm getting at is, if this question of intent has to be reached to determine that question, are we looking at the same set of facts for all of them? Or are we talking about different questions of intent for different lots?

Anyone have any thoughts?

MS. ROBERTS: I'm not aware of anything which would
distinguish one lot from another once you get above 189.

I know the Appeals Court made some reference to looking at the intent on sort of a lot-by-lot basis somewhere in the opinion. But $I$ don't know that that -- in fact if the evidence would be the same for each lot.

But of course the burden's on the plaintiffs. If they think there's some difference lot by lot, I'm not aware of it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Are you all in the same boat on this issue of intent? Or is it different?

Mr. Cohen?

MR. COHEN: Well, I'm not aware of any difference of intent.

We've argued throughout, actually, that we thought 1 -- starting with 1 and going forward, all was part of the same partition; different from the Appeals Court.

So -- but if we assumed, just starting with 189 and above, that all came out of one partition, I think if we find an intent for any one lot, it probably is going to apply to all the lots.

THE COURT: Does every lot have its own access route out to a road? Or is there some kind of common driveway intent that was established in 1870?

MR. COHEN: Well, I think in 1870 none of the lots had any access --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. COHEN: -- anywhere except the few lots that happened to abut on State Road --

THE COURT: Oh, I know.

MR. COHEN: -- in existence at the time.

THE COURT: But that's what this whole case is all about.

MR. COHEN: Right.
THE COURT: -- trying to determine the intent at the time of the partition.

And therefore, was it the intent that every single lot have its own separate means of access?

MR. COHEN: Well, I would argue that there was an intent that the lots -- each lot had -- have access to, we've argued both to state Road and down to the ocean and to the cliffs on the western part, although it was not an automobile type society; the people --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. COHEN: -- were walking and riding horses and going in all directions. And access to the beach may have been much more important to the inhabitants of Aquinnah at the time than access to State Road.

THE COURT: So if you have here some -- and I'm not sure how many lots are shown, and I know the numbers go way up --

MR. COHEN: Right.

THE COURT: -- because we just talked about a 700-whatever. But this appears to be about what, 125 lots shown on this exhibit?

I don't know.

MR. COHEN: I don't know the number.

THE COURT: But the point is that would each lot, you're saying, have its own separate access?

MR. COHEN: Well, that each lot be granted access, yes.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. COHEN: I --

THE COURT: Mr. --

Go ahead, Mr. Cohen.

MR. COHEN: Your Honor, might I address or question a different issue?

I was not involved from the beginning. But my understanding of what happened historically, procedurally, was that the initial complaints and the initial amended complaints by the plaintiffs indeed only had a limited number of defendants, because the plaintiffs presumed or made some assumptions about where the most logical location for the easement would be; and that the defendants consistently opposed that and consistently insisted that every lot that could conceivably be burdened by an access
easement be brought into it.

And that is what ultimately led to the idea of bringing in the Wampanoag tribe.

And it seems to me that somewhere there was a change, because Judge Green allowed out a number of defendants on two different occasions.

I wasn't involved, but at the time it would appear that the Court made a determination that those defendants couldn't possibly be burdened by the lot (sic).

And if I understand what you're saying now is you're asking us to go back and make the same determination that the plaintiff started out making as to where we would like the easement to be, and therefore who we think ought to be the parties to this proceeding.

THE COURT: Well, after the Appeals Court decision, where else would we go?

MR. COHEN: Heh. I don't know, because the Appeals Court leaves open that if a determination is ultimately made that it burdens the settlement lands, then at that point in time, the tribe could be brought in as a party.

THE COURT: Right. But that's part of the exercise to decide what is the route; isn't it?

MS. ROBERTS: Could I interject? Just, it's always been my understanding, painful though the prospect is, that ultimately it's going to be the Court who's going to
decide, based on the evidence, where to put this easement certainly that's my reading of the Appeals Court decision because it's not based on prior use; it's not based on what's there now. A number of these lots don't even -don't abut whatever trails are through there now.

And so it's going to be up to the Court to make a decision about, based on all the evidence, about where the Court thinks this easement should go.

Which is why I've been pushing to bifurcate, because I just think that's a very knotty problem. And you're going to have each landowner coming in here, and they're going be arguing about why it shouldn't be going over their particular lot, because, you know, of wetlands or because they have endangered species, or...

THE COURT: I hear you, Ms. Roberts. But you know, it's -- the old cliche, "You can pay me now or pay me later."

I mean, eventually there's going to have to still be that determination of who's affected. Either the parties come up with it, or the Court.

And are you suggesting that if the Court finds that there was an intent to create an easement, that $I$ just listen to all of you argue about your thoughts about where the easement should be; the Court's going to adjudicate the location; and then after the fact, you know, send a letter
out, "Guess what; you've won." Heh. "The Court has selected you to be the servient estate."

The point is, somehow we have to, at an earlier stage, decide who's affected.

MS. ROBERTS: Well, that's why we have always taken the view that you need to bring in everybody: Because you don't know yet where it's going to go.

And so I mean, one of my problems with the Appeals Court decision, for example, is that if the Court adjudicates -- you know, the Court can one of two ways. It can either say, "There was an intent to create an easement," or "there was not."

If it says "there was not," then we all go home -we'll go up to the Appeals Court first and then we'll all go home.

But if the Court says, "Yes, there was an intent to create an easement; now let's figure out where it goes," and bring the tribe in - or anyone else who was not a party to that original determination that there was such an intent - those new parties are going to be able to say, "Hey, I wasn't a party to the adjudication as to whether there was this intent or not, and I demand to be heard on that before we get to where this easement is located on the ground."

And it's because of that that we have always taken the
position that everybody needs to be in at every step of the way. And if they fall out, in this case, based on the Appeals Court decision, I would say that people under lot 189 have probably now fallen by the wayside.

But other than that, I think everybody else needs to be in.

THE COURT: And who is "everybody"?
MS. ROBERTS: Well, that goes to the problem: What do you do with the tribe?

I mean, the Appeals Court apparently is of the view that you can look at other land and make a determination as to whether you can place this on other land. And it's only if you get to the point where you decide that you can't, and you need the tribe, that you would start bringing the tribe in.

But I would suggest to Your Honor that if the Court concludes that there was no intent to create an easement here -- and I think so far I'm hearing that we're all in agreement that the intent is going to be the same, whether it's lot 242 or lot -- whatever the lot, the evidence is going to be the same.

And so if we can tackle that issue -- burden is on the plaintiffs; if they don't meet that burden, then that ends this case, except for going up on appeal.

THE COURT: All right. Well, let me say that probably
the first order of business would be for me to make a ruling on this bifurcation question, giving the parties an opportunity to file their position on that.

MR. DECOULOS: Judge, before you make that, can $I$ make -- you know, you asked the question, "Who is 'everybody'?" -- in this case. "Everybody" in this case is the person that got served and filed an answer.

And if somebody got served and didn't file an answer, then he's going to be defaulted and he might lose out some rights. But the fact of the matter is, he was -- you know, we followed due process there, and I don't -- I don't understand the --

THE COURT: I understand, Mr. Decoulos. But there were certain parties who were dismissed that perhaps did answer and were later dismissed. The question --

MR. DECOULOS: I don't know why -- why were they later dismissed?

THE COURT: Well, you would have to go back and look at this file --

MR. DECOULOS: Yeah.
THE COURT: -- to look at what the procedural history is.

MS. ROBERTS: I can tell the Court that there were -the Stutz defendants; there were six or seven landowners that were dismissed based on the plaintiff's representation
that these properties didn't abut the Radio Tower Road or the Zack's Cliff Road.

That was done at a conference with Judge Green. And I made a point of saying: It's the plaintiff's burden to make sure they have everybody in here that they need; and we think they need everybody; but if they're not going to object to the dismissal, okay.

So the Court dismissed those people.
MR. DECOULOS: I think that once we find out the interests of the -- the parties who have an interest in this case, then we can determine the route that the road should be taking. Until we find out --

THE COURT: Find out what?
MR. DECOULOS: Find out where the road should be laid -- laid out.

THE COURT: And in your view, Mr. Decoulos, who makes that determination?

MR. DECOULOS: Ultimately, you.
THE COURT: All right. But that's going to based on advocacy and proposals and arguments --

MR. DECOULOS: That's right.
THE COURT: At what point in time do you think that the party with the burden of proof to establish an easement is going to suggest to the Court what those parties think the route should be?

MR. DECOULOS: I don't understand your question. MR. HALL: It was already done, Your Honor (time is $4: 10: 52 \mathrm{PM})$.

THE COURT: The parties that are seeking an easement have the burden for --

MR. DECOULOS: There's only a half a dozen of them. THE COURT: All right. So at what point in time will you be suggesting to the court what the route is?

MR. DECOULOS: Absolutely.

THE COURT: When?

MR. DECOULOS: When I find out which parties are still involved in the case --

THE COURT: And so you'd be --

MR. DECOULOS: -- 'cause that might make a big difference.

THE COURT: All right. So you're saying that you're limiting your view to those parties who are still in the case. Or -- let me rephrase.

Are you limiting your focus, as far as where you think the easement should be, and limiting to just those parties who are still in the case?

MR. DECOULOS: Yes. -- we know where we'd like to see the road. We've got a very good idea. And I want to find out, if there are any parties that are being affected by that road -- if they've been defaulted, then we go on from
there; if they've been dismissed, we'll have to understand it.

But until we get a complete picture, from the whole base once again -- 'cause it's gone all over the lot rather than staying within the confines of what happened in 1870 , and all of the roads that were constructed and laid out since that time.

So I'm not happy with saying that you should bifurcate this case until you have a very good handle on all the facts.

I mean, this thing can almost be treated as an agreed statement of facts once we get all our discovery done.

THE COURT: That I would like to see. (Mirth.)

MR. DECOULOS: Well, nobody's going to testify -THE COURT: All right.

MR. DECOULOS: -- in 1870 .

THE COURT: All right.

Before I turn to Mr. Hall...

All right, we're going to have this first threshold question $I$ have to answer, whether we're bifurcating or not.

And assuming we get over that, and we get to your issue, Mr. Decoulos, about the location of the road, when would you be prepared? How much time do you need to
identify what route you're interested in and who's affected by that route?

MR. DECOULOS: Until I find out which parties are going to be affected, $I$ can't tell you.

And like I said at the beginning, I said I'm going to create a spreadsheet; I'm going to find out who answered -who got served, who got answered; and then we can work on it.

We might be able to work our way around another lot where somebody never showed up.

So it's just a question of finding out --
THE COURT: Heh. Finding out those who've been defaulted and putting it over their lands?

MR. DECOULOS: Absolutely.
THE COURT: Okay. All right.
Mr. Hall.
MR. DECOULOS: That'll be the easiest way, Your Honor.
THE COURT: (Chuckling.)
MR. HALL: Your Honor, I believe that the plaintiffs proposed at the time of summary judgment, did propose to the Court a series of potential routes, so --

THE COURT: All right. I wasn't the summary judgment judge.

MR. HALL: No, that's true. I believe it was struck --

THE COURT: All right, so --

MR. HALL: -- I believe it was struck by Judge Green, but those routes, proposed routes, were in fact - are in fact - in the file, and they could be revived -THE COURT: Mm-hmm?

MR. HALL: -- if the Court would be so inclined. I'm not sure how far the plaintiffs went in terms of trying to engineer anything, but they did propose some routes, my recollection is.

THE COURT: All right. Well, it may not have been pertinent at the time when Judge Green was looking at it. You know, circumstances have changed.

MR. HALL: Yes.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HALL: And the other issue on the bifurcation, once more, without beating it to death too much: Just keeping in mind that this petition to partition was a petition that was basically submitted under the statute by ten landowners.

So do we look at the intent of those landowners and what lots they ended up getting? Or --

THE COURT: Well, that's the question we're not going to answer today.

MR. HALL: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Let me ask if anyone else has
any comment they want to make now on this before $I$ finish on this issue of bifurcation.

Mr. Cohen?
MR. COHEN: Well, thank you.
A comment that Mr. Hall and Your Honor just made just raised something in my mind: That if we assume that Judge Green - because of his determination of the tribe as an indispensable party - perhaps did not consider everything that was in the summary judgment record, does it make any sense to try to address some of the issues by a renewed motion for summary judgment to this Court, and then determine, after that determination, what remains to --

THE COURT: What would the scope of the issue be that you think is appropriate for summary judgment?

MR. COHEN: Well, certainly, I think the parties thought that the issue of whether easements by necessity existed or not was what was being argued before.

And I know some of the defendants argued that the Appeals Court had everything before it and should have addressed that issue, and that perhaps, you know, now - in light of the Appeals Court decision and a review of that record and perhaps some further discovery of the parties to see if there are other documents that have come to light that shed any further light on this issue - then perhaps that isn't (phonetic at 4:16:07 PM, might be heard as
"is-in") the issue of whether there -- the -- it was the intent of the commissioners, at the time, that they not create landlocked lots.

THE COURT: All right. But you're not arguing then something that's all that different than Ms. Roberts. You're saying summary judgment - the summary judgment on the legal issue of whether there was the intent --

MR. COHEN: Perhaps, Your Honor.
THE COURT: -- which is -- again, you know, you can take out one of those manuals on summary judgment, and it says that summary judgment usually is not appropriate where the intent of the parties is at stake.

But I'm also well aware we're talking about something that is 130 years old. So you're not going to get a lot of live testimony.

No, I hear you on that.

What I'm going to --

Mr. Rappaport, did you want add anything before I finish on this?

MR. RAPPAPORT: I don't, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to ask that -- I'm going to accept Ms. Roberts' proposal as an oral motion that there be bifurcation.

And I'm going to give each party who's interested here the opportunity to submit a brief on the question for or
against, and to give me your proposal by way of language for a either -- well, if it's a denial, that's easy. But if the motion were to be allowed for bifurcation, your suggestion for the language of that order, proposed -- give me a proposed order. And I will consider the competing positions of the party whether to have bifurcation or not. I'm going to be away all next week, so I'm not going to even have a chance to look at this until $I$ return. How much time do you want to submit these briefs? MS. ROBERTS: Your Honor, I have an Appeals Court brief that's due in about -- it's due May 15th. So I'm into that at the moment. If we could --
[MR. DECOULOS]: We have a report due September 8th. MS. ROBERTS: -- do it... on the other hand, $I$ don't want to hold things up. So, heh.

THE COURT: This case is 9 years old. I don't think a couple more days will hurt.

MS. ROBERTS: Okay.
THE COURT: So the thing is that you're talking about something after the 15 th of May?

MS. ROBERTS: Like May 20th? I mean, I'll return to this immediately after -- May 21st, something like that? If that's all right with everybody else? UNIDENTIFIED LAWYER: Yup. THE COURT: All right. Counsel, the 22 nd is a Monday.

If we said May 22 nd, is that sufficient time?

MR. DECOULOS: Judge, can I? I think she should reduce her motion to writing, rather than considering it as an oral motion.
"Bifurcate" is just one word. Let her follow the rules and put it in writing for the -- in the next week or ten days or two months from now.

THE COURT: Is there a rule that says I cannot accept an oral motion?

MR. DECOULOS: No, there isn't, but I think that in view of the fact that this is not, you know, an easy case, to say the very least, I think we should obligate her to put it in writing.
'Cause I don't know, she said "bifurcate." Bifurcate what? Bifurcate the implied easements? Bifurcate the location? It goes on.

MS. ROBERTS: Your Honor, I don't have a problem with that.

THE COURT: All right. You don't have to do your memo in full at the present time.

May 22nd will be the deadline for the memo, but if you could do, in a couple of pages, the motion, and send it out to the service list, and then -- because, again, I am going to stick to my rule, that if something's going to be mailed in to the Court, that we're going to use the service list.

And in that motion, I would say that you should indicate that the Court has indicated that any party that wishes to respond must do so on or before May 22.

MS. ROBERTS: Just one other sort of little glitch here, Your Honor. I would like to reach agreement with everybody here as to who we think is supposed to be on the service list. That, Your Honor, was one of Your Honor's first concerns. And I'd like to get that squared away, and then when we're all in agreement on who should be served, and then I'll go draft the stuff and serve it.

THE COURT: Well, let me say that the most recent filing by anyone was Mr. Burke. And he had a three-page service list attached to his motion -- or it wasn't even a motion. It was just a withdrawal of appearance. And Mr. Fabio had indicated that he used the attached service list for the service of the withdrawal.

So the point is: This could be a starting point, and the parties --

I want to make sure that we were giving notice to everyone who's entitled to notice. All right? So if all of a sudden we find a name here, and all of you say, "Well, let's not bother with that person," you know, I don't want it to be an elimination of anyone just because you don't want to notify them.

If they are entitled to notice, they should be
notified. And you can all work that out as to who those parties are.

MR. DECOULOS: But that's a risky move for us to take, "Let's set this person aside." So I don't want to take that move.

THE COURT: Well, that's it.

MR. DECOULOS: No, yeah.

THE COURT: I would say be overinclusive.

MR. DECOULOS: And what I want to do, as I said at the very outset, $I$ want to list every defendant that got served and answered.

THE COURT: Mm-hmm?

MR. DECOULOS: And then if they didn't give answer, then I'd like to move for a default on it. That's the only appropriate way to do it, in my mind.

THE COURT: Yep. And again --

MR. DECOULOS: And I'm going to do that.

THE COURT: -- the point is that you can work this out, but I'm not going to monitor this and referee it, because again, it's the parties who have to make sure that they follow the rules and notify those who are entitled, but if there are people who you know are not in the case for some reason -- under the rules, if they have than defaulted, they are not entitled to further notice.

MR. DECOULOS: I will move for default against them,

Judge, because $I$ want a record that's not going to later on say, "Well, I didn't get notice of it."

THE COURT: I understand. I understand.
MR. DECOULOS: Thank you, Judge.
THE COURT: Mr. Hall?

MR. HALL: Your Honor, regarding the May 22nd, date, 'cause that could pose a real burden for me.

I probably should have gone Mr. Rappaport's route and called, because I'm an expectant father, and we have a very high risk situation. My fiancee has been on bedrest for some months, and the baby is due at the end of May, but --

THE COURT: So are you looking for more time?
MR. HALL: I'm looking for more time, personally, yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Well, the thing is --
MR. HALL: I'm thinking the end of June, 'cause the baby will clearly have been born, and then we'll have had a month to deal with all the issues that are attendant to that.

THE COURT: I'm well aware that this is, you know, always an issue, usually, for plaintiffs who want to move a case along quickly, and so the thing is you're asking for the end of June?

MR. HALL: I'm asking June 25th, 24th, somewhere in that ballpark. And I know that --

MS. ROBERTS: Your Honor, may I make a suggestion that Mr. Decoulos do whatever he thinks he needs to do in order to determine who he thinks the parties are, share that with the rest of us, so that we can make sure that we're all in agreement on who that should be, who should be served in this case: Have a deadline for us to accomplish that.

And once that's been done, I will commit to have my motion and memo served on all the people that we think are still in the case, within ten days of that.

And if we could have, $I$ don't know, 30 days for -maybe 20 days for Mr. Decoulos to determine who he thinks is involved, share that with us, and give us 10 days to add or subtract to that list, and then --

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Decoulos, the issue is, are you prepared to --

MR. DECOULOS: Yes. I'll take that burden, Judge.
But I just want to make sure that -- I want to work with the most recent service list. You said some -Attorney Burke filed?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DECOULOS: We don't even know if that's even correct or not, do we?

THE COURT: That's correct. No, we don't.

But I think the last time I saw you, maybe a year ago, I think we had what we thought was a service list that we
said we should use, at that time.

But things change. And I cannot attest, sitting here, that that list was 100 percent accurate as to all those persons who had been defaulted or not.

MR. DECOULOS: Well, I'll take the task of looking at who got served and who filed an answer.

Then if somebody thinks somebody else did something else, they can speak up.

THE COURT: You can be my guest, Mr. Decoulos --

MR. DECOULOS: Thank you.

THE COURT: -- and the files will certainly be downstairs. And you can go through them as you see fit.

MR. DECOULOS: She gave me the most recent docket list.

THE COURT: Yep.

MR. DECOULOS: And there's answers filed on the docket list, so --

THE COURT: All right. How soon do you think --

MR. DECOULOS: -- I think -- and it shows service --

THE COURT: -- that you might be able to complete your task.

MR. DECOULOS: Couple of weeks.

THE COURT: All right. Let's start having some target dates then.

MR. DECOULOS: But I need their e-mail addresses so
that $I$ can confer with them, not chasing voice-mail. THE COURT: All right. All right. Today's the 25 th. If you talk about 2 weeks, let's say by Friday, May 12th? MR. DECOULOS: Make it Monday. THE COURT: Monday the 15 th.

MR. DECOULOS: Fine.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Decoulos is going to be finished and communicate with all of you -- or he's going to finish his work.

Can we then say by the end of that week that the parties resolve the issues about who should be on the service list by the 19th? Does that seem reasonable?

MS. ROBERTS: That's fine, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Then the 19 th, you try to establish the agreed-upon list.

And then by the 31st, the end of May, Ms. Roberts, you should send out your motion.

And then by June 30 we'll have the briefs from the parties on the question of bifurcation.

All right. That's the timetable. Is it all clear? MS. ROBERTS: That's fine, Your Honor.

MR. DECOULOS: I didn't get the date, Your Honor, when she's going to file the motion, Your Honor. THE COURT: She's going to file the motion on or before May 31.

MR. DECOULOS: So we've got 30 days after that. Thank you.

THE COURT: Correct. All right.

Yes, Ms. Roberts?

MS. ROBERTS: Do we need a hearing date, Judge?

THE COURT: For what?

MS. ROBERTS: For this motion to bifurcate?

THE COURT: No. Your motion is just the reduction to writing of what you've proposed here today.

And I'm going to take your briefs and, on the papers, rule on it.

All right. Is there anything else that anyone would like to raise today?

MR. DECOULOS: What I'd like to do, Your Honor, is also start with an amended complaint and give something similar to a record appendix which should be before you, the answers and everything else.

And once we get that all done, then we can be very transparent with one another as to what documents we can agree to, because those things sometimes can be a hindrance, if they're not certified; they want 'em certified.

And I'd like to have an understanding about those.

THE COURT: Well, you know, that's your decision, Mr. Decoulos, whether you want to, you know, propose an
amended complaint. It would have to be served and argued. But I'm not looking for or requiring any amended complaint today.

MR. DECOULOS: Well, I'm not talking about an amended complaint. I'm talking about getting the complaint in place. Getting the answers in place. So that we've got a record now of all the people that are involved in this case. And then get on to the facts of the case rather than all of the -- you know, let's do something substantive rather than adjective.

THE COURT: I hear you. All right.

MR. DECOULOS: Thank you.

THE COURT: Anything else, Counsel?

All right. Mr. Rappaport, from the Vineyard?

MR. RAPPAPORT: I'm intent, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Heh. All right. Then I believe the matter is finished for today. Thank you.

MS. ROBERTS: Thank you, Your Honor.

COURT OFFICER: All rise.
(Matter adjourned at 4:28:53 PM.)

## C ERTIFICATION

I, Ellen H. Dibble, an Approved Court Transcriber, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript, from the audio recording provided to me by Attorney Wendy Sibbison of the Land Court proceedings in the above entitled matter.

I, Ellen H. Dibble, further certify that the foregoing is in compliance with the Administrative Office of the Trial Court Directive on Transcript Format.

I, Ellen H. Dibble, further certify that I neither am counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this hearing was taken, and further that I am not financially nor otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

ElV. $\mathscr{A}$ GiGBV.
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Volume: I of II Day 2 of 11 Pages: 63-111 Exhibits: None

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DUKES, SS. DEPARTMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT LAND COURT DEPARTMENT

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MARIA A. KITRAS, as Trustee of *
    BEAR REALTY TRUST et al., *
    Plaintiffs *
    V .
    TOWN OF AQUINNAH et al.,
        Defendants *
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    * No. 97-MISC-238738
            STATUS CONFERENCE, POST-REMAND: MOTION TO
                DISMISS PLAINTIFFS VICTORIA AND GARDNER BROWN;
                MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF BIFURCATION;
                MOTION FOR CHANGES IN PARTIES; STATUS CONFERENCE
                ON APPROACH TO MATTER OF INTENT (CHANGES IN
                PARTIES, ETC.); ISSUES OF TIMING
                BEFORE JUDGE LEON J. LOMBARDI
            APPEARANCES (see next page) :
                    Boston, Massachusetts
                    Room 1
                    September 12, 2006
                        Ellen H. Dibble
                Approved Court Transcriber
    
## APPEARANCES:

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For: Gossamer Wing Realty Trust and Baron Land Trust
(Time is 11:10:29 AM.)
THE CLERK: Land Court Miscellaneous case 238738, Kitras versus Town of Gay Head.

THE COURT: Good morning, Counsel. If you would, please identify yourselves for the record, which is being recorded. I will start with the attorneys who are in the courtroom.

MR. DECOULOS: Nicholas Decoulos representing Maria A. Kitras, the plaintiff, Your Honor. Good morning.

MS. MORSE: Attorney Leslie-Ann Morse, representing Mark Harding and the Eleanor $P$. Harding Realty Trust.

MR. COHEN: H. Theodore Cohen. I represent the plaintiffs Gardner and Victoria Brown.

MR. LIMA: David Lima representing Thomas Seeman.
MR. SALTONSTALL: Stephen Saltonstall representing Sarah Saltonstall.

MS. ROBERTS: Jennifer Roberts representing the Vineyard Conservation Society.

THE COURT: All right. And if we could have the attorneys who are connected by telephone.

MR. RAPPAPORT: (By phone): Ronald Rappaport representing the Town of Aquinnah.

MR. HALL: (By phone): Benjamin Hall, Jr., representing Gossamer Wing Realty Trust and Baron Land Trust.

THE COURT: All right. Requests were made by the attorneys from Edgartown to do this by telephone, and I was more than willing to do that. I realize in this case we also have attorneys coming up from the cape, a lengthy distance, and I'll just say, for the record, that when possible, we will try to accommodate the travel schedules for people coming long distances.

I will say this is a case where there are so many people that it might be difficult. But I think with Verizon or Sprint or some major carrier, they have the capabilities of patching in many, many people. So I will certainly entertain the requests for those who are coming from long distances to do it telephonically.

There are times, however, where I think the proceeding is such that everyone's presence is going to be required in court. But today this is perfectly fine.

We have at least three matters before the Court today, and let me begin with the motion to dismiss plaintiffs Victoria Brown and Gardner Brown.

MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS VICTORIA AND GARDNER BROWN

THE COURT: I have a motion and affidavit on behalf of those parties. And I have an opposition that was filed by Gossamer Wing Realty Trust and Baron Land Trust.

So Mr. Cohen, if you wish to proceed on this?

And have you seen the opposition?

MR. COHEN: Yes, I have, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Perhaps -- you know, I understand your motion on its face is pretty straightforward: They've sold the land.

MR. COHEN: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And Mr. Hall raises different points in objection. Do you want to address those matters?

MR. COHEN: Well, quite simply, Your Honor, as you point out, the Browns no longer own the property in question. They sold it to the Martha's Vineyard Land Bank Commission.

THE COURT: And the question, I guess, is why shouldn't there then be a substitution?

MR. COHEN: Well, Your Honor, I think a substitution is possible, and I would think perhaps one of the other plaintiffs or other defendants ought to make that motion, or perhaps they should move to join the Land Bank Commission in this proceeding.

Mr. Rappaport's office represented the Land Bank Commission in their acquisition of the property. And I spoke with him and asked him whether the Land Bank intended to become a party to this proceeding, and he advised me that they were taking no position right now, and that it made sense for the Browns to move with a motion to dismiss to get themselves out of this proceeding, since they no
longer own the property.
I believe it would be appropriate for someone other than the Browns who are parties to this proceeding, if they wish, to bring them in either via a motion for substitution, or to try to bring them in either as a plaintiff or a defendant.

I believe the Land Bank Commission is not interested in being a plaintiff in this proceeding.

THE COURT: All right. Let me first turn to Mr. Hall.
It's your opposition. But then Mr. Rappaport's name was mentioned, so I'm going to ask Mr. Rappaport to respond as well.

Mr. Hall?
MR. HALL: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.
It's Gossamer Wing and Baron Land's position that the jurisdiction of the Court was brought over the lands, lot 238, that the Browns owned.

The Browns took the position -- moved from being defendant to plaintiff, and assumed a more self-motivated position in the case.

And the jurisdiction of Court has been invoked over these lands; there are cross-claims and counterclaims over the land; and it's our position that this case in equity is an in rem case.

Now, once jurisdiction is established over the owner
of the land, the land itself is subject to the jurisdiction of the court.

This land is -- the Court has chosen at this time to not address the issue of necessary party to the action, and instead to look at the issue of intent.

And by so doing, now we have the situation where one of the potentially necessary parties to the case walks out. And I don't think it's wise at this time to allow the Browns' land to fall outside of the jurisdiction of the Court, before the issue of necessary parties has even been addressed in a general way by the Court.

Secondly, the Browns are free to not come out to the ball game anymore. They're essentially free to sit on their hands and do nothing. They have no interest in the land whatsoever, so what do they care what happens to Court decisions in the matter? They can sit on their hands and do nothing, and the Land Bank could sit on its hands and do absolutely nothing if they so choose.

The jurisdiction of the Court I think is paramount on this land; and to let it out would be premature.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Rappaport, do you wish to be heard on this?

MR. RAPPAPORT: I'm not in a position to respond on behalf of the Land Bank?

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RAPPAPORT: But having heard what Mr. Cohen said, I must say I agree with him, that $I$ think that the Browns should be dismissed because they no longer own the property, and that if any remaining party to the case, we should bring in the Land Bank, they should do so by motion. The Land Bank can obtain whatever counsel they desire and respond to it.

THE COURT: Well, I'm also looking at Rule 25(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which says (reading): "In the case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or against the original party, unless the Court, upon motion, directs the person to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with the original party."

And I guess I would turn to those who are interested in responding on this to ask, why couldn't the Court treat this motion to dismiss as a motion to substitute the Land Bank?

Mr. Cohen, let's start with you.

MR. COHEN: Your Honor, I believe you do have the power to do that under the rule. I did not feel it was appropriate for me on behalf of the Browns to make that motion.

If I might just respond to one thing that Mr. Hall said, which was that the Browns could stay in and simply
not respond: Clearly the Browns do not wish to be part of a proceeding that they no longer have any interest in, and have no interest in, say, taking no action, defaulting, and then perhaps some judgment being entered against them, whether it relates just to the land, or whether by some reason there are monetary damages or other elements of the judgment.

They simply don't want to be subject to a judgment with regard to land that they no longer own.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Hall or Mr. Rappaport?
MR. HALL: Ben Hall. If I may?
The -- if the Court were to substitute in the Land Bank by -- upon its own motion and by order, that would be acceptable to us. We just didn't want to have the Browns leaving the case, imposing additional costs on the parties to have to serve process and essentially commence the action against the Land Bank.

We believe that since the Land Bank owns holds the property, it's subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, that they're the appropriate party to be before the court, and we have no problem if the Court were to order substitution of the new owner - or joinder - without the need to have to go through an entire new service process; that would be acceptable.

THE COURT: All right. And Mr. Rappaport, you said
you're not in a position to speak for the Land Bank today. You do not represent them in this matter. Just, if you could enlighten the Court, do you represent the Land Bank on other matters?

MR. RAPPAPORT: I do, Your Honor. THE COURT: Mm-hmm. Is there anything you wish to say or not say?

MR. RAPPAPORT: No, Judge, there isn't.
THE COURT: All right. I will take this matter under advisement and rule, following the hearing, on it.

All right. The next matter is --
MR. DECOULOS: Can I could be heard on that, Judge? THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. Yes. If anything else wishes to be heard on that.

MR. DECOULOS: Judge, we prepared a plan of the lots that we think are necessary to complete this matter. They owned lot 238, which is in the middle of the paper (indicating, paper ruffling apparently) on the right-hand side.

And as you can see, by just looking at the topography of it, it's a fairly flat lot, and maybe, maybe not, the road will go through their property if we ever get to that point in this case.

And we think that they should be involved in it. THE COURT: All right.

MR. DECOULOS: Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Decoulos.

Anyone else who wishes to be heard on this matter?

MS. ROBERTS: I would just point out to Your

Honor, 'cause it predates your involvement with this case, that on a number of instances in the ' 90 s, VCS bought out lots in this area, and the way that was treated was to substitute the prior owner for VCS.

THE COURT: Substitute VCS for the prior owner.

MS. ROBERTS: Yes, I'm sorry. Yes. Correct.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you for the background.

All right. The --

MS. MORSE: Your Honor, just raising the issue because it's bothering me slightly, if you're going to substitute -- doesn't the Land Bank deserve notice to be heard if this is going to be a motion to substitute? Or did I misunderstand?

THE COURT: Well, you didn't misunderstand. That's one of the reason why I'm taking it under advisement. I want to look at that issue.

If the motion had been brought by a party to substitute, service was to be made on the party --

MS. MORSE: Correct; I looked at ...

THE COURT: -- and there are other times -- I'm thinking of a motion to join, to join parties. Those
parties many times, in a motion to join, aren't given notice before they're brought in. You don't notify a party before you sue them. And I don't know if there's any great violence to anyone's rights if they are substituted, and if they wish to bring a motion to say, "We want out," to hear them at that time.

So I'm going to think about that, and I'm going to keep in mind this issue of whether one approach or the other is the proper one here.

MS. MORSE: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And with that, does anyone else wish to add any points?

Okay. Yeah? All right.

MS. ROBERTS: No. No. No, just -- no, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, Ms. Roberts. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF BIFURCATION.

THE COURT: Then the next matter that we'll take up is the Gossamer Wing Realty Trust and Baron Land trust motion to reconsider the decision of the Court that was dated on August 14, 2006, allowing the motion for bifurcation.

And I think all received my order which indicated that this matter typically is not one that is given oral argument, unless the court so chooses.

I emphasized just a few moments ago about looking at the new Land Court rules. This would be covered by the
rules, but $I$ did feel that where there was already planned a status conference on the case, that it would be appropriate to have oral argument.

And with that, Mr. Hall, you may proceed.

MR. HALL: Thank you, Your Honor. There are essentially two issues that we'd like the Court to take a second look at.

Of course the first is that the Court in bifurcating and addressing the issue of intent is essentially going to make a finding of fact. And with all due respect, we could find no case law to support a Court engaging in fact-finding that might affect parties beyond those that are before the Court.

And so we just go back to the fundamental law of the land, which is that parties that are going to have fact-findings put against them essentially should have the right to be heard.

And the way that the court has chosen to not engage in what we believe to be the requisite action of determining who all the necessary parties are and bringing them before the Court, that there's a jurisdictional problem that's going to arise in that people affected by the fact-findings are not going to have had an opportunity to be heard on the issue of intent before that takes place.

So we believe that the case law essentially requires
that the necessary parties be brought in first, that they're all before the jurisdiction of the court before any fact finding takes place.

The second issue, of course, is trying to set the ground rules of the law, if the Court is going to retain the bifurcation, essentially as a request for some sort of clarification.

Judge Green and the Appeals Court both, I think, alluded to presumptions of intent that arise from initial showings of a severance of the land -- unity of title and a severance of land, leaving lots without access, essentially.

And we believe that Judge Green - on the record before him, on the motion to dismiss, on the papers that are already on file with the court - found that requisite intent to be in place in this case. And so even though the case law is quite clear that it is the burden of the plaintiff to show that there was intent, that merely by showing that there was a unity of title and a severance leaving landlocked parcels, that the presumption of intent due to the necessity is in place.

And this has already been determined by Judge Green in his June 2001 decision at pages 12 to 14. He goes through quite a lengthy discussion of the presumptions of law.

And in fact now, where we are today, if the court
would take notice of the presumed intent of the parties as having been shown, that the initial burden on the plaintiff has now been shifted to the defendants to show some sort of intent to not grant an easement.

And as the Court has noted, and Judge Green noted -Judge Green noted that there was no record before him of any evidence showing that there was no intention to grant such easements by necessity.

And the condince (phonetic at 11:27:45 PM, unclear) courts noted that there couldn't be any real witness available to show that otherwise.

So in a sense, by bifurcating this issue of intent, we're almost engaging in a interesting dialogue. For what reason, it's difficult to imagine.

So I just wanted the Court, if we are going to continue down the road of bifurcation, to set those ground rules and to rule that the presumed intent is present, and that therefore the burden now has shifted to the defendants to show that there was no intent.

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to certainly turn to all the other parties, but let me just ask you generally, though, Mr. Hall: The Appeals Court certainly reviewed with great care the decision of Judge Green. And they then decided to take a different approach, to reverse the judgment, and to remand it to the Court for further
proceedings.

And there were certain paragraphs in the Appeals Court decision which indicated - from my view; and perhaps you have a different take on it - that there was certainly a couple of different tasks here. One was to determine who are the parties that would be affected by this; but also, as the Court said, that they had assumed, for lots numbered 189 or 190 and above, the intent to create easements. And they also indicated that they considered -- (reading): "The record reveals other circumstances that may render doubtful the parties' presumed intent to reserve easements."

They said (reading): "We consider relevant the historical sources of information on tribal use and common custom applicable to the time, and though by itself hardly conclusive in assuming the material's admissibility, we see no reason why common practice, understanding, and expectation of those persons receiving title could not shed light on the parties' probable objectively considered intent."

Was that not the Appeals Court saying that this is part of the task of the court: To get into the matter of intent? And it isn't just a presumption?

MR. HALL: Well, Your Honor, I don't believe they've overruled 50 or 60 cases of the Court that we've cited in
not only our memorandum opposing the bifurcation - well, maybe I'm exaggerating - but the many cases of the SJC and the Appeals Court which have essentially dictated the presumption of intent in these cases.

And once the presumption -- Orpin and Morrison is one of the -- the quintessential case that the Appeals Court cited. And that is pretty much right on point in this case: Where the actual intent of the parties, in Orpin and Morrison, only came -- there was some hearsay evidence that was produced in that case, and that only came before the Court because, even though it was hearsay, there was no objection to such evidence.

In our case, I don't believe that you'll get any witnesses to testify as to the actual intent in the case. Certainly the defendants are free --

THE COURT: Nor is the Appeals Court suggesting that.

MR. HALL: -- to search out and find any evidence of an intent not to establish an easement.

But I believe that the case law is clear, and I think that the Appeals Court decision specifically does not overrule that presumption, but asks the Court to look at the actual intent.

But it's our position that the presumption of -- once there's a sever- -- once there's the showing of a severance of a unity of title with a landlocked parcel - which is, I
don't think anybody can dispute that those are the facts in this case - that the burden then shifts to the defendants to show that there was some sort of intent not to grant an easement.

THE COURT: All right. Let me ask you this, Mr. Hall: If the issue is as clear as you suggest, why shouldn't the Court then proceed to decide the question of law?

And you may be completely correct.
Thus you're saying: This is the simple question; this is what the existing body of law would lead the Court to decide.

Then I would issue a ruling. Then we move on to the issue of... Mr. Decoulos has just presented a map - I guess I would say, a proposed access plan - showing these potential routes. And I don't know if it's been identified who the owners are of all those lots.

But then, have those parties appropriately made parties to the litigation.

At this point I don't know who owns those lots. I don't know whether those people are interested in access or not, whether they want to be plaintiffs or defendants in the case.

But I guess I go back to my earlier point, that if it's so clear, why don't we just tee up the question of: Was there the requisite intent - either by presumption or
more of an actual intent - and then move on?

MR. HALL: All right. Your Honor, thank you.

If the Court agrees with me, we still are missing -the Court has missed a step in that once you presume the intent, as a matter of law the burden shifts to the defendant to show that there was no actual intent - no intent - to grant the easement by ne- -- or to leave an easement by necessity, or access to these lots.

THE COURT: Mr. Hall, whether that's true or not, I'm still on the issue of bifurcation.

MR. HALL: That's true.

THE COURT: Why should we not settle that question one way or the other before we go through the exercise of bringing everybody in?

MR. HALL: Because the issue of intent, Your Honor, is a fact-based finding. As a matter of law, you can do the burden-shifting rulings; you can do the presumption rulings. But you can't -- if you are going to engage in that, you would have to make the finding.

Unless the Court, as a matter of law, on the record that's been established before the Court, as of today -and even the Vineyard Conservation Society in their reply brief to the Appeals Court indicated that they believed that there was no other evidence which could be presented. If the Court were to rule as a matter of law that the
presumption of intent is there and it can't be defeated, then we can move on.

But if you are going to engage in the test of whether there was some sort of actual intent, then $I$ think the Court would have to have a fact-finding hearing on that and allow other people to put in other evidence.

I mean, after all, what's before the court is a summary judgment record, and as the Court knows, that can always be supplemented, for trial, or it could be supplemented with additional summary judgment motions.

So the record --

THE COURT: Of course one of the --

MR. HALL: -- before the Court is not necessarily a complete and closed record --

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HALL: -- so there would be fact-finding.

So it's up to the Court to decide which way it's going to go on this. If we are going to have fact-finding, then I believe we need the necessary parties.

If we're going to as a matter of law make these rulings, then we don't need the necessary parties, and the Court can make those rulings.

THE COURT: Obviously, the purpose of today was to have a status conference to decide how we're going to move forward, and so that's part of the discussion that we're
going to have now.

Let me turn, on this motion, to anyone who's here in the courtroom that wishes to be heard on it, and then I'll ask Mr. Rappaport if he wants to be heard.

Counsel, anyone here wish to be heard?

Mr. Decoulos.

MR. DECOULOS: Judge, why don't we just cut to the chase right here. Let's find out if VCS or any of the active parties have any evidence that would rebut that presumption, because that's a rule of law. It's not a rule of evidence, this implied presumption.

If you meet -- as Mr....

MR. HALL: Hall.

MR. DECOULOS: -- Hall said, there's three or four elements to an implied easement by necessity. And we've met all of those elements, not because we're geniuses, but that's the facts of life in 1870.

Now, do they have anything?

Either put up, or like they say, shut up. And --

THE COURT: Well, let me just say that -- I want to give you a chance, but $I$ also wanted to go back to what Mr. Hall was saying, on the record.

Yes, it's a summary judgment record. And sometimes later decisions - whether it's the same judge or different judge - may look at it differently as the case goes
forward.

However, another option...

There are really three -- three sort of options here. One is another form of summary judgment. Two would be a trial. Or three is case stated, where the parties get together, and they say, "This is the evidence; this is what we all agree on, and we submit it on a case-stated basis."

And the Court takes it and issues what is in many instances comparable - and it is - a trial decision, where you can draw inferences from the record; you can take the full record that everyone says is complete; and there's no necessity for live witnesses in that context.

So I just want to say that that's one of the points I want to discuss with you, is the various options.

And you're suggesting, Mr. Decoulos, in your own way, that VCS would have the opportunity to put in evidence if they have it.

And that could be all part of the case-stated approach.

I recognize there may be objections raised back and forth over the evidence.

That could be sorted out.

But $I$ certainly agree with the suggestion that it's most unlikely we're going to have any live witnesses to talk about events in the 19th century.

MR. DECOULOS: Well, you know, you've taken the words out of Ms. Morse's mouth and mine. And I think it was hers more than mine.

We met last week, and she did state that, you know, this is a good case for a case-stated, to prove the en- -to come to the point as to whether there was -- whether they have any rebuttable evidence as to the presumption of an implied necessity -- easement by necessity.

THE COURT: All right. Well, then that's a segue to Ms. Morse.

Didn't mean to take away your point, but it certainly just does jump up as one of the options. So if you wish to add anything?

MS. MORSE: Are we talking about the motion to bifurcate?

THE COURT: Yes, let's go back to the motion for bifurcation and your position on that.

MS. MORSE: My position is that I'd just as soon go with the bifurcation and do the intent first. I think it's simpler; it's easier.

And I understand what he's saying, but you need to bring all the parties in if you're going to make rulings.

However, Mr. Decoulos and I did meet for quite a period of time, and we'll get into some of this later.

But I think we feel that we could bring in everybody
that we need now, and go with the intent first.

THE COURT: All right. Any other counsel wish to speak to the bifurcation issue, the motion for reconsideration, who are in the courtroom?

MS. ROBERTS: A couple of points, Your Honor.

I just don't want them to go unrebutted, the statements by Mr. Hall and Mr. Decoulos that they've come forward with evidence satisfactory to show an easement by necessity, and the burden's now on us.

I think the Appeals Court was quite clear in its decision in saying that there's no public policy favoring the creation of implied easements, that necessity alone is not enough to create an implied easement.

And when it shipped the issue back here, it stated and I quote - that "the issue is best left for the trial judge after the parties have had an opportunity to make whatever showing they wish or are able, remaining mindful that it is the proponent's burden to prove the existence of an implied easement."

So to the extent there's been any talk here this morning that the burden is somehow on our shoulders, I did not want to let pass.

We, obviously, want to have the issue of intent bifurcated, and hope that Your Honor will maintain that decision and will not reconsider it.

I do however want to point out that it's been VCS's position since 1997, oft expressed, that it's the plaintiff's burden to make sure that everybody who they need to have in this case is in this case, in order for them to get a judgment in the end.

It's not the defendant's burden. It's not VCS's burden.

What I have done over the last 9 years, though, is point out to them when I thought that they didn't have the people they needed -- we did that through two or three motions to dismiss at the very beginning of these proceedings.

And I would, as things currently stand, would actually agree with Mr. Hall that there are probably parties who need to be brought into this. I can say that almost assuredly. But again, it's not my hunt to make sure that happens.

But I did want to note for the record that it is certainly our view that not all necessary parties are before the Court at this point, and it's up to the plaintiffs to bring them in.

And in that regard I would just add one last point: In terms of the necessity of parties to be brought before the Court, it is both people whose rights will be affected because an easement - according to at least the plan we
have this morning from Mr. Decoulos - because the easement's going over their property; but it's also people all the way around that who are not in here, because it's not only prejudiced because an easement may go over your lot because you are in; it's also prejudiced because it's going over your lot because it's not going over somebody else's lot, because at least somebody else isn't (time is 11:42:47 AM) in this -- in this lawsuit.

So the prejudice needs to be not only is something going to happen here that's going to affect a nonparty negatively, but also it's prejudice because it's going to affect somebody negatively in this case because a nonparty is not in.

And that, $I$ think, clearly applies here, where an easement may go over VCS property because VCS is a party, and not - by way of example - go over the Land Bank property, because the Land Bank is not a party. Or: Not go over the tribe, because the tribe's not a party. Or any of the numerous other parties who either have never been joined in this case, or were joined and then let out. THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

MS. ROBERTS: So just to be consistent, I want it clearly understood by everybody that we don't agree that all necessary parties are before the Court.

THE COURT: All right. Let me, before I turn to

Mr. Rappaport on this, pick up where Ms. Roberts left off on this issue of parties.

I think we all agree - and the Appeals Court restated the proposition - that the party who is asserting an easement has the burden - the initial burden; and maybe the complete burden, but certainly the initial burden - to show the easement.

And I would suggest also if there's a claim of an easement, then a burden to suggest the location of the easement as well.

Now, Mr. Decoulos today has presented a plan showing various routes.

And I assume that these are, as indicated on the plan, potential easement location.

I don't know whether the suggestion is there's only going to be one, two, or all of them.

But it says "potential easement location."
I have not gone back to the initial complaint in this matter, and to see what was specifically pled by way of the easement in the claim of the location.

But clearly the Appeals Court looked at it more recently, in 2005, and said that (reading): "We pause to note that it's sometimes difficult to determine from the pleadings what owners are claiming what easements for what lots, or even what parties remain interested in the case."

There's nothing that bars the plaintiffs, now, if they so choose, to bring a motion to add parties. And that is apart from the question of bifurcation.

Clearly if we were to go to the point of deciding the intent question first, and then getting to the matter of parties, clearly at that time the exercise would have to be done to make sure that everyone is here.

But that does not stop parties from, if they wish, doing this work themselves. And it looks like Mr. Decoulos has made a major step in that direction.

The only unknown factor right now is the various lot numbers, who are the owners, which parties are in the case now and which ones are not.

Then we go to the point of Ms. Roberts: Well, the parties who are in the case shouldn't be prejudiced that it might go over their lots because it could have gone over someone else's.

There's where, I think, VCS - or those who take that position - would have to start pointing fingers at their neighbors to say, "Not us; it should be you that it goes over."

It isn't Mr. Decoulos's hunt, so to speak, as you indicate, for any of the other plaintiffs', to start speculating what other parties should have the easement go over there.

Then it's their assertion that, "Here are the locations." And they proceed against those parties.

And if someone says, "Not in my back yard; in somebody else's," well, then there would have to be further efforts to bring in other people, if you think that there's a better route going over someone else's lot.

Mr. Rappaport, do you wish to be heard on the issue of the reconsideration motion?

MR. RAPPAPORT: Very briefly, Your Honor.

The motion should be denied, because your decision clearly sets forth the reasons articulated by the Appeals Court, which for better or worse are now binding on all of us. And that there's absolutely no basis for the reconsideration motion.

And again, $I$ would point to, particularly on page 5, where you quote the burden of proof language that the Appeals Court cites; that's what we all have to live with.

So I think the motion should be denied.

THE COURT: All right. I've heard from everyone who wishes to speak on this motion?

MR. DECOULOS: Judge, can I just -- one more observation I have? Please? Thank you very much.

You know, I was just looking at the decision by the Appeals Court, and it would be nice if they stopped where it said that the United States is not an indispensable
party, because after that, that's all they did was, you know, philosophize as to whether or not these things should happen or should not happen, when we've got a body of law that says, "Look-it, you've got an implied easement by necessity if you meet all of these elements."

Thank you very much, Judge.
THE COURT: All right. Anyone else wanted to add last words?

MR. HALL: Yes, Your Honor. May I?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HALL: All right. Benjamin Hall.

Your Honor, Ms. Roberts -- I wasn't sure, when she was arguing, whether she was arguing...

I thought she was saying that we do need the necessary parties for this important fact-finding, and that we're looking -- she looked at the... she argued just how important the necessary parties were; and if the Court is going to engage in any fact-finding, whether it's on a case-stated basis or by way of a trial or by way of summary judgment, that we still or doing fact-finding. And $I$ point the Court to page 300 of the Appeals Court decision where the Court talks about: Should the requisite intent be found for some "or all" (verbal emphasis) of the petitioned common lots.

Now, I think that that language alone there would
require us to go through the process first of determining who the necessary parties are, so that we're not running afoul of due process issues. After all, people do have the right to be -- it's an inviolate right to be heard in a court proceeding where your rights are affected.

And in fact the Appeals Court does talk about that the easement by necessity question that the Court said - the Appeals Court said (apparently reading) - "requires thoughtful consideration and resolution by a fact-finder."

So inasmuch as we do have a representative group of parties and the Court were to rule on the law, I don't believe we're running afoul of the Appeals Court decision. However, if we do engage in fact-finding, I think we need to make sure that we've dotted all the I's and crossed the T's and made sure that we have all the necessary parties that would be affected by such fact-finding.

And it appears that the Appeals Court envisions this intent issue is going to look at a grouping of lots, or individual lots, on a case-by-case basis.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else?

All right. I'm prepared to say that I'm going to deny the motion today.

I know that Mr. Hall has raised some points, and raised them with great vigor. And I understand where he's coming from. But in my judgment, it seems that there's
some support for the view that the bifurcation is the proper approach.

I don't envision the process of bifurcation to entail extensive fact-finding saying that there was an easement over one lot versus another. I think that the question that's going to be before the court is one of law, perhaps to look at the circumstances - all the attendant circumstances at the time - as to whether there was the requisite intent, or whether there's just a mere presumption that controls; but is not going to be a process where the outcome of the first question on the intent is going to settle the route.

I certainly agree with everyone - and I think there's no disagreement on the fact - that as we get to the point of saying, "Well, there was the" -- "If there was the intent, now we have to establish a route," that everyone who is directly affected or perhaps potentially affected would be made parties.

That, again, is something which the parties will need to discuss now.

But clearly, if there is an avenue for review by a single justice, Mr. Hall can explore that, but it's my decision today to deny the motion for reconsideration. STATUS CONFERENCE ON APPROACH ON MATTER OF INTENT (CHANGES IN PARTIES ETC.) :

THE COURT: We will move on now to the status conference to get your views as to what is the approach that we're going to take from this point forward to have a determination of this matter of intent.

And Ms. Morse, you were about to stand?

Do you want to speak first on this?

MS. MORSE: Certainly, Your Honor, since it was my request.

And I have met with the plaintiff to see if -plaintiff's counsel, the kinter (phonetic at 11:52:53 AM, might be heard as "counter" or "Kitras") counsel, to see if we can come to some understanding on how this case goes forward. And one of the things we did was determine what lots we believe are going to be affected.

And part of the problem with this case is that in my opinion it sort of got hijacked very early on into the thing that: "Well, you need everybody in - virtually - in Aquinnah, in this case."

And I just don't think it's necessary.

My lots stand about 300 feet from Moshup Trail. I don't think there's any logic that you're going to put an easement, you know, a half a mile, so it hits Mrs. Saltonstall's property.

So I think there's going to be also a motion by us to dismiss some of the people out of this case.

That said, I believe there are two parties that need to be in this case that are not. One is the Martha's Vineyard Land Bank.

And the second one, unfortunately, is the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. There was recently a case handed down in the Appeals -- I'm sorry, in the Federal District Court. It dealt with land directly across the street, on Moshup Trail. And there was a decision that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts was an indispensable party in that case.

Unfortunately for us, the lot that they were talking about, which is 556, Moshup Trail bisected that lot. And it directly abuts my client's property. And if -- I'm not going to argue; if a federal district court judge says they were an indispensable party, I'm afraid they probably are. I've read the decision. I...

THE COURT: What was the cause of action in the federal district court?

MS. MORSE: Exactly like this. It was just done in the federal district court rather than in this court.

And they were looking for access. And they sued the Town of Aquinnah, who owns the lot. The Town of Aquinnah argued, successfully, for a motion to dismiss because they could not bring in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

I can --

THE COURT: And that's lot 556 which you say is
bisected by Moshup Trail?

MS. MORSE: Bisected -- yes.

THE COURT: And your client owns which lot?

MS. MORSE: 555 -- 554 and 555.

THE COURT: Mmm. The depiction that Mr. Decoulos has offered seems to have one of these proposed easement locations actually bordering upon but perhaps not encroaching into 556. Is that the case?

MS. MORSE: Yes, I believe so.

THE COURT: So again, I realize Ms. Roberts has this view about, you know, an easement may have an impact on other lots even though it's not on the lot. What is your position about why the Commonwealth, if -- has an interest in 556, needs to be in here if this easement actually isn't on 556?

MS. MORSE: Well, Your Honor, part of it is, I believe the case law states that you've got to bring in all abutters. That's...

And they would -- their interest is that...

The Town of Aquinnah bought this property through a self-help grant from the Commonwealth, and they retained certain rights over the property, enough that the -- for what they -- needs to remain conservation land unless there's a two-thirds vote of the legislature, and so on and so forth.

And so that's my problem. If --

THE COURT: Which body of law are you saying that would require abutters to easements having to be notified -- or to be made parties?

MS. MORSE: I believe that the whole case law regarding easements - implied easements - that you have to bring in your abutters. And unfortunately, this is one of the abutters.

I am... and I know, if -- having been successful in the federal district court, $I$ can pretty much guarantee that Mr. Rappaport - I'm sure he can speak for himself - is going to file a similar motion if $I$ don't bring in the Commonwealth. So I think that it was easier to just go ahead and do it.

THE COURT: All right. Well, let me have Mr. Rappaport respond, because it's directly on this point.

Mr. Rappaport?

MR. RAPPAPORT: Well, the difficulty $I$ have is, my memory of that case at the federal district court dealt with lands south of Moshup Trail. I had not focused on, till counsel mentioned it, that the lot may flop over onto the north side. So I'm really not prepared to respond to it.

THE COURT: Well, by the ruling that we're going to have bifurcation, and we're going to have the question of
intent on the easements decided first... as I alluded to, and now Ms. Morse has also suggested, that there may still be some changes regarding parties.

And so if that is the case, without making it a...

Well, let me just ask you: What's your intent -- and this is with all of you here; I'm not barring motions being brought to either add or dismiss parties. If the parties wish to do this, you know, that certainly could be done before the Court, you know, deals with the issue of intent.

But I guess what -- and this would actually go a long ways towards what Mr. Hall's, you know, interests and concern was: The fact that the parties are prepared to do it; you can do it.

You know, Ms. Morse, you say you intend to file motions. When are you going to file the motions?

MR. DECOULOS: Hey... wait a minute.

THE COURT: Well, now, let me turn to Ms. Morse.

MR. DECOULOS: Yeah.

THE COURT: You said you were going to file motions to dismiss parties, and you were also going to bring a motion to add the Commonwealth.

MS. MORSE: Yes.

THE COURT: Have those motions been filed?

MS. MORSE: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So when were you intending to
file those motions?

MS. MORSE: Probably within the next month.
I don't believe they're sitting again for another month, if $I$ remember correctly.

But -- I set this one up.

THE COURT: Yeah. Let me just say for the record that we're on a six-week rotation period, and during the six -on a week period I sit two weeks on motions. So you just have to consult the schedule.

So the point is -- and I'm not suggesting that I'm going to rule on them today, but I'm just saying that you can file motions. I'm sitting the week of October 9th and the week of October 23 rd on motions.

MR. DECOULOS: Judge?

Are you all done? I'm sorry. Go ahead.

MS. MORSE: Okay.
It would probably be the week of October 12th. I'm out of the state the week of October $23 r d$.

THE COURT: All right. And we have a holiday on Monday, and I'm not going to be here on Tuesday, but I think $I$ am sitting at least on the Thursday for motions in the afternoon.

Yes, Mr. Decoulos.

MR. DECOULOS: Yes, Judge. The case that was tried down at the U.S. District Court, the Commonwealth wasn't a
party to that case, and what Judge Wolf did was say:
"Look-it, the Commonwealth's got an interest in this land because they advanced this money."

THE COURT: Right.

MR. DECOULOS: So maybe the Commonwealth should -- I think she's right in bringing the Commonwealth in, but the Commonwealth might just as well say, "Look-it, we don't have an interest in it."

THE COURT: Well, they'll -- they have an opportunity to say that.

MR. DECOULOS: Yep.

THE COURT: Yeah. All right.

Anyone else want to speak on this issue that Ms. Morse has now raised about changing the parties around a little bit?

Mr. Saltonstall.

MR. SALTONSTALL: Yes, Your Honor. My client, her lot is 326. On the Appeals Court decision it's nowhere near the proposed access plan. She's separated -- she's I think about a mile away. She's separated from these lots by tribal land. It wouldn't be practical, in any event, to have some sort of easement across her land, because there's a marsh that would block access.

I spoke this morning with Mr. Decoulos and Ms. Morse, and they would be amenable to letting my client out at this
point, and I'm wondering if Your Honor would be willing to do that this morning.

THE COURT: Well, I would say that I am not prepared to rule on a motion such as that without giving others notice of it and an opportunity to be heard.

So if, you know, parties wish to file a motion and certain people join onto that motion, they can do so, but that would have to be brought separately, Mr. Saltonstall.

MR. SALTONSTALL: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Anyone else?
MR. HALL: Yes, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Hall.
MR. HALL: Thank you, Your Honor. I think the Court is bringing up - and Leslie Morse brings up - an interesting question: Again, the issue of who the necessary parties are. And if I could make the suggestion, while the Court has denied my motion for reconsideration, perhaps the Court could file a report with the Appeals Court - or request a report with the Appeals Court - on what exactly the Court is to do under these circumstances.

And I mean, obviously the Appeals Court dictated where we are, in respects; and Ron Rappaport was quite, quite, quite clear in saying: For good or for bad, we're kind of living with this Appeals Court decision.

I think it might behoove us to ask for a little
guidance from the Appeals Court. So I ask that the Court request a report.

THE COURT: I have some familiarity with reports to the Appeals Court. And I think you may know, as well, that they don't take reports easily; they're not something that they act on, on a regular basis. And it has to be a question of very significant import for them to rule on it.

I think in this matter, the Appeals Court has sent a case back with some instructions, and says it's up to the trial court. I frankly do not see that the Appeals Court would be amenable to starting to, you know, get involved in the actual case management of this matter.

So I would decline to report the case at this point. I don't think it's reportable.

Anything else on this?

All right.

ISSUES OF TIMING:

THE COURT: All right. I think what we need to do is to set a time by which, if there's going to be motions brought on the matter of parties -- and this is all of your, perhaps, interests to doing this, which you certainly, again, can, apart from the bifurcation order. I'm not saying that you can't do it, but I'm not going to make it a prerequisite that we have to settle all of the issues of parties today, or even before we get to the point
of the issue of intent, because, as I've stated previously, that the question that will be answered is a question of law on the principle of whether these easements exist.

And if the parties feel it would be beneficial to have certain specific people added now, or deleted, that you certainly can bring that to the Court's attention.

But that, as I said, does not foreclose a further examination of the question of parties at the time when we actually adjudicate and settle the actual locations.

Mr. Decoulos.

MR. DECOULOS: Judge, as to the matter of intent: There's ethical considerations in this case that people are overlooking: If you don't have a defense to something, then you ought to tell the court exactly that -- exactly that.

And I think that the defendants who are claiming that we have the burden of proof once there's a presumption...

Suppose we get by that particular point: What is their response as to the lack of intent?

THE COURT: All right. Let me just say --

MR. DECOULOS: They should tell the Court, "We don't have anything."

THE COURT: All right. All right. But hold on, Mr. Decoulos. Because we're mixing things again. We're talking about giving you a window of opportunity here to
deal with the matter of parties, and then we'll move on to the bifurcation.

But. Let's get there for one second.

It would be my view that what we should do is have a process similar to a pretrial conference where the parties are put to the task of preparing a joint pretrial memorandum, where there's going to be the identification of exhibits, you know, the issues, all of the usual requirements for a pretrial memorandum.

And usually it would list witnesses; again, I don't think we're going to have them, unless you have certain people who would be called for authentication of documents. I don't know if that's going to be an issue or not.

But the point is, in the course of putting together a joint pretrial memorandum, either for a case-stated basis or an actual trial, the parties will have to put pen to paper to be specific.

MR. DECOULOS: Why can't we then get a pretrial order today so that we can get to that point very rapidly. And I understand that you meet every 6 weeks -- you conduct motion sessions every 6 weeks --

THE COURT: No, 2 weeks in every 6; two weeks during every 6-week period.

MR. DECOULOS: Well, let's say, when can we meet in the first week in December with you? Sometime in December?

THE COURT: Well, what's your view about this matter of other parties that some people would like to --

MR. DECOULOS: Well, we can take care of that with Ms. Morse's motion in October. But I'm talking about making the parties sit down and say, "Look-it, this is exactly what we've had to do," and that pretrial order should state, "You've got to meet in October; you can't meet the week before December 1," if that's when the pretrial conference was going to be held -- just so that we can get all of these things all worked out and stop wasting everybody's time on it.

THE COURT: Ms. Morse, you're on your feet?

MS. MORSE: Yeah. I mean, December lst sounds to me awfully too fast, even if that's the course you're going to go, especially if you're going to bring in -- I mean, I know, the Land Bank, if they choose another attorney rather than Mr. Rappaport, or what the Commonwealth decides to do.

And unfortunately I think that they're both very necessary here. So I'm looking to go out further, especially if you almost are putting it together as a case stated, which is where $I$ think you're going with this.

THE COURT: Well, a lot is going to be where the parties are going with this.

All right. I will certainly consider these points and look at my calendar as far as the proper timing, but let me
start, just on this issue of any motions that may pertain to parties, that if people wish to file such motions, are you comfortable in saying that all those motions have to be in by the end of October? -- in fact should be --

I know you said you're away, the last full week of October, Ms. Morse?

MS. MORSE: Mm-hmm.
THE COURT: All right. Hold on one second.
(Pause.)
MR. DECOULOS: Ms. Morse and I agreed that we should -- she should do it before she goes on vacation.

MS. MORSE: You said you had --
MR. DECOULOS: It's not going to take much work.
THE COURT: All right. Well, as I said I'm sitting October 12th. Is there --

MS. MORSE: That's very good. It's in the afternoon.
THE COURT: Right.
But let me ask the other parties.
Are you content with having October 12 th being the date for having a hearing on any additions or deletions, substitutions, whatever, parties, before we move on to the matter of the bifurcated proceedings?

MS. ROBERTS: Yes, Your Honor.
MR. SALTONSTALL: Yes, Your Honor. MR. LIMA: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Hall?

MR. HALL: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Rappaport?

MR. RAPPAPORT: I'm on trial in the superior court in Edgartown on that day.

THE COURT: On the 12 th?

MR. RAPPAPORT: Yeah. But I'll...

THE COURT: Well, do you anticipate -- this would be at two o'clock in the afternoon. Do you anticipate your trial being involved in the afternoon?

MR. RAPPAPORT: It's scheduled to go all day the 11th and all day the 12th. I mean, hopefully it won't, and maybe I could get someone else from my office to participate.

THE COURT: Do you anticipate motions yourself?

MR. RAPPAPORT: I don't know.

THE COURT: Mm-hmm?

MR. RAPPAPORT: But $I$ think schedule it for the 12 th, Your Honor, and we'll just do the best we can.

THE COURT: All right. Then why don't we stay with
2:00 PM --

MR. HALL: Excuse me, I'm just a little unclear what's happening on the 12 th?

THE COURT: That's going to be the date for a hearing on any motions pertaining to changes of parties.

MR. HALL: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And so those motions should be appropriately marked, in advance, so that they're timely served on opposing parties and counsel, so that we can hold the hearing on the 12 th.

All right. And at that point, I'll be prepared to talk about the future deadline on this case for further filing.

In fact, let me back up. I will send a notice out before then; I think that we shouldn't wait till October 12th for me to at least establish the date for the pretrial conference. But I will look at my calendar and decide when that is going to take place.

MR. DECOULOS: You know, a pretrial conference is a wonderful thing, Judge, provided the parties want to work on it.

THE COURT: No, I heard you. And I understood that you wanted to have an earlier deadline for the parties to meet to make sure that it's fully vetted.

MR. DECOULOS: Right. Fine. Thank you very much, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else from the parties here today?

All right. With that, we've concluded -(Matter adjourned at 12:11:52 PM , to resume October 12,

## C E R T I F I C A T O N

I, Ellen H. Dibble, an Approved Court Transcriber, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript, from the audio recording provided to me by Attorney Wendy Sibbison of the Land Court proceedings in the above entitled matter.

I, Ellen H. Dibble, further certify that the foregoing is in compliance with the Administrative Office of the Trial Court Directive on Transcript Format.

I, Ellen H. Dibble, further certify that $I$ neither am counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this hearing was taken, and further that I am not financially nor otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

Glo. $\mathscr{H}$ Di CBl

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Volume: I of II Day 3 of 11 Pages: 112 - 208 Exhibits: None

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DUKES, SS.
DEPARTMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT LAND COURT DEPARTMENT

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MARIA A. KITRAS, as Trustee of *
    BEAR REALTY TRUST et al., *
    Plaintiffs *
v.
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                                    * No. 97-MISC-238738
                MOTIONS:
    MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE CHARLES D. HARDING, JR., FOR ELEANOR
HARDING (Attorney Morse)
MOTION TO ADD PARTY (COMMONWEALTH) (Attorney Morse)
MOTION OF THOMAS SEEMAN, TO DISMISS (Attorney Lima)
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS CERTAIN PARTIES (Attorney
Decoulos)
CLARIFICATION BY THE COURT AS TO MARTHA'S VINEYARD LAND
BANK SUBSTITUTION FOR BROWNS (at previous session)
MOTION OF VINEYARD CONSERVATION SOCIETY TO DISMISS
(Attorney Roberts)
GOSSAMER WING REALTY TRUST'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE LATE
OPPOSITION TO MOTION OF VINEYARD CONSERVATION SOCIETY'S
MOTION TO DISMISS AS TO LOTS 1-188 (Attorney Hall)
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS CERTAIN PARTIES (Attorney
Decoulos)
BEFORE JUDGE LEON J. LOMBARDI
APPEARANCES (see next page):
Boston, Massachusetts
Room 1
December 4, 2006

Ellen H. Dibble Approved Court Transcriber

APPEARANCES:

Nicholas J. Decoulos, Esq.
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Peabody, MA 01960
For: Maria A. Kitras, as she is trustee of the Bear Realty Trust, Bear II Realty Trust and Gorda Realty Trust, and James Decoulos, as he is trustee of the Bear II. Realty Trust and Gorda Realty Trust

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Newton Centre, MA 02459
For: Richard F. Sullivan
Jennifer S. D. Roberts, Esq.
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For: Vineyard Conservation Society, Inc.
Ronald Rappaport, Esq.
Reynolds Rappaport Kaplan \& Hackney, LLC
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For: The Town of Aquinnah
Benjamin L. Hall, Jr., Esq. (Arrives at 2:33:58 PM.)
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Edgartown, MA 02539-5155
For: Gossamer Wing Realty Trust and Baron Land Trust
(Time is 2:23:08 PM.)
THE CLERK: Good afternoon. This is Monday, December 4th, 2006. Miscellaneous Land Court case 238738, Kitras versus Town of Gay Head.

THE COURT: Now known as Aquinnah.
Good afternoon. Would all the participants please identify themselves for the record.

MR. DECOULOS: Nicholas Decoulos representing the plaintiff Maria A. Kitras, Your Honor.

MS. MORSE: Leslie-Ann Morse representing Mark Harding and the Eleanor P. Harding Realty Trust.

MS. ROBERTS: Jennifer Roberts for the defendant Vineyard Conservation Society.

MR. RAPPAPORT: Ronald Rappaport for the Town of Aquinnah.

MR. LIMA: David Lima, Thomas Seeman.
MR. MARGULIS: Thomas Margulis representing Richard F. Sullivan.

THE COURT: All right. Miss Ziter, have we heard from Mr. Hall?
(Discussion off the record.)
THE COURT: All right. He hasn't called about today. The thing is, do we know whether he's on his way or... (Discussion off the record.)

THE COURT: All right.

Has anyone been in touch with Mr. Hall? Does anyone know whether he intends to be here today?

MS. ROBERTS: No one has heard from him, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Well, it is after two o'clock, and we'll proceed. We'll conduct our business and see if he arrives. And hear him if he has any issue concerning the matters we've already dealt with.

There are a number of motions that are before me today. And I will take a couple of them first.

They are filed by Ms. Morse.

MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE CHARLES D. HARDING, JR., FOR ELEANOR P. HARDING:

THE COURT: All right. The first is the motion to substitute. I take it that the per- -- there's a couple of different spellings of his name that you have in your papers. It's Charles D. Harding, H-A-R-D-I-N-G --

MS. MORSE: Yes.

THE COURT: -- Jr.; is that correct?

MS. MORSE: That's correct.

THE COURT: All right. And this is a motion to substitute upon the death of Eleanor $P$. Harding; and he is a successor trustee to her and serves as co-trustee with Sheila H. Besse; is that correct?

MS. MORSE: Correct.

THE COURT: All right. Is there any opposition to
this motion to substitute?

MS. ROBERTS: No, Your Honor.

MR. DECOULOS: None.

THE COURT: All right. Hearing none, the motion to substitute is allowed.

MOTION TO ADD PARTY:

THE COURT: The next motion by Ms. Morse on behalf of her clients is a motion to add a party, and that is... you indicate the plaintiffs - Harding plaintiffs - say that (reading): The Commonwealth of Massachusetts holds conservation easements on set-off lots 556, 550, and 549; and the failure to add the Commonwealth may impede or impair its ability to protect its interests.

Is that correct?

MS. MORSE: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is there something you wish to add on that at all? Have you had any communication with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on this matter?

MS. MORSE: Yes, I have. I happened to be in a arbitration that lasted seven hours with the Commonwealth attorney. They agree, that they need to be a party in this case. It's just a question of bringing them in.

I had a long conversation with the assistant attorney general. He's well aware of this case, in fact, because there's another case almost identical to this case, and it
originally started in the federal district court, and the federal district court dismissed because it ruled that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts was an indispensable party, and they couldn't bring the Commonwealth into the federal system.

In any case, that brought the fact of the easements forward. And after seeing that, I didn't feel that we had any choice but to bring them into this case.

As I said, I talked to the assistant attorney general.

THE COURT: Would that be Mr. Callanan?

MS. MORSE: Yes, sir.

And he agreed that he needed to be a party, so I don't think there's any problem.

THE COURT: All right. Any comment? Any opposition to this motion from any of the participants here?

MS. ROBERTS: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And particularly Mr. Rappaport.

MR. RAPPAPORT: No, I don't, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. The motion is allowed. But let me ask you: It's interesting, Rule 24: If someone seeks to intervene, they have to bring a motion with a pleading, either a complaint or an answer showing what their defense would be.

To add a party -- all of a sudden someone's in the mix of a very involved case. And the question is, what type of
notice and what type of service do you believe is appropriate to give the Commonwealth about this action now? MS. MORSE: My thought, Your Honor, was simply, was to serve them --

THE COURT: With what? (Chuckles.)

MS. MORSE: A copy of the complaint.

Probably the second amended complaint?

MR. DECOULOS: I don't know.

MS. MORSE: And I believe Mr. Callanan will accept service on behalf of the Commonwealth. I don't see that as a problem.

THE COURT: Well, the docket -- in fact, we were trying to go through this earlier today ourselves.

Clearly the original complaint was filed on May 20th, 1997. There was an amended verified complaint filed in court on November 30, 1998.

The file has a variety of later amended complaints, which were offered but not acted upon, or denied. So I would suggest that it appears to me today that the last amendment that we see here is the November 30, 1998.

MR. DECOULOS: What docket number is that, Judge?

THE COURT: Well, this is another problem,
Mr. Decoulos, that, you know, with different systems and revisions of our computer system, it doesn't always appear to be the same number? But the one that was run off here
on November 29, 2006 indicates that would be Number 103.
MR. DECOULOS: Thank you.
THE COURT: But I wouldn't --
MR. DECOULOS: -- bet on it.
THE COURT: -- stake my life that it's going on to remain --

MR. DECOULOS: Wouldn't bet a nickel on it.
THE COURT: -- 103 in perpetuity.
All right. All right. So that motion is allowed in, and I trust that you will serve Mr. Callanan with what he needs out of this file.

MS. MORSE: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: All right. All right.
MOTION ON BEHALF OF THOMAS SEEMAN TO DISMISS

THE COURT: Next I'd like to turn to the motion filed by Mr. Lima on behalf of his clients -- the Seemans; is that correct?

MR. LIMA: That is correct.
THE COURT: Before you make any long presentation on it, I see that your clients are listed in Mr. Decoulos's motion, that those parties should be dismissed. So I would say that that's in essence what you're seeking by your motion today; is it not?

MR. LIMA: That is correct. I believe there's no opposition to it.

THE COURT: Well, that's what I'm going to ask.

Is there any opposition to the motion filed on behalf of the Seemans by Mr. Lima, that his clients should be dismissed from this action?

MS. ROBERTS: No, Your Honor.

MR. RAPPAPORT: No, we don't have any opposition to that.

THE COURT: All right. I've given everybody an opportunity to speak. No one has any opposition. Your motion's allowed.

MR. LIMA: Thank you.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS CERTAIN PARTIES

THE COURT: All right. Now we'll move on to a couple of the others, but before $I$ do so, Mr. Decoulos, on your motion to dismiss on certain parties, there was an earlier filing dated October 11, 2006, which I think was a illustration - perhaps I should call it - of what you intended to file later on. This was unsigned; it was never docketed; it was only date-stamped.

You then filed your actual original copy on October 23rd, 2006, which is your motion to dismiss certain parties. That's the motion we're dealing with; is that correct?

MR. DECOULOS: That's right, sir.
THE COURT: All right. To avoid further confusion,

I'm going to return that earlier unsigned version of the motion, just so again we try to eliminate extraneous papers when we can.

MR. DECOULOS: Heavens knows we've got 'em.

CLARIFICATION: MARTHA'S VINEYARD LAND BANK

WAS SUBSTITUTED FOR VICTORIA BROWN AND GARDNER BROWN, JR.

THE COURT: All right. Let me begin -- actually now we're down to two motions, I believe. One is the Vineyard Conservation Society's motion to dismiss. And the Kitras plaintiffs' motion to dismiss certain parties. Is that correct?

MS. MORSE: Yes.

THE COURT: Any other motions?

MR. DECOULOS: Nope.

MS. ROBERTS: There may be a -- I don't -- I may have lost track, Judge, but the motion to substitute the Land Bank? I'm not quite sure whether that --

THE COURT: That was acted upon --

MS. ROBERTS: -- that that's done? That's...
THE COURT: -- last time.

MS. ROBERTS: Okay. And if that's done --

THE COURT: When Mr. Cohen was here on that second appearance, $I$ definitely said that that was the time that the Land Bank had the opportunity to appear if it wished to be heard on that issue.

They did not. And I allowed...

MS. ROBERTS: Okay.

THE COURT: I treated his motion to dismiss the Browns as a motion to substitute; and the Martha's Vineyard Land Bank was substituted -- for the Browns.

MS. ROBERTS: So now we just have the last two motions, Your Honor, just outlined (time is 2:33:14 PM). MOTION OF VINEYARD CONSERVATION SOCIETY TO DISMISS

THE COURT: All right. And I'm going to start with Vineyard Conservation Society, on this. And also with the various motions that are here.

To clarify: You first filed one on October 6th, 2006. And then I asked that you supplement it with other materials, and so I take it that you not only submitted a memorandum on November 3rd but refiled a motion to dismiss.

So we're dealing with the same motion; is that correct?

MS. ROBERTS: Correct.

THE COURT: All right. At this point I would just note that Mr. Hall has arrived.
(Time is 2:33:58 PM; Attorney Hall now present.)

THE COURT: And Mr. Hall, we have acted upon the two motions filed by Ms. Morse to add a party, being the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, to substitute Charles D. Harding, Jr., as a co-trustee for the late Eleanor P.

Harding. There was no opposition to Mr. Lima's motion on behalf of dismissing the Seemans from this action; and I allowed that.

And we are now at the point of dealing with the motion of the Vineyard Conservation Society and the Kitras plaintiffs' motion.

Do you have any comment on any of those other motions?

MR. HALL: Thank you, Your Honor. Yes.

GOSSAMER WING REALTY TRUST'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE

LATE OPPOSITION TO MOTION OF VINEYARD CONSERVATION SOCIETY'S MOTION TO DISMISS AS TO LOTS 1-188

MR. HALL: If I may submit to the court a paper that I have with me today. It's a request for a few extra days to prepare opposition papers.

THE COURT: Didn't we deal with this before?

MR. HALL: That was on substantive -- the substantive issue of the motion to dismiss that had been filed by the Vineyard Conservation service (sic), and the Court held that they needed to go through the full-blown process of preparing a full packet of -- a full motion pursuant to Rule 4 of the Land Court.

So this is a request for more time -- to file papers.

THE COURT: All right. Let me just back up for one --

MR. HALL: I'm prepared to argue orally.

THE COURT: Heh. All right. Let me just, if I
could --

Miss Ziter, do you have the...
(Discussion off the record, pause.)

THE COURT: All right. Let me just say, even without seeing the earlier filing: We had the issue when the Conservation Society filed their earlier motion and the parties appeared, that there was a request at that time for additional time. And I believe I set a timetable for that.

Now I do read in your filing today that you had requested (reading): "Initially 40 days, but at least 30 days to prepare a opposition, being the normal amount of time allowed for the preparation of an opposition to motion for summary judgment, which if (phonetic at 2:38:15 PM, unclear word) the Court is likely to deem at least the Seeman motion, but will probably deem the VCS motion as well."

So you recognized that there was the deadline, but you indicate that for certain reasons you need additional time. Is that it?

MR. HALL: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HALL: But I'm prepared to argue orally today with respect to Mr. Seeman's motion. We only opposed the facts that he had presented, and the legal basis on which he presented, but from a procedural standpoint - I think we
discussed this the last time - we were totally in accord with letting him out of the case. We would have stipulated.

THE COURT: All right. Well, the motion is allowed, and it's over and done with.

MR. HALL: Stipulated.

THE COURT: All right. Is there any opposition to giving Mr. Hall until December 7 to file an opposition?

MR. DECOULOS: I have no opposition to that, Judge.

MS. MORSE: I have none.

MS. ROBERTS: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Hearing none, your motion for leave to file a late opposition to the VCS motion, only, is allowed. I really don't want to see a lot of additional extraneous verbiage on matters that we've already dealt with, such as the Seeman motion.

All right. Now I will turn to Ms. Roberts on her motion, and you may proceed.

MOTION OF VINEYARD CONSERVATION SOCIETY TO DISMISS

MS. ROBERTS: Your Honor, this motion is based on the prior decisions in this matter of both Judge Green in this Court and the Appeals Court judgment, which dealt with -which made certain factual findings, which we would suggest dictate that lots 1 through 188 now be dismissed from this proceeding.

And the rationale for that is the doctrine of the law of the case, Your Honor.

The facts, as found by Judge Green, as set out in his --

THE COURT: Well, let me stop you there. If it was summary judgment, a judge does not make findings of fact in a summary judgment context.

MS. ROBERTS: Well, then the undisputed facts --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. ROBERTS: -- as discussed by Judge Green and relied on by Judge Green in his decision --

THE COURT: All right. So perhaps you could hone in on, what were the undisputed facts?

MS. ROBERTS: Those facts were - found at pages 10 and 11 of his decision - were that there were three categories of land in this area of Aquinnah as a result of or during the course of the set-offs in the 1870s. And he found starting at the bottom of page 10 - the first category was land held in severalty, and determined according to the commissioners' 1871 report. And those were lots numbered 1 through 173.

The next --

THE COURT: I'm sorry. You're saying that was where? In the...

MS. ROBERTS: That's at page 10 of Judge Green's
decision.

THE COURT: Well, but that is really his discussion?

MS. ROBERTS: Correct.

THE COURT: There were numbered paragraphs which preceded that, which $I$ would take it would be ending on page 9.

Is there -- the so-called "undisputed facts," the record that you would say backs up the facts would be those facts not in dispute 1 through 17.
(Pause.)

MS. ROBERTS: I would... what I can do, Your Honor, and I'm not prepared to do it today. But what $I$ can do is pull out from the summary judgment record the various deeds on which Judge Green relied.

We submitted at the time a stack of documentation from the registry of deeds on Martha's Vineyard showing the various entities and the properties and when they had been deeded out.

THE COURT: If I could direct your attention to page 7, paragraph 12. This refers to the 1878 commissioners' report. Was the commissioners' report part of the record? The 1878 report?

MS. ROBERTS: I believe it was, but I would want to go back and check, Your Honor. It's been 5 years now, I think, since we filed that.

THE COURT: And perhaps we could...

MS. ROBERTS: Your Honor's correct in pointing to paragraph 12 in Judge Green's decision. Again, the categorization of Judge Green were lots 1 to 173; and then lots 174 to 189; and then finally in the third category was the partition of the common lands.

THE COURT: By the way, as far as the terminology that's used - and I know that's mentioned quite frequently in this case - they talk about lots 1 through 173 were "run out and bounded." And then 174 to 189 were "run out and bounded" afterwards.

What's your interpretation as far as what's meant by that phraseology? Because obviously with something from the 19th century -- it's probably pertinent to this case.

MS. ROBERTS: My understanding is that when the commissioners were delegated to do this work, they were asked to go out to the town and describe by metes and bounds the various parcels of land in Aquinnah that were then - "owned" is a sort of a loaded word in this case but that were held by individual tribe members for their own use, as distinguished from all of the land that was held in common by the tribe generally.

For example, there were cranberry lands that no particular tribe member owned but were available and used by the entire tribe. There were pasture lands that were
used by the entire tribe, that were described as being held in common, with no particular tribe member, as opposed to any other, having a right of ownership over those common lands.

In contrast to that, there were particular areas within town where individual tribe members had their home and their garden, and their -- and which was under Indian lore theirs for as long as they chose to hold it.

So the job of the commissioners was to go and identify particular land area held by individual tribe members.

And that was the start of the set-off proceeding. It was only --

THE COURT: Well, what is there in paragraph 12 or the other paragraphs that would tell me that lots 1 through 173 were owned in severalty?

MS. ROBERTS: Your Honor, you'd have to go back to the underlying documentation. And I'd be happy to do that. I'm not prepared to do it today.

There were commissioners' reports that were filed which were in the record - which were filed with the -reported back to the general court, that go on at some length about what was going on during this period. And they were relied upon by all parties - in the course of the summary judgment - for the factual basis or the historic basis of what was going on at the time.

Again, I would -- I can't tell you standing here today what the historic source is, from the summary judgment record, that Judge Green relied on in saying this in paragraph 12, but it was there, and he did say it.

THE COURT: All right. Why don't you proceed.

MS. ROBERTS: Similarly, and relying on the same materials, the Appeals Court reached a conclusion about the state of title of these lots 1 through 188 back in the 1870's. And that, as Your Honor will recall from having read this Appeals Court decision, I'm sure, many times: The Appeals Court in this case decided that they first needed to decide whether any easement by necessity could be implied at all before they got to the question of who was a necessary party to the proceedings.

And so under that, under their view, they needed to decide first, could an easement be implied.

And the Appeals Court determined that it could not be implied for lots 1 through 188, because there was no unity of title there, because for those lots they had been previously held by individual tribe members in severalty.

So they were out of the equation by the time the common lands were divided up in the late 1870's.

THE COURT: Let me ask you, for those lots that were of a higher number, above 189, what did the Appeals Court say as far as how the fact that there might be some
easements that perhaps could be proven, how that would impact on the Indian lands? What did they say -- I mean, your premise is that there would be no easements for the lower -- call it the "lower numbered lots." But there is an open question for the higher number lots.

And if there were easements for these so-called higher number lots, how did this decision deal with that question as it relates to the Indian lands?

MS. ROBERTS: Well, Your Honor, my understanding of the law of easements by necessity is that if you don't have unity of title, you can't be either benefitted by or burdened by the easement.

THE COURT: Yeah, but I'm focusing now on the unity -what would be the so-called "common lots," the higher numbered lots.

And my point is: Didn't the Appeals Court in essence say: Well, you know, if it impacts (time is 2:48:58 PM) the Indian lands, we do not think the United States is an indispensable party, and you can, frankly, deal with that problem as the issue arises -- in the future.

And my point is: If they made that sort of determination as it relates to the Indian lands and the United States not being an indispensable party, did it make any difference whether they were the lower numbered lots or the higher number lots...

This goes to the question of: Was all of the guidance being given by the Appeals Court in the central part of the decision, when there was at least part of the decision which says that: Yeah, there may be some easements that would implicate and affect the Indian lands.

MS. ROBERTS: The tribal land here, Your Honor, encompasses lots both below 188 and above 188. And so the Appeals Court -- it's my understanding what they said was that lots from 188 and down are gone, because there's no unity of title --

THE COURT: But was that --

MS. ROBERTS: For lots --
THE COURT: Well, was that --
MS. ROBERTS: -- for lots --

THE COURT: Was that an essential finding or holding of the case in reaching its determination as to what the status would be of the United States or the tribe?

MS. ROBERTS: According to the Appeals Court -- and let me see if $I$ can find the language -- they said that they wouldn't need to reach...

See if I can find it here.
On page 291 of their decision they first talk about the issue of whether the United States is indispensable, and then say, "Of course we need not reach that question unless easements by necessity may be implied for some or
all of the lots in question."
So that's why at least as the Appeals Court saw it, that was a necessary part of their decision -- foundation for their next decision: Having found that some easements could be implied, they could then go on to the issue of whether you had all the parties before you that you needed.

So based on, I think, the plain language of the Appeals Court, they needed to make that decision.

This is not dicta, if that's where Your Honor is headed.

THE COURT: It's certainly being raised in the opposition.

MS. ROBERTS: It clearly is. But I would suggest, in view of that language that $I$ just quoted to you, that it is plainly not dicta.

So I would respectfully suggest that the Appeals Court not only did but needed to reach a conclusion with respect to these lots, and its conclusion was that lots 1 through 188 lack the necessary unity of title.

It is worth noting that it was that ruling by the Appeals Court which was the sole subject of the plaintiffs' request for further appellate review to the SJC.

So it was an issue of which the plaintiffs were very much aware, that... we have copies of the request for further appellate review if it was of interest Your Honor.

It was a request that was not granted by the SJC.

And so as things currently stand, the highest ruling out of any court on the subject is that of the Appeals Court.

The relevant law is clear here. You have whatever weight you choose to give to Judge Green and his decision, and you have the weight of the Appeals Court.

In the absence of exceptional circumstance -- and I would also suggest, Your Honor, that there has been no final decision in this case, and so there are exceptional circumstances under which it would be within your power to come to some different conclusion on the issue of these lots.

But the case law is clear that those are exceptional circumstances, and that the burden would be on the plaintiff to show that there's been some change in the controlling legal authority, some substantially different factual evidence than what was presented in the record before Judge Green and the Appeals Court, or that the earlier decisions of Judge Green and the Appeals Court were clearly erroneous.

THE COURT: Again, there's many different aspects to this case, what the issues were, how they were presented, what parts it have were decided and the like.

And there was certainly, at the request of the
plaintiffs, a partial judgment - I shouldn't even call it "partial judgment"; the Appeals Court doesn't like that but a judgment under Rule $54(\mathrm{~b})$ - which in essence is a partial judgment - on the questions that were decided by Judge Green.

But the SJC in 2003 recited the established law that is within the inherent authority of a trial judge to reconsider decisions made on the road to final judgment. That's Herbert Sullivan versus Utica Mutual; 439 Mass. 387 is the cite on that particular case.

And so then, they don't indicate that it's an extraordinary matter, but it's within the inherent authority to reconsider on the road to final judgment.

But you're right; I mean, there hasn't been the final judgment, but there certainly was at least a 54 (b) judgment, at the request of the plaintiffs.

Then the question is, what were the issues that were subject to that judgment, and the record that goes along with it.

MS. ROBERTS: I can give Your Honor a couple of additional cites on the law of the case doctrine. This little case that $I$ happen to be looking at is Commonwealth versus Clayton, 63 Mass. App. 608, which says that, "The 'law of the case' doctrine reflects a reluctance to reconsider questions decided upon an earlier appeal in the
same case. An issue, once decided, should not be reopened unless the evidence on a subsequent trial was substantially different, controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of the law applicable to such issues, or the decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice."

And I have...

THE COURT: And that's where it may become relevant to know what was the record in this case.

MS. ROBERTS: I'd be happy, Your Honor, to give you the record cites and copies of the particular -- for the particular paragraph in Judge Green's decision, and the Appeals Court decision, because it's a stack of materials, and it'd be a lot to wade through it, and I'd be happy to do that for you, if that would be of assistance to the Court.

THE COURT: Well, again, we can deal with this issue at the end of today's hearing as far as any supplementation.

As we know, every time we have some supplementation, it spawns a great deal of additional work by a lot of parties. So I'm mindful of, certainly, the history here, and how long you've all been working on this case.

But, you know, you're, as you would say, "teeing up" certain matters for me, and if I'm going to deal with them
fully and responsibly, $I$ will probably need to ask you to give me the necessary supporting documentation from one side or the other on these questions.

MS. ROBERTS: If I could just add one final point, Your Honor, and then I'd be finished with my prepared remarks.

There's a two-edged sword in this case. The plaintiffs, I suspect, are pretty unhappy with this decision about lots 1 through 188. The defendants are pretty unhappy with the Appeals Court's decision about how to treat the United States and the tribe in this matter.

But we appreciate the fact - or have up until today appreciated the fact - that we're bound by the Appeals Court's decision in that, and have not sought -- have not come in here still arguing, at this level of the court, that the tribe and/or the United States of America should be brought in as a party, because we consider the Appeals Court - or had considered the Appeals Court - to have resolved that matter -- adversely to us, I might add.

But if Your Honor's indicating a different view of what the Appeals Court decision has accomplished, then we'd certainly go back and relook at it in that light.

THE COURT: And leaving aside all other aspects of the two decisions - the trial court and the Appeals Court certainly $I$ would think we could all agree that as a bare
minimum, the Appeals Court said something; and what they said was pertaining to the status of the United States and the tribe.

And I think that -- if anyone has a different view on that, certainly they can articulate that. But I think that that part of it -- that's what the Appeals Court decision was all about. The question is, how much else goes with it?, which remains to be decided.

Is there anything else you wish to add at this point, Ms. Roberts?

MS. ROBERTS: No, Your Honor. I've just --

THE COURT: Would anyone else like to be heard on the same side of the question as Ms. Roberts?

Mr. Rappaport.

MR. RAPPAPORT: I would, Your Honor. And I will be brief.

Ms. Roberts alluded to the fact that an application for further appellate review was filed by Maria Kitras as trustee of Bear Realty Trust with the $S J C$ on the issue of lots 1 through 189.

And I do have a copy -- I know -- it's a judicial notice of -- just for the use of the Court's reference, I do have a copy, if you don't mind.
(Pause; handing, apparently, at 2:59:33 PM.)

THE COURT: But can much be gleaned from the fact that
the SJC didn't grant further appellate review?
There may be a number of reasons. They may say, "Oh, sort it out at the trial court level and we'll look at it as a whole later on." And they didn't want to engage in piecemeal further appellate review.

MR. RAPPAPORT: That is entirely possible, Your Honor. It was essentially a one-word denial.

But it was a denial of both motions filed by VCS and the Town on the issue of whether the United States was a necessary party.

And the same order addressed this application for further appellate review.

THE COURT: Right.
MR. RAPPAPORT: I would simply say that the position that's being taken by the filings that are in front of you today by Bear are directly contrary to the arguments that were raised to the SJC in regards to the effect of the Appeals Court's language, particularly on page 293, where the Appeals Court found that lots 1 through 189 -- or 188 through 189 do not have easements by necessity.

And that's on page 293 of that decision.
I would just like to point to Your Honor's attention the language in the request for appellate review, on page 1 - and on two different places - where again it is stated that: The sole issue of whether the Appeals Court should
have determined that certain landlocked severalty lots had been in common ownership - again that's the first paragraph - was in error.

The second paragraph of that decision asks that that decision be reviewed by the SJC.

The end result on page 16 is they say that (reading): The result is illogical and unequal, and obviously that it will vastly complicate the proceedings; and ask that the SJC take that issue and that issue only for further appellate review.

Your Honor, the parties made choices at an earlier stage of this proceeding as to what the record was going to be, and the parties were content with that record.

And that's why it went up. That's why it went in front of Judge Green, and that's why it went to the Appeals Court: Based on that record.

The Appeals Court made a ruling on lots 1 through 189 in explicit terms, so explicit that Bear requested further appellate review on that question.

And I suggest, Your Honor, that they are bound by that. I am not happy with the Appeals Court decision. But we have to live with it. And I've said it before. I said it the last time we had the hearing. And Bear has to live with it. I mean, that's a finding by the Appeals Court.

And frankly, with all due deference, Your Honor, I'm
not saying that you don't have the power to get behind it, but to a certain extent a higher court has spoken on this question. And I think, in all due deference, Your Honor, that that is a strong statement by a higher court that these lots do not get the benefit of easements by necessity. And again, that --

THE COURT: Well, let me -- I understand what you're saying, Mr. Rappaport. The question, though, is, in your view and whatever authorities you may have to back it up, as we parse through the decision: Is it dicta, or is it essential? What's your view?

I mean, I assume you do recognize that sometimes our appellate courts put in some language which isn't absolutely essential to consider it dicta; it doesn't have to be followed at times.

How do you characterize what's in this decision?

MR. RAPPAPORT: I think, in my view, it's essential. And it's essential because that's how the Appeals Court got to the issue of whether the tribe and the United States were an indispensable party.

And they parsed through the steps to get there. And I think it's essential. And Bear thought it was essential. Because all you have to do is read their application to the SJC when they sought to have that reviewed. Now they're seeking to go in a different direction.

I'd like to go in a different direction on the issue of whether the United States is a necessary party, but I don't think that, frankly, that's open to me at this point.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else at this time? MR. RAPPAPORT: No.

THE COURT: All right. On this motion, those who want to be heard in opposition?

MR. DECOULOS: Opposition, yes.
Judge, this has finally come to a road, a fork in the road: No more procedural law; let's talk about substantive law.

Now, what did the Appeals Court say? At page 291, "The question presented by the judgment before us, then, is whether the United States, as a trustee over the settlement lands, was an indispensable party in an action seeking a declaration that certain lots in the general vicinity of the settlement lands had the benefit of ... necessity."

They said that. Not you. Not Judge Green. That was the issue.

They answered that without any ambiguity: "As we have concluded ... the United States is not an indispensable party within the meaning of rule 19 , the present claims were not properly dismissed on that basis."

That's what they said. That's the end of the
procedural problems that they've created for the last 7 or 8 years by saying that the Indians and the tribe and the United States was -- is an indispensable parties.

Now, the last time we were here, Judge, I made the maybe not solicited comment about what I thought about the decision, but I said after Roman numeral number 3, they could have stopped; we could have got rid of all of the documents that were created in this procedural morass that's what it was - and come to the conclusion that we've got to start all over again.

In fact, we're going to have to file an amended complaint, but I'm going to wait till after Ms. Morse serves them with the first amended complaint, then -because things have changed as a result of this decision. Things have changed because we found some plans down at the registry of deeds showing that common land, lots 1 through -- 174 through 189 were common land.

And then, as I said in my brief, providentially, hey, these aren't common lands anymore. You know what? Let's give some land to somebody that we know.

I don't know what they did there, but they said in their 1871 report, "This is common land." And in 5 or 6 years, they change it from common land to land that somebody belongs.

So that's going to have to be decided by you as a fact
as to whether or not in 1871, was it common land? And does it become land in severalty just because 5 or 6 years later, maybe somebody had some connections with...

Who knows what happened there? But that's going to have to be decided as a fact by you.

Now. . .

THE COURT: Well, in your view, what is the critical point in time to determine whether land was held in common or severalty? I mean, what --

MR. DECOULOS: It's the substantive part of this case.

THE COURT: No, no, no -- I know. But what -- heh.

What would the Court be looking back to? What --

MR. DECOULOS: The record.

THE COURT: You go back far enough, and I assume we're dealing with either the first charters or, again, the Indian tribe that may have owned all of it, but on the name of one person. If you go back far enough, you're going to find a claim that it was all owned by one person.

There's a point in time you look at and say, this is the time where we look at the state of the title.

MR. DECOULOS: I'm happy to say that great minds think alike, Judge. I've been preparing all of the documents that make any mention of how the Indians owned this land. There's a report on the Mashpee matter that I'm going to include, and we are going to have documents maybe from
about 1850 to $1878 . \quad$ That's the whole case.

There's nothing in -- there's some parts of it $I$ think that we're going to be asking for a change, but that's the document part of the case. And that's where all the facts are.

THE COURT: Why 1850, not 1910 versus 1880? What's the magic of one point in time or another?

MR. DECOULOS: Well, because we've looked at all these documents, and we've found that these documents are very, very important to the decision of this case. And I'm trying to get -- what $I^{\prime} m$ trying to do so that it'll be of assistance to everybody: "These are all of the documents." Just like we're now saying, "These are all the necessary parties."

If they've got some documents that are different than the ones that I'm proposing, then I'll submit it to everybody, a list of them anyway. And somebody might want to add another document to it. But that's what you're going to have to decide on, not on what they said in their dictum. That's dictum if $I$ ever saw a dictum -- or ever read dictum; I'm sorry.

So there's the three parts to the Appeals Court decision: The issue, the ruling, and then they go on telling you: Well, these are all a lot of things that you should be looking at -- the judge or the trier of the
facts.

But that's not part of the decision. Maybe you don't want to look at those facts. You've got a right to do that.

Now, I've cited in my brief, Your Honor, the case that was cited by VCS, and it was decided by Judge Kaplan, and he quotes the restatement of Better Boating Association case.

And that tells you that we didn't have a shot at trying to decide whether or not these lands were in severalty, but we've found out, since then, that they weren't in severalty, at least in our opinion, because he's calling them -- in 1871, as I said a few minutes ago, it was common land.

THE COURT: Well, again: Then it goes back to the issue that the case was decided at that stage on summary judgment. What was the record? And if the parties were unhappy with the record, they could have put in contrary evidence, which would created disputed material fact; it would not have been decided on summary judgment.

So -- I mean, again --

MR. DECOULOS: My --
THE COURT: -- Ms. Roberts has volunteered to
demonstrate to the Court what was in the record.

And then the question is, would you say that that
record was in error?

MR. DECOULOS: That record is in error. I know what was in the record, Judge, was an affidavit by James Decoulos. And he listed a lot of documents and a lot of plans, but he didn't list the 1871 plan. He maybe listed the 1871 report; and in the 1871 report they're talking about: The common lands, and what a wonderful man that the surveyor was to lay out all of these lots, number 1 to 173 , and the rest of it is common land.

No question in 1871 what the lots were: They were lots 1 through 173. Never 174 to 189. Never heard of until in 1878. That's the first time that somebody saw a lot numbered 174 .

So we've -- in our motion for summary judgment -- or our counter-motion -- I don't know; I didn't handle it. I might have but $I$-- I can't remember.

But we have a list in the motion for summary judgment, the affidavit, a list of all of the documents that were -there's a table of contents to it. And there isn't in that table of contents the 1871 plan. The 1878 (sic) plan is there, and that -- I mean, the 1871 report is there, and it says: From 1 to 173.

And I've attached a copy -- I think it's on page 24 of my report. I've got it here.

THE COURT: And what are you referring to,

Mr. Decoulos?

MR. DECOULOS: The page 24, there's a --

THE COURT: Page 24 of what?

MR. DECOULOS: Well, to my appendix, that's number 6 . This is the 1871 report, attached to my memorandum. THE COURT: You're talking about in this case now? This motion. This motion.

MR. DECOULOS: In this case -- in this motion, what I filed, all right?

THE COURT: Okay. Yup.

MR. DECOULOS: Here's what it says, the last paragraph on page 24.
"In addition to this report" - which goes on for 25 pages - "in addition to the report of the division, he most respectfully submits a map of the Gay Head lands and sectional plans of the same, on a larger scale, for the accuracy of which he is indebted to the skill of John Mullin whom we were so fortunate to secure."

I've got copies of those plans right here, Judge. I thought my client had extra copies, but they don't. And I'm going to make a set and put them in the mail to everybody, today -- once we find out who the necessary parties are. I don't want to be making the U.S. Post Office any richer than they are.

So I've got -- there's 20 sheets. I can send you the
two sheets that are pertinent, or I can send you all 20 sheets, or $I$ can send you the title page, the date it was recorded. It was recorded the same day that the deeds from lots 1 to 173 were recorded in Book 49. It was October 26th, 1871.

THE COURT: Let me ask you about your statement of facts submitted by plaintiffs in support of cross-motion for summary judgment and in opposition to motions for summary judgment of VCS et al.

Number 42 was (reading): "In 1870, all of the lots shown on the set-off plan were held in common as a result of the enactment of Chapter 213 of the Acts of 1870 , although lots 1 through 189 were claimed by individuals."

What --

MR. DECOULOS: There's an error there, 'cause in 1870, lots 174 through 189 were not in existence. And I've got the plan here to show you that it just goes up to 174.

In fact, in one of these reports, I'm pretty sure, it talks about -- and I -- you know, there's so much here. They talk about just deeding out lots 1 through 174 (sic) --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. DECOULOS: -- 173.

What $I$ intend to do, Judge, is to put this little -this booklet together, is to have - and we've worked on it,
and it's almost complete - all of the documents -- and the documents that are illegible, we've transcribed them to the best of our ability, and I want to give a copy to the Court, give a copy to my brother -- my sibling counsel (chuckles).

I learned that from Judge Bennett (chuckles).

So that we can have everything together, so that if there's any documents that are missing, I wait for the VCS to give me the documents, and we'll insert it in there, and we can all agree that these are all of the documents in this case, unless somebody else finds something else.

THE COURT: Well, that's the point. It keeps going on and on and on. And we're getting the dribs and drabs of filings.

I mean, the point is, at what point are we going to say that -- someone says, "Oh, I want more time to respond to what someone else filed," and if you're content to have this go on and on with additional filings, then $I$ suppose that's all right with me.

MR. DECOULOS: Judge, I'm content for the ultimate truth. And I know you are. And I know everybody else in this room is. And the ultimate truth lies in all of those documents that are on record at the registry of probate and on record at the registry of deeds.

And that's what $I$ would be content with. And if I
should find something else, I want to call it to your attention. And I expect to be treated fairly as I've always been treated fairly here.

So there's nothing here that's -- we're not going to have any testimony by the Indian chiefs of 1870 , or by Richard Pease or his brother. We're not going to have that. It's all documented.

And we were very fortunate. For some reason or other that sectional plan was not there when we did the title examination during the procedural part of this case.

THE COURT: Well, I think what you're alluding to, Mr. Decoulos, is you're, you know, suggesting how you intend to proceed with the trial of this case, if we get to that stage.

MR. DECOULOS: Well --

THE COURT: My earlier order still stands: That we're having bifurcation. The first issue is going to be the matter of intent, and the second is where the routes would go, where the access points would be, if it's shown to the Court and the Court rules that yes, indeed, there was the intent to create these easements by necessity.

MR. DECOULOS: I called that to your attention, Judge, the last time we were here, and you said that we're going to do this with a pretrial discovery, or a pretrial memorandum --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. DECOULOS: -- and everybody's going to agree as to what the documents are.

THE COURT: Correct. Correct.

MR. DECOULOS: So that's going to resolve it right then and there.

THE COURT: All right. But we have the -- before we get there --

MR. DECOULOS: But I'm going to ahead of myself.

THE COURT: -- Mr. Decoulos, you know, you say that we've had this fork in the road, and all the procedural questions are gone.

We have procedural issues that are before me now. And that is whether VCS's motion is going to be allowed or denied. So if you want to add anything further to what you've already said or put in writing on the VCS motion, you may do so.

MR. DECOULOS: If I was to do anything, Judge, the only thing $I$ would do for your benefit is to make a copy of the affidavit of James Decoulos, submitting it. But that's in the motion for summary judgment. You may have it there right before you.

THE COURT: You're talking about this affidavit that was bound as part of the summary judgment materials; is that right?

MR. DECOULOS: Yes.
THE COURT: I mean, well, let's make sure --
MR. DECOULOS: There's a table of contents there that reflects all of the documents that were attached to support -- that's it (indicating).

THE COURT: All right. Anyone else want to --
MR. DECOULOS: Judge, excuse me, one last? Do you mind if $I$ mail you these plans in the...

I thought we had an extra set, but we don't. So I'm going to make a copy. Do you want me to reduce them? Or leave them at this size?

THE COURT: No, just -- well, you can make another set of copies at that size --

MR. DECOULOS: Fine.
THE COURT: Don't reduce them. It'll be hard enough to read some of this --

MR. DECOULOS: I'll wait till you act on your motion for the necessary parties, so that I don't have to kill more trees.

THE COURT: All right. Does anyone else want to be heard on this motion in opposition to VCS?

Mr. Hall.
MR. HALL: Thank you, Your Honor.
Your Honor, I see the motion of Vineyard Conservation Society to have basically three factors that one should
analyze. There are three essential issues. The first is the procedural issue.

Can they move under $12(\mathrm{~b})(6) ? 12(\mathrm{~b})$ searches the pleadings. It does no more than that. They have not provided any evidence or further facts to be found in order to have this Court consider the matter to be one under Rule 56, which the Court is free to do. They've simply asked that the matter be entertained under $12(\mathrm{~b})(6)$.

The reporters to the Mass. Rules of Civil Procedure said quite clearly that it has to be made before responsive pleadings are done.

You can't raise a new defense, which this is, a new defense, by way of $\mathrm{a} 12(\mathrm{~b})(6)$ motion. It can't be done.

They should have moved to amend their answer, to raise the motion, and then sought relief by way of Rule 56. Notwithstanding, the Court's free to consider it under Rule 56.

From a procedural standpoint, I think that since they are asking the Court, under $12(\mathrm{~b})(6)$, to search the pleadings, and this Court has discussed and the plaintiffs have said that they're going to be amending the pleadings and we're expecting to get an amended pleading from the Hardings, and we clearly anticipate providing responsive pleadings to whatever amended plaintiffs pleadings come in - that it would be premature to decide this matter, at
any rate, because the pleadings really aren't yet complete enough for anyone to search the pleadings.

So we're sort of at a stage where the pleadings are where they were before the Appeals Court even reviewed this case, and after that point there were several other substantive decisions that this Court made with respect to those pleadings.

So in one sense, the VCS motion is premature, and it would be very easy for this court to deny it, with leave to renew later on, until the pleadings were complete, and then search the pleadings to see if there really was an issue, as a matter of law.

And second --

THE COURT: But the point, though, Mr. Hall, is that, as I understand the VCS motion, as far as a matter of law, the most simple approach to the VCS motion is just that their argument that the question's now settled by the Appeals Court in its ruling, and thus you don't have to look at anything. That -- I've been having colloquy with counsel about, well, what did the summary judgment record contain, things of that nature. I think Ms. Roberts or Mr. Rappaport might say, "Well, frankly, you don't even have to go there." They might suggest that the Appeals Court has answered the question definitively, and it's really inappropriate for me to look at anything, because
you have a ruling from the Appeals Court on this.

MR. HALL: Well, Your Honor, if the Court is going to look at this as a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, the Court can freely do so. There's abundant case law. And from a procedural standpoint, they chose to move under 12 (b) (6).

They could have moved under 56. They chose to move under $12(\mathrm{~b})(6)$, which leaves the court with the question: What pleadings am I searching?

You have to search the pleadings. And the pleadings talk about -- the pleadings are --

THE COURT: Well, why do $I$ have to search the pleadings?

MR. HALL: Because that --

THE COURT: I mean, I understand one approach, but there seems to be a lack of acknowledgment of the nature of the argument raised by the moving parties here: That as a matter of law -- leave aside all factual issues, as a matter of law, the Appeals Court has given an answer on part of this case.

MR. HALL: That's my second issue, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HALL: The first issue is, did they move correctly
for the relief that they're seeking? In our opinion they didn't. They should have moved under Rule 56 --

THE COURT: Mm-hmm?

MR. HALL: -- and in doing so, they would have had to comply with Rule 4 in a more complete manner. They chose to put in the filings that they did in the manner that they did.

I think that by way of that motion, they've locked themselves into that motion. You search the pleadings. The pleadings, as this Court knows, are in a sense inchoate, and remain so as a result of the decisions that have been made since the time of the last amended pleading, which $I$ think was back in... well, the last amended complaint, I believe, was in 1998.

So we have 8 years of procedure that have changed things. There's been decisions made; substantive decisions have been made. Parties have dropped out. So there's a lot to look at.

And all these proceedings have helped us all to narrow the focus and to get to where we are today.

The second issue is the issue that they've presented, which is the substantive issue is, what is the substance of the Appeals Court decision? And what weight and precedential value does it have?

Your Honor, this is a -- as the Court noted directly, and the Court very keenly honed right in on it: That in a summary judgment motion, the judge does not make any
findings. The judge searches the record - merely searches the record - for findings, and draws inferences. And there being be conflicting inferences, and there being be conflicting interpretations about things that occurred.

And those conflicts can only be resolved by a trial.

But for purposes of summary judgment, the Court draws the inferences that are in the light most favorable to the party that's opposing the motion, so in this particular case it would be the plaintiffs and -- and Hall.

So -- and other parties that opposed.

THE COURT: Although there was a cross-motion...

MR. HALL: There were cross-motions. But I believe in the case, the way that the court rendered his decision Judge Green - that essentially he looked at the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs inasmuch as he was finding against them.

So he was granting the motion of Vineyard Conservation and others that had moved for summary judgment to dismiss the case.

And that decision essentially came down to finding a predicate finding, which was that an easement by necessity, if it did exist, as of the time of the original set-off -and there were presumptions made, and made all through Judge Green's decision, where he made presumptions and he made suppositions, where he indicated that these
suppositions were -- and cited conflicting evidence and conflicting arguments.

But he realized that those suppositions didn't matter, because the way he was drawing his inferences - in the light supposedly most favorable to the plaintiffs - led him to a conclusion that didn't require that he actually rely on those interpretations.

So what he did was he said that an easement by necessity must, as a matter of law, go from the lots that are claiming the easement by necessity to a road that was in existence at the time that the lots were created.

The Appeals Court, in their review of that, basically said, "That's bunk; the necessity can change over time."

THE COURT: Was that -- was that dicta?

Was that dicta?

MR. HALL: Well, I would say that that finding is a predicate essential finding.

But I don't think we'd even need to get to the issue of dicta or anything like that, because you look at the nature of what the Appeals Court was looking at. The Appeals Court was reviewing a summary judgment record.

And there's case law out there, which I will be citing for Your Honor, that says essentially that when an Appeals Court look at a summary judgment record, that they are doing exactly what the lower court did: They're looking at
the record, and they're trying to discern the facts; they don't find any facts.

So any alleged fact-finding that takes place or sounds like it took place in the decision, is -- are facts that are found and are interpreted, and the inferences are drawn in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.

So there's no fact-finding. The Appeals Court did not find any facts; anything that they said was a mere recitation of things that they saw from the record.

Now, that record - and there's case law - can be expanded after a remand to the trial court. It can be expanded in two ways: By way of new evidence that's presented in new motions for summary judgment on other issues; it can also be presented at a trial, which the Court knows and counsel all know: That is where you resolve the inferences that are in conflict and the interpretations that are in conflict.

And this case is rife with multiple interpretations and inferences that can be drawn from the record.

Now, if you look at the record, what was before the Court, and I...

Did the Court ever get a copy of the record appendix that was given to the Appeals Court?

THE COURT: I don't think we have any sort of bound copy, but the record is going to be found throughout all
these papers; is it not?

MR. HALL: Yes, it would, but I think for the Court's ease in looking at this - and I'll see if I can disassemble mine and make a copy for the Court - it would be very handy for the Court to have two nicely bound copies of the record on appeal, because it contains most of the substantive documents.

And all the questions that the Court has asked this morning as to what was particularly in the record... well, there are several things, Your Honor, that were not in the record; and it's clear, from reading both Judge Green's decision and the Appeals Court decision, that they could not have taken heed or discerned the facts that are from three very important key items that were not presented.

The first is the 1871 report of Mr. Pease. That was based on the 1866 -- and which was also based on the 1863 statutes of the Commonwealth, which basically directed a commissioner be appointed to go and determine, find fully and finally and resolve the boundary lines of people that had claimed individual ownership of lots in Gay Head.

Gay Head originally was a plantation, when the Commonwealth became a state of the United States. And there's case law that the SJC has decided. The Coombs case I can cite, and another case called Danzell versus Webquish. They're quite old cases, but in both of those
cases, the courts have ruled that until 1871, the title of all lands in Gay Head was held by the Commonwealth.

And you have to look at the chronology of the events, Your Honor, and try to understand what we're looking at; in the 1860 's is: We're looking at a situation where the slaves were being emancipated, and there were great calls to say, "Hey, we have all these individuals that are guardians of the state, the native people; and we need to make them full citizens; they're entitled to be full citizens; we need to make them full citizens."

So a process was undertaken in a variety of ways, and several statutes occurred that emancipated and basically made the various tribes citizens of the United States. And I believe it was in 1869 that the Gay Head Indians were made citizens, with the full benefit of and subject to the laws of the Commonwealth.

Prior to that, though, in 1866, there were recognition of -- there were people that went to study what had happened in Gay Head, and how the natives were doing. And there were questions about how things were being handled, and there were a variety of reports.

And these will all, I believe, either have been put into a record before or will be added to the record.

And what they found was there were two issues that needed to be resolved. One was that there are all these
people out there that are claiming individual lots of land. And everybody's living in peace and harmony, and it was sort of aboriginal law. And this ties into: What is the nature of Indian title?, which is also kind of an important issue that plays into the decision that this Court will have to make.

And the decisions of the Appeals Court and Judge Green is that the aboriginal law - and the Appeals Court I think agreed with this - is that the Commonwealth, by deciding that it wanted to determine who all the individual persons were that occupied and claimed certain separated parcels of land under the aboriginal law, that the Commonwealth was then going to grant the fee title under those lots to those individuals. So there has never been question that the fee title of this land, up until the time that -- was held in the Commonwealth.

So if you look at this period of time, from 1863 until 1878, that 15-year period, there was sort of an elongated process of dividing up the entire town, first to those people that already were living on the land and tenanting certain portions of the land. But then they were also using certain other portions in common.

So you look at the entirety of the record, and you see that this 1871 report that followed the petition to partition under the 1870 statute; and you see that because
neither the Appeals Court nor Judge Green had that 1871 report, they were making suppositions and inferences and drawing inferences about the record that they were looking at and making and deciding issues that -- that aren't necessarily so.

So they're drawing inferences from a record that they were looking at at the time. And it was only now that we've been asked to look at this issue anew by way of this new defense being raised by Vineyard Conservation service, essentially for the first time here, that lots 174 to 189 are without the unity of title.

So the 1866 statute essentially said we're said we're going to fully and finally determine the bounds of all these lots that are going to be owned by individuals.

And they appointed a commissioner. And in 1869, the senate sent a committee down to take a look at what was going on down in the Vineyard in light of the fact that these tribal people were going to be confirmed as citizens now, and they realized that they needed to take of a number of issues, first being the issue of title to the lands and establishment of a town; and the second was to look at issues of descent that had been noted in prior reports by various other committees.

So the 1869 committee, they came down to the island, and they noted that Mr. Pease, as commissioner under the

1866 statute, was "laboring hard and had come a long way" toward resolving all the questions that needed to be determined under that 1866 statute.

In fact, ironically, the prior commissioner, who had gotten sick and died, who'd been appointed under the 1863 statute, some of his sectional plans and work were submitted in the record for the summary judgment.

And I think that's where additional confusion came about, is that the 1863 work, which was a little premature, essentially was a report of Mr. Marston to the governor, saying, you know: This is what I've got so far.

Mr. Pease was appointed under a new resolve, that essentially said: Take this work and finish it.

So in 1869, they recognized that Mr. Pease, as commissioner for the Commonwealth, was doing this work.

And they designed a new statute that became Chapter 213 of the Acts of 1870. That case essentially established the Town of Gay Head and set up this procedure for petitioning -- a petition to partition to the probate court. And in that section it allowed various tribal members -- it basically gave -- the statute gave all the common lands to the town.

Now, remember, at that point in time the individual owners had not yet been determined. So there was no determination as to who owned all these individual lots.

So at the same time as giving all the common lands to the Town, they also said: Here's a procedure where you can break up the town; you can petition to partition the probate court, and they're going to appoint a commissioner that's going to resolve the issues of partitioning the common lands; at the same time as you are partitioning the common lands, you are to also determine the individual owners of the lots that are sitting on these lands, and run out those properties and bound them, and give them good title, essentially.

So you look at the procedure. The 1870 statute comes into effect. In September there's a remonstrance to -- a petition that's actually filed by some tribal members to partition the town.

In December the Peases are appointed commissioners. Now, they haven't even finished their work under the 1866 statute. They've been appointed the commissioners to partition the town and to figure out who owns all these individual lots.

In May 1871, Mr. Pease files this report. That's the key report. That's never been put into evidence.

THE COURT: Let me just say, you obviously can discuss this at great length, and you have been. And it's helpful in some respects, but we have to keep this case in perspective, Mr. Hall: What's before the Court right now.

MR. HALL: Yes.

THE COURT: And the issue is, frankly, I think, a much more narrow one, and that is: Is the motion to be allowed or denied - of the Vineyard Conservation Society - without trying the case today on every aspect of the history.

Was the question settled or not settled by the Appeals Court? And you're suggesting it was not settled.

MR. HALL: It was not settled, Your Honor, because they were looking at simply a summary judgment record, and they could not resolve these conflicting inferences.

The case law is clear; one has to look. There are a couple of Massachusetts cases that suggest it. One called Riley that actually says it. And then you look to the federal law. Under the Rawlins (phonetic at 3:38:32 PM; Rollins 321 Mass 586 or Rollins 354 Mass 630 seem wrong?) case, you look to federal law to resolve any questions --

THE COURT: What about the claim that there's the line of authority dealing with the law of the case doctrine?

MR. HALL: Well, they never argued that in their papers. I didn't see anything about law of the case. They argued Adamowicz. And Adamowicz was based on a trial.

The cases that they cited, Your Honor, that they're relying on -- in fact, the case that was cited by Ms. Green (sic at 3:39:03 PM, meaning Roberts) at 63 Mass. Appeals Court 608, had to do with subsequent to a trial.

These are all cases that have to do with coming back after there's been a trial. We have never had a trial in this case, Your Honor. These inferences, based on undisputed facts of an inchoate record, had never been resolved.

And Judge Green, if you look at Judge Green's decision, you'll see, for instance, the Court noted paragraph 12, the commissioner's 1878 report.

Well, you can see, he never really talked about the 1871 report because he didn't really have it in front of him.

He refers to it, but he never had the 1871 report in front of him, so he didn't have the benefit of seeing what was said and how things were handled, that there was a finality to the determination of who owned all these individual lots. So.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else you want to add, at this point, Mr. Hall? Because I'm going to turn to the others, and then, as my usual practice is, give a chance for rebuttal. So --

MR. HALL: Well, we talked about the --
THE COURT: In fact, can you hold one second please.
MR. HALL: Sure.
(Off-the-record discussion to 3:40:29 PM.)
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Hall.

MR. HALL: The other issue is, Your Honor, that the two other factors that weren't in the record were that there weren't the deeds -- the Dukes County registry of deeds book and pages that showed exactly how lots 174 to 189 were assigned or allotted to the various people that they were.

And the Court has to remember that but for the petition to partition, lots 174 and above would have remained common lands, because after 1871, that final report, all questions of title were resolved on those individual lots. These people were now full citizens of Massachusetts, and any attempt for them to try to claim or grab land between 1871 and 1878 would have had to have been by way of some sort of record title or adverse possession.

They couldn't do it in seven years.

So they're full citizens at that point, and all questions of aboriginal law at that point go away.

And I don't think that James v. Watt says that that isn't the case.

So the deeds -- they were missing the deeds; there were no deeds for lots one-seventy (time is 3:41:33 PM, might be heard as 171) -- 1 to 173, and there were no deeds for 175 (time is 3:41:41 PM) to 189.

Interestingly enough, Your Honor, lot 188 and 89 were not run out, even though in the preamble to the report in

1878, which was in the record, they that they ran it out and bounded it.

But they didn't run it out and bound it.
THE COURT: And again, "ran it out" --
MR. HALL: They assigned it.
THE COURT: Well, I know what bounding is. What is "running out"?

MR. HALL: Well, my understanding is, Your Honor, that they had a chain that had links in it, and they would literally take the chain and run it down the hill.

THE COURT: That's one explanation of it.
MR. HALL: But that use of that language is not consistent between 174 and 189. 189 -- 188 and 89 were actually to Zaccheus Cooper, and it's acknowledged that only portions of those two lots were actually part of the land that he was supposed to get before, but he didn't really get.

And another lot was assigned to the heirs of so-and-so, not -- but run out for the heirs of somebody.

And it's interesting, because here were these commissioners, under new authority of the probate court, who had already filed a final report as to severalty.

So: These issues were never before the Appeals Court. They didn't look at them. They couldn't find facts. They couldn't make any -- they couldn't draw any inferences from
them. And the trial court, back here, is where all these inferences that can be drawn have to be resolved.

There are many inferences that can be drawn.

My discussion of all the facts that are involved in these various reports and the time line, it's critical to understand that there are many inferences that can be drawn, not just the ones that Judge Green drew in his decision.

And he pointed out that even -- in footnote 19 and 20, he pointed out that there were suggestions as to separate ownerships, and he talks about: A most likely interpretation of the historical records.

Well, he's making interpretations. There are other interpretations that could be made. And --

THE COURT: All right. Well, Mr. Hall, you've asked for additional time post-hearing to submit something in writing. I've given you probably twice as much time as you would have ever had up in the Appeals Court to argue. And at this point I'm going to turn to the others. I'll give you an opportunity for a quick response afterwards. And I'm sure you'll be putting some comments in writing post-hearing.

All right. Ms. Morse.
MS. MORSE: Your Honor, I don't have a horse in this race. My lots are considerably higher.

THE COURT: Fine. Then $I$ think that's enough. Anything else want to be heard on opposition? Then if not, anything from the Vineyard Conservation Society or the Town?

MS. ROBERTS: Just, the only thing I'd add here, Your Honor, is that we've taken the position from the get-go certainly $I$ have on behalf of VCS, the Vineyard Conservation Society - that it's not fair for the plaintiffs to name VCS as a defendant and draw a line on a map that goes over VCS's property to get them to a road, and not bring in other people in the area over whose property you could also draw a line on a map and get to the road.

So it's always been, from our point of view, sort of a fundamental fairness: Why should we be the ones to bear the burden of litigation and ultimately of an adjudication of a road over our property? Why aren't other people, who have properties around here, in that hunt as well?

THE COURT: How is that relevant to your motion?

MS. ROBERTS: Because the one thing that $I$ think we can say as of today is that we now have a rationale for dropping out lots 1 through 188 from this case. We've taken the position, consistently, from the beginning, that everybody should be in.

But now, based on the Appeals Court decision, it
seems - and we've obviously argued - that lots 1 through 188 should no longer be in this case.

That being said, should Your Honor choose to deny the motion, I would just like it to be on the record that that does impact our view about who necessary parties are.

If in fact the Appeals Court didn't decide lots 1 through 188 should be gone from this, then we would consistently with the position that we've taken for the last 8 years or so - say: Then fine, then everybody needs to be in. I just wanted to make that point to Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Decoulos? Anything further?

MR. DECOULOS: I have nothing else to add.

THE COURT: All right. But let me -- I failed to ask you a question, though, when you were on your feet before.

Do you have any comment to Mr. Rappaport's argument concerning the relevance of the application for further appellate review and the position taken by the plaintiffs before the SJC?

MR. DECOULOS: No, I...

I haven't read it, so I can't give you an exact, any comments. But $I$ will read it, and I'll report back to you, Judge. In fairness to my client --

This is something that they just raised. I mean, there's a motion to dismiss and now we're getting into
appellate review and -- I don't know. Are they bound by an application for appellate review? Are those admissions on the part of...

Is he trying to say that your application for appellate review is an admission that lots 174 through 189 are no longer in this case? I haven't read it, so I don't know what they said.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. DECOULOS: But will you give me -- I'll take a look at it, and -- give me 5 -- I can do it, you know, within 5 or 6 days.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I'm not sure if...
MR. DECOULOS: Or maybe we can take it up on our pretrial memorandum. That might be more appropriate.

THE COURT: Yeah, I think -- you know, I want to make sure that we limit to what's the most critical filings after this hearing, and I don't think that that's going to be necessary for you to file, or anything in writing on this particular question.

MR. DECOULOS: Thank you, Judge.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Hall?
MR. HALL: Three very brief points, Your Honor.
First, any representation that the Appeals Court said that lots 1 through 189 could not benefit by easements by necessity - or other easements - is simply misstating what
the Appeals Court said.

They said -- the way I read it is that they could not be "burdened" by an easement by necessity. That doesn't mean they couldn't "benefit" from one.

So under either -- under that reading of it, a close reading of their decision, that leaves open the question of if these lots do benefit from an easement by necessity, or other type of easement -- there being another type of easement that has not yet been argued in this case, that I'm sure we'll be hearing from; it's in the Restatement (Third), section 2.12, Servitudes Based on Prior Use -which would clearly apply to all these lots which were tenanted and occupied by people that eventually became lots 1 through 173.

That -- those issues will need to be adjudicated by the Court. But again, they're not yet in the pleadings, and so we need to amend the pleadings to clarify that, I think, as needed.

The second issue is FAR.

There is an SJC case that says that you cannot put any weight whatsoever on the fact that $F A R$ was denied. They denied it. All the arguments that went into it have no substance whatsoever. There's no -- there potentially could be some judicial estoppel, but it's not a fact-finding type of argument.

So just because one poses an argument on FAR, the SJC has ruled that their denial of $F A R$ is to say nothing about the merits of the case whatsoever. It goes back down to the Appeals Court.

And the last thing I'd like to say, Your Honor, is: Ms. Roberts made a comment that they feel that they are being unduly and unfairly burdened by having these roads run over their properties.

Well, if that's the case, why are they trying to get lots 1 through 189 dismissed out of the case when possibly the roads could go over those lots?

So there's an incongruity there, that I don't understand.

MR. DECOULOS: Just one comment about what he just said.

The sectional plans show roadways going through common land, through land that was conveyed in 1870. They show roadways there. And what I'm going to have my client do is enhance these plans so that they can be looked at and make some sense out of them.

And I'm going to have him place them in an index something similar to the assessor's maps. So we'll have an assessor's map, literally, of 1870, showing houses; they show houses; they show points of beginning for the surveyors to work from.

So that's a very valuable set of plans, Judge, and I want to put it in a form that's going to make -- almost makes -- well, not as good as a registration plan, but at least so that you've got something you can hang your hat on if you decide which way you're going to decide on this.

THE COURT: All right. Well, that's a submission for later in these proceedings.

MR. DECOULOS: I understand. I just want to make the Court aware that there were roadways that go through common land and the severalty land. Thank you.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS CERTAIN PARTIES (again)

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Decoulos, while you're on your feet, I'm going to turn now to your motion, which is the...

MR. DECOULOS: Necessary parties?
THE COURT: That's correct. Motion, actually, "to dismiss certain parties" is the way it's captioned.

But I also want to go back to the point in time that Judge Green issued his decision in 2001 - because I take it that his decision was based on what the pleadings were at that time - and identify the plaintiffs and the defendants.

And now you've, you know, said certain ones are necessary. Others are not. And we'll go through those.

But I also find in Judge Green's decision here that certain people are identified and are not addressed in your
motion one way or the other.

And let me go through them with you. Beginning with South Shore Beach Incorporated.

MR. DECOULOS: They're not -- they don't own the land anymore, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, what happened to them as a party? I mean, the point is, they were a party, so do you put them on your list of parties to be dismissed?

MR. DECOULOS: So -- I'll look that up, Judge.

MS. MORSE: Your Honor, I believe Vineyard Conservation Society bought out that property.

THE COURT: Heh. And this is going to be a little bit more informal for all of you, because, you know, we've got to have some dialogue here, and -- because otherwise the rigidity of oral argument on this motion is going to be become very awkward.

All right. South Shore Beach, Inc., Ms. Roberts, is it your understanding that your client now owns the land that that entity had title to, and was -- that's the reason why they were named as a defendant?

MS. ROBERTS: It is, Your Honor. And I actually gave Mr. Decoulos, a month or so ago, a list of all of my comments on his motion, and his various parties, because the last version I saw, some of the lot numbers were wrong and there were some other issues.

I didn't bring my handwritten notes of that with me today, but --

THE COURT: All right. But then --

MS. ROBERTS: -- VCS does now own that particular property.

THE COURT: But -- all right, just out of my curiosity, when you're listed - your client is listed both as necessary party defendants and parties to be dismissed, I think, are you -- do you have any land he says to be dismissed as to you?

MS. ROBERTS: (No audible response at 2:23:08 PM.)

THE COURT: And the answer is no.

So I guess then the South Shore Beach, Inc. lot would be one of the ones identified under "necessary party defendants" with the name of Vineyard Conservation Society.

Does that sound right?
MS. ROBERTS: It should have been, but I don't know whether it was.

THE COURT: All right. So we can delete South Shore Beach, Inc.

Hope Horgan.

MR. DECOULOS: Pardon me?

THE COURT: Hope E. Horgan, who is listed as a defendant.

MR. DECOULOS: I don't know anything about that. The
only thing I've got going on -THE COURT: Helen S. James.

MR. DECOULOS: I'll check these out for you. Horigan? THE COURT: Donald Taylor.

MR. DECOULOS: Wait a minute. Donald -- I didn't get the one before Donald Taylor.

THE COURT: Helen S. James.

MR. DECOULOS: Can I have the lot numbers, Judge?

It'd make my j-- --

THE COURT: No.

MR. DECOULOS: No?

THE COURT: Because I don't have them.

MR. DECOULOS: Okay. Helen S. --

THE COURT: I mean, this is -- look. I made a photocopy of the first page of Judge Green's decision. I crossed out those names that you address one way or the other. There are left a lot of parties who are being ignored. So if we're going to start to all of a sudden say that I'm allowing your motion as far as dropping certain defendants, I'm assuming these people are still in the case if you haven't moved that they be deleted.

MR. DECOULOS: I'd like a copy of that, Judge. (Mirth.) THE COURT: This is my work product, Mr. Decoulos. (Mirth.)

MR. DECOULOS: No, but that's -- this isn't discovery. This is turning-back (phonetic at 3:55:23 PM, unclear; laughter) -- we've got a dialogue going here.

THE COURT: Take good notes, and I'll give you the names.

MR. DECOULOS: Well, so far I've got South Shore, and the second one was...

THE COURT: Hope E. Horgan, $H-O-R-G-A-N$.

MR. DECOULOS: And then I've got Helen S...

THE COURT: James.

MR. DECOULOS: Janes?

THE COURT: James, J-A-M-E-S.

MR. DECOULOS: Yep.

THE COURT: Next, Donald Taylor.

MR. DECOULOS: Donald, pardon me?

THE COURT: Taylor.

MR. DECOULOS: Taylor.

THE COURT: The heirs of Wallace E. Francis.

Estate of Edwin D. Vanderhoop. And I understand there's a lot of Vanderhoops, but they're all Leonard Vanderhoop that's on your list. So this is Edwin D. Vanderhoop.

Patrick J. Evans. There's a Beverly Evans and a Lawrence Evans on your list but not Patrick J.

Julie B. Hoyle, $\mathrm{H}-\mathrm{O}-\mathrm{Y}-\mathrm{L}-\mathrm{E}$.

And if someone sees that I'm putting someone on this list that really is covered by Mr. Decoulos's motion, please let me know.

The next one is Carmella Stephens, trustee of Deer Meadow Realty Trust.

MR. DECOULOS: Carmella Stephens?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. DECOULOS: What's the trust?

THE COURT: Deer Meadow Realty Trust.
MR. DECOULOS: Thank you.
THE COURT: Stella Winifred Hopkins, AKA Winifred S. Hopkins.

MR. DECOULOS: I didn't get the name of the first name of the second party.

THE COURT: It's the same person. It's Hopkins. It's Stella Winifred Hopkins, AKA Winifred S. Hopkins.

MR. DECOULOS: Thank you.
THE COURT: Heirs of Esther Howwasswee.
Heidi B. Stutz.
And I know there are a couple of other people with -I'm sorry. Skip that one. It's on the list.

The estate of William Vanderhoop.
Wilma Greenberg.
Selma and William Greenberg are accounted for, but not Wilma.

Rolph, $\mathrm{R}-\mathrm{O}-\mathrm{L}-\mathrm{P}-\mathrm{H}, \mathrm{Lumley}$.

MR. DECOULOS: Lumley?

THE COURT: Lumley, L-U-M-L-E-Y.

And lastly, Aurilla Fabio.

MR. DECOULOS: Aurilla?

THE COURT: Fabio, F-A-B-I-O.

MR. DECOULOS: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: And I'm not making any comments whether they should be in or out. I'm just saying you need to account for them, which your motion, you know, go-...

I'm assuming, again, with the recitation of when the complaint was filed, and an amended complaint, that the amended complaint and the identification of parties is what was the basis for Judge Green to list the parties in his decision.

Now, let me begin by just asking, is there any opposition to Mr. Decoulos's motion, keeping in mind that VCS would like to have all the owners of lots be dismissed from 1 to 188 or 189?

MS. ROBERTS: We just want it clear on the record, which I'm sure it is, that we reserve the right to argue that there are necessary parties absent. But with that -we've been saying that for 7 or 8 years now, so.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. RAPPAPORT: Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Rappaport.

MR. RAPPAPORT: I think the motion is fundamentally untimely.

MR. DECOULOS: I cannot hear you.

MR. RAPPAPORT: I'm sorry.

MR. DECOULOS: I'm sorry, Judge.

MR. RAPPAPORT: I say I think the motion is fundamentally untimely. It's being brought by a party who is one of the parties who is sought to be dismissed under the issue of whether or not the Appeals Court knocked out 1 through 188 or 189.

That's number one.

And if the Court says yes, they should not be out, then this has been a motion brought by a party who's -who's gone from the case.

Second, it's -- and we're all in a funny position here, 'cause some of the parties seeking to be knocked out are sort of the lots of the towns.

So I'm not arguing (chuckles) -- I'll be glad if the Town will be gone from the whole case.

But it seems like we're doing this backwards. I understand the desire to streamline. But it seems like we first -- we've bifurcated the case. Is there an easement by necessity at all? If there is, where's it located?

And by knocking out any parties now, they're not
around. If it's determined that there is an easement by necessity to be located on the ground, they're not going to be around to be subject to where an easement may be located.

THE COURT: Well, but the plaintiffs are giving up their claim to an easement by necessity over these lots. Are you suggesting that they should have an easement by necessity over some of these lots that they seek to dismiss?

MR. RAPPAPORT: No, I'm suggesting they should have...
I think they shouldn't be...
I think the Court's going to find there aren't going to be easements by necessity at all.

But let's put that aside for a moment.
These are where the plaintiffs - if they prevail and meet their burden that there should be easements by necessity - would like to see these easements located.

But it seems like it's going to be up to all the remaining parties to say, "We don't think they should be located there; we think, in fact, they should go north. We think" -- I mean, and then the Appeals Court has left that out (phonetic at 4:02:10 PM, could be heard as "open").
"We think they should go right out through the tribal land."

And it's left open. If that's what can be shown, that
this Court can then deal with the tribal issue at that time.

So we're subtracting before we've even determined whether phase one - namely, should there be an easement by necessity at all - we're eliminating.

Again, when it comes to the Town, no problem with any of the town lots being let out (chuckles).

But I don't really think that the process is served by this exercise.

THE COURT: Well, the point is that in prior hearings we discussed this, had some oral argument on it. And it really came with the motion to bifurcate.

I did allow the motion, but Mr. Decoulos, I believe, was the one who suggested that he could assist by starting to narrow the scope of who would be still in the case, since it does not preclude a party, as Ms. Roberts had suggested, from later on, bringing a further motion to bring people in on the question of the location of the easement.

If the Court finds that there is no easement at all, then the whole thing goes away for everybody.

If I find there is an easement, then it really becomes a very live issue whether it's the routes suggested by Mr. Decoulos or other parties saying that no, we think it should go in a different area, and thus we need to bring in
some additional parties.

But it did seem to be worthwhile to perhaps simplify this matter by not having a lot of extra, extraneous parties that no one had any desire whatsoever to affect.

Let's take the Seemans as an example. I mean, why keep them in the case when it's all agreed that there's not going to be any route that goes over their property?

MR. RAPPAPORT: Well, $I$ was in agreement of letting the Seemans out of the case, because frankly, they were 189 and below. So that is a, heh, consistent position.

When you get above 189, I really -- I think we're all struggling here: How do we simplify... how do we simplify and streamline the case.

And I don't want to keep anybody in and force them to carry the burden, but it seems like the same people are the ones who choose to show up time after time. No one else does. And I guess I question whether or not this is an exercise that we're all going to regret later on.

MR. DECOULOS: Judge, can I say something?
THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DECOULOS: He may be right. The sectional plans show roadways and houses that we weren't aware of when I filed this motion.

And as I told you, I want to enhance that plan and I want to see where those roadways are going, and they might
be going right through the Town of Aquinnah property for all I know, but that's an 1870 plan, and $I$ don't want to give up any rights that we might have had in 1870.

THE COURT: Are you withdrawing your motion?

MR. DECOULOS: No.
(Mirth.)

MR. DECOULOS: I want you to wait. Please.

THE COURT: Oh, you would like me to wait? (Mirth.)

MR. DECOULOS: Yes.

THE COURT: That I probably can accommodate you on. (Mirth.)

MR. DECOULOS: Thank you.

THE COURT: How long would you like me to wait,

Mr. Decoulos?

MR. DECOULOS: Well, I'm going to ask my client how fast we can get an enhanced plan to show a road -- the road network in 1870 as it relates to the set-off plans of 1871 and the set-off plans of 1878.

THE COURT: All right. I will defer action on this until I receive something in writing from you, Mr. Decoulos, with service on the other parties, indicating what your intent is on this.

And clearly, if you're going to be submitting new information, I would give other parties an opportunity to
be heard on that, either on paper or, you know, in oral argument, depending upon what it is you want to submit.

I would also say to the other parties who are here that it would certainly -- it's not required, but it would certainly be helpful if they could meet to try to identify whether there's any sort of consensus as to whether there seems to be some other area that might be implicated in this exercise, or not.

But I do stand by the earlier ruling on the motion that we are going to first decide the question of whether, as a matter of law, the easements exist for the benefit of certain lots at all.

And then we can decide, based on your evidence, as far as whatever that evidence may be, as to where that area should be, and to see whether the existing parties are in the case.

And so I will defer on this last motion. MOTION OF VINEYARD CONSERVATION SOCIETY TO DISMISS (again)

THE COURT: On the matter of the VCS motion, I want to go back to that as far as what additional filings the parties may make on this.

Ms. Roberts, you said that you would like to -- if I'm correct; and I don't want to suggest for you, but I think you suggested that you would like to identify for the Court what pertinent parts of the summary judgment record were
before the Court when Judge Green issued his decision. Is that correct?

MS. ROBERTS: Yes, Your Honor. Let me just clear something up here.

Maybe we should put this all in abeyance, leave everybody in who's in, have an adjudication whether an easement was intended or not, and if you find that one was not intended, then that will end this.

My concern is that if you find that an easement was intended, and at that point there are arguments -- and we've let out a bunch of people now; and after you adjudicate that, you're hearing from me and Mr. Rappaport that, "Well, it isn't fair to run this over our property; you should bring in this party and this party and this party," they're going to rightly be saying, "Well, hey, we didn't have the opportunity to be parties to the adjudication of whether an easement was intended or not, so we should be allowed to re- -- essentially relitigate that before we get to the particular road."

So --

THE COURT: I think that was Mr. Hall's position.
MS. ROBERTS: It was Mr. Hall -- and I was going to say, it's one of the few times and Mr. Hall and I actually agree with each other.

And as this has played out, I've become --

MR. HALL: This is what I've argued in opposition to the bifurcation all along, was that --

MS. ROBERTS: Well, it's --

MR. HALL: -- why don't we determine who the parties are first, figure out where the roads could possibly go, determine who the parties are, and then --

MS. ROBERTS: Well, that's not what I'm suggesting. What I'm suggesting is, let's figure out whether an easement was intended or not. And once we get over the intent issue -- if there was no intent, we can all go home. And if you find that there is an intent, then we get into, where is it going to be.

THE COURT: But aren't you just saying that if you -if the Court determines there was an intent, then you're going to find potential routes, and thus you may need to bring people in who want to argue whether there was intent or not.

MS. ROBERTS: What I'm saying is that if we let people out now --

THE COURT: Mm-hmm?

MS. ROBERTS: -- and then the Court finds that there was an intent for an easement and we then go to the issue of where the routes are, Mr. Rappaport and I may well be arguing that people who are let out today should be back in, because the route should go over their property.

And they will then be saying, "Hey, but it wasn't fair to us because we didn't get to be part of the adjudication of whether an easement was intended or not."

So maybe the thing to do here is leave everybody in, adjudicate that issue of intent. If there was no intent, then we all go home. And if there is intent, then we can all start fighting over who should be in and who should be out based on both where the plaintiffs say the route should be and what the defendants say the alternate route should be -- which is also the long way of saying maybe we should put both my motion and Mr. Decoulos's motion on hold until that issue's been resolved, the issue of the intent.

THE COURT: Well, on May 20th of next year is the tenth anniversary of this case, and I would certainly hope that the parties can get together and come up with a uniform roadmap as far as how you want to proceed with this case in this court, because I'm constantly getting these alternative ideas of procedure, and then it keeps evolving as we talk about it, that $I$ see shifting positions on this.

I'm going to give you an opportunity after this hearing to see if you can come up with a consensus on how you want to proceed. You have articulated one approach, and I'm sure some other parties have a different idea, but at least to talk about it to see if you can come up with an idea.

But failing an agreement, then, you know, I'm going to deal with the matters that are before me, which, obviously, are these motions that are here today.

But keep in mind that whoever's going to be the moving party on this question of intent, so to speak, can get going and file papers. I mean, we haven't had any filing yet as far as who's the moving party going to be on this bifurcated question.

But in between we've had all the other discussions about parties.

I will say one thing: That if $I$ do go forward on the VCS motion and the Kitras motion on the question of parties, I'm not foreclosing the idea of bringing other parties in if that's necessary.

I would look quite askance though at a request to bring someone in in the future who's being dismissed by these motions. I guess the point is, speak up now or forever hold your peace. As far as if you think that there's a reason why you wouldn't want someone dismissed because of a potential implication, you know, now's the time to say, "Okay, we agree to twelve of them but we object to these three because it's a possibility that they might be right in the path of a route," whatever it may be.

So let me go back to what $I$ said before about filing. If you want to file some...

Unless I hear that you've all agreed that the matter should be stayed for a period of time - if I don't have that by the end of the week, Friday, an agreement on staying the matter - then $I$ would say that, Ms. Roberts, you can submit to the Court an identification or copies of -- I hate to say copies of the record, but I think Mr. Hall's point was well taken that he has altogether there the record, and --

MS. ROBERTS: We all do, Judge.

We all have the appendix. So what $I$ can do is make a copy of the appendix for you, and give you designations of where it's found in the appendix.

THE COURT: All right. All right. And you're comfortable that the record appendix for the Appeals Court is as far as $I$ would have to look, as opposed to going back to any other summary judgment materials?

MS. ROBERTS: If it's not, then -- I'll have to look. I'd be surprised if it wasn't.

MR. DECOULOS: And --

MR. HALL: It would be all that the Appeals Court looked at, Your Honor, so.

THE COURT: Right.

MS . ROBERTS: No --

THE COURT: No, I understand. I understand. And then, Mr. Hall, if in your response to the VCS motion, if
you want to comment on what you think are omissions, fine, but I don't expect you to submit all the paperwork now, on this. I don't want to see reports and plans and a whole new set of filings.

The point is: What was the record? And you can say, "Well, the 1871 report wasn't there," whatever. You can identify what wasn't there, but I don't want you to submit it at the present time. Do you understand?

MR. HALL: I do, Your Honor, except you're kind of boxing me in now, because now I'm not able to show the inferences, the multiple inferences that can be - could be - drawn. That would --

THE COURT: That isn't the nature of what's before me right now --

MR. HALL: But I think it -- it has --

THE COURT: -- and I don't intend to turn this into a trial right now. I'm dealing with this motion, which should be fairly straightforward, and either you have, you know, good grounds that can be articulated in a straightforward fashion, or you don't.

And I'm not going to be trying the whole case by virtue of a response to this motion.

I'm also going -- because if we are going to look at this in sort of a summary judgment fashion: Moving party files first; you have an opposition, and then a reply to
the opposition.

Because you (indicating) didn't file on time, I'm going to give the moving party the opportunity to file a response if they wish to your filing. And that's it. No more sur-replies or anything beyond that, to the filings by VCS .

And so, I'm going to say, Ms. Roberts, you can submit your materials by a certain date. When could you get it in?

MS . ROBERTS: Ah...

THE COURT: Assuming there's no agreement that you're all going to stay matters for whatever reason.

MS. ROBERTS: Is two weeks too long, Your Honor? If you're looking for... what works for -- what would you like, Judge? What would you like?

THE COURT: Yeah, well, no -- I mean, two weeks is fine, but $I$ just want to make it clear that I'm going to extend the time for Mr. Hall to file an opposition, so that he can respond to what it is you've filed.

I want you to present to the Court a complete package. You've given me what you have now, as of today. And you're going to supplement it.

Then I'm going to give Mr. Hall an opportunity to file a response to that.

And then I'll give you an opportunity to file a reply
to what Mr. Hall has sent in by way of an opposition.

MS. ROBERTS: All I'm going to be doing, Your Honor, is giving you copies of the records from the summary -from the appendix. So that's...

MR. DECOULOS: She doesn't need two weeks for that, Judge.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. ROBERTS: Well, as I understand it, we're waiting till Friday to see what we work out among ourselves, and then -- so I'm get --

MR. DECOULOS: Work out what? The names of the parties?

THE COURT: No, it's more than that. It's an overall strategy of whether you want to come to an agreement that yes, it makes sense, leave everything in the status quo by way of parties, and go forward and settle this question up or down on the question of intent.

And if you want to do that, fine. All the issue about adding and deleting parties is put in abeyance.

MR. DECOULOS: I have no problem staying that, Judge. What I'm concerned about is if she's waiting two weeks to file just the appendix, there's no need for that.

You have it in front of you anyway. You've got the motion for summary judgment. But be that as it may, the appendix is ready to be mailed in to you tomorrow. I've
got copies of that.

THE COURT: All right.
[MS. MORSE]: Okay. Do you have any problem staying on these motions?

MR. DECOULOS: I have no problem staying this, Judge. THE COURT: All right. I'm going to let you -- you're going to discuss that. Assuming that there's no stay agreed to by the end of the week, then let's say Wednesday the l3th, get your appendix in, all right?, what it is you want to submit.

And Mr. Hall, I'll give you one week until the 20 th to file an opposition.

And Ms. Roberts, if you so choose or anyone else wants to file a response to that: By the 27 th of December. All right?

Counsel.

MR. MARGULIS: May I speak on behalf of my client?

Richard Sullivan owns a very tiny lot. He's been in the case for 10 years. And year one I said to, I don't believe it was you but your partner? I said to him, "Here's my client's lot; here's where you are; what could you possibly want? We'll give it to you."

He said, "No, we don't want anything."
"Good," I said, "Let's dismiss it."

He said, "Sure, we'll get to that."

I don't want this matter stayed. I came here today because $I$ finally saw a motion which said clearly that this lot can't possibly impact the Kitras land, and I was delighted to see that some sense was coming about and we were going to dismiss my client. And now you're saying, well --

THE COURT: Is he on the -- is your client on the list?

MR. MARGULIS: Richard F. Sullivan. I just don't know the lot number, but it is as remote from the Kitras land as you can get. And $I$ was hoping to come home and tell them, call them up, charge them some outrageous fee -- I'm actually doing this for nothing because he's a friend of mine -(Laughter.)

THE COURT: Lot 329.

MR. MARGULIS: -- and tell him, "Guess what, you're dismissed; we don't have to"...

We have a pile of paper just like you do, that he's trying to keep.

So I would not agree to a stay on this. I'd like this motion to dismiss my clients acted on.

THE COURT: Lot 329, according to Mr. Decoulos's submission...

MR. MARGULIS: Lot 329 is down-this-way (phonetic at

4:20:02 PM , sounds of map rustling).
(Pause.)
THE COURT: Is there any agreement -- I mean, we just had, basically by agreement, to release the Seemans from this litigation. Any comment regarding the Sullivan parcel?
(Discussion off the record.)
MS. ROBERTS: I don't even know where it is, Your Honor. I mean, we'll certainly look at it.

THE COURT: Well, I think I've just located it. (Pause.)

THE COURT: Why don't the interested attorneys come to sidebar?
(On the record discussion at sidebar at 4:21:18 PM.)
MR. MARGULIS: So I'm here. And where's Kitras et cetera?

THE COURT: Well, on this map...
Here, as I understand it, is Bear Realty Trust; Brian Hall, trustee, Baron Land Trust. These were many of the lots on your plan that you submitted --

MR. DECOULOS: Yes.
THE COURT: -- saying that these were necessary parties, defendant and plaintiffs.

And now Ochs, Fruchtman, and Fruchtman are right over here. So as I'm looking at it, this whole thing is a
subset of this area down here (indicating).

Mr. Sullivan's up there (indicating).

Again, the-involved-is (phonetic at 4:22:02 PM, unclear), here's Ochs --
[MR. DECOULOS]: I-didn-t (phonetic at 4:22:01 PM; could be heard as "I can" or something else) see that at-all (phonetic).

THE COURT: Well, I know you can.
[MR. DECOULOS]: (Indiscernible at 4:22:11:PM), I mean, (indiscernible) things (indiscernible).

MS. ROBERTS: Our position at the Appeals Court was always that the only road in the area the-ten (phonetic at 4:22:16 PM) set-off was State Road, which runs to the north of all these properties, so the most logical way to the north.

THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

MS. ROBERTS: So to the extent that the (indiscernible at 4:22:32:PM, paper rustling)is telling me that (indiscernible) extend the road for Old South Road, which is where (indiscernible at 4:22:44 PM)this properties borders.
[MR. DECOULOS]: (Indiscernible, muffled at 4:22:43 PM.)

THE COURT: Don't cover the microphone.

UNIDENTIFIED LAWYER: No, I'm not.

THE COURT: This one, by the way, is a little easier to read. It's not quite as dark.

UNIDENTIFIED LAWYER (aside?): (Indiscernible at 4:22:57 PM.)

THE COURT: So what are you saying, Ms. Roberts?

MS. ROBERTS: I guess I'm saying that at the end of the day, if you find that there's a -- that there was an intent to create an easement, then I can pretty much guarantee that VCS will be arguing that the way goes north, and on whether it goes over the tribe land and/or hooks up to Old South Road or state Road, that will be where it will be headed.

THE COURT: Mr. Decoulos.

MR. DECOULOS: This is -- I never describe (phonetic at 4:23:28 PM). I don't know if that's going to be the ultimate (indiscernible at 4:23:33 PM).

There's roads going all the way through all over the place here. I don't know if it's going through his land or not now. I just don't know.

That's just one plan.

THE COURT: Mmm?

MR. DECOULOS: So. In order to properly put it before you, we had to show this, you know, plan, which, I guess, as it related to the set-off. If you can just be a little bit patient.
[MR. MARGULIS]: Oh, we've been patient.

MR. DECOULOS: I know you have. A little bit more. (Mirth.)

MR. MARGULIS: I would simply ask then that you take it under advisement, and not -- I would not be wanting to be a party to any agreement at this stage (phonetic at 4:24:10 PM).

MR. DECOULOS: Well, we don't -- we don't want you in there. But I just found these plans just recently, so that's changed my outlook on the case.
(The lawyers and judge leave the table where the map was spread out and return to their microphones.)

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. And I'll certainly agree that the matter is under advisement at the present time.

And I will either rule on the motion regarding the Sullivan lot or continue to defer until I hear from Mr. Decoulos as to his intent there.

Also I'll be waiting to receive the papers regarding the VCS motion. And I do hope, in the interests of your economy, your clients' wallets, as well as the Court's time, that you can come to some agreement as to how best to proceed.

You know, I think that, you know, it's been a
situation for a decade now of running in circles about this case, and I mean, the time has come to let's figure out the best way to resolve this case. And I know, no matter which way I rule, it's going to go back up again. So we'd better keep that in mind too.

MR. HALL: Your Honor, may I address a point about the parties?

You asked a question about the heirs of Esther Howwasswee?

THE COURT: No, I didn't ask. I just said that it was listed --

MR. HALL: You said that they were not addressed.

THE COURT: -- and Mr. Decoulos had not addressed it.

Is it your suggestion that that lot is now owned by your clients, who are already parties?

MR. HALL: Well, Baron Land -- we moved for
substitution and are mentioned (phonetic at 4:25:55 PM; could be heard as "in our mention") for lots 242 and 177.

THE COURT: Right, the land that you purchased after the time of decision of Judge Green.

MR. HALL: That's right.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. HALL: So what we -- we asked to be intervened and substitute. The Court denied it based on the status of the case at the time.

Would the Court entertain renewing that motion and allowing it so that we can have parties for those lots, because it -- otherwise it's still the heirs of Esther Howwasswee. And they -- a citation was published, and obvi- -- nobody came forward.

THE COURT: At this point, Mr. Hall, all I can say is you can file it --

MR. HALL: Okay.
THE COURT: -- and see what sort of response you get from your fellow "siblings."

MR. HALL: Okay.

THE COURT: The --

MR. DECOULOS: You like that, huh?
(Mirth.)

THE COURT: One... the one...

Oh, I know what it was. Martha's Vineyard Land Bank Commission was - you say - it's listed as a necessary party defendant, Mr. Decoulos, as the owner of lot 238.

MR. DECOULOS: That's the one --
THE COURT: And also 569.

They were never on the docket of this case --

MR. DECOULOS: Yup.

THE COURT: -- at the time of Judge Green's decision. Nor do they even appear on my radar screen until the Browns sold their lot to the Land Bank Commission. And that was
lot 238.

So I don't know whether, in a sense, they've ever -except for getting notice of the motion to substitute, I don't know if they've ever been served or were really parties to this case.

MR. DECOULOS: Their lawyer is right here, Judge (indicating).

THE COURT: Well, he has no appearance for the Land Bank Commission.

MR. RAPPAPORT: I'm not representing the Land Bank on it. I know that they were given notice of the motion to add. I do not know whether or not they were ever served with any complaints. I don't know.

THE COURT: Yeah. I mean, because as necessary party defendants, if $I$ were to allow this motion, and say they're a party defendant because of their ownership of 238 and 569, I think that may be news to them because they've never been served in that capacity.

MR. HALL: Your Honor, I think that was -- that was my point when I opposed the Browns being let out of the case, because now you are substantively letting the lot outside of the jurisdiction of the Court.

And I didn't think that serving the motion on them was going to effectuate a safe (phonetic at 4:28:36 PM) effective service of process for purposes of an
international-case (phonetic at 4:28:38 PM).

THE COURT: They were substituted for the Browns. They were -- they're in the case as the owner of lot 238. And in effect now, they're in the case --

MR. HALL: In rem.

THE COURT: You know, and then you have those other lots.

But look, if the Vineyard Land Bank Commission wants to raise some sort of objection, they can do so.

But I'm just alerting you, Mr. Decoulos, that on your list, you're assuming that certain parties are in the case and are not being newly added, and I'm saying that they may be in a sense newly added by that.

All right. Thank you all.
(Matter adjourned at 4:29:19 PM.)

## C E R T I F I C A T I O N

I, Ellen H. Dibble, an Approved Court Transcriber, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript, from the audio recording provided to me by Attorney Wendy Sibbison of the Land Court proceedings in the above entitled matter.

I, Ellen H. Dibble, further certify that the foregoing is in compliance with the Administrative Office of the Trial Court Directive on Transcript Format.

I, Ellen H. Dibble, further certify that I neither am counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this hearing was taken, and further that I am not financially nor otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

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MARIA A. KITRAS, as Trustee of *
BEAR REALTY TRUST et al., *
Plaintiffs *
* No. 97-MISC-238738
v.
TOWN OF AQUINNAH et al., *
Defendants *
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
MOTION TO ESTABLISH SUMMARY JUDGMENT SCHEDULE
(by Attorney Morse, on behalf of Harding clients)
NOTICE OF MOTION TO AMEND, IN PREPARATION
(by Attorney Decoulos for Kitras clients);
COURT DATE SCHEDULED 2/12/07
BEFORE JUDGE LEON J. LOMBARDI
APPEARANCES (see next page):
Boston, Massachusetts
Room 1
January 16, 2007

Ellen H. Dibble
Approved Court Transcriber

## APPEARANCES:

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For: Gossamer Wing Realty Trust and Barons Land Trust

Also present, appearing as an observer:
John M. Donnelly, Assistant Attorney General
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18th Floor
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For: The Commonwealth of Massachusetts
(Time is 11:30:18 AM.)
MR. HALL: (Answering his phone): Hello?
THE CLERK: (On the phone): Mr. Hall?
MR. HALL: Yeah?
THE CLERK: Hi. It's Christie Ziter with the Land Court.

MR. HALL: Hi, Christie.
THE CLERK: Hi. I have Mr. Rappaport. If you can hold, I'll see if you're both on here.

MR. HALL: Okay.
(The clerk contacting Mr. Hall and Mr. Rappaport by phone and linking them to the courtroom by phone.)

THE CLERK: Mr. Rappaport?
MR. RAPPAPORT: Yes.

THE CLERK: Mr. Hall?
MR. HALL: Yes.
THE CLERK: Just one moment. I'll call the case here.

Land Court miscellaneous case 238738, Kitras versus Town of Gay Head.

THE COURT: Good morning, Counsel. If you would, first let's start with those who are in the courtroom.

If you would please identify yourself for the record, which is being recorded.

MR. DECOULOS: Nicholas Decoulos, representing Maria A. Kitras et al., the plaintiffs, Your Honor -- some of the
plaintiffs.
MS. MORSE: Leslie-Ann Morse, representing Mark Harding and Sheila S. (Sic) Besse, and Charles D. Harding as they are co-trustees of the Eleanor P. Harding Realty Trust.

MR. DONNELLY: I'm John Donnelly. I'm representing the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

MS. ROBERTS: Jennifer Roberts for the defendant Vineyard Conservation Society, Inc.

THE COURT: All right. For those on the telephone, if you would, please.

MR. RAPPAPORT: Ronald Rappaport representing the Town of Aquinnah, Your Honor.

MR. HALL: I'm Benjamin Hall, Jr., representing Gossamer Wing Realty Trust and Baron's Land Trust.

THE COURT: All right. Let me first ask counsel for the Commonwealth: Have you filed an appearance before? I'm trying to recall. We had some recent developments of new parties. And has the Commonwealth been a participant in this case?

MR. DONNELLY: We're actually -- no. We received a summons, but we have not -- there was discussion about accepting service on behalf of the Commonwealth. The only problem is they have not cleared it with the interests of the Commonwealth, as -- in order to sign that.

Once that's made clear to me, then I can go ahead and execute that. So -- I guess at this point I'm sort of an observer since we're not officially a party.

THE COURT: All right. Well, we'll note your appearance as an observer this morning.

MR. DONNELLY: (Chuckles.)

THE COURT: And for the record, we just had another case where the Commonwealth was represented by an assistant attorney general who indicates that he will be leaving that particular bureau, and there's going to be a change.

I don't know, again, what's going on. There will certainly be some changes, as of tomorrow, in the Attorney General's Office. There's a new attorney general as of tomorrow. And so I don't know if that has any impact as far as going forward.

MR. DONNELLY: I... I would think not. I believe this case -- it's not contingent on one of the state agencies' involvement?, from what I've been told. It's a matter of our office just clearing up what the interests of this Commonwealth is.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. DONNELLY: And I think we'll go forward with that.

THE COURT: All right. Well, we'll give you,
certainly, time for that.

What brings us here today is the motion filed by

Ms. Morse on behalf of her clients to establish a summary judgment schedule.

And let me just say that in the course of our last hearing, we had - and maybe it was even the last couple of hearings - lengthy discussion on a variety of procedural matters.

And I do recall that the words slipped out of my mouth, "Summary judgment," where, leading up to that - and we had had discussions before that - that this case isn't going to be resolved on summary judgment.

And the fact is that the parties -- and I think Mr. Decoulos in his letter of response - which, I assume people received, the others - that he made reference to, "The parties may be able to file an agreed statement of facts or a case-stated."

The point is that a case can be resolved in a variety of ways. I mean, if it's ripe for dispositive motion, so be it. A motion to dismiss, motion for summary judgment. But if there's going to be disputed evidence or disputed facts, then a dispositive motion isn't going to necessarily work very well.

Then there are three other ways that a case can be resolved: Trial; there is the case-stated, or an agreed statement of material facts, where the parties agree that these are the only facts and the only ultimate facts upon
which the rights of the parties depend.

But there's also the third approach, where is the submission of agreed evidence to the trier of fact per decision thereon. And in that third instance, where there's agreement as to the evidence, it takes the place of evidence which would otherwise be introduced in the usual way. And the fact-finding tribunal must find the facts upon the agreed evidence as it does in the usual case. And the fact-finder may reach whatever decision is warranted by the evidence -- which means drawing whatever inferences that may flow.

Summary judgment, you know, obviously the inferences are to be drawn against the moving party.

And I think at this stage, in the history of this case, I think the parties are looking for a way of having a disposition of the case, finally, on these issues.

So I think you have to decide, if it's not going to be trial - and we've talked before about who the witnesses would be, or the lack of witnesses - then it may be the submission of agreed evidence to the Court.

And I don't know whether you might have certain persons - expert witnesses - that would be called to testify in certain discrete areas, or not; whether you want to have prefiled evidence, direct evidence, from your witnesses, whoever they may be, and have it open for cross.

There's a variety of different ways we can deal with this, but the point is, we will use your motion, Ms. Morse, as the vehicle to talk about this, about how best to go forward, but this Court had already ruled: We're having the first portion - the bifurcation - to settle the issue of was there the requisite intent, or not. If there was the requisite intent, we move on to then have all the necessary evidence on the question of where that easement area should be located.

And before we go any further about talking about scheduling, I'm still troubled about the issue of parties.

And when we were here last, I went through a rather detailed discussion with Mr. Decoulos about saying that his motion, which talked about adding and dropping certain parties, did not address other parties who were still in the pleadings.

And before I schedule this at all, I want to be satisfied we have all the necessary people on each side of the V.

So let me first start with Mr. Decoulos on the question: Since we last met, when we were last together, and I gave you all the names of the people that weren't addressed in your motion, what's happened in that regard?

MR. DECOULOS: I've gone ahead, Your Honor, and drawn up a motion to amend that complaint, and listed, believe it
or not, only 28 defendants. So that I think that we're getting to -- and $I$ distributed it amongst my fellow counsel here, and I will send one down to Mr. Rappaport and Mr. Hall.

And I will file that motion to amend the complaint so that we can have it heard or they can assent to it. I don't think we can get an assent -- well, maybe they can assent to it, save some time.

But I wholeheartedly believe in what Ms. Morse said about getting this thing moving. And I think that the first place to start is with an amended complaint.

We've got a drainage problem that we're addressing as well. When they built Moshup Trail, they dammed up the water on the -- not the ocean side, obviously, but on the other side of the road.

So we've got that. We're addressing that as well. So I think we're going to have a very comprehensive complaint --

THE COURT: Let me ask you --

MR. DECOULOS: -- in less than 20 pages.

THE COURT: All right. Let me ask you, when you say you're addressing that issue about drainage, are you saying in this complaint?

MR. DECOULOS: Yes.

THE COURT: And is it within the subject matter
jurisdiction of this court? I mean, what's the nature of the claim that you're asserting that deals with the...

First of all, who is the actor who did it, and secondly, what is the cause of action?

MR. DECOULOS: It's a private nuisance, and we're following a law that's found in the Triangle case, which says that if they want to dam up water on your property, they've got a right to take it by eminent domain, or cause it to be drained properly.

THE COURT: And who do you say is the actor?

MR. DECOULOS: The Town. They own the road. So what we need is a conduit under the road in maybe one or two places to dry up the...

You know, what they've caused is nothing but a -they've created wetlands by damming up the property. It was never there before.

THE COURT: All right. So you're going to serve and file your motion and mark the motion for hearing if there is no assent to your motion to amend.

MR. DECOULOS: I was told by Ms. Morse that the next time that we can meet is February 16? So I'll mark it up for February $16 t h$, and if the assents come flowing in...

THE COURT: You can mark it up for February 12th, if you want.

MR. DECOULOS: All right.

THE COURT: The 12th or the 15th.

MR. DECOULOS: 12th or the 15th. I've got a choice. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Morse, what is your view as far as a schedule? In other words -- well, let me ask one other question, Mr. Decoulos.

Does your motion to amend, does it add any new parties to this case?

MR. DECOULOS: The Commonwealth. I think Martha's Vineyard Land commission or land --

THE COURT: Land Bank?

MR. DECOULOS: Land Bank. That's about the only parties that we have, Your Honor. And we're omitting a lot of them.

THE COURT: No, I understand that that probably is the effect of that.

And Ms. Morse, when we talked in the past about your obligation to serve, it was to serve the Commonwealth? Is that who you had to involve?

MS. MORSE: Yes, Your Honor. I had talked to the soon-to-be former assistant attorney general, and he said just send it to him and he would accept service.

And I gather they have a question as to where their interest actually lies, and I'll be happy to talk to them about it.

And as for my motion, $I$ just want to get this case moving. I have one client that's already died, and one of her heirs that's already died while this case is pending.

So I mean, I have no problem with amending the complaint; whatever we need to do to get the case moving -THE COURT: Right.

MS. MORSE: -- and get it to some resolution.

THE COURT: I hear you, Counsel. But as we sit here today, we see evolving pleadings, and we've had decisions of the Appeals Court; it's come back; we've had a number of hearings after the Appeals Court decision, and I think we are moving in that direction.

Ms. Roberts, do you wish to be heard?

MS. ROBERTS: We assented to Ms. Morse's motion just to get a schedule in place, but I hear you on the issue of whether it's a summary judgment or exactly how we frame it.

But we'll work, I think, again, to present another schedule once the amended complaint has been addressed.

I would just note, having seen it for the first time about half an hour ago, that $I$ know that VCS will be opposing that. They're adding new claims 10 years after this case was filed, which would strike me as being too late. And at least one, and possibly two, of the claims $I$ think are futile.

So once we get served with the motion, we will be
filing an opposition, and have it in February for Your Honor's consideration.

And then I would think once that's been resolved, we'll know who the parties are, and can move forward with a schedule, I would hope.

And I think we've been working cooperatively to try to accomplish the scheduling, so.

THE COURT: All right. Well, in less than a month I'm going to see you again on the motion to amend. And at that time we can take up your motion again, Ms. Morse. I'm going to continue your motion for one month until the next hearing, until we get a better sense of the parties.

MS. MORSE: That's fine, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. MORSE: As I said, my only thing was to move people.

THE COURT: And it is slowly moving. All right?

So no further action is being taken today, and I'll wait to hear you next time on this motion to amend.

Thank you.
(Matter adjourned at 11:44:56 AM.)

## C ERTIFICATION

I, Ellen H. Dibble, an Approved Court Transcriber, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript, from the audio recording provided to me by Attorney Wendy Sibbison of the Land Court proceedings in the above entitled matter.

I, Ellen H. Dibble, further certify that the foregoing is in compliance with the Administrative Office of the Trial Court Directive on Transcript Format.

I, Ellen H. Dibble, further certify that I neither am counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this hearing was taken, and further that I am not financially nor otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

ElV. $\mathscr{A}$ GiGBV.
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Volume: I of II Day 5 of 11
Pages: 223-248
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COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DUKES, SS. DEPARTMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT LAND COURT DEPARTMENT

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MARIA A. KITRAS, as Trustee of * BEAR REALTY TRUST et al., * Plaintiffs *

* No. 97-MISC-238738
v.

TOWN OF AQUINNAH et al., * Defendants *

*     *         *             *                 *                     *                         *                             *                                 *                                     *                                         *                                             *                                                 *                                                     *                                                         *                                                             *                                                                 * 

STATUS CONFERENCE
MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL TIME TO FILE RESPONSE (by Martha's Vineyard Land Bank, Attorney Tillotson)

SCHEDULING AS TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS FILED ON BEHALF OF GOSSAMER WING REALTY TRUST AND BARON LAND BANK (Attorney Hall)

STATUS CONFERENCE, AS REQUESTED ON BEHALF OF THE KITRAS PLAINTIFFS, THE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT HAVING BEEN FILED

DISCOVERY ISSUES RAISED; PRESUMPTIVE DATE FOR CONCLUSION OF DISCOVERY SET FOR SEPTEMBER 30, 2007

STATUS CONFERENCE SCHEDULED FOR OCTOBER 12, 2007
COMMONWEALTH'S MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE PARTY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS

BEFORE JUDGE LEON J. LOMBARDI

APPEARANCES (see next page):

> Boston, Massachusetts
> Room 2
> July 10, 2007

Ellen H. Dibble Approved Court Transcriber

## APPEARANCES:

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Peabody, MA 01960
For: Maria A. Kitras, as she is trustee of the Bear Realty Trust, Bear II Realty Trust and Gorda Realty Trust, and James Decoulos, as he is trustee of the Bear II Realty Trust and Gorda Realty Trust

Cara Daniels, Esq.
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For: Caroline Kennedy, individually, and as guardian
Diane C. Tillotson, Esq.
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For: The Martha's Vineyard Land Bank

John M. Donnelly, Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
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(with an intern)
For: The Commonwealth of Massachusetts

Leslie-Ann Morse, Esq.
(by phone at first; in the courtroom from 10:22 AM)
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For: Eleanor P. Harding Realty Trust and Mark Harding
(On phone):

Jennifer S. D. Roberts, Esq. (By phone)
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For: Vineyard Conservation Society, Inc.

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(By phone, continued)
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For: The Town of Aquinnah
Benjamin L. Hall, Jr., Esq. (By phone)
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For: Gossamer Wing Realty Trust and Barons Land Trust
(Time is 10:07:26 AM.)

COURT OFFICER: Court now is in session. Judge Lombardi's presiding. Please be seated.

THE CLERK: Tuesday, July 10th, 2007, Judge Lombardi, now hearing Miscellaneous Case 238738, Kitras v. Town of Gay Head.

THE COURT: Good morning, Counsel. If you would please approach, those who are in the courtroom, and we will also determine who's on the telephone.

All right. Beginning with the plaintiff.
Mr. Decoulos, if you would please identify yourself for the record?

MR. DECOULOS: Nicholas Decoulos representing the plaintiffs Kitras and Decoulos.

THE COURT: All right. Counsel.
MS. DANIELS: Your Honor, in the Kitras matter, I'm here representing Caroline Kennedy, individually, and as guardian.

THE COURT: And your name?
MS. DANIELS: Cara Daniels.
THE COURT: All right, Ms. Daniels.
MS. TILLOTSON: Good morning, Your Honor. Diane Tillotson representing, in the Kitras matter, the Martha's Vineyard Land Bank.

MR. DONNELLY: John Donnelly, assistant attorney
general, representing the Commonwealth in both cases.

THE COURT: And with you?

MR. DONNELLY: This is my intern. He's 303-certified. THE COURT: All right. That's fine. Just didn't know if we had another party being represented here separately.

All right. On the telephone?

MS. MORSE: Attorney Leslie-Ann Morse representing the Eleanor P. Harding Realty Trust and Mark Harding.

MS. ROBERTS: Jennifer Roberts representing the Vineyard Conservation Society.

MR. WICE: David Wice, representing David and Betsy Wice.

MR. RAPPAPORT: I'm Ronald Rappaport, representing the Town of Aquinnah.

MR. HALL: Benjamin Hall, Jr., representing Gossamer Wing Realty Trust and Baron's Land Trust. THE COURT: All right. Let's proceed then with what's before us, which is a request by Mr. Decoulos for a status conference in this matter.

As you know, a few weeks back, Mr. Decoulos filed a Third Amended Complaint, which was actually very helpful, because $I$ think we have many files that are quite full here relating to earlier aspects of this case which are perhaps now of marginal relevance as we go forward.

But we do have the filing of the complaint, the
service by Mr. Decoulos, the returns of service on a number of parties, and a request for default as to some.

MOTION TO FILE RESPONSIVE PLEADING,
BY MARTHA'S VINEYARD LAND BANK
THE COURT: And let me just mention that I'm aware that we have a pending motion to file responsive pleading that was submitted by the Martha's Vineyard Land Bank. And that particular motion was filed -- there was no assent to it. Thus at some point we would have to have this marked for hearing, or I could put out an order under Rule 6, which says that if anyone wants to submit written comment, they may do so, and I will deal with it on the papers of particularly Mr. Decoulos representing the plaintiffs, and also we do have other, I guess -- Ms. Morse, you also represent some plaintiffs too?

MS. MORSE: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Is there any objection to the motion today, or shall we take some other route to that? In other words, shall we hold a separate hearing at another time on this motion?

Let me begin with Mr. Decoulos.
MR. DECOULOS: I think an order would be in... I think you should file an order, Judge; give them the 10 days or 20 days, as you did to all of the other defendants, and they either come in or come out. This motion is just
nothing but a motion to stall.

So let's get it over with. If they want to file an answer -- they've been served; they haven't done anything except file a motion to dissent (phonetic at 10:11:35 AM, simultaneous, could be heard as "consent" or something else).

THE COURT: Mr. Decoulos, I don't understand. Are you saying that you want the Court to just issue an order saying: You've got 10 days to file an answer?

MR. DECOULOS: That's right. Just like you did for everybody else.

THE COURT: In other words, you're in a sense assenting to their request for some additional time.

MR. DECOULOS: I want to get away from the adjective part of this case as fast as I can, Judge.

And I think that would be the fastest way to do it. Just a ten-day order: Either file it or don't file it.

THE COURT: All right. Does anyone else want to be heard on this matter?

MR. HALL: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Hall?

MR. HALL: Benjamin Hall. I had not seen the motion, so I would like an opportunity to take a look at it and file a response if $I$ could, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

I will issue an order under Rule 6, which is that, you know, I will deal with this matter on the papers; $I$ will give any interested party an opportunity to file a response to the motion, and after the papers have come in, I will rule on the motion. All right?

MR. HALL: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

AS TO MOTIONS FILED ON BEHALF OF GOSSAMER WING REALTY TRUST AND BARON LAND BANK (Attorney Hall)

THE COURT: Now, another preliminary matter is the fact that I'm aware that there are a number of motions that have been filed pertaining to I believe it's a cross-claim and counterclaim by Mr. Hall, on behalf of his client.

I have under Rule 4 scheduled that for hearing in August. There has to be, under Rule 4, sufficient time for a party who is on the receiving end of a dispositive motion to file an opposition, and then time for the original moving party to file a reply.

And so under normal court proceedings, that is scheduled down the road, so to speak -- and speaking about "down the road," I'm scheduling it for Fall River. And that would be one of the times that the Court is sitting outside of Boston. It will also accommodate the interests of those parties from the Cape and the islands.

Now, I'm aware that the essence of the motion is that
the cross-claim and counterclaims have no text; thus it fails to state a cause of action. I don't know whether Mr. Hall, between now and the time the motion to dismiss would be heard, intends to file any motion to amend.

Mr. Hall, can you illuminate us?

MR. HALL: Well, Your Honor, I've been preparing some opposition to the motion, and a cross-motion to amend. THE COURT: All right. All right. We won't go into the merits, obviously, today.

So Mr. Decoulos, you probably were on the receiving end of the papers on this, and you know that this is scheduled for August now. So that's the next event which is going to be take place.

MR. DECOULOS: You can rest assured I won't be down there, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay. We will note your absence.

STATUS CONFERENCE, AS REQUESTED ON BEHALF OF THE KITRAS PLAINTIFFS, THE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT HAVING BEEN FILED

THE COURT: Having said that, I think we're now just talking about logistics in this case to move it forward. And once we get through these last motions, unless someone else has something to raise with me, I think that we are back to the point where we said we're going to proceed with this case on a bifurcated basis, after the decision of the Appeals Court on -- the first question was
whether there was an intent - in the creation or the set-off of these lots - to create certain easements.

And if the answer is in the affirmative, then to determine the route that the easement would take, whether it be one or more routes.

Now, Mr. Decoulos, you have in your most recent amended complaint -- and correct me if I'm misstating this: You have identified various options; is that correct?

MR. DECOULOS: That's right.

THE COURT: All right. So the thing is that before you filed that third amended complaint, it was an open issue as to where the easements may go. Or it certainly wasn't settled where the easements may go.

What is the position -- and I'll ask Ms. Morse this as well, who's representing the plaintiffs: Is it your contention that it is one or more of these routes, or all of these routes, that would be the outcome of the case as you see it?

MR. DECOULOS: I think that that should be decided after the bifurcation is ruled, if we have a favorable judgment or not.

That -- that should be settled by civil engineers, taking into consideration the wetlands that are there -THE COURT: Mm-hmm?

MR. DECOULOS: Taking into consideration the Moshup

Trail that was put in -- created in 1954.

And we've also found an 1897 U.S. Coast geodetic plan that shows roadways in the affected area. So we would bring that to the Court's attention.

So it's not just one road that's going to service all of the lots. And we want to take, like $I$ said, consideration. We're not going to go through the wetlands.

I had an old friend of mine, Judge, and he always said even the Indians didn't want to get their feet wet.

So I'm going to take that into consideration, and that would be one of my guiding principles.

Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Morse, do you have a different view, or do you concur with Mr. Decoulos?

Ms. Morse?
(Attorney Morse no longer in contact by phone at this time.)

THE COURT: Do we have anyone on the telephone?

MS. ROBERTS: Just me, Your Honor, Jennifer Roberts.

MR. WICE: David Wice is still here.

MR. RAPPAPORT: Rappaport and Hall.

MS. ROBERTS: I know Ms. Morse was attending by car phone because she's stuck on the Southeast Expressway, so she may have had technical problems.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, if she comes out of a tunnel,
we can patch her in again, or she can have -- resume, you know, if her connection works again.

But the point is that that, as Mr. Decoulos articulated it, was the consensus that we had previously, how we're going to proceed with this case. And unless someone wants to be heard on that, I assume that consensus is going to be maintained.

DISCOVERY ISSUE RAISED

MR. HALL: Your Honor, Benjamin Hall.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HALL: My prior concerns and objections that the Court is aware of remain.

But I would also like the opportunity to engage in a very brief discovery, perhaps one deposition.

THE COURT: All right. Well, there's been no formal order closing discovery in this matter. So that $I$ would say as this case proceeds, you can get onto it, Mr. Hall, and complete that.

I think we should talk about whether there should be an absolute deadline now, so you can then do your pretrial memorandum, and we can talk about is this going to be on a case-stated basis? Is it going to be a trial, we're dealing with events and individuals and documents that go back to the mid-19th century, if not late $19 t h$ century.

And so I think we've all said, there's no live
witnesses to come forth. But it's certainly a matter of procedure, as far as which vehicle to use, whether it be case-stated or some other mechanism.

I think that there is a major distinction, however, between saying just doing it as summary judgment and case-stated, or an agreed upon set of facts, as far as inferences and the like. There should be a level playing field without the issue of who is the moving party, and to whom the inferences flow - or flow against - in this matter.

So let's take up the matter of discovery.

What is the proposal by those who are participating here for an outside date for discovery?

MR. DECOULOS: Your Honor, we've assembled approximately 20 documents starting from 1863 to about 1878. We're going to assemble a few more to get us up to the Moshup Trail.

And I will make those available in August, 'cause I'm going away for a couple of weeks, starting tomorrow.

And I'll make those all available to my fellow attorneys here - my siblings - and we'll go from there.

And I would think that discovery could end by September 30. I'm putting all these documents out there, so there's not going to be much...

And as you've just stated, you know, there's
nothing -- there isn't any live testimony coming in from 1870.

THE COURT: All right. Does anyone else --

Mr. Decoulos is suggesting the end of September to complete all discovery.

Is there any other viewpoint on that?

MS. ROBERTS: I would just -- Your Honor, this is Jennifer Roberts.

I would just like to reserve the right to come back to the Court if it turns out that there's something unexpected in these 20 documents or so that Mr. Decoulos is going to provide in August which would necessitate a longer time frame. I just want to reserve the right to ask for that.

But assuming it's the same stuff we've been looking at for a number of years now, I would think the end of September would be fine.

THE COURT: I think this is now the first time we've been together after the 10 th anniversary of this case, so I hope there isn't going to be a great deal of new information.

So again, Mr. Decoulos, from your standpoint, do you believe these documents have been previously shown to these parties, or are these somewhat new bits of evidence?

MR. DECOULOS: Most of them were in the motion for summary judgment, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Well, the goal, the target, is the end of September. But I will, you know, give some latitude if there's some good cause - good cause - to have an extension of time.

MR. DECOULOS: I will put these documents all together by August 20 --

THE COURT: All right.

MR. DECOULOS: -- and submit -- I'll mail them out August 20 th.

THE COURT: All right. And for the record, Ms. Morse has arrived in person.
(Attorney Leslie-Ann Morse now present in the courtroom at 10:22:05 AM.)

THE COURT: Ms. Morse, we were just talking about, again, how we're going to proceed.

In the prior agreement there was going to be a bifurcation, and we were going to deal with the matter of the intent to create easements, and then the location later.

We were also talking about discovery. And the -shall we say, the presumptive date for the closing of discovery is September 30, the end of the month, whatever day of the week that may be, business day.

But Ms. Roberts wanted to reserve her rights in case there was something that was, you know, a surprise among
those documents that Mr. Decoulos is going to be sending out sometime fairly soon on this.

So, again, there would have to be some good cause shown to me to extend the date beyond September 30 for discovery.

So, Mr. Hall, between now and then I assume you're going to be getting your deposition done.

MR. HALL: Yeah -- I'll discuss it with other counsel. Perhaps we can do it in a simplified fashion rather than a deposition -- yes. SCHEDULING OF NEXT STEP:

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Assume for a moment that everything is completed by September 30. Then are the parties prepared now to talk about what next step would be taken, and when and how it's going to be done?

MS. ROBERTS: Jennifer Roberts, Your Honor. I need to sort of wrap my arms around the concept of the case-stated. That's not something that I've been involved with before, but it would seem to me in this case that once everyone exchanged all the relevant historical materials, then if there are any disputes over the admissibility of any of it, we can determine that.

THE COURT: Yeah. A motion in limine would certainly still be a viable vehicle to use.

By the way, there's a couple of volumes in the -- two
or three volumes in the Mass. Practice series -- series by Nolan and Henry on civil practice; and I might suggest there's some good material in that talking about how to use case-stated and agreed statement of facts or agreed set of facts. And judges of this court have utilized that vehicle in the past.

MR. DECOULOS: Once all those documents have been furnished, I think we'd want to get an agreed statement of facts, Your Honor, in the next 45 days -- so that we could be into November 15.

We could file a request for admissions, but I -- we have to have -- get together. We have to have an assembly of all of the attorneys in order to get that done, and I don't know if you want to do that with a pretrial conference, or we can do it without you.

THE COURT: Well, there's still -- and again, I know there's a desire on the part of just about everyone to move this case along, and I too would like to do it, but it's hard to set firm deadlines and targets and steps to be taken until some of this falls into place.

As I said, we have some earlier motions that have to be acted upon; we have the completion of discovery. And perhaps the best thing is to have another gathering such as this one, early in October, when that -- all those materials have been shared and discovery is complete, and
then actually figure out how we're going to move on.
MR. DECOULOS: That's fine. You want to set the date now?

THE COURT: Sure. All right. Is there any other view on that? Does anyone want to be heard about this approach?

Ms. Tillotson?
MS. TILLOTSON: Thank you, Your Honor. If the case is 10 years old, $I$ obviously have a lot of catching up to do. I just filed my appearance a couple of weeks ago.

But one thing that struck me - reading through the pleadings and listening to the conversation today - is that almost more important than a statement of agreed-upon facts would seem to be an agreed-upon record appendix that would contain one set of all the documents that the Court needs to look at, because again, I'm not -- again, from what I've seen of the pleadings, I'm not certain that it's going to be easy to agree upon the facts, at least the facts that the Court needs to find with respect to whatever inferences or whatever the intent was.

But it would seem to me that we could agree upon an appendix of documents.

So in addition to circulating the 20 documents, it might be helpful if counsel who've been involved in the case would also circulate a list of the documents that they feel are necessary for adjudication of this case on the
merits.

And again that's just a suggestion.

THE COURT: Well, again, that's consistent with this approach of an agreed record or a case-stated.

It isn't necessarily that it's an agreed statement of facts, but: Here's the agreed record.

And if you can agree on certain facts, that's wonderful. But ultimately, the parties say, "This is the record that the Court is to review and decide."

Let me turn now to this matter of a date in October.

I could give you the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, or 12 th of October.

MR. DECOULOS: How about the 4th, Your Honor?

MR. RAPPAPORT: Your Honor, it's Ronald Rappaport. I'm going to be away the first week -- out of the country, the first week in October. I can definitely do the 12 th.

THE COURT: All right. How's the 12 th? It's Friday the 12 th.

MS. ROBERTS: Fine with me, Your Honor. Jennifer Roberts.

MS. TILLOTSON: Fine with me, Your Honor.

MS. DANIELS: It's fine with me as well.
MR. HALL: Your Honor, would that be AM or PM?

THE COURT: Well, we haven't yet determined that part of it. I have a -- under our new sitting schedule, I
actually have more flexibility. I have a courtroom assigned to me the entire day.

So is it easier for the parties to do the afternoon, particularly those who have to travel some distance?
[MR. HALL]: Well, since it's a Friday, I would suggest perhaps later morning, around 11:00, might be better for us coming from the Cape and the islands.

THE COURT: Eleven o'clock?

MR. DECOULOS: Fine.
MS. DANIELS: That's fine.
THE COURT: All right. Fine.
All right. One other thing on this case, and this has been, heh, an issue for years. And that is ferreting through these files, and there's four full folders, and now we're starting a new one sort of fresh, is: Who are the parties, and what is the service list?

And I know the temptation is to pull out some past service list and use it, but I do want to point out that we have a new group of defendants. There's a lot of overlap; there's been a lot of elimination.

So Ms. Daniels, not to pick on you specifically, but it's the easiest one I had here. Looking at your service list, for instance, there are names on here that are defendants from the earlier pleadings who are no longer in this case.

MS. DANIELS: Mm-hmm?

THE COURT: And so that there's actually, in this caption, $I$ think fewer parties than there used to be, so I think that it's absolutely essential that we all work from the same list, and make sure that we have current addresses for these parties.

Mr. Decoulos, and Ms. Morse, as plaintiffs, do you happen to have -- have you prepared a list of all these defendants and their addresses?

MR. DECOULOS: I'm awaiting your order to default them, Judge. And once you can do that, it'll be very easy.

THE COURT: Well, the order is entered.

MR. DECOULOS: Oh, I didn't know that.

THE COURT: Under 55A, those who you have sent proper notices of returns of service -- and you can talk to the sessions clerk --

MR. DECOULOS: Fine.

THE COURT: -- later on this.

MR. DECOULOS: Yes.

THE COURT: There were --

MR. DECOULOS: Once I get that, I can give you a service list that $I$ think is appropriate.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. DECOULOS: And have we als-...

THE COURT: Now, is there anything else to discuss on
this case, the Kitras case? And we need to turn our attentions --

COMMONWEALTH'S MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE PARTY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Donnelly.

MR. DONNELLY: On that same issue, I do have a motion to substitute party, since the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs has changed names, and also the secretary has changed with the new administration. So.

THE COURT: All right. Has that motion been filed, or you're filing it now?

MR. DONNELLY: I'm filing it now.

THE COURT: All right. I'll accept it. It'll be part of the same Rule 6 order $I$ put out for anyone to submit a response if they wish to.

MR. DECOULOS: How about the Brutus case, Judge? THE COURT: Frangos?

MR. DECOULOS: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. I'm -- well, let me first establish, does anyone else want to say anything regarding the Kitras case?

MS. ROBERTS: Jennifer Roberts, Your Honor. Fren (phonetic at 10:31:05 AM, unclear) hadn't seen any date scheduled for those motions to dismiss on the Hall matter? Has the Court sent out a date? Such as August in Fall

River?

THE COURT: Yeah, hold on one second.
(On the record discussion at sidebar at 10:31:22 AM.)

THE COURT: I understand the notice has gone out. We'll double-check to make sure it went to everyone, that we used the right service list.

But is Fall River Superior Court on August 30, at 11:30.
(Pause.)

THE COURT: Anything else on the Kitras case?

All right. Hearing none --

MR. HALL: Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Hall.

MR. HALL: I believe my brother Mr. Rappaport and I have-all-back-from (phonetic at 10:31:57 AM).

On the service list, if we could address something about that, just for jurisdictional clarity?

I'm concerned about people that had been served originally, and they have appeared in the case, even though they're not -- they do not continue to be named defendants? Could the Court perhaps issue an order dismissing as to all those people who have appeared, just for -- so we have a clean line of break, so we don't have to serve 15 people who technically have appeared in the case but are no longer really in the case?

THE COURT: Well, I would be willing to entertain such an order, because I believe the clear intent of the plaintiffs in submitting the third amended complaint was to supersede the prior pleadings and to limit it to those parties.

But I would ask that you, Mr. Hall, and perhaps in consultation with attorneys for the plaintiffs, provide me a list of who you think those parties are. And I would be happy to issue an order.

But again, at this point, you know, many changes have happened over the years, as far as parties in and out, so you need to perhaps provide me those who you believe would be subject to such an order.

So once received, I will, you know, entertain that request and issue something.

All right. Any -- Mr. --

MR. RAPPAPORT: Your Honor, I'm Ronald Rappaport.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. RAPPAPORT: I believe I'm stating the obvious, but that the plaintiffs have chosen in their complaint various routes that they would like to see, and my understanding is all that is the second part of the case.

THE COURT: That's correct.

MR. RAPPAPORT: It's still open to the remaining parties to say no, it should not be those routes; it should
be a totally separate route.
THE COURT: That's correct. Correct.
MR. RAPPAPORT: Okay. Thank you.
THE COURT: All right. All right. Then is there
anything else?
All right. This matter then is closed. Those parties
who wish may terminate their telephone conversation, or
their connection with the court.
We're now going to call the second case.
(Matter adjourned at 10:34:03 AM.)

## C ERTIFICATION

I, Ellen H. Dibble, an Approved Court Transcriber, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript, from the audio recording provided to me by Attorney Wendy Sibbison of the Land Court proceedings in the above entitled matter.

I, Ellen H. Dibble, further certify that the foregoing is in compliance with the Administrative Office of the Trial Court Directive on Transcript Format.

I, Ellen H. Dibble, further certify that I neither am counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this hearing was taken, and further that I am not financially nor otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

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COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DUKES, SS.
DEPARTMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT LAND COURT DEPARTMENT

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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
MARIA A. KITRAS, as Trustee of
    BEAR REALTY TRUST et al., *
v.
TOWN OF AQUINNAH et al., *
        Defendants *
    * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
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    Plaintiffs * No. 97-MISC-238738
        MOTIONS
    MOTION OF VINEYARD CONSERVATION SOCIETY TO STRIKE THREE INTERLOCUTORY NOTICES OF APPEAL BY PLAINTIFF KITRAS ET AL; BRIAN M. HALL, TRUSTEE OF BARON'S LAND TRUST AND BENJAMIN L. HALL, JR., TRUSTEE OF GOSSAMER WING REALTY TRUST

CROSS-MOTION TO CORRECT THE ORDER DATED SEPTEMBER 14, 2007 TO NOW ORDER AMENDMENT OF THE CROSS-CLAIMS, TO ALLOW THE PRIOR CROSS-MOTION OF GOSSAMER WING REALTY TRUST AND BARON'S LAND TRUST FILED AUGUST 30, 2007 TO AMEND THEIR ANSWERS, COUNTERCLAIMS AND CROSS-CLAIMS, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, TO ORDER A SEPARATE JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 54(B) FINALLY DISMISSING THE CROSS-CLAIMS OF GOSSAMER WING REALTY TRUST AND BARON'S LAND TRUST PURSUANT TO THE SEPTEMBER 14, 2007 ORDER TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT (By Attorney Hall on behalf of his clients)

BEFORE JUDGE LEON J. LOMBARDI

APPEARANCES (see next page):

> Boston, Massachusetts Room 3
> June 13, 2008

Ellen H. Dibble Approved Court Transcriber

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(Time is 10:34:21 AM.)
THE CLERK: Friday, June 13th, miscellaneous case number 238738, Kitras versus Town of Gay Head.

THE COURT: Good morning, Counsel. If you would, please identify yourselves for the record, which is being recorded.
(Next file from 10:34:44 AM, with overlap.)
THE COURT: We'll start with those who are in the courtroom.

MR. DONNELLY: John Donnelly for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

MS. ROBERTS: Jennifer Roberts for the defendant Vineyard Conservation Society.

MS. TILLOTSON: Diane Tillotson for the defendant Martha's Vineyard Land Bank.

THE COURT: All right. And by telephone?
MR. HALL: Benjamin Hall, Jr., for Gossamer Wing Realty Trust and Baron's Land Trust.

MR. RAPPAPORT: Ronald Rappaport for the Town of Aquinnah.

MR. WICE: David Wice for David Wice and Betsy Wice.
THE COURT: All right. We have before me today the motion filed by the Vineyard Conservation Society.

And we have an opposition filed by Gossamer Wing and a cross-motion.

And I do have the opposition as well of the Commonwealth, joining with the Vineyard Conservation Society.

Are there any other filings that have been made that I'm not aware of?

MS. ROBERTS: Not that $I$ know of, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. DONNELLY: I received a counter-motion yesterday?
THE COURT: No, I -- I said a cross-motion.
MR. DONNELLY: Oh, I'm sorry.
THE COURT: And that was -- you may have received it yesterday. The Court received it on the 11th.

And that -- you know, we'll certainly discuss that as well, but let's begin with Ms. Roberts and her motion.

MOTION OF VINEYARD CONSERVATION SOCIETY TO STRIKE THREE INTERLOCUTORY NOTICES OF APPEAL BY PLAINTIFF KITRAS ET AL., AND BY ATTORNEY HALL ON BEHALF OF BARON'S LAND TRUST AND GOSSAMER WING REALTY TRUST:

MS. ROBERTS: This is a motion to strike, I think, three notices of appeal filed by the Kitras plaintiffs and Mr. Hall. I've seen no opposition from the Kitras plaintiffs, so I assume, without the opposition, that at least with respect to those notices of appeal, that those would be struck.

Which leaves us with Mr. Hall and his notice of appeal.

As Your Honor knows, the doctrine of present execution allows interlocutory appeals - such as the one Mr. Hall is attempting to take here - only in very limited circumstances. The matter being appealed from needs to interfere with rights in a way that can't be remedied on appeal later, and the right at issue needs to be with respect to a matter that is collateral to the issue in controversy.

This doctrine of present execution has been applied to the dismissal of claims of sovereign immunity, to the denial of special motions to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute, and to the disqualification of counsel, which has been seen as decisions that couldn't be rectified on appeal if the party was forced to go through the entire proceeding in the trial court before being able to address the issue on appeal.

The weight of authority is that motions to amend like Mr. Hall's are not immediately appealable, and are not subject to the doctrine of present execution. And furthermore...

THE COURT: But you say in your papers that the matter is "less than clear"? I think? Is that your phrase?

MS. ROBERTS: -- it's ...
The weight of authority appears to be that motions to
amend are not immediately appealable, but there is no -and that, $I$ think, is a Judge Van Gessel (phonetic at 10:38:03 AM) analysis of the law from the superior court citing to an Appeals Court decision.

There is no Supreme Judicial Court decision that decides the matter definitively. The Appeals Court cites to federal precedent, which is to the effect that motions to amend are not immediately appealable -- the denial of a motion to amend.

So what $I$ can say today is that the weight of authority is to the effect that motions to amend - the denial of a motion to amend - is not immediately appealable, but there is no decisive decision from the SJC on that.

So that's --

THE COURT: So are you suggesting the weight, such as it is, is from foreign jurisdictions?

MS. ROBERTS: No, it's -- it is the Van Gessel superior court decision relying on the Bateman v. Consolidated Rail Corporation Appeals Court decision.

Mr. Hall has a different --

THE COURT: But again -- again, I understand what you're saying as far as the Appeals Court, but there it's the Appeals Court looking to federal precedent. MS. ROBERTS: Correct.

THE COURT: Yep.

By the way, let me just step back for one moment to -and I hope the parties are all aware of some correspondence that occurred earlier, which is in the file here, that Mr. Decoulos had filed an earlier notice of appeal, and on January 11, 2008 -- his letter says 7, but I think there's a problem with probably dup'ing and copying correspondence. But we received this on January 25, 2008, and his letter says, "On January 11, 2007," and I believe that is to be read as "2008."
"I received your notice from the Court that the record on appeal had been assembled. Please be advised that the matter appealed was an interlocutory order, and not a found judgment. Accordingly, the assembly of the record is premature."

Then, on February 8, 2008, Mr. Decoulos filed: "I enclose a notice of interlocutory appeal of the plaintiffs, Maria Kitras," um, and Decoulos. "Please make the appropriate entry on the docket."

So Mr. Decoulos has filed notices of appeal in the past, and views that they are interlocutory and not -- and are premature.

At the same time, let me now raise the issue of a more recent decision, and that is the Supreme Judicial Court case of Ellis. And both sides do cite to it. This was the

February 15, 2008 decision dealing with matters arising out of the Land Court, where a judge struck a notice of appeal, and then the party who had filed the notice filed a second notice of appeal. The judge struck that one.

And the Court said - and this is the Supreme Judicial Court - "We need not decide the propriety of the order striking the first notice of appeal, because we find that in any event, the order striking the second notice of appeal was in error. The Land Court judge should not have struck plaintiff's second notice of appeal, because the plaintiffs properly were seeking appellate review of the judge's earlier conclusion, that the doctrine of present execution does not apply in this case."

Now, you can substitute whatever words you want for either "present execution" or "motion to amend," or "interlocutory matter," but if $I$ were to follow the route suggested by the Vineyard Conservation Society, would we not have the situation where - again, if $I$ were to agree with VCS - that I would allow your motion, strike the notice of appeal; there could very well be a notice of appeal from the action of striking the first notice on your way to the appellate courts, because the Court made it very clear that the trial court should not be in the business of striking the second notice of appeal. And they didn't answer the question whether $I$ should strike - or any trial
court judge should strike - the first notice of appeal.

Are they saying: This is a matter for the appellate court to decide whether it's a proper appeal or not?

MS. ROBERTS: If the issue on appeal is whether the doctrine of present execution applies or not, then $I$ think you're right, that we'll end up going up on that now, not later.

If the issue on appeal is whether you properly denied the Hall motion to dismiss because it was futile and unduly delayed and prejudicial to the parties, then that's plainly something that shouldn't be going up now.

And that's what...

THE COURT: But let me stop you there.

But see that's where I would say that, you know, substitute whatever words you want for "present execution." Now you said if it's on the question of whether present execution applies, then it may fall the exact same route as Ellis. But for any other grounds, if $I$ were to strike the notice of appeal, and then there's a notice of appeal of the action striking the first one, are you saying that the Court would be within its rights to strike the second notice of appeal in a context other than present execution?

MS. ROBERTS: I don't know the answer to that. I mean, it seems to me from the decision, that if the issue is, "was it properly struck the first time," because of the
doctrine of present execution, then according to this decision you're going to get to go up on that now.

Frankly, I think once the appellate courts see what they've done here and see that everyone is now going to be arguing that everything is subject to the doctrine of present execution, they may decide to retrench on this, but that's the way the law stands right now.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else you want to add, Ms. Roberts?

MS. ROBERTS: Not on -- no, not on this point, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. Let me ask anyone else who would like to speak on the same side as Ms. Roberts if they would like to be recognized.

Mr. Donnelly's shaking his head no.

MR. DONNELLY: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Tillotson?

MS. TILLOTSON: No.

THE COURT: No.

All right. Mr. Rappaport?

MR. RAPPAPORT: I don't have anything further to add
from what Ms. Roberts said, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And Mr. Wice?

MR. WICE: I agree with the position taken by

Ms. Roberts.

THE COURT: All right.

All right, Mr. Hall.
MR. HALL: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I assume we've gone through everyone who might be speaking on the same side as Ms. Roberts, so you've filed an opposition, and this is your opportunity to be heard.

MR. HALL: Thank you, Your Honor.
This is -- what the Court is looking at today is the issue of the finality of the denial of motion to amend a cross-claim, which is a permissive matter under Rule 13.

I think that we -- the Court has clearly read my opposition papers, and sees the Rudders case for what it is. It's a bar to a trial court entering decisions that are clearly within the purview of the Appeals Court.

I apologize, Your Honor; we're on a telephone here that while we're speaking, we can't hear what's going on in the courtroom. So if any papers get shuffled in our side, all of a sudden there's a dead zone.

So I haven't heard entirely everything that Ms. Roberts said, but I think I understand what the Court was saying, and I believe I understand what she was saying, because I think she didn't go beyond what she had already argued in her papers.

Is that correct?
THE COURT: I think that's a fair characterization.

MR. HALL: So the Rudders case we believe is a bar, that the trial court should not be entering into an area dealing with the issue of whether or not there is sufficient finality of the matter.

Whether under the doctrine of present execution or otherwise, we've cited sufficient authority to show that there is sufficient finality, under several other readings of the law, with respect to denying a motion to amend a permissive pleading.

We stand in sufficiently different status from the Decoulos and the plaintiffs in their notice of appeal, because ours is not a simple motion to amend the complaint, but it's part of a responsive pleading where we may or may not be allowed to -- we may or may not, on our option, raise the cross-claims.

But it just seems to make sense that since the cross-claims clearly arise out of the same transaction that we're all talking about, that all the parties should have all their rights adjudicated in one matter. By dismissing -- or by initially dismissing the cross-claims, and then not allowing us to amend our responsive pleading to insert proper cross-claims, and finding our cross-claims - on essentially all bases, according to the Court's order, as $I$ read it, the order of February 8th, I believe it was - that now by raising the issue of futility,
that clearly makes it a final order that we will not be allowed to amend to add cross-claims.
(Time is 10:34:44 AM.)
MR. HALL: So we believe that under that specific special circumstance or scenario, that there's sufficient finality on which we can base our appeal.

But we believe that that's a decision for the Appeals Court and not for this lower court. And the Court has correctly found that if the Court did strike our notice of appeal, we would be left with no choice but to follow up with a second notice of appeal. And the Rudders case would apply anyway.

So whether the Appeals Court gets it in round one or round two, it's just going to be imposing additional tremendous burdens on my parties, to get to the Appeals Court.

So we ask that the Court deny the motion of the Vineyard Conservation Society. It's just contrary to the law, we believe.

And if the Court would allow me an opportunity later, perhaps, to address my cross-motions, when the time is appropriate, I would appreciate it.

CROSS-MOTIONS OF GOSSAMER WING REALTY TRUST

## AND BARON LAND TRUST

THE COURT: Well, the time is now, Mr. Hall. You may
continue and address your cross-motion.

MR. HALL: Thank you. We cross-moved under Rule 5 of the Land Court, and we'd ask the Court to correct the order of September 14th, 2007, which dismissed our cross-claims from our initial responsive pleadings to the Third Amended Complaint, which itself had to be slightly adjusted pursuant to a court order.

The Court's decision on September 14 th dismissed the cross-claims by allowing the Vineyard Conservation Society and other movants' motion to dismiss on the basis of Rule 12 (b) (6).

But the Court cited, and the other parties had cited, the Malone case - if I've pronounced that correctly - which had determined, actually, the decision should have been under Rule $41(\mathrm{~b})$ of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

And we had at that time cross-moved for leave to amend, under Rule 5.
(Time is 10:50:29 AM)

MR. HALL: The Court had allowed us to late file our papers, And then allowed the other parties time to respond, but specifically said that the cross-motion to amend at that time, on August 30th, would have to be marked for a later motion.

As such, the dismissal -- it's our position that the dismissal should have been actually an order ordering us to
amend our pleadings to conform to the Rule 8 requisites that the Court had found.

Regardless, we believe and ask the Court to reconsider that motion entirely, in light of Rule $10(c)$, which the Court did not address in its order of September 14 th, which allowed pleadings to incorporate by reference other pleadings, or other portions of pleadings. And we believe we did so in our cross-motion that was filed August 30th.

As an alternative, we've asked the Court to allow those, the cross-motion to amend of August 30th.

Finally, alternatively, in order for us to quickly process an appeal of that order, which struck our cross-claims, we've asked the Court to enter a separate judgment under Rule $54(\mathrm{~b})$ on that order, so that we may then prosecute an appeal, because we did not believe that there was sufficient finality in the dismissal, that left open the possibility that the Court would later address our cross-motion to amend, which would have been the appropriate relief.

So we believe that there was still relief kind of left open in that order. But given the futility reading of the Court in their February order that denied our motion to amend, we believe that Rule $54(\mathrm{~b})$ separate judgments should enter under the earlier order of September 14 th.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else, Mr. Hall, on
that?

MR. HALL: No. I stand on my papers for the legal arguments, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Would anyone like to be heard either in response to Mr. Hall's --

MR. RAPPAPORT: Your Honor, may I respond to that?

THE COURT: -- comments on --

Yes, Mr. --

MR. RAPPAPORT: This is Ronald Rappaport.

THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Rappaport.

MR. RAPPAPORT: I'd just like to briefly respond.

Rule 5 of the Land Court rules does talk about cross-motions, but what Mr. Hall is attempting to do is to have the orders revisited -- the court orders of September and November. And that would seem to me plainly to fall under Rule 9, which is a motion for reconsideration.

And there are specific rules, obviously, in Rule 9 about procedures to be followed for such a motion. And none of what was done here falls within that. And I don't see how Rule 5 - which is supposed to be directed to the motion of striking an appeal - can be used as a vehicle to circumvent the requirements of Rule 9, which is a motion for reconsideration.

So I just think that that request is procedurally
defective.

I also think that the motion or the request that a separate judgment enter falls within the same procedural defect. I don't think that that can be done under Rule 5. I think that has to be a separate motion marked up and heard. I never have seen rule 5 being used to get sort of substantive motions, that should be done under other rules.

So I have procedural problems with those two requests, Your Honor, particularly the motion for reconsideration.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Rappaport.

Anyone else wish to be heard?

Ms. Roberts?

MS. ROBERTS: I have the same points with respect to this being a motion for reconsideration in large measure, and that it's a wholesale failure to comply with Rule 9 of the Land Court rules.

THE COURT: And I would suggest for those of you here, keep your voice up so your voice will come through loudly on the telephone.

MS. ROBERTS: Okay.

So we agree with respect to what Mr. Rappaport has said with respect to Rule 9.

With respect to Rule $54(\mathrm{~b})$, I'm sure Your Honor is well familiar with the Long v. Wickett decision, which came out --

THE COURT: All 24 pages of it.

MS. ROBERTS: (Chuckles.) -- where they say such things as that the Rule $54(\mathrm{~b})$ is to be used only for narrow exceptions; it should not be routinely granted. It is a, quote, "special dispensation," unquote, "used only in the infrequent harsh case"; if there's a counterclaim that will remain in the proceeding, then that weighs very heavily against granting it.

And obviously there are many claims and counterclaims that continue on, here. So this is plainly not a case for 54(b) certification. And it's not an opportunity to revisit the decision that Your Honor made earlier in the matter.

MOTION OF VINEYARD CONSERVATION SOCIETY TO STRIKE INTERLOCUTORY NOTICES OF APPEAL (again)

MS. ROBERTS: Back to our motion, I would just suggest - and it is sort of a conundrum here - that if Your Honor denies our motion to strike, then the matter's going to go up on appeal on the issue of whether you correctly denied Mr. Hall's motion to amend.

If you grant our motion to strike, and Mr. Hall appeals that, then the matter's going to go up on the issue of whether Mr. Hall's motion is subject to the doctrine of present execution.

That it's going up seems almost inevitable at this
point, but $I$ would suggest that if it does go up, really the issue on which it should go up is whether the doctrine of present execution applies, at which we would, I think, have the weight of authority in support of our position on that.

So, while it's --
THE COURT: But don't you make that same argument either way?

MS. ROBERTS: I don't... no, I -- I will think about this some more, but my initial reaction to it is: Probably not.

If you deny the motion to strike, then that's essentially upholding Mr. Hall's appeal, and the appeal is of your order denying his motion to amend. So don't --

THE COURT: But you would then perhaps say that, well, this whole appeal that's before the Appeals Court is not properly before the Court, because it's a matter of present execution.

I'm just thinking of the way you're raising your argument here --

MS. ROBERTS: Yeah. I -- yeah, mm-hmm?
THE COURT: -- that you would seem to say that, well, you think it doesn't fall within present execution.

So I would think that either on the question of striking a second notice of appeal or, really, on the
merits of the first, to say that this matter isn't properly before the appellate court.

MS. ROBERTS: Well, I guess what'll happen - and I'm not quite sure, 'cause again, I'll have to see how this plays out - but if you deny our motion to strike, then $I$ would probably be taking an interlocutory appeal of that (chuckling) on the issue of whether the present execution doctrine applies here.

It is a hairball. (Laughs.)

THE COURT: Well, as you indicate, something that the appellate courts need to straighten out.

MS. ROBERTS: Yup. Yup.

THE COURT: I mean, because the whole Long v. Wickett lengthy dissertation was them being very upset with the caseload, the number of appeals, the piecemeal appeals in a single action, perhaps.

And the Ellis case has not clarified the situation from, I think, the perspective of many.

MS. ROBERTS: Yup.

THE COURT: Anything else?

MS. ROBERTS: No, Your Honor. Thank you for the time.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Donnelly?

CROSS-MOTIONS OF GOSSAMER WING REALTY TRUST AND BARON LAND TRUST (again)

MR. DONNELLY: I'd only like to add that we were only
served with this cross-motion as of yesterday. Service is not -- there's not proper service with a fax sent to my office.

And I would just like the Court to note that we have rules so that allows us to respond in a proper manner, with the proper amount of time, to a cross-motion.

And that's all I would add to that.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Your comment is duly noted.

Ms. Tillotson?
MS. TILLOTSON: I have nothing to add, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.
And Mr. Wice, do you have anything to add?
MR. WICE: I haven't received anything. My mailings come sometimes a week or 10 days after the dates in them. And whatever it is you're talking about I haven't seen, so I can't comment on that.

THE COURT: All right. I will keep that in mind as well.

Mr. Hall, last word, so I'll give you a chance to respond to what your brothers and sisters have said regarding your cross-motion.

MR. HALL: Yes, Your Honor.

Rule 5 does not limit cross-motions to those that specifically arise out of the motion, and Rule -- Land

Court Rule 5 I'm referring to.

And Land Court Rule 5 -- at any rate, I believe that the Rule 54 motion would be additionally counter to and arises out of the fact that the Vineyard Conservation Society is seeking to have the Court try to bar us from getting to the Appeals Court on whether or not we can have cross-claims that arise out of the same series of transactions, assuming that the decisions come down in a manner that do bar us from the Appeals Court.

Then what relief would we have to having our rights adjudicated with respect to cross-claims that arise out of exactly the same transactions.

It just seems to put the procedure, form...

You know, the form over the substance, to tie us up in getting us all bogged down in all these procedural details just seems to be forgetting the bigger picture that we're looking to have all these rights adjudicated in one hearing, in one matter, rather than trying to break it up, have separate actions filed, and then move to consolidate with all the potential procedural hurdles of finality that come in with respect to Rule $12(\mathrm{~b})(9)$ for pending actions, and all the problems that have been noted, even in the superior court case that Ms. Roberts had cited in the Vineyard Conservation Society papers.

So we ask the Court to review the totality of what
we're trying to do here, and the case law -- deny the VCS motion to strike our notice of appeal, grant our cross-motion, in some form, to either...

If the Court were to grant our cross-motion to give us leave to amend, ordering us to amend, and would address the issue that futility would not apply to every single cross-claim that might be made, and to look at the decisional law, based on Rule $12(\mathrm{~b})(6)$, which means that you can't just strike or dismiss the entirety of a cross-claim if, under any reading of the cross-claim, that there might be one way under which the party so pleading would have a right to some form of relief. Rather, the Court, in its stead, struck the entirety of the cross-pleading.

And moreover, it's under the Court's plenary powers in general, or under Rule $60(\mathrm{~b})$, to go back any time, before a final order is entered, and to make a correction or modification to an order, as long as a request is made.

So we believe that our cross-motion is fully within the context of the bigger picture here, is trying to be allowed (time is 11:02:53 AM)... to have the entirety of the rights declared in this action, rather than having to have it broken up, have some rights determined, have the Appeals Court have to decide later on, and then have to have the whole matter come back just simply to adjudicate
the rights of my clients with respect to these cross-claims, just doesn't make any sense, Your Honor.

Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Roberts?

STATUS, SCHEDULING, ASSEMBLY OF THE RECORD

MS. ROBERTS: Just this is on an unrelated matter. But what I'd like to see, hopefully, before we leave today, is a status conference, so that -- I know Your Honor's got other plans as of July 3rd or so. But if we're going to move the case forward, particularly since Mr. Decoulos is not opposing what we've asked for here, we'd like to -- I don't know who's going to be assigned this case, but --

THE COURT: Well, I can tell you that Chief Justice Scheier has decided that Judge Trombly will be handling this matter. And I would say that you could make a written request to Judge Trombly for a status conference, and then he can schedule it.

I am aware that when we last met on the issue of scheduling, I think it was to be triggered with the idea that once the record was fully complete and shared with all the other parties, at that point we would be ready to go. I've never heard from anyone that that record has been fully --

MS. ROBERTS: It has not --

THE COURT: -- assembled or complete.

MS. ROBERTS: It has not been.

THE COURT: And so that that's why it hasn't been scheduled. So perhaps status conference would be appropriate, and also at that time, Judge Trombly can assess the situation with what appeals, if any, are being filed, on whatever grounds there may be.

Unless someone else wants to be heard --

Ms. Tillotson?

MS. TILLOTSON: Your Honor, I would just ask that -and again -- that there be some consideration given to an order requiring the assembly of that record within a certain amount of time.

I mean, it's been, I think, a year since I've been involved in the case, and I think we've been waiting for that record to be assembled for approximately a year.

And I would point out that despite -- regardless of how the present motions pan out, that essentially what's being debated is whether or not the plaintiffs will be permitted - plaintiffs or certain defendants will be permitted - to assert additional legal claims.

I don't think it's going to make a difference in terms of the factual record and the documents that get assembled whether or not they are able to assert, for example, an implied easement, based on an instrument of record.

The instrument of record, presumably, is going to be
in that record that's going to be assembled, whatever it is they're relying on.

So again I would respectfully ask that some consideration be given to giving a date certain for that record to be assembled, so that we can then respond and move on with it, because $I$ don't think that the record should be impacted by whether or not decision is made either on these motions or frankly at the appellate level.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I understand what you're saying. I do think, however, that that is something that Judge Trombly at a status conference, when Mr. Decoulos and other parties are all present.

I mean, clearly I don't think it's proper -- although I understand what you're saying about the amount of time that's transpired, but $I$ don't intend to issue an order today, directed to Mr. Decoulos, without him at least being given a chance to be heard on that.

So I think that that certainly would be an appropriate matter at the next status conference.

I would say in conclusion here, as I take this matter under advisement, that for late-filed motions -- and I know that there's an argument of whether the rule here, Rule 5, authorizes a cross-motion to be filed as late as one day before the hearing. But if it's found that a party has been given insufficient time to respond to a motion, the

Court very often will give the parties an opportunity to submit a memorandum post hearing.

I think, as I take this matter under advisement, that no additional memoranda would be required. But if $I$ find that it would be helpful to have additional filings, I will let you know prior to ruling.

But I will look at the papers as filed at the present time, and decide whether it's appropriate for me to issue rulings on what I have.

Thank you very much.
MS. ROBERTS: Thank you, Judge.
[MR. RAPPAPORT]: Thank you.
COURT OFFICER: All rise, please.
(Matter adjourned at 11:07:45 AM.)

## C ERTIFICATION

I, Ellen H. Dibble, an Approved Court Transcriber, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript, from the audio recording provided to me by Attorney Wendy Sibbison of the Land Court proceedings in the above entitled matter.

I, Ellen H. Dibble, further certify that the foregoing is in compliance with the Administrative Office of the Trial Court Directive on Transcript Format.

I, Ellen H. Dibble, further certify that I neither am counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this hearing was taken, and further that I am not financially nor otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

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| \# | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 137:9, 138:20, } \\ & \text { 139:19, 139:24, } \\ & \text { 140:17, 143:16, } \\ & \text { 147:8, 147:11, } \\ & \text { 147:22, 149:4, } \\ & \text { 149:13, 149:20, } \\ & \text { 169:22, 172:22, } \\ & \text { 173:1, 173:6, 174:24, } \\ & \text { 175:14, 176:10, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 11:42:47 [1] - 88:8 } \\ & \text { 11:44:56[1] - 221:21 } \\ & \text { 11:52:53 [1] -95:10 } \\ & \text { 11th [2] - 108:11, } \\ & \text { 252:12 } \\ & \text { 12[9]-63:21, 76:23, } \\ & \text { 109:25, 127:20, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 164: 10,169: 4,169: 8, \\ & 170: 13,174: 5 \\ & 175_{[1]}-169: 23 \\ & 177[3]-34: 2,36: 5, \\ & 204: 18 \\ & 178{ }_{[1]}-34: 5 \\ & 18{ }_{[1]}-8: 21 \\ & 1800[2]-225: 4, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 189 [41]-9:20, 9:22, } \\ & 31: 18,31: 19,31: 20, \\ & 31: 24,32: 1,32: 7, \\ & 32: 15,33: 8,33: 17, \\ & 33: 20,36: 7,37: 1, \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\begin{array}{r} \text { \#10 [5] - 62:19, } \\ \text { 111:19, 208:19, } \\ \text { 222:19, 248:19 } \end{array}$ |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | 37:17, 43:4, 78:8 |
|  |  |  |  | 28:10 |
|  |  | 128:3, 129:13, 130:4, |  | 130:24, 138:20 |
|  |  | 168:8, 223:18 |  | 139:19, 139:20 |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 183:19, 184:10, } \\ & 209 \cdot 20 \end{aligned}$ | 12(b [1] - 154:3 | 1812 [2]-225: | 140:17, 143:17, |
| 'em [2] - 60:21, |  | 12(b)(6 ${ }_{\text {[5] }}$-154:3,154:13, 154:19, | 250:20 | 147:11, 149:13 |
| 121:4 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 209:20 } \\ & \text { 1-188 [2] - 112:18, } \end{aligned}$ |  | 850 [2] - 145:1 | 149:16, 164:10 |
| 'everybody | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 123:11 } \\ & \text { 1/16/07 [2] - 210:14, } \end{aligned}$ | 156:8, 271:8 | 145:6 | 169:5, 169:23, |
| 44:6 |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 156:6, } 262: 11 \\ & \text { 12(b)(9 }{ }_{[1]}-270: 21 \\ & \text { 125 }{ }_{[1]}-39: 3 \end{aligned}$ | 1860's [1] - 162 | 170:13, 174: |
| 'law [1] - 135:24 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 210:17 } \\ & \text { 10 [11] - 57:12, } \\ & \text { 126:14, 126:18, } \\ & \text { 126:25, 198:19, } \\ & 220: 21,223: 23, \\ & 228: 23,229: 9,240: 8, \\ & 269: 15 \end{aligned}$ |  | 1863 [5] - 161:1 | 174:24, 176:10, |
| 'severance [1] - |  |  | 163:17, 165:5, 165:9 | 9, 18 |
| 10:21 <br> 'the [1] - 11:18 |  |  | 235:15 | 187:9, 187:11 |
|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 125[1]-39: 3 \\ & \text { 12:11:52 }{ }_{[1]}-109: 25 \\ & \text { 12th }[17]-59: 3, \\ & \text { 100:17, 107:15, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 1866 [6] - 161:16, } \\ & \text { 162:17, 164:12, } \\ & \text { 165:1, 165:3, 166:16 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 1897[1]-233:2 } \\ & \text { 18th [3]-210:23, } \end{aligned}$ |
|  |  |  |  | 24:13, 250 |
|  |  | 107:19, 108:6, | 1869 [4]-162:14 | $\begin{aligned} & 19[2]-142: 23, \\ & 171: 9 \end{aligned}$ |
|  | $100[2]-19: 8,58: 3$ | 108:12, 108:18, | 164:15, 164:24, |  |
| 01060[5] - 62:19, |  | 108:23, 109:5,109:11, 218:23, | 165:14 | 190 [5]-9:22, 32 |
| 111:19, 208:19, | $103 \text { [2] - 119:1, }$ |  |  | 33:8, 33:21, 78:8 |
| 222:19, 248:19 | 119:8106 [6] - 64:21 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 109:11, 218:23, } \\ & \text { 219:1, 219:2, 241:11, } \end{aligned}$ | $33: 19,33: 21,37: 23$ | 1910 [1] - 145:6 |
| 01772 [2]-64:12, |  | 241:16, 241:17, | 37:24, 47:5, 47:17, | 19103 [2]-225:4 |
| 3:9 | $106[6]-64: 21$, $113: 11,113: 18$, | 241:18 | 37:24, $47.5,47: 17$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 250:21 } \\ & 1954[1]-233: 1 \end{aligned}$ |
| $\begin{gathered} \mathbf{0 1 9 6 0}[4]-64: 3, \\ 113: 3,210: 3,224: 3 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 113:11, 113:18, } \\ & \text { 210:15, 225:7, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 13 \text { [2]-249:23, } \\ & 259: 10 \end{aligned}$ | 149:12, 149:15, |  |
|  | 250:17 |  | 151:5, 163:25, | $1954[1]-233: 1$ $1992[1]-64: 14$ |
| 02108[3]-210:23, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 10:07:26 [1] - 226:1 } \\ & \text { 10:11:35[] }-229: 4 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \mathbf{1 3 0}_{[1]}-51: 14 \\ & \text { 13th }[2]-198: 9, \end{aligned}$ | 165:17, 166:11, | 1997 [2]-87:2,118:15 |
| 224:14, 250:4 |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 176:17, 176:23, } \\ & \text { 188:2, 188:3, 188:18, } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| 02109 [2]-224:10, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 10:22[1] -224:16 } \\ & \text { 10:22:05 }[1]-237: 13 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 13th [2] - 198:9 } \\ & 251: 2 \end{aligned}$ |  | 118:15 ${ }^{1998}$ [3] - 118:1 |
| 250:10 |  | 14 [5] - 34:18, 74:20, | 236:2 | 118:20, 157:12 |
| 02110[1]-224:7 | 10:22:05 [1] - 237:13 10:31:05 ${ }^{1]}$ - 244:23 | 76:23, 249:14, | 1870's [2] - 130:9, | 19th [5]-59:12,59:14, 84:25, 128:14, |
| 02110-3113 [1] - | 10:31:22 [1] - 245:3 | 249:18 | 130:22 |  |
| 64:7 | 10:31:57 [1] - 245:15 | $\begin{gathered} \text { 14th }[4]-262: 4, \\ \text { 262:8, 263:5, 263:24 } \end{gathered}$ | 1870s [1] - 126:17 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 234:24 } \\ & \text { 1st }[1]-106: 13 \end{aligned}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \mathbf{0 2 4 5 9}[1]-113: 12 \\ & \mathbf{0 2 5 3 9}{ }_{[5]}-64: 22, \end{aligned}$ | 10:34:03 [1] - 247:10 |  | $\begin{aligned} & 1871 \text { [23]-126:20, } \\ & \text { 143:22, 144:1, } \end{aligned}$ |  |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 10:34:21[1] - 251:1 } \\ & \text { 10:34:44 [2] - 251:7, } \end{aligned}$ | 15[3]-239:10, |  |  |
| 113:19, 210:16, |  | 245:23, 256:1 | 146:13, 147:5, 147:6, | 2 |
| 225:8, 250:18 | 261:3 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 15-year }[1]-163: 18 \\ & \text { 15th }[5]-52: 11, \end{aligned}$ | 147:10, 147:20, |  |
| 02539-5155 [5] - | 10:38:03 ${ }_{[1]}-254: 3$10:50:29 ${ }_{[1]}-262: 18$ |  | 147:21, 148:5, 149:5, | 2 [4]-59:3, 63:1, |
| 64:24, 113:22, |  | $\begin{aligned} & 52: 20,59: 5,219: 1, \\ & 219: 2 \end{aligned}$ | 161:15, 162:1, | 105:22, 223:22 |
| 210:19, 225:11, | 10th [2] - 226:4, |  | 166:20, 168:10, |  |
| 250:14 | 236:18 | $16 \text { [6] - 64:12, 113:9, }$ |  | 2/12/07[1] - 209:14 |
| 02653 [5]-64:18, | $\begin{array}{r} 11[11]-63: 1,64: 12, \\ 112: 1,113: 9,120: 16, \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 140:6, 209:21, } \\ & \text { 218:21, 248:17 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 168:12, } 169: 9, \\ & 169: 13,188: 18 \end{aligned}$ | $20[10]-57: 11,$ |
| 113:15, 210:11, |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 169:13, 188:18, } \\ & 195: 6 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 20[10]-57: 11, \\ \text { 148:25, 149:1, 171:9, } \end{gathered}$ |
| 224:22, 250:7 | $\begin{aligned} & 126: 15,209: 1,223: 1, \\ & 249: 1,255: 6,255: 9 \end{aligned}$ | 160 [1] | 195:6 | 148:25, 149:1, 171:9, |
| 02675[4]-64:10, |  | $17[1]-127: 9$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1878[11]-127: 20, \\ & 127: 22,145: 1, \end{aligned}$ | 235:15, 236:11, |
| 113:7, 210:7, 224:17 | 11/16/11 [2] - |  | 127:22, 145:1, |  |
| 05255-1992 [1] - | 111:17, 208:1 | $171[1]-169: 2$ | 147:12, 147:20, | $2001 \text { [2] - 76:23, }$ |
| 64:15 | 11/16/2011 [2] |  | 163:18, 168:8, |  |
|  | 62:17, 222:17 | $33: 20,126: 21,128: 4,$ | 188:19, 235:16 | 2003 [1] - 135:6 |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & 111[1] \\ & 112\left[{ }_{[1]}\right. \end{aligned}$ | 147:11, 147:22, | $188 \text { [18] - 9:20, 9:22, }$ | 2005[1] - 89:22 |
| 1 [39]-9:19, 9:22, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 11:00 }{ }_{[1]}-242: 6 \\ & \text { 11:02:53 }{ }_{[1]}-271: 21 \end{aligned}$ | $149: 4,149: 23$ |  | 63:21, 74:20, 110:1, |
|  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 125:24, 130:8, } \\ & \text { 130:18, 132:7, 132:9, } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| 31:18, 37:15, 63:21, | 11:07:45[1]-275:14 | 174 [14]-34:1 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 133:19, 137:9, } \\ & \text { 139:19, 169:24, } \end{aligned}$ | 112:23, 114:3, 119:1, |
| 106:8, 112:22, | 11:10:29 [1] - 65:1 | $128: 5,128: 10$ |  | 120:16, 120:21,122:12 |
| 125:24, 126:20, |  | 143:17, 147:11, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 170:13, 172:22, } \\ & \text { 173:2, 173:7, 183:19, } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| 127:9, 128:4, 128:9, | 11:27:45 [1] - 77:9 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 147:13, 149:16, } \\ & \text { 149:17, 149:20, } \end{aligned}$ |  | $2007 \text { [10] - 209:21, }$ |
| 129:14, 130:8, | 11:30:18[1] - 211:1 |  | 184:11 | 223:17, 223:18, |
| 130:18, 133:18, |  |  | 1880 [1] - 145:6 | 223:23, 226:4, |




1 - 280

| 254:3, 261:3, 262:18, | anew [1]-164:8 | 253:19, 254:1, 254:8, | 271:24 | appreciate [3] - |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 275:14 | Ann [10]-7:13, 64:9, | 254:13 | appeals [6]-21:12, | 8:10, 137:12, 261:22 |
| AM) [1] - 245:15 | 65:10, 113:6, 114:10, | appealed [2] - 253:5, | $253: 3,266: 22$ | appreciated [1] |
| AM).. [1] - 271:21 | 210:6, 212:2, 224:16, | 255:13 | 268:15, 273:5 | $137: 13$ |
| am.. [1] - 98:9 ambiguity [1] | $\begin{gathered} \text { 227:7, 237:12 } \\ \text { anniversary } \end{gathered}$ | Appeals [143]-8:20, 9:3, 9:18, 16:13, | $\begin{gathered} \text { appear [4]-40:7, } \\ \text { 118:24, 121:24, } \end{gathered}$ | APPROACH [2] 63:14, 94:24 |
| $142: 21$ <br> amenable | $\begin{gathered} 192: 14,236: 18 \\ \text { answer [18] - } 2 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 17: 16,19: 3,19: 4 \\ & 22: 15,23: 8,23: 13 \end{aligned}$ | 205:24 <br> APPE | $\begin{gathered} \text { approach [12] - } \\ 74: 8.77: 24.84: 1 \end{gathered}$ |
| 101:25, 103:11 | 21:4, 44:7, 44:8, | 23:17, 27:21, 28:18, | 13:8 | 94:2, 95:2, 155:16 |
| AMEND [2] - 209:13, | 44:15, 47:21, 49:23, | 29:4, 29:16, 31:18, | appearance [7] - | 156:15, 192:22, |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 249:16 } \\ & \text { amend [32] - 154:14, } \end{aligned}$ | $55: 13,58: 6,117: 22$ | $33: 11,37: 2,37: 16$ | 13:12, 54:14, 121:23, | $215: 2,226: 8,240: 5$ |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 154:14, 156:19, } \\ & \text { 179:12, 229:3, 229:9, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 40: 15,40: 17,41: 2 \\ & 42: 8,42: 14,43: 3 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 206: 8,212: 17,213: 5, \\ & 240: 9 \end{aligned}$ | $241: 4$ |
| 217:5, 218:19, 219:7, | 232:3, 256:25, | 43:10, 50:19, 50:21, | APPEARANCES [10] | 23:1, 27:25, 50:14, |
| 221:9, 221:19, 231:4, | 257:23 | 52:10, 76:8, 77:22, | -63:16, 64:1, 112:21, | 51:11, 55:15, 68:2, |
| 231:7, 253:18, 254:1, | answered [8] - 21:3, | 78:2, 78:21, 79:3, | 113:1, 209:16, 210:1, | 70:22, 71:20, 75:3, |
| 254:8, 254:9, 254:11, | 23:15, 48:6, | 79:6, 79:16, 79:20, | 223:21, 224:1, | 118:2, 174:14, |
| 254:12, 256:15, | 55:11, 104:2, 142:21, | 81:23, 86:10, 89:3, | 249:21, 250:1 | 243:22, 255:19, |
| 259:9, 260:8, 260:12, | 155:24 | 89:21, 91:11, 91:17, | appeared [7] - | 261:22, 263:19, |
| 260:21, 261:2, | answered.. [1] - | 91:24, 92:21, 93:6, | 12:21, 33:19, 33:24, | $273: 4,274: 18,275: 8$ |
| 262:17, 262:21, | 23:15 | 93:8, 93:12, 93:17, | 124:7, 245:19, | appropriately [2] - |
| 263:1, 263:10, | Answering [1] - | 96:6, 101:18, 102:18, | 245:22, 245:24 | 80:17, 109:3 |
| 263:18, 263:23, | 211:2 | 102:19, 102:21 | appearing [1] | Approved [15] - |
| 266:20, 267:14, | ANSWE | 102:24, 103:1, 103:4, | 210:20 | 62:2, 62:16, 63:24 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 271:5 } \\ & \text { amended [22] - } \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 103:8, 103:10, } \\ & \text { 125:22, 130:7, } \end{aligned}$ | appellate [21] - | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 111:2, 111:16, } \\ & \text { 112:24, 208:2, } \end{aligned}$ |
| 21:25, 39:19, 60:15, | 58:16, 60:17, 61:6 | $\begin{aligned} & 130: 10,130: 11, \\ & 130: 17.130: 24 \end{aligned}$ | 138:18, 139:1, 139:5, | 208:16, 209:23, |
| 61:1, 61:2, 61:4, | anti [1] - 253:12 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 130:17, 130:24, } \\ & \text { 131:16, 132:2, 132:8, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 139: 12,139: 23 \\ & 140: 10,140: 19 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 222: 2,222: 16, \\ & 223: 24,248: 2, \end{aligned}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 118:7, 118:15, } \\ & \text { 118:17, 143:11, } \end{aligned}$ | anti-S 253:12 | 132:18, 133:2, 133:8, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 140:10, 140:19, } \\ & \text { 141:13, 173:18, } \end{aligned}$ | $248: 16,249: 2$ |
| 143:13, 154:22, | anticipate [4] - | 133:16, 133:21, | 174:1, 174:2, 174:5, | April [1] - 7:2 |
| 154:24, 157:10, | 108:8, 108:9, 108:15, | 134:3, 134:7, 134:19, | 256:11, 256:22, | AQUINNAH [5] - |
| 157:11, 183:12, | $154: 23$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 134:20, 135:2, } \\ & 136: 13.137: 10 \end{aligned}$ | $257: 2,258: 3,268: 2$ | 63:10, 112:10, |
| 183:13, 217:11, $200 \cdot 18 \quad 232 \cdot 7$ | anyway [3] - 145:17, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 136:13, 137:10, } \\ & \text { 137:13, 137:17 } \end{aligned}$ | $268: 11,274: 8$ | $209: 10,223: 8,249: 9$ |
| 220:18, 232:7, | $197: 23,261: 12$ | 137:13, 137:17, 137:18, 137:21, | appendix [14] - | Aquinnah [21]-7:4, |
| $232: 11,246: 3$ <br> AMENDED [2] - | apart [3] - 35:20, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 137:18, 137:21, } \\ & \text { 137:24, 138:1, 138:6, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 21: 12,60: 16,148: 4 \\ & 160: 22,194: 10 \end{aligned}$ | $8: 5,38: 21,64: 22$ <br> 65.22, 95.18, 96.21 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { AMENDED [2] - } \\ & 223: 15,231: 18 \end{aligned}$ | $90: 3,103: 22$ | 137:24, 138:1, 138:6, 139:18, 139:19, | 160:22, 194:10, | 65:22, 95:18, 96:21, |
| Amended [2] - | 259:15 | 139:25, 140:15, | 194:14, 197:4, | 114:15, 126:16 |
| 227:21, 262:5 | App [1] - 135:23 | 140:17, 140:21, | 197:22, 197:25, | 128:18, 188:1, |
| amending [2] - | APPEAL [3] - | 140:24, 141:18 | 198:9, 240:13 | 210:16, 212:13, |
| $154: 21,220: 4$ | 249:12, 252:16, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 142:12, 145:22, } \\ & \text { 155:4, 155:18, } \end{aligned}$ | $240: 21$ | $225: 8,227: 14$ $250: 18,251: 20$ |
| amendment [1] - | $266: 15$ | $155: 23,156: 1,$ | applicable [2] - | $250: 18,251: 20$ |
| 118:20 | appeal [42]-43:24, | 156:19, 157:21, | $78: 15,136: 4$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { arbitration [1] - } \\ & 116 \cdot 20 \end{aligned}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { AMENDMENT } \\ & \text { 249:15 } \end{aligned}$ | 135:25, 161:6, | 159:12, 159:20, | 138:17, 139:11, | 116:20 area [13] - 27 |
| America [1] - 137:16 | $\begin{aligned} & 252: 20,252: 23, \\ & 253: 1,253: 7,253: 14 \end{aligned}$ | 159:21, 159:23, | 141:23, 173:17, | 73:7, 126:16, 129:10, |
| amount [5] - 12:8, | $253: 17,255: 5$ | 160:7, 160:23, | $174: 2,174: 4$ | 172:11, 186:25, |
| 124:11, 269:6, | $255: 12,255: 17$ | 164:1, 167:6, 167:24, | applied [1]-253:10 | 189:7, 189:14, 201:1, 201:12. 216:9. 233:3. |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 273:12, 274:14 } \\ & \text { analysis }[2]-27: 8, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 255: 20,256: 2,256: 4 \\ & 256: 7,256: 9,256: 10 \end{aligned}$ | 170:23, 171:18, | $\begin{gathered} \text { applies }[5]-88: 14, \\ 257: 5,257: 17,267: 3, \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 201:12, 216:9, 233:3, } \\ & 260: 2 \end{aligned}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 254:3 } \\ & \text { analyze }[1]-154: 1 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 256: 20,256: 21, \\ & 256: 24,257: 1,2 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 172:25, 173:6, } \\ & \text { 174:23, 175:1, 176:4, } \end{aligned}$ | 268:8 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { areas [3]-32:22, } \\ & 129: 5,215: 23 \end{aligned}$ |
| AND [13]-63:12, | 257:4, 257:8, 257:19, | 184:10, 185:21 | 28:14, 37:20, 175:12, | arena [1]-25:2 |
| 66:20, 121:6, 223:13, | 257:22, 260:11, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 194:14, 194:20 } \\ & 201: 11.220: 10 \end{aligned}$ | $256: 13,261: 12$ | argue [8] - 38:13, |
| 230:9, 249:13, | 261:6, 261:10, | 220:11, 231:25, | 271:6 | $41: 23,96: 13,123: 24$ |
| 249:15, 249:16, | $261: 11,263: 12$ | 254:4, 254:6, 254:20, | appoint [1] - 166:4 | 124:22, 171:18, |
| 249:18, 252:17, | $263: 15,264: 22$ | 254:23, 254:24, | appointed [7] - | 183:21, 191:16 |
| 252:18, 261:24, | $266: 19,267: 13$ | 259:14, 261:7, | 13:21, 161:18, | argued [13] - 37:14, |
| 268:24 | 267:16, 267:25, | 261:13, 261:15, | 164:15, 165:5, | $38: 15,50: 17,50: 18$ |
| and.. [1]-14:17 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 268:6, 271:2 } \\ & \text { appealable [4] - } \end{aligned}$ | $267: 16,270: 6,270: 9$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 165:12, 166:15, } \\ & 166: 17 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 61:1, 92:16, 96:22, } \\ & \text { 167:19, 167:21, } \end{aligned}$ |



| ```become [5] - 67:22, 136:8, 144:2, 178:16, 190:25 becomes [1] - 186:22 Bedford [1] - 25:8 bedrest [1] \(-56: 10\) BEEN [2]-223:15, 231:18 BEFORE [5] - 63:15, 112:20, 209:15, 223:20, 249:20 begin [6] - 15:18, 66:18, 121:7, 183:16, 228:21, 252:14 beginning \([7]\) - 20:25, 23:19, 39:17, 48:5, 87:11, 172:23, 176:24 Beginning [2] - 178:2, 226:10 behalf [16] - 13:24, 66:21, 69:24, 70:22, 116:7, 118:10, 119:16, 120:2, 123:2, 172:7, 198:17, 209:12, 212:23, 214:1, 230:13, 249:18 BEHALF [6] - 119:14, 223:13, 223:15, 230:8, 231:17, 252:17 behind \({ }_{[1]}\) - 141:1 behoove [1] - 102:25 BEING [1] - 15:19 believes [1]-20:12 belongs [1]-143:24 below [9]-31:20, 31:24, 32:1, 32:8, 33:8, 33:14, 36:7, 132:7, 187:10 Ben [1] - 71:11 beneficial [1]-104:4 benefit \([9]\) - 141:5, 142:17, 152:19, 162:15, 168:13, 174:24, 175:4, 175:7, 189:11 benefitted [1] - 131:11 Benjamin [13] - 7:15, 64:23, 65:23, 92:11, 113:20, 210:17, 212:14, 225:9, 227:15, 229:22, 234:9, 250:13, 251:17 BENJAMIN [1] -None``` | $\begin{gathered} \text { Bennett [1]-150:6 } \\ \text { Besse [3] - 115:23, } \\ 210: 7,212: 3 \\ \text { best }[7]-86: 15, \\ \text { 108:19, 150:3, } \\ \text { 203:23, 204:3, 216:3, } \\ \text { 239:23 } \\ \text { bet }[2]-119: 4,119: 7 \\ \text { Betsy }[4]-225: 5, \\ 227: 11,250: 21, \\ \text { 251:21 } \\ \text { better }[5]-91: 6, \\ 91: 12,204: 4,221: 12, \\ 242: 7 \\ \text { Better }[1]-146: 7 \\ \text { between }[9]-10: 24, \\ 24: 13,24: 18,169: 13, \\ 170: 13,193: 9,231: 3, \\ 235: 5,238: 6 \\ \text { Beverly }[1]-181: 23 \\ \text { beyond }[4]-75: 12, \\ \text { 196:5, 238:4, 259:22 } \\ \text { bifurcate }[12]-16: 8, \\ 19: 14,20: 1,29: 12, \\ 34: 19,34: 24,41: 9, \\ 47: 8,53: 14,60: 7, \\ 85: 15,186: 12 \\ \text { Bifurcate }[5]-16: 11, \\ 53: 5,53: 14,53: 15 \\ \text { bifurcated }[7]- \\ 18: 25,19: 11,86: 24, \\ 107: 22,184: 23, \\ \text { 193:8, 231:24 } \\ \text { bifurcating }[4]- \\ 30: 12,47: 21,75: 8, \\ 77: 12 \\ \text { BIFURCATION }[3]- \\ 15: 21,63: 13,74: 16 \\ \text { bifurcation }[32]- \\ 18: 15,18: 17,23: 6, \\ 26: 8,28: 3,29: 8, \\ 44: 2,49: 15,50: 2, \\ 51: 23,52: 3,52: 6, \\ 59: 19,74: 20,76: 6, \\ 77: 16,79: 1,81: 10, \\ 85: 17,85: 19,86: 3, \\ 90: 3,94: 1,94: 3, \\ 98: 25,103: 22,105: 2, \\ 151: 17,191: 2,216: 5, \\ 232: 20,237: 17 \\ \text { big [1] - 46:14 } \\ \text { bigger }[2]-270: 16, \\ 271: 20 \\ \text { binding }[1]-91: 12 \\ \text { bisected }[2]-96: 11, \\ 97: 1 \\ \text { Bisected }[1]-97: 2 \\ \text { bit }[7]-8: 10,25: 1, \\ 27: 2,101: 15,178: 12, \\ 202: 25,203: 2 \\ \text { bits }[1]-236: 23 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { block }[1]-101: 23 \\ & \text { blown }[1]-123: 19 \\ & \text { boat }[1]-37: 9 \\ & \text { Boating }[1]-146: 7 \\ & \text { body }[3]-80: 10, \\ & \text { 92:3, } 98: 2 \\ & \text { bogged }[1]-270: 15 \\ & \text { Book }[1]-149: 4 \\ & \text { book }[1]-169: 4 \\ & \text { booklet }[1]-149: 25 \\ & \text { bordering }[1]-97: 7 \\ & \text { borders }[1]-201: 21 \\ & \text { born }[1]-56: 17 \\ & \text { Boston }[13]-63: 20, \\ & 64: 7,112: 22,209: 20, \\ & 210: 23,223: 22, \\ & 224: 7,224: 10, \\ & 224: 14,230: 23, \\ & 249: 22,250: 4, \\ & 250: 10 \\ & \text { bother }[1]-54: 22 \\ & \text { bothering }[1]- \\ & 73: 14 \\ & \text { bottom }[2]-30: 24, \\ & 126: 18 \\ & \text { bought }[3]-73: 6, \\ & 97: 20,178: 11 \\ & \text { Boulevard }[2]- \\ & 225: 4,250: 20 \\ & \text { bound }[8]-137: 13, \\ & 140: 20,152: 24, \\ & 160: 24,161: 5,166: 9, \\ & 170: 3,174: 1 \\ & \text { boundary }[1]- \\ & 161: 19 \\ & \text { bounded }[3]- \\ & 128: 10,128: 11, \\ & 170: 2 \\ & \text { bounding }[1]-170: 6 \\ & \text { bounds }[2]-128: 18, \\ & 164: 13 \\ & \text { box }[1]-64: 14 \\ & \text { Box }[15]-64: 17, \\ & 64: 21,64: 24,113: 15, \\ & 113: 18,113: 21, \\ & 210: 11,210: 15, \\ & 210: 18,224: 21, \\ & 225: 7,225: 10,250: 7, \\ & 250: 14,250: 17 \\ & \text { boxing }[1]-195: 10 \\ & \text { break }[4]-17: 1, \\ & 166: 3,245: 23, \\ & 270: 18 \\ & \text { Brewster }[1]-224: 6 \\ & \text { Brian }[1]-200: 18 \\ & \text { BRIAN }[1]-249: 13 \\ & \text { brief }[9]-34: 14, \\ & 51: 25,52: 11,81: 23, \\ & 138: 16,143: 18, \\ & 146: 5,174: 22, \\ & 234: 14 \end{aligned}$ |  | ```77:18, 80:2, 81:5, 81:17, 86:18, 86:21, 87:3, 87:6, 87:7, 89:5, 89:6, 89:9, 91:16, 104:17, 134:15, 172:16, 185:16, 187:15 burden's [2]-37:6, 86:9 burden-shifting [1] - 81:17 burdened [7]-20:4, 26:16, 39:25, 40:9, 131:12, 175:3, 176:7 burdens [3]-11:24, 40:19, 261:15 bureau [1]-213:10 Burke [4] - 13:12, 14:14, 54:12, 57:19 Business [10] - 62:20, 62:22, 111:20, 111:22, 208:20, 208:22, 222:20, 222:22, 248:20, 248:22 business [4]-44:1, 115:5, 237:23, 256:23 BY [6] - 15:19, 112:15, 228:4, 249:12, 252:16, 252:17``` <br> C-A-M-M-A-N-N ${ }_{[1]}$ 27:15 <br> calendar [2] - <br> 106:25, 109:12 <br> Callanan [3] 117:10, 118:9, 119:10 <br> Cammann [3] 26:20, 27:10, 27:17 can.. [1]-21:7 cannot [4]-53:8, 58:2, 175:20, 184:4 capabilities [1] 66:11 <br> capacity ${ }_{[1]}$ - 206:18 Cape [3] - 66:4, 230:24, 242:7 <br> caption [1] - 243:3 captioned [1] 177:17 <br> car [1] - 233:22 <br> Cara [2]-224:6, <br> 226:20 <br> Cardinal [5]-64:17, 113:14, 210:10, <br> 224:21, 250:6 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |





1-286


| urtroom [12] - 8:8, | -claims [13] | 60:5, 107:20, 108:24 | :2, 125:8, 166:1 | 0:11, 231:25 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 65:7, 83:3, 86:4, } \\ & \text { 211:12, 211:21, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 68: 22,260: 15, \\ & 260: 17,260: 2 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 109:11, 120:19, } \\ & \text { 149:2, 196:8, } 235 \end{aligned}$ | 198:1 | 254:4, 254:5, 254:13, |
| 224:16, 226:8, | 22, 260:23 | 21, 238:4, 240:2 | 2:4, 43: | 256 |
| 237:12, 242:1, 251:9, | 262:4, 262:9 | 241:10, 244:23 | 80:11, 82:17 | 24, 258:2, 261:7 |
| $259: 17$ | 263:13, 270:7, 270:11, 272:2 | 244:25, $274: 4$ date-stamp | 82:24, 109:12, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 262:8, 262:14, } \\ & 265: 24,266: 12 \end{aligned}$ |
| $7: 10,141: 13,162: 1$ | CROSS-CLAIMS ${ }_{\text {[3] }}$ | 120:19 | $145: 19,146: 10$ | 274 |
| 268:11 cover [2]-8:18 | $\begin{array}{r} 249: 17 \\ \text { cross } \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 74:19, } 120: 16 \\ & \text { DATED }_{[1]}-249: \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 189:10, 189:13, } \\ & \text { 215:17, 241:9, 256:6, } \end{aligned}$ | 271:8 decisions |
| 201:24 | 149:7, 231:7, 251 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { dates }[3]-33: 19 \\ & 58: 24,269: 15 \end{aligned}$ | 257:3, 258:6, 271:2 | 69:16, 83:24, 125:21, |
| 182:2 | $3: 10$ | vid [14] - 7:19 | decided [17] - 29:4, | 37:24, 155:6, 157:9 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 128:23 } \\ & \text { create }[24]-11: 10, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 269:22, 271:3, 271:4, } \\ & \text { 271:19, 274:23 } \end{aligned}$ | 114:16, 225:3, 225:5 227:11, 233:20, | $\begin{aligned} & 134: 24,135: 4, \\ & 135: 25,136: 1 \end{aligned}$ | 270:8 decisive [1] - 254:13 declaration [1] - |
|  | OSS-MOTION | 250:19, 250:21 | $3: 25,144: 5,146: 6,$ |  |
| 18:21, 19:16, 20:3, | - 249:14, 249:15 | 251:2 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 146:16, 146:20, } \\ & \text { 161:23, 232:19, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 142:16 } \\ & \text { declared }_{[1]}- \end{aligned}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & 30: 1,36: 4,41: 22 \\ & 42: 11,42: 17,43: 17 \end{aligned}$ | 158:11 | 53:7, 57:9, 57 | 272:14 |  |
|  | OSS-MOTION | $1,57: 12,60$ | decides [3]-16:23 | 271:22 <br> decline [1] - 103:13 |
| $\begin{aligned} & 48: 6,51: 3,78: 8 \\ & 86: 13,151: 21,202: 8 \end{aligned}$ | ${ }^{[2]}$ - 261:23, 268:23 | 123:13, 124:10 | 106:17, 254:6 |  |
|  | otions | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 124:11, 174:1 } \\ & 228: 23,228: 2 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { deciding [4] - 28:2 } \\ 90: 4,163: 9,164: 4 \end{gathered}$ | DECOULOS [217] - |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 232:2, 237:18 } \\ & \text { created }[6]-143: 1, \end{aligned}$ | 264:14, 269:24 | 229:9, 239:9, 269:15 | decision [112]- $8: 20,8: 24,10: 10$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 7:8, 18:25, 19:6, } \\ & \text { 19:23, 20:5, 20:11, } \\ & \text { 20:15, 20:19, 20:21, } \end{aligned}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 143:8, 146:19, } \\ & \text { 159:11, 218:15, } \\ & \text { 233:1 } \\ & \text { creation }[3]-11: 15, \end{aligned}$ | cross-moved [2] 262:2, 262:16 | dead [1]-259:18 <br> deadline [6] - 53:2 | $\begin{aligned} & 8: 20,8: 24,10: 10 \\ & 11: 9,11: 22,16: 1 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 20:15, 20:19, 20:21, } \\ & \text { 21:6, 21:16, 21:18, } \end{aligned}$ |
|  | cross-pleading [1] - 271:14 | $\begin{aligned} & 57: 6,109: 7,109: 1 \\ & 124: 17,234: 20 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 19: 5,23: 8,23: 2 \\ & 24: 5,24: 8,28: 8, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1: 22,22: 2,22: 7, \\ & 7: 13,30: 7,31: 9, \end{aligned}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & 86: 12,232: 1 \\ & \text { critical }[4]-14: 25 \\ & \text { 144:7, 171:5, 174:16 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { crossed [2] - 93:14, } \\ & \text { 180:16 } \end{aligned}$ | deadlines [2] -$\begin{aligned} & 15: 14,239: 19 \\ & \text { deal }[27]-8: 22, \end{aligned}$11:3, 12:25, 17:10, | $\begin{aligned} & 29: 3,29: 5,34: 1 \\ & 40: 15,41: 2,41: \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 4: 7,34: 9,44: 4 \\ & 4: 16,44: 20,45: 9 \end{aligned}$ |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { 144:7, 171:5, 174:16 } \\ \text { cross [44] - } 68: 22, \end{gathered}$ | curiosity [1] - 179:7 |  | $\begin{aligned} & 42: 9,43: 3,50: 21 \\ & 60: 24,74: 19,76: 2 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 5: 14,45: 18,45: 2 \\ & 6: 1,46: 6,46: 9 \end{aligned}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 149:7, 158:11, } \\ & \text { 158:12, 215:25, } \\ & \text { 230:12, 231:1, 231:7, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { custom }_{[1]}-78: 15 \\ & \text { cut }_{[2]}-27: 9,83: 7 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 11:3, 12:25, 17:10, } \\ & \text { 19:19, 29:14, 29:22, } \\ & 29: 25,30: 2,30: 5, \\ & 30: 6,33: 4,56: 18 \end{aligned}$ | 77:23, 78:3, 79:20 | 6:11, 46:14, 46:22, |
|  |  |  | 8:9, 86:11, 86:25 | 77:15, 47:17, 48:3 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 230:12, 231:1, 231:7, } \\ & 251: 25,252: 9 \end{aligned}$ |  |  | 93:12, 94:23, 96: | $3: 10,55$ |
| 259:10, 260:15,260:17, 260:20, |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 131:19, 136:17, } \\ & 136: 21,136: 25, \end{aligned}$ | 96:15, 101:18 | :9, 55:1 |
|  |  |  | 102:24, 126:11, 126:1, 127:1, 128.3, | 55:17, 55:25, 56:4 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 260:22, 260:23, } \\ & \text { 261:2, 261:21, 262:1, } \\ & \text { 262:2, 262:4, 262:9, } \end{aligned}$ | dam [1] - 218:7 | 186:1, 193:2, 216:1, | $\begin{aligned} & 126: 15,127: 1,128: \\ & 130: 10,131: 7,132: \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 7: 16,57: 21,58: 5 \\ & 8: 10,58: 13,58: 1 \end{aligned}$ |
|  | damages [1]-71:6 dammed [1] - | 228:12, 230:2, | 132:22, 133:3, 133: | $\text { 8:19, 58:22, } 58: 2$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 262:2, 262:4, 262:9, } \\ & \text { 262:16, 262:21, } \end{aligned}$ | 217:13 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { 236:19, 237:17 } \\ \text { dealing [12] - 11:4, } \end{array}$ | 133:8, 134:6, 134:10 | :4, 59:6, 59:22 |
| 263:8, 263:10,263:13, 263:18, | ${ }_{218: 15}{ }^{\text {damming }}{ }^{[1]}$ - | 30:4, 35:25, 120:22, | 136:4, 136:5, 136:1 | 0:1, 60:14, 61 |
|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 122:16, 123:4, } \\ & \text { 144:15, 167:18, } \end{aligned}$ | 136:13, 137:9, | 61:12, 65:8, 72:12 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 263:13, 263:18, } \\ & \text { 264:14, 269:1, 269:6, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 218:15 } \\ & \text { Daniels [4] - 224:6, } \end{aligned}$ |  | 7:10, 137:14 | 72:15, 73:1, 83:7 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 264:14, 269:1, 269:6, } \\ & \text { 269:22, 269:24, } \\ & \text { 270:7, 270:11, 271:3, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Daniels [4]-224:6, } \\ & \text { 226:20, 226:21, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 144: 15,167: 18, \\ & 195: 17,234: 23, \end{aligned}$ | 21, 138:6 | 83:14, 85:1, 91:2 |
|  | 242:21DANIELS | 6:1, 260:3 | 139:21, 140:4, 140: | 9:16, 99:18, 100:14 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 270:7, 270:11, 271:3, } \\ & \text { 271:4, 271:7, 271:10, } \end{aligned}$ |  | deals [2]-99:9, | 140:21, 141:10 | 100:24, 101: |
| 271:14, 271:19,272:2, 274:23 | DANIELS [5] - 226:16, 226:20, |  | 1:16, 143: | 01:11, 104: |
|  | 226:16, 226:20, |  | 143:14, 145:10 | 4:21, 105: |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { Cross [4] - 64:2, } \\ 113: 2,210: 2,224: 2 \end{gathered}$ | $243: 1$ | 96:7, 98:19, 115:7 | :23, 146: | 105:24, 106:3 |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Danzell }[1]-161: 24 \\ & \text { dark }[1]-202: 2 \end{aligned}$ | $125: 15,125: 22$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 157:21, 158:13, } \\ & \text { 158:20, 158:24, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 107:10, 107:13, } \\ & \text { 109:14, 109:20, } \end{aligned}$ |
| 249:15, 249:15, | Date [5] - 62:18, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 49:16, 115:21 } \\ & \text { debated [1] - 273:18 } \end{aligned}$ | :4, 161:12, 163 | 4:8, 116:3, 118 |
| 249:16, 249:17, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 111:18, 208:18, } \\ & 222: 18,248: 1 \end{aligned}$ |  | 8:7, 171:8, 172:25 | 8:21, 119:2, 119:4 |
| 261:23, 268:23cross-claim |  | decade [1] - 204:1 | 175:6, 177:19 | 20:24, 121:4, |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { DATE [2]-209:14, } \\ & \text { 223:16 } \end{aligned}$ |  | 177:20, 177:2 | 121:14, 125:9, 142:8, |
| 230:12, 231:1,259:10, 271:7, |  |  | 180:15, 183:1 | 144 |
|  | $\begin{gathered} \text { date }[19]-10: 16, \\ \text { 18:22, } 56: 7,59: 22, \end{gathered}$ | $5: 25,106: 8$ | 190:1, 204:20, | 144:21, 145:8, |
| 271:10 |  | 106:13, 112:23, | 205:23, 215:4, 215:9, | 146:22, 147:2, 148:2, |



1 - 289


$$
1-290
$$





| 127:14, 128:4, 130:3, | 26:10, 26:18, 26:23, | 166:25, 168:18, | 209:12, 210:7, 210:8, | 107:20, 108:24, |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 134:6, 134:19, | 27:12, 27:17, 28:6, | 168:25, 171:15, | 210:8, 212:3, 212:4, | 109:5, 111:12, |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 134:20, 135:5, } \\ & \text { 140:15, 142:19, } \end{aligned}$ | 28:14, 29:6, 33:7, 34:4, 36:9, 36:12, | 174:21, 190:22, 190:23, 194:25, | 224:18, 227:8 HARDING [5] - | 136:18, 140:23, |
| 158:14, 163:7, 164:1, | 36:15, 36:17, 46:2, | 196:18, 196:23, | 112:12, 112:13 | 174:17, 175:10, |
| 167:23, 168:6, 171:7, | 48:19, 48:24, 49:2 | 197:1, 198:11, | 115:11, 115:12, | 190:12, 192:21, |
| 177:19, 183:14, | 49:6, 49:13, 49:15 | 200:19, 205:6 | 115:16 | 208:12, 214:4 |
| 190:1, 204:20 | 49:24, 56:6, 56:13, | 210:17, 211:3 | Hardings [1] - | 218:18, 221:12, |
| Green's [10] - 24:5, | 56:16, 56:24, 65:23, | 211:11, 211:15, | 154:23 | 222:12, 226:5 |
| 126:25, 128:3, | 68:14, 71:11, 75:5, | 212:14, 217:4, | rdly [1] - 78:15 | 228:10, 228:19, |
| 136:12, 158:24, | 78:24, 79:17, 81:2, | 223:14, 225:9, | harmony [1] - 163:2 | 230:14, 248:12, |
| 161:11, 168:6, | 81:11, 81:15, 82:13, | 227:15, 229:21, | arsh [1] - 266 | 270:18, 274:24, |
| 177:24, 180:15, | 82:16, 83:13, 92:9, | 229:22, 230:9, | $\mathrm{t}_{[1]}$ - 177:4 | 275 |
| 205:23 | 92:11, 102:11, | 230:13, 231:3, 231:5, | hate [1]-194:6 | hearings [3] - |
| Greenberg [2] - | 102:13, 108:2, | 233:21, 234:9, | have-all-back-from | 186:10, 214:5, |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 182:23, 182:24 } \\ & \text { ground }[5]-16: 19, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 108:22, 109:1, 123:8, } \\ & 123: 12,123: 16, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 234:17, 238:6, } \\ & \text { 244:24, 245:13, } \end{aligned}$ | $[1]-245: 15$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 220:11 } \\ & \text { hearsay } \end{aligned}$ |
| 42:24, 76:5, 77:16, | 123:24, 124:20 | 246:6, 249:18, | 185:1 | 79:11 |
| 185:2 | 124:22, 125:6, | 250:13, 251:17 | HAVING [2] | Heavens [1] - 121:4 |
| grounds [3] - | 153:23, 156:2, | 252:21, 252:25, | 223:15, 231:18 | heavily [1] - 266:7 |
| 195:19, 257:18, | 156:14, 156:21 | 253:3, 254:21, 257:9, | Head [12] - 65:3, | heed [1] - 161:13 |
| 273:6 | $\begin{aligned} & 156: 23,157: 2, \\ & \text { 158:12, 159:16, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 259:1, 261:25, } \\ & \text { 263:25, 264:14, } \end{aligned}$ | 114:4, 148:15, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { heh [4]-52:15, } \\ & \text { 144:11. 187:10 } \end{aligned}$ |
| $\begin{array}{r} \text { group }[3] \text { - 9:2 } \\ 93: 10,242: 19 \end{array}$ | 161:2, 167:1, 167:8, | 266:21, 269:20 | 161:20, 161:21, 162:2. 162:14. | 242:13 |
| grouping [1] - 93:18 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 167:19, 168:21, } \\ & \text { 168:23, 169:1, 170:5, } \end{aligned}$ | Hall's [9]-36:2, $99: 11,190 \cdot 21,194: 7$ | 162:19, 165:18, | Heh [7] - 28:10, |
| groupings [1]-9:21 <br> guarantee [2] - | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 168:23, 169:1, 170:5, } \\ & \text { 170:8, 170:12, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 99:11, 190:21, 194:7, } \\ & \text { 253:19, 264:6, } \end{aligned}$ | $211: 19,226: 6,251: 3$ | $40: 17,42: 1,48: 12,$ <br> 61:16, 123:25 |
| guarantee [2] - 98:10, 202:9 | 174:22, 191:1, 191:4, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 25:19, 264:6, } \\ & 266: 20,266: 23, \end{aligned}$ | head [1]-258:14 | 61:16, 123:25, 178:12 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { guardian }[2]-224: 8, \\ & \text { 226:18 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 194:20, 195:9, } \\ & \text { 195:15, 204:6, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 267:13 } \\ & \text { Hall.. [1]- 47:19 } \end{aligned}$ | 202:12 | Heidi [1] - 182:19 <br> heirs [7]-13:17 |
| guardians [1] - | $204: 12,204: 16$ | hand [2] - 52:14 | hear [19]-8:6, 8:7, | 170:18, 170:19, |
| 162:8 | 204:21, 204:23 | 72:18 | $17: 6,33: 7,41: 15$ | 181:18, 204:8, 205:3, |
| guess [15] - 26:6, | 205:8, 205:11, | nded [1] - 96:5 | 51:16, 61:11, 74:5, | 220:3 |
| 27:20, 67:12, 70:15, | 206:19, 207:5, 211:2, | handing [1]-138:24 | $115: 6,184: 4,194: 1,$ | Heirs [1] - 182:18 |
| 80:14, 80:23, 99:10, | 211:4, 211:7, 211:10, | handle [3]-29:21, | 203:18, 220:8, | held [14] - 10:21 |
| 179:13, 187:17, | 211:16, 212:14, | 47:9, 147:15 | $220: 15,221: 1$ | 33:13, 106:9, 123:18, |
| 193:17, 202:6, | 227:15, 229:20, | andled [2] | 259:16 | $126: 19,128: 20,$ |
| 202:23, 213:2, | 229:22, 230:6, 231:6, | 162:20, 168:14 | heard [49] - 8:13 | 128:22, 129:1, |
| 228:14, 268:3 | 234:9, 234:11, 238:8, | handling [1] - | 18:10, 42:23, 50:25, | 129:10, 130:20, |
| Guess [2]-42:1, | 241:23, 242:5 | 272:14 | 69:22, 70:1, 72:12, | 144:8, 149:11, 162:2, |
| 199:17 | 245:12, 245:14 | hands [3]-69:14, | $72: 14,73: 3,73: 16,$ | 163:15 |
| est ${ }_{[1]}-58: 9$ | 249:13, 249:13 | 69:16, 69:17 | 75:17, 75:23, 83:3, | Helen [4]-180:2, |
| guidance [3]-8:25, | 251:17, 252:17, | handwritten [1] - | $83: 4,83: 5,91: 7$ | 180:7, 180:13, 181:9 |
| 103:1, 132:1 | 259:2, 259:7, 260:1, | 179:1 | $91: 19,93: 4,95: 11$ | Hello [1] - 211:2 |
| guiding [1]-233:11 | 261:4, 262:2, 262:19, | handy [2] - 9:2 | 102:5, 109:17, | help [1] - 97:21 |
|  | 264:2, 269:23 | 161:4 | 114:19, 115:3 | helped [1] - 157:17 |
| H | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Hall [91] - 7:15, 22:9, } \\ & \text { 23:3, 25:1, 33:6, } \end{aligned}$ | hang [1] - 177:4 | 121:25, 138:1 | helpful [5] - 166:23, |
|  | $48: 16,50: 5,56: 5,$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { happy [9]-17:6, } \\ \text { 47:8, 129:17, 136:10, } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 142:7, 147:11, } \\ & \text { 153:21, 169:2 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 189: 5,227: 21 \\ & 240: 23,275: 5 \end{aligned}$ |
| H-O-R-G-A-N [1] - | 64:23, 65:23, 67:6, | $136: 14,140: 21,$ | 172:2, 185:22, 189:1, | Hemenway |
| 181:8 | 68:9, 68:13, 70:24, | 144:21, 219:24, | 201:6, 204:18, 217:6, | 224:9, 250:9 |
| H-O-Y-L-E [1] - | 71:10, 71:11, $75: 4$, | 246:9 | 220:13, 229:5, | Henry [1] - 239:2 |
| 181:25 | 77:22, 80:5, 81:9, | hard [6]-8:11, 24:7, | 229:19, 231:4, 234:6, | Herbert [1] - 135:9 |
| Hackney [5] - 64:21, | 83:13, $83: 14,83: 22$, $86: 7,87: 14,92.11$ | $26: 3,153: 15,165: 1,$ | $240: 5,259: 6,259: 19$ | hereby [5] - 62:3, |
| 113:17, 210:14, | 86:7, 87:14, 92:11, | 239:19 | 264:5, 265:6, 265:11, | 111:3, 208:3, 222:3, |
| $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline 225: 6,250: 16 \\ \text { hairball }[1]-268: \text { © } \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 93:23, } 94: 22,102: 12, \\ & \text { 108:1, 112:18, } \end{aligned}$ | hard-pressed [1] - | 272:22, 273:7, | 248:3 |
| $\text { half }[3]-46: 6,95: 22 \text {, }$ | 113:20, 114:20, |  | 274:17 | reto [1]-23:23 |
| 220:20 | 115:1, 122:20, |  | aring [3] - | Hey.. [1]-99:16 |
| HALL [122] - 7:15, | 122:21, 122:22, | 114:10, 114:11, | hearing [32] - 18:24, | $\begin{gathered} \mathrm{Hi}[3] \\ 211: 8 \end{gathered}$ |
| 23:4, 23:8, 23:22, | 125:8, 153:22, | 115:16, 115:21, | $32: 12,43: 18,60: 5 \text {, }$ | high [1] - 56:10 |
| 24:10, 24:12, 24:16, | 155:14, 158:9, | 116:9, 122:25, 123:1, | $62: 12,72: 10,82: 5,$ | high [1]-56.10 |




1 - 296

| ```181:12, 210:4, 224:4 Janes [1] - 181:11 January [4] - 209:21, 255:6, 255:8, 255:9 Jennifer [17]-7:17, 34:15, 64:16, 65:17, 113:13, 114:12, 210:9, 212:8, 224:20, 227:9, 233:19, 236:8, 238:16, 241:19, 244:22, 250:5, 251:12 job [1] - 129:9 John [9] - 148:17, 210:21, 212:6, 224:12, 225:4, 226:25, 250:2, 250:20, 251:10 join [5] - 67:17, 73:25, 74:1, 102:7 joinder [1] - 71:22 joined [3] - 70:13, 88:20 joining [1] - 252:2 joint [4]-15:1, 15:8, 105:6, 105:15 jotted \({ }_{[1]}\) - 10:9 JR [4] - 112: 12, 115:11, 121:6, 249:13 Jr [13] - 7:15, 64:8, 64:23, 65:23, 113:20, 115:18, 122:25, 210:17, 212:14, 225:9, 227:15, 250:13, 251:17 judge [16] - 23:24, 48:23, 83:24, 83:25, 86:16, 96:13, 126:6, 135:7, 145:25, 157:25, 158:1, 203:11, 256:2, 256:4, 256:9, 257:1 JUDGE [5] - 63:15, 112:20, 209:15, 223:20, 249:20 Judge [119]-17:9, 18:5, 23:10, 23:15, 24:3, 24:4, 24:5, 27:20, 28:9, 28:17, 28:23, 33:15, 34:9, 34:16, 40:5, 44:4, 45:3, 49:2, 49:11, 50:6, 53:2, 56:1, 56:4, 57:16, 60:5, 72:8, 72:12, 72:15, 76:8, 76:13, 76:22, 77:5, 77:6, 77:23, 83:7, 91:21, 92:6, 100:14, 100:24, 101:1, 104:11,``` |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { key }[2]-161: 14, \\ & \text { 166:21 } \\ & \text { kill }[1]-153: 18 \\ & \text { kind }[10]-21: 24, \\ & \text { 24:7, 33:22, 33:23, } \\ & \text { 37:22, 102:23, 163:4, } \\ & \text { 195:9, 263:20 } \\ & \text { kinter }[1]-95: 10 \\ & \text { KITRAS }[9]-63: 7, \\ & \text { 112:7, 209:7, 223:5, } \\ & \text { 223:15, 231:17, } \\ & \text { 249:6, 249:12, } \\ & \text { 252:16 } \\ & \text { Kitras [32] - 7:3, 7:9, } \\ & \text { 64:3, 65:3, 65:9, } \\ & 95: 11,113: 3,114: 3, \\ & 114: 9,121: 9,123: 5, \\ & \text { 138:18, 193:12, } \\ & \text { 199:3, 199:10, } \\ & \text { 200:15, 209:13, } \\ & 210: 3,211: 18, \\ & 211: 25,224: 3,226: 5, \\ & \text { 226:14, 226:16, } \\ & \text { 226:23, 244:1, } \\ & \text { 244:21, 245:10, } \\ & \text { 251:3, 252:20, } \\ & \text { 252:21, 255:18 } \\ & \text { knocked }[2]- \\ & \text { 184:10, 184:17 } \\ & \text { knocking }[1]- \\ & \text { 184:25 } \\ & \text { knotty }[1]-41: 10 \\ & \text { known }[2]-11: 20, \\ & \text { 114:5 } \\ & \text { knows [6] - 82:8, } \\ & \text { 121:4, 144:4, 157:8, } \\ & \text { 160:15, 253:2 } \end{aligned}$ $\mathbf{L}$ L-U-M-L-E-Y $[1]-$ 183:3 laboring $[1]-165: 1$ lack $[4]-104: 19$, 133:19, 156:16, 215:19 laid [4] - 12:2, 45:15, 47:6 LAND [16] - 63:4, 112:4, 112:15, 121:5, 209:4, 223:4, 223:13, 228:4, 230:9, 249:4, 249:13, 249:16, 249:18, 252:17, 261:24, 268:24 land [62] - 11:15, 20:4, 26:16, 43:11, $43: 12,67: 4,68: 23$, $69: 1,69: 3,69: 9$, $69: 15,69: 20,71: 5$, $71: 9,75: 15,76: 10$, |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |



| lose [1] - 44:9 | map [11]-26:25, | 209:3, 223:3, 249:3 | 72:4, 115:7, 125:15 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { mention }[5]-13: 11, \\ & \text { 14:20, 144:23, } \\ & \text { 204:18, 228:5 } \\ & \text { mentioned }[4]- \\ & 68: 11,98: 21,128: 8, \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| lost [1] - 121:16 | 27:20, 30:24, 31:6, 80:13, 148:15, 172:10, 172:12, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { material [4]-11:20, } \\ & \text { 146:19, 214:24, } \\ & 239: 3 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 136:25, 193:2, } \\ & \text { 196:12, 214:6, 256:1 } \\ & \text { Meadow [2]-182:5, } \\ & \text { 182:9 } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| lot-by-lot [1] - 37:3 |  |  |  |  |
| OTS [2]-112:18, |  |  |  |  |
| 123:11 | 176:23, 200:1 | material's [1] - 78:16 |  |  |
| 31:25 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 203:11 } \\ & \text { map.. }[1]-200: 17 \\ & \text { maps }_{[1]}-176: 22 \\ & \text { marginal }[1]- \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { materials [8] - } \\ \text { 122:14, 130:7, } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { mean }[47]-17: 14, \\ 17: 20,26: 14,28: 14, \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 204:17 } \\ & \text { mere }_{[2]} \text { - 94:9, } \end{aligned}$ |
| loudly [1] - 265:18 |  |  |  |  |
| wer [6] - 10:5 |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 122:14, 130:7, } \\ & \text { 136:13, 152:24, } \end{aligned}$ | 17:20, 26:14, 28:14, 28:15, 32:18, 41:18, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 160:8 } \\ & \text { merely [3] - 13:3, } \end{aligned}$ |
| 131:4, 131:24, |  | 194:16, 196:8 | $\begin{aligned} & 42: 8,43: 10,47: 11, \\ & \text { 52:21, 82:7, 85:11, } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| :25, 261:8 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 227:24 } \\ & \text { Margulis [2] - } \\ & \text { 113:11, 114:17 } \\ & \text { MARGULIS [8] - } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { 238:20, 239:25 } \\ \text { matter } 98]-13: 2, \\ 13: 11,13: 22,15: 13, \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & 76: 18,158: 1 \\ & \text { merits }[5]-16: 8, \end{aligned}$ |
| mley [3]-183: |  |  | 52:21, 82:7, 85:11, <br> 102:21, 106:13, |  |
| 183:2, 183:3 |  | $\begin{aligned} & 13: 11,13: 22,11: 13, \\ & 18: 5,20: 1,23: 14 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 106:15, 108:12, } \\ & \text { 131:2, 135:14, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 176:3, 231:9, 241:1, } \\ & 268: 1 \end{aligned}$ |
|  | 114:17, 198:17, 199:9, 199:17, | 44:10, 61:17, 62:6, | 140:24, 141:12, | messier [1] - 16:18 <br> met [6]-11:25, |
|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 69: 16,72: 2,72: 9, \\ & 72: 11,72: 16,73: 3 \end{aligned}$ | $147: 21,150: 1$ |  |
| MA [38] - 62:19 | 203:1, 203:4 | $74: 17,74: 22,78: 22$ | $\begin{aligned} & 147: 21,150: 1 \\ & 153: 2,156: 15, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { 216:21, } 272: 18 \\ \text { metes }[1]-128: 17 \end{array}$ |
| 64:3, | MARIA [5] - 63:7, | $\begin{aligned} & 81: 5,81: 16,81: 20 \\ & 81: 25,82: 20,89: 19 \end{aligned}$ | 173:24, 175:4, 178:7, |  |
| 64:12, 64:18 | 112:7, 209:7, 223 |  | 180:14, 185:21, | microphone [1] - |
| 24, 111:19, 113:3, | 249:6 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 81:25, 82:20, 89:19, } \\ & 90: 5,95: 4,103: 8, \end{aligned}$ | 187:5, 193:6, 196:16, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 201:24 } \\ & \text { microphones [1] - } \end{aligned}$ |
| 113:7, 113:9, 113:12, | $\begin{gathered} \text { Maria [9] - } 64: 3, \\ 65: 8,113: 3,114: 9, \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 103:12, 103:20, } \\ & \text { 104:11, 105:1, 106:1, } \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| :15, 113 |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 203:12 } \\ & \text { mid-19th [1] - } \end{aligned}$ |
| 113:22, 208:19, | 138:18, 210:3, | 107:22, 111:6, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 204:2, 206:14, } \\ & \text { 214:17, 218:1, 220:4, } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| 3, 210:7, 21 | 211:24, 224:3, | 116:18, 125:21, | 273:13, 274:1 | 234:24 |
| 210:16, 210:19, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 255:18 } \\ & \text { mark [3] - 218:18, } \end{aligned}$ | 135:12, 137:1 |  | middle [1] - 72:17 <br> might [38] - 10:16, |
| 4:3, 224:7, 224:10, |  | $\begin{aligned} & 137: 19,144: 24, \\ & 151: 18,154: 6,154: 8, \end{aligned}$ | $24$ |  |
| 224:14, 224:17, | $\begin{gathered} \text { mark [3]-218:18, } \\ \text { 218:21, } 218: 23 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 151: 18,154: 6,154: 8, \\ & \text { 154:25, 155:12, } \\ & \text { 155:15, 156:18, } \\ & \text { 156:19, 159:3, 159:9, } \end{aligned}$ |  | 10:19, 18:21, 21:7, |
| 224:22, 225:8, | 64:10, 65:11, 1 |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 142:23, 167:24 } \\ & \text { means }[3]-38: 12, \end{aligned}$ | $44: 9,46: 14,48: 9 \text {, }$ |
| 225:11, 248:19 | 114:10, 210:7, 212:2, |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 44: 9,46: 14,48: 9 \\ & 50: 25,58: 20,66: 9 \end{aligned}$ |
| 250:4, 250:7, 25 | 224:18, 227:8 | 187:3, 189:11 | 215:10, 271:8 | 70:24, 75:12, 90:16, 95:11, 101:7, 102:25, |
| $\begin{aligned} & 50: 14,250: 18 \\ & \text { magic }_{[1]}-145 \end{aligned}$ | $228: 9,262: 22,265: 5$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 189:19, 194:1, 194:4, } \\ & \text { 199:1, 203:15, 204:3, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { meant }[2]-31: \\ & 128: 12 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 95:11, 101:7, 102:25, } \\ & \text { 130:25, 137:19, } \end{aligned}$ |
| agically [1] - $33: 18$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { 228:9, 262:22, 265:5 } \\ \text { marsh [1] - 101:23 } \end{gathered}$ | 208:6, 213:18, | 128:12 measure [1] - | 145:17, 147:16, |
| 59:1, 62.24, 111.24 | arston [1] - 165:10 | 217:25, 222 |  |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & 59: 1,62: 24,111: 24 \\ & \text { 148:21, 153:8, } \end{aligned}$ | MARTHA'S [3] - | 226:16, 226:2 | mechanism | 155:22, 155:23 |
| 108:24, 222:24, | 112:15, 121:5, 228:4 Martha's [13]-19:9, | 230:2, 230:10, |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 187:25, 188:3, 189:7, } \\ & \text { 193:23, 215:21, } \end{aligned}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 237:8, } 248: 24 \\ & \text { mailed [2] - 53:24 } \end{aligned}$ | 67:10, 96:2, 122:4, 127:16, 205:16, | 234:16, 235:1, 235:10, $235: 11$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 83:12, 85:23, 92:5, } \\ & \text { 105:20, 105:24, } \end{aligned}$ | $259: 4,271: 7,271: 11$ |
| 197:25 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 127:16, 205:16, } \\ & \text { 219:9, 223:11, } \end{aligned}$ | 235:10, 235:11, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 105:20, 105:24, } \\ & \text { 106:7, 106:8, 109:19, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { mile [2]-95:22, } \\ & 101: 20 \end{aligned}$ |
| ailings $[1]$ - 269:14 | 224:11, 226:23 | 244:24, 247:6, 248:6,$253: 5,253: 8,253: 22,$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 106:7, 106:8, 109:19, } \\ & \text { 185:16, 189:5, } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Main [8] - 64:12, |  |  | 218:2 | mind [12] - 12:12, |
| 64:14, 64:24, 113 |  | 253:5, 253:8, 253:22, $254: 6,255: 13$ | member | 13:25, 49:17, 50:6, |
| 113:21, 210:18, | Mashpee [1] | 256:16, 257:2 | 128:24, 129:2 | $55: 15,74: 8,138: 23,$ |
| 225:10, 250:13 | 144:24 <br> Mass [7] - 135:9 | 259:10, 260:4 | members [6]$128: 20,129: 6$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 204:5, 269:18 } \\ & \text { mindful }[3]-10: 17, \end{aligned}$ |
| intain [1] - 86:24 |  | 260:19, 266:13 |  |  |
| maintained [1] | 135:23, 154:9, | 267:17, 268:1 | $129: 10,130: 2$ |  |
| 234:7 | 167:15, 167:24 | 270:18, 271:2 272:6, 272:15 | memo [5] - 15:5 | 86:17, 136:22 |
| $90: 10,235: 4$ | 23 |  |  | mine [5]-85:2, 85:3, |
| Malone [1] - 26 | - 63:20, 96:5, 96:9, |  | $57$ | $\begin{array}{r} \text { mine }[5]-85: 2,85: 3, \\ 161: 4,199: 14,233: 8 \end{array}$ |
|  | 96:23, 112:2 |  |  | 161:4, 199:14, 233:8 minimum [1]-138:1 |
| management [1] 103:12 | 116:10, 116:18, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 109:25, 207:1 } \\ & 221: 21,247: 1 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { 275:4 } \\ \text { memorandum [11] - } \end{array}$ | minute [3]-7:24, |
| Manchester | $117: 3,122: 2$ | MATTER [4] - 13:8, | memorandum [11] - <br> $15 \cdot 1,79 \cdot 1,105 \cdot 7$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 99:16, 180:5 } \\ & \text { minutes [1] - 146:13 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 64:15 | 209:20, 210:2 |  | 105:9, 105:15, | $\begin{gathered} \text { Mirth }[8]-47: 14, \\ \text { 180:23, 180:25, } \end{gathered}$ |
|  | , | 15:19, 63:14, 94:24 | 122:15, 148:5, |  |
| manner [5]-9:16, | \|224:15, 249: | 21 | $234: 21,275: 2$ | 188:6, 188:9, 188:1 |
| 157:3, 157:4, 269:5, | 250:4, 251:1 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 266:18, 266:22 } \\ & \text { matters [12] - 8:19, } \end{aligned}$ |  | 203:3, 205:14 <br> Miscellaneous [4] - |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 270:9 } \\ & \text { manuals }[1]-51: 10 \end{aligned}$ | [5] - 63:3, 112:3, | 15:25, 66:17, 67:7, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { memory [3]-28:23, } \\ & \text { 29:3, 98:19 } \end{aligned}$ |  |


| $7: 3,65: 2,114: 3$ | 198:3, 212:2, 219:20, | motion [260]-13:1, | 195:22, 197:24, | $158: 12,160: 13$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 226:5 | $220: 7,221: 13$ | $13: 19,30: 14,33: 4$ | 199:2, 199:22, | 193:3, 193:17, 198:4, |
| $211: 18,251: 2$ | $228: 16$ | $53: 3,53: 4,53: 5$ | 205:1, 206:3, 206:11, | $239: 21,244: 2$ |
| Miss [2] - 114:19, | Morse [46] - 7:13, | 53:22, 54:1, 54:13, | 206:15, 206:23, | 253:12, 253:18, |
| $\begin{aligned} & 124: 2 \\ & \text { missed }[1]-81: 4 \\ & \text { missing }[3]-81: 3, \end{aligned}$ | 29:23, 64:9, 65:10 | 54:14, 57:8, 59:17 | 213:25, 214:17 | 253:25, 254:7, |
|  | 85:10, 95:5, 99:2 | 59:23, 59:24, 60:7 | 214:18, 214:20, | 254:11, 261:21, |
|  | 99:14, 99:17, 101:13, | 60:8, 66:18, 66:21, | 216:2, 216:14, | 264:14, 265:7, |
| 150:8, 169:20 | 101:24, 102:14, | 67:3, 67:16, 67:24 | 216:23, 216:25, | 269:24, 273:17 |
|  | 106:12, 107:6 | 68:4, 70:5, 70:12 | 217:5, 218:18, | 274:8, 274:21 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 174:25, 232:7 } \\ & \text { misunderstand [2] - } \end{aligned}$ | 107:10, 112:13, | 70:17, 70:23, 71:13, | 218:19, 219:7, 220:1, | motivated [1] - |
|  | 112:13, 113:6, | 73:16, 73:21, 73:25, | 220:14, 220:25, | 68:19 |
| 73:17, 73: | 114:10, 115:10, | 74:1, 74:5, 74:18, | 221:9, 221:10, | mouth [2]-85:2, |
| $\begin{aligned} & \operatorname{mix}[1]-117: 24 \\ & \text { mixing [2] }-11: 1, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 116:7, 122:23, } \\ & 143: 12,171: 23 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 74: 20,76: 14,83: 2, \\ & 85: 14,85: 16,86: 3, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 221:11, 221:19, } \\ & 228: 6,228: 8,22 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 214:8 } \\ & \text { movants' } \end{aligned}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { mixing [2] - 11:1, } \\ & \text { 104:24 } \end{aligned}$ | 209:12, 210:6, 212:2, | $90: 2,91: 8,91: 10$ | 228:20, 228:25, | $262: 10$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 104:24 } \\ & \text { modification [1] - } \end{aligned}$ | 214:1, 216:2, 217:9, | 91:14, 91:18, 91:20, | 229:1, 229:4, 229:22, | move [30]-10:8, |
| 271:18 | 218:20, 219:4, | 93:22, 94:23, 95:24, | 230:4, 230:5, 230:16, | 20:23, 55:3, 55:5, |
|  | 219:17, 221:10 | 96:22, 98:12, 99:20 | 230:25, 231:3, 231:4, | 55:14, 55:25, 56:21, |
| 52:12, 185:14, | 224:16, 227:7, | 102:4, 102:6, 102:7, | 231:7, 236:24, | 67:17, 67:24, 80:12, |
| 211:17, 238:12, | 228:14, 232:14, | 102:17, 105:21, | 238:23, 244:6, | 81:1, 82:2, 82:24, |
| 25 | 233:13, 233:15, | 106:4, 115:13, | 244:10, 251:23, | $95: 1,105: 1,107: 21$ |
| moments [1] - 74:24 <br> Monday [5] - 52:25, | $\begin{aligned} & 233: 16,233: 22 \\ & 237: 10.237: 12 \end{aligned}$ | 115:20, 116:1, 116:4, | 251:25, 252:8, 252:9, $252: 14,252: 19$ | 120:13, 154:3, 156:5, 156:7. 156:23. 216:7. |
|  | $237: 14,243: 7$ | 117:19, 117:21, | $254: 9,254: 12$ | 156:7, 156:23, 216:7, 221:4, 221:15, |
| 114:2 | Morse's [3] - 85:2 | 119:9, 119:15, | 256:15, 256:19, | 231:20, 239:17, |
| monetary [1] - 71:6 | 106:4, 220:14 | 119:21, 119:23, | 257:9, 259:9, 260:8, | 240:1, 270:19, |
| money [1] - 101:3 | Moshup [8] - 95:20 96.7, 96.11, 97.1 | $\begin{aligned} & 120: 2,120: 15 \\ & 120 \cdot 21 \quad 120 \cdot 2 \end{aligned}$ | 260:12, 261:17 | 272:10, 274:6 |
| monitor [1]-55:19 month [7]-56:18, | 98:20, 217:13, | $121: 2,121: 9,12$ | $262: 21,262: 23$ | 154:14, 156:7, |
| $\begin{aligned} & 100: 2,100: 4,178: 22 \\ & 221: 8,221: 11, \end{aligned}$ | $232: 25,235: 17$ | $121: 16,122: 3,122: 4$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 263:4, 263:8, 263:10, } \\ & 263: 18,263: 22 \end{aligned}$ | 156:25, 158:18, |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Moshup's [1] - } \\ & \text { 22:24 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 122:15, 122:16, } \\ & \text { 123:1, 123:4, 123:6, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 263: 18,263: 22, \\ & 264: 17,264: 19, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 180: 21,204: 16, \\ & 262 \cdot 2262 \cdot 16 \end{aligned}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 237:22 } \\ & \text { months [2]-53:7, } \end{aligned}$ | 22:24 <br> most [22] - 9:7, | 123:17, 123:20, <br> 124:6, 124:12 | 264:22, 264:23, | 262:2, 262:16 moving [12] - |
|  |  | $124: 15,124: 23$ | $265: 14,266: 16$ | 156:17, 193:4, 193:7, 196:3, 215:13, |
| morass [1] - 143:8 moreover [1] - | $54: 11,57: 18,58: 13$ | 125:4, 125:12, | 266:18, 266:20, | 217:10, 220:2, 220:5, |
| $271$ | 84:24, 148:14, | 125:13, 125:16, | 266:21, 266:23, | 220:12, 221:17, |
| morning [13] - 65:4, | $155: 16,158: 7$ | $125: 18,125: 20$ | $267: 12,267: 14$ | 230:18, 235:8 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 65:9, 86:21, 88:1, } \\ & \text { 101:24, 102:2, 161:9, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 158:15, 159:5, 160:6 } \\ & 161: 6,171: 11, \end{aligned}$ | 147:15, 147:17, | 269:22, 269:25, | Moving [1] - 195:24 |
|  |  | 148:7, 148:8, | $270: 3,271: 2,271:$ | MR [459]-7:8, 7:11, |
| 211:20, 213:5, 226:7, 226:22, 242:6, 251:4 | 232:6 | $152: 14,152: 16$ | 271:4, 271:19, | $\begin{aligned} & 7: 15,7: 19,7: 22,8: 4 \\ & 8: 9,13: 15,14: 5 \end{aligned}$ |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { 226:22, 242:6, 251:4 } \\ \text { Morrison [2]-79:5, } \end{gathered}$ | 232:6 Most [1] - 236:24 | 152:21, 153:17, | $274: 23,274: 25$ | 14:11, 14:13, 18:25, |
| $79: 9$ | Motion [1] - 177:16 | 153:21, 153:24, | motion's [1] - | 19:6, 19:23, 20:5, |
| MORSE [46] - 7:13, | MOTION [36] | 154:13, 154:15, | 120:10 | $20: 11,20: 15,20: 19$ |
| 29:24, 65:10, 73:13, |  | $155: 16,156: 3,157: 6$ | MOTIONS [6] - | 20:21, 21:6, 21:16, 21:18. 21:22. 22:2. |
| $73: 23,74: 10,85: 14,$ | $112: 13,112: 14$ | $157: 7,157: 25,158: 8$ | $112: 12,223: 13$ | $22: 7,22: 10,22: 24$ |
| 85:18, 95:7, 96:18, 97:2. 97:4. 97:9. | 112:14, 112:16, | 158:17, 167:3, | 230:8, 249:11 | $23: 4,23: 8,23: 22$ |
| $97: 16,98: 5,99: 22$ | 112:17, 112:18, | 172:19, 173:4, | 261:23, 268:23 | 24:10, 24:12, 24:16, |
| 99:24, 100:2, 100:16, | $112: 18,112: 19,$ | 173:25, 177:13, | motions [50]-21:23, <br> 82.10, 87:11 99.6 | $26: 10,26: 18,26: 23$ |
| 106:13, 107:7, | $\begin{aligned} & 115: 11,116: 6 \\ & 110: 11 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 178:1, 178:15, } \\ & \text { 178:23, 180:19, } \end{aligned}$ | 82:10, 87:11, 99:6, 99:15. 99:19. 99:23. | 27:12, 27:13, 27:17, |
| 107:12, 107:16, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 119:14, 120:12, } \\ & 122: 8,123: 9,123: 1 \end{aligned}$ | 182:2, 183:10, | $\begin{aligned} & 99: 15,99: 19,99: 23 \\ & \text { 100:1, 100:8, 100:12, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 28: 6,28: 14,29: 6 \\ & 29: 9,30: 7,30: 11 \end{aligned}$ |
| 114:10, 115:17, | 123:11, 125:19, | 183:17, 184:2, 184:7, | 100:13, 100:21, | $30: 18,30: 23,31: 1$ |
| 115:19, 115:24, | 177:11, 189:18, | 184:14, 186:12, | 103:19, 107:1, 107:2, | 31:3, 31:9, 31:10, |
| 117:11, 118:3, 118:6, | 209:12, 209:13, | 186:13, 186:17, | 107:3, 108:15, | $31: 22,33: 7,34: 4,$ |
| 118:9, 119:12, | 223:11, 223:19, | :23, 188:4, 189:9, | 108:25, 109:2, 115:8, | 34:7, 34:9, 34:13, |
| 121:12, 125:10,171:24, 178:10, | 228:3, 244:3, 249:12 | 9:19, | 121:8, 121:13, 122:7, | 36:9, 36:12, 36:15, |
|  | $249: 14,249: 15$ | $\begin{aligned} & 192: 11, ~ 193: 12, \\ & 194 \cdot 25 \quad 195 \cdot 17 \end{aligned}$ | 122:11, 122:23, | $36: 17,37: 12,37: 24,$ |
|  | 252:15, 266:14 | 194:25, 195:17, | 123:7, 139:8, 149:8, | 38:2, 38:5, 38:8, |

$$
1-300
$$





person [10] - 30:14,
30:19, 44:7, 54:22,
55:4, 70:12, 144:17,
144:18, 182:15,
237:11
personally [1] -
56:13
persons [4]-58:4,
78:18, 163:10,
215:22
perspective [4] -
11:1, 35:12, 166:25,
268:18
pertain [1] - 107:1
pertaining [3] -
108:25, 138:2,
230:12
pertinent [4]-49:11,
128:14, 149:1,
189:25
petition [7]-49:17,
49:18, 163:24,
165:19, 166:3,
166:13, 169:8
petitioned [1] -
92:23
petitioning [1] -
165:19
phase [1] - 186:4
Philadelphia [2] -
225:4, 250:21
philosophize [1] -
92:2
phone [23]-8:4,
64:19, 64:20, 64:23,
65:21, 65:23, 210:13,
210:14, 210:17,
211:2, 211:3, 211:11,
211:12, 224:16,
224:19, 224:20,
225:2, 225:3, 225:6,
225:9, 233:16,
233:23, 250:12
phonetic [20] -
50:25, 77:9, 95:10,
124:13, 167:14,
181:2, 185:22,
199:25, 201:3, 201:5,
201:12, 202:14,
203:6, 204:17,
206:24, 207:1, 229:4,
244:23, 245:15,
254:2
phonetic) [1] - 201:7
photocopy [1] -
180:15
phrase [1] - 253:23
phraseology [1] -
128:13
physical [1] - 22:16
pick [3]-21:8, 89:1,
$242: 21$
picking [1] - 20:24
picture $[3]-47: 3$,
270:16, 271:20
piece [1] - 25:18
piecemeal [2] -
139:5, 268:15
pile [1] - 199:19
Place [3]-210:22,
224:13, 250:3
place [18]-20:7,
43:12, 61:6, 75:24,
76:3, 76:16, 76:21,
109:13, 160:3, 160:4,
176:21, 202:18,
215:5, 217:11,
220:15, 231:13,
239:20
places [3]-23:1,
139:24, 218:13
plain [1] - 133:7
plainly [4] - 133:15,
257:10, 264:16,
266:10
plaintiff [11] - 40:12,
65:9, 68:6, 68:8,
68:19, 76:18, 77:2,
95:9, 114:9, 134:16, 226:10
PLAINTIFF [2] -
249:12, 252:16
plaintiff's [6] - 18:8,
44:25, 45:4, 87:3,
95:10, 256:10
PLAINTIFF'S [4] -
112:14, 112:19,
120:12, 177:11
Plaintiffs [5] - 63:8, 112:8, 209:8, 223:6, 249:7
plaintiffs [51]-7:9, 37:6, 39:20, 39:21, 43:23, 48:19, 49:7, 56:21, 65:13, 66:18, 67:16, 80:21, 87:21, 90:1, 116:9, 133:23,
135:1, 135:16, 137:8,
149:7, 154:20,
154:24, 158:9,
158:15, 159:5, 160:6,
172:9, 173:18,
177:21, 185:5,
185:15, 192:8,
200:23, 211:25,
212:1, 226:14,
228:13, 228:15,
232:15, 243:7, 246:3,
246:7, 246:20,
252:20, 252:22,
255:17, 256:11,
260:11, 273:18,
273:19

131:17, 138:24, 167:14, 167:24, 168:24, 169:21, 169:23, 179:11, 181:2, 185:22, 200:1, 200:14, 201:3, 201:5, 201:13, 201:23, 202:4, 204:17, 206:24, 207:15, 241:23
PM) [6] - 46:3, 122:7, 202:15, 202:16, 203:7, 207:1
PM)this [1] - 201:20 PO [15] - 64:17,
64:21, 64:24, 113:15, 113:18, 113:21, 210:11, 210:15, 210:18, 224:21, 225:7, 225:10, 250:7, 250:14, 250:17
point [92] - 10:7,
11:9, 14:19, 15:23,
18:14, 19:12, 19:15,
24:12, 35:16, 36:19, 39:7, 40:20, 42:3, 43:13, 45:4, 45:22, 46:7, 54:17, 55:18, 67:9, 72:23, 73:4, 79:7, 80:19, 80:23, 85:6, 85:11, 87:1, 87:9, 87:20, 87:22, 90:4, 90:14, 91:15, 92:20, 94:14, 95:3, 98:16, 100:10, 102:1, 103:13, 103:25, 104:18, 105:14, 105:19, 109:6, 122:19, 123:4, 131:16, 131:21, 137:4, 138:9, 139:22, 142:3, 144:8, 144:19, 145:7, 150:12, 150:15, 155:5, 155:14, 165:23, 168:18, 169:16, 169:17, 171:19, 172:14, 173:10, 177:18, 178:7, 186:10, 190:10, 193:17, 194:7, 195:5, 204:6, 205:6, 206:20, 213:2, 214:16, 216:2, 228:9, 231:23, 234:3, 242:18, 246:10, 258:10, 267:1,
272:21, 273:16
pointed [2]-171:9, 171:10
pointing [2] - 90:19, 128:2
points [12] - 8:17,

14:19, 67:6, 74:12,
84:13, 86:5, 93:23,
106:24, 151:19,
174:22, 176:24, 265:13
policy [2]-11:14, 86:11
portion [1] - 216:5
portions [4]-
163:21, 163:22,
170:15, 263:7
pose [1] - 56:7
poses [1] - 176:1
position [30]-23:7,
26:2, 43:1, 44:3,
67:23, 68:15, 68:18,
68:20, 68:23, 69:23,
72:1, 79:23, 85:17,
85:18, 87:2, 90:19,
97:13, 139:14, 172:6,
172:23, 173:8,
173:18, 184:16,
187:10, 190:21,
201:11, 232:14,
258:23, 262:24,
267:4
positions [2]-52:6,
192:19
possession [1] -
169:14
possibility [2] -
193:22, 263:17
possible [5] - 31:20, 34:21, 66:6, 67:15, 139:6
possibly [8] - 30:21,
34:1, 40:9, 176:10,
191:5, 198:22, 199:3,
220:23
Post [1] - 148:23
post [3]-171:16,
171:22, 275:2
POST [1] - 63:12
post-hearing [2] -
171:16, 171:22
POST-REMAND [1] -
63:12
potential [9]-26:18,
35:5, 48:21, 80:15, 89:14, 89:17, 191:15,
193:20, 270:20
potentially [3] -
69:7, 94:17, 175:23
Powell [1]-24:24
power [3] - 70:21,
134:11, 141:1
powers [1]-271:15
pppegp@verizon.
net [5]-62:23,
111:23, 208:23,
222:23, 248:23

$$
1-305
$$

| practical [1] - | 220:17, 237:12, | previous [1] - | 129:11, 140:12, | 52:5, 60:9, 80:14, |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 101:21 | 253:2, 253:10, | 112:16 | 253:15, $266: 7$ | 97:6, 101:19 |
| Practice [1] - 239:1 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 253:20, 256:12, } \\ & \text { 256:15, 257:5, } \end{aligned}$ | iously [6] - | proceedings [13] - | proposing [1] |
| 78:17, 168:19, $239: 2$ | 257:15, 257:16, | 130:20, 234:4, | 22, 111:5, | proposition [1] |
| Pratt [3]-26:19, | 257:22, 258:1, 258:6, | 236:22 | 130:14, 140:8, | 89 |
| 27:10, 27:17 | $\begin{aligned} & 260: 5,266: 24,267: 3, \\ & 267: 17,267: 23, \end{aligned}$ | primary [1] - 12:14 | 157:17, 177:7, 208:5, | propriety [1]-256:6 |
| 169:25 | 268:7, 273:17, | principles [1] | proceeds [1] - | 263:1 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { preceded }_{[1]}-127: 5 \\ & \text { precedent }[2] \text { - } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 274:12, 275:7 } \\ & \text { presentation }[1]- \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 233:11 } \\ & \text { PRIOR }{ }_{[1]}-249: 1 \end{aligned}$ | 234:17 process [16] - 13:20, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { prospect }[1]-40: 24 \\ & \text { protect }[1]-116: 13 \end{aligned}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 254:7, } 254: 24 \\ & \text { precedential } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 119:19 } \\ & \text { presented }[17] \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { private }[1]-218: 5 \\ & \text { pro }[4]-7: 22,7: 23 \text {, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 35: 17,44: 11,71: 16 \\ & 71: 23,93: 1,93: 3, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { prove [2]-85:5, } \\ & 86: 18 \end{aligned}$ |
| 157:22 <br> preclude [1] - | $\begin{aligned} & 9: 15,16: 20,17: 4, \\ & \text { 17:9, 17:13, 80:13, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 14:15, 250:19 } \\ & \text { probable }[1]-78: 19 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 94: 3,94: 10,105: 5 \\ & 123: 19,162: 11 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { proven [3] - 34:23, } \\ & 35: 22,131: 1 \end{aligned}$ |
| 186:16 | 81:24, 89:11, 124:24, $124 \cdot 25,134: 18$, | probate [4]-150:23, | $163: 19,186: 8$, $206 \cdot 25,263: 12$ | provide [3]-236:12, |
| predates [1]-73:5 predicate [2] - | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 124:25, 134:18, } \\ & \text { 134:23, 142:13, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 165:19, 166:4, } \\ & 170: 21 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} \text { 206:25, 263:12 } \\ \text { produced }[2]- \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 246:7, 246:12 } \\ & \text { provided [7] - 62:4, } \end{aligned}$ |
| 158:21, 159:17 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 157:19, 160:13, } \\ & \text { 160:14, 161:14 } \end{aligned}$ | problem [19] - | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 27:22, 79:10 } \\ & \text { product [1]-180:24 } \end{aligned}$ | 109:15, 111:4, 154:5, |
| preexisting [] 10:18 | presenters [1]-26:1 | $71: 21,75: 21,95: 15$ | productive [1] - | providentially |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { prefiled }{ }_{[1]}-215: 24 \\ & \text { prejudice }[2]-88: 9 \text {, } \end{aligned}$ | presenting [1]-18:5 <br> presiding [1]-226:3 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 98:1, 117:13, 118:11, } \\ & \text { 118:22, 131:20, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 11:16 } \\ & \text { pronounced }{ }_{[1]} \end{aligned}$ | 143:18 <br> providing [1] |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 88:11 } \\ & \text { prejudiced }[3] \text { - } \end{aligned}$ | pressed [1]-8:11 <br> presumably [1] - | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 186:6, 197:20, 198:3, } \\ & \text { 198:5, 212:24, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 262:13 } \\ & \text { proof }[3]-45: 23, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 154:23 } \\ & \text { public }[2]-11: 1 \end{aligned}$ |
| 88:4, 88:5, 90:15 prejudicial [1] - | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 273:25 } \\ & \text { presume [1] }-81: 4 \end{aligned}$ | 217:12, 220:4, 255:7 problems [6] - | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 91:16, 104:17 } \\ & \text { proper }[11]-13: 16, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline 86: 11 \\ \text { published }[1] \end{array}$ |
| 257:10 | $\begin{array}{r} \text { presumed }[4] \\ 39: 21,77: 1,77: \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 24: 11,42: 8,143: 1 \\ & 233: 24,265: 8 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 74: 9,94: 2,106: 25 \\ & 243: 14,257: 3 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 205:4 } \\ & \text { pull [2] - 127:13, } \end{aligned}$ |
| prelimina | $\begin{aligned} & 39: 21, \\ & 78: 11 \end{aligned}$ | $270: 22$ | 260:22, 269:2, 269:5, | $\begin{array}{\|c} \text { pull }_{[2]}-127: 1 \\ 242: 17 \end{array}$ |
| prema | presumptio | procedural [18] | 269:6, 274:13 | pulled [1] - 33:23 |
| 69:20, 154:25, 155:8, | 76:20, 78:23, 79:4 | 16:2, 16:7, 44:21 | properly [8] - | purchased [1] - |
| 165:9, 255:15, | $\begin{aligned} & 79: 5,79: 21,79: 23, \\ & 80: 25,81: 17,82: 1, \end{aligned}$ | $124: 25,142: 10$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 142:24, 202:22, } \\ & \text { 218:9, 256:11, 257:8, } \end{aligned}$ | 204:19 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 255:22 } \\ & \text { premise }[1]-131: 3 \end{aligned}$ | 80:25, 81:17, 82:1, <br> 83:10, 83:11, 85:7, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 143:1, 143:8, 151:10, } \\ & \text { 152:11, 152:13 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 218:9, 256:11, 257:8, } \\ & \text { 257:25, 267:17, } \end{aligned}$ | purpose [1]-82:23 <br> purposes [2] - |
| preparation [1] $124 \cdot 12$ | 94:10 <br> presumption.. | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 154:2, 154:18, 156:5, } \\ & 214: 5,265: 3,265: 8, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 268:1 } \\ & \text { properties }[7]-45: 1 \text {, } \end{aligned}$ | 158:6, 206:25 PURSUANT |
| PREPARATION ${ }_{[1]}$ - | 104:17 <br> presumptions [4] | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 270:15, 270:20 } \\ & \text { procedurally }[2]- \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 127:17, 166:9, } \\ & \text { 172:18, 176:8, } \end{aligned}$ | 249:18 |
| 209:13 prepare [2] - 123:14, | 76:9, $76: 24,158: 23$, | $39: 18,264: 25$ | 201:14, 201:20 | $\begin{gathered} \text { pursuant [2] } \\ 123: 20,262: 7 \end{gathered}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 124:11 } \\ & \text { prepared [15] - } \end{aligned}$ | 158:24 <br> presumptive [1] | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Procedure }[3] \text { - } \\ & 70: 9,154: 9,262: 15 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { property [27] - } \\ 25: 14,25: 18,28: 5, \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { purview [1]-259:14 } \\ & \text { pushing }[1]-41: 9 \end{aligned}$ |
| 47:25, 57:15, 72:15, | 237:21 | procedure [8] | 67:9, 67:20, 68:1 | put [33]-20:7, |
| 93:21, 98:22, 99:12, | PRESUMPTIVE [1] - | 35:17, 157:13, | 70:4, 71:19, 72:22, | 20:17, 41:1, 53:6, |
| 102:3, 109:6, 123:24, | 223:16 | 165:18, 166:2, $166: 11,192: 18$ | 95:23, 96:12, 97:20, | 53:13, 75:16, 82:6, |
| 124:22, 127:12, | $\begin{gathered} \text { pretrial }_{[19]}-15: 1, \\ \text { 15:5, 15:9, 15:16, } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 166:11, 192:18, } \\ & \text { 235:2, 270:13 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 95:23, 96:12, 97:20, } \\ & 97: 22,172: 10, \end{aligned}$ | $83: 19,84: 16,95: 21,$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 129:18, 137:5, } \\ & 238: 14,243: 8 \end{aligned}$ | 15:5, 15:9, 15:16, $32: 20,105: 5,105: 6,$ | 235:2, 270:13 procedures [] | 172:12, 172:17, | 105:6, 105:16, |
| preparing [5] - 15:1, | 105:9, 105:15, | 264:19 | 178:11, 179:5, 187:7, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 141:13, 146:18, } \\ & \text { 148:21, 149:24, } \end{aligned}$ |
| 105:6, 123:20, | 105:18, 106:6, 106:9, | proceed [16]-8:25, | 188:1, 190:13, | 152:16, 157:4, |
| 144:22, 231:6 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 109:11, 109:14, } \\ & \text { 151:24. 174:14. } \end{aligned}$ | 66:24, 75:4, 80:7, <br> 91:2, 115:5, 125:18, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 191:25, 218:7, } \\ & 218: 15 \end{aligned}$ | 162:22, 166:21, |
| prerequisite <br> $15 \cdot 4,103.24$ | 234:20, 239:14 | 130:5, 151:13, | proponent's [1] | 5:20, 177:2, 178:7, <br> 5:14 190:5 |
| presence [1] - 66:15 | pretty [9]-16:20 | 192:16, 192:22, | 86:18 | 192:11, 197:19, |
| Present [3]-210:13, | $17: 8,67: 3,79: 7$ 98:10, 137:8, 137:10, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 203:24, 227:17, } \\ & \text { 231:24, 234:5, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { proposal }[3]-51: 22, \\ & 52: 1,235: 12 \end{aligned}$ | 202:22, 228:10, |
| $210: 14,210: 17$ | $\begin{aligned} & 98: 10,137: 8,137: 10 \\ & 149: 18,202: 8 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 231: 24,234: 5, \\ & 237: 15 \end{aligned}$ | 52:1, 235:12 proposals [1] - | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 233:1, 237:5, 244:14, } \\ & 270: 13 \end{aligned}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { present [32]-14:2, } \\ & \text { 21:21, 53:20, 77:17, } \\ & \text { 122:21, 142:23, } \end{aligned}$ | prevail [1] - 185:15 <br> prevailing [2] - | $\begin{gathered} \text { proceeding [16] - } \\ \text { 18:18, 29:16, 40:14, } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 45:20 } \\ & \text { propose }[3] \text { - 48:20, } \end{aligned}$ | puts [1] - 15:5 <br> putting [6] - 48:13, |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 195:8, 196:20, } \\ & \text { 203:15, 210:20, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 10:14, 17:19 } \\ & \text { preventing }{ }_{[1]}- \end{aligned}$ 16:22 | $66: 14,67: 18,67: 22$, 67:25, 68:3, 68:8, 71.2, $03 \cdot 5,125: 25$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 49:8, } 60: 25 \\ & \text { proposed }[8] \end{aligned}$ $48: 20,49: 3,52: 4,$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 105:14, 106:20, } \\ & \text { 171:21, 182:1, } \end{aligned}$ |

$$
1-306
$$






| ```sisters [1] - 269:21 sit [6] - 69:13, 69:16, 69:17, 100:8, 106:5, 220:8 sitting [8] - 58:2, 100:3, 100:12, 100:21, 107:14, 166:8, 230:22, 241:25 situation [8]-15:11, 56:10, 69:6, 162:5, 204:1, 256:18, 268:17, 273:5 six [3] - 44:24, 100:7 six-week [1] - 100:7 size [2]-153:11, 153:13 SJC [15] - 79:2, 133:22, 134:1, 135:6, 138:19, 139:1, 139:17, 140:5, 140:9, 141:24, 161:23, 173:19, 175:20, 176:1, 254:13 skill [1] - 148:17 Skip [1] - 182:21 SLAPP [1] - 253:12 slaves [1] - 162:6 slightly [2]-73:14, 262:6 slip [1] - 9:2 slipped [1] - 214:7 slowly [1] - 221:17 so-and-so [1] - 170:19 so-called [3] - 127:7, 131:6, 131:14 society [1] - 38:17 Society [29]-7:18, 8:16, 64:18,65:18, 81:22, 113:16, 114:13, 122:10, 123:5, 124:6, 153:25, 167:4, 172:4, 172:8, 178:11, 179:15, 210:12, 212:9, 224:22, 227:10, 250:8, 251:13, 251:23, 252:3, 256:17, 261:18, 262:9, 270:5, 270:24 SOCIETY [8] - 15:20, 112:16, 122:8, 125:19, 189:18, 249:12, 252:15, 266:14 SOCIETY'S [2] - 112:18, 123:11 Society's [1]-121:9 sold [3]-67:4, 67:10, 205:25``` | ```sole [2]-133:21, 139:25 solicited [1] - 143:5 some.. [1] - 193:25 someone [15]-68:2, 90:17, 91:3, 91:6, 108:13, 117:20, 150:16, 150:17, 182:1, 193:16, 193:19, 231:22, 234:6, 273:7 something's [1] - 53:24 Sometime [1] - 105:25 sometime [1] - 238:2 sometimes [7] - 9:9, 25:3, 60:20, 83:23, 89:23, 141:12, 269:15 somewhat [1] - 236:23 somewhere [4] - 22:22, 37:4, 40:4, 56:24 soon [5] - 15:15, 58:18, 85:18, 219:21, 238:2 soon-to-be [1] - 219:21 sooner [1] - 35:13 sorry [10] - 72:13, 73:10, 96:6, 100:15, 126:23, 145:21, 182:21, 184:5, 184:6, 252:10 sort [29]-24:25, 37:3, 54:4, 76:6, 77:3, 80:3, 82:4, 84:3, 95:16, 101:22, 128:19, 131:21, 139:3, 155:3, 160:24, 163:3, 163:18, 169:14, 172:14, 184:18, 189:6, 195:24, 205:9, 207:9, 213:2, 238:17, 242:15, 265:6, 266:17 sorted [1] - 84:22 sought [4]-137:14, 141:24, 154:15, 184:9 sound [1] - 179:16 sounds [3] - 106:13, 160:3, 200:1 source [2] - 31:20, 130:2 sources [1] - 78:14 south [3] - 30:19,``` | ```30:20, 98:20 South [7]-178:3, 178:17, 179:13, 179:19, 181:6, 201:19, 202:11 Southborough [2] - 64:12, 113:9 Southeast [1] - 233:23 sovereign [1] - 253:11 Spaulding [5] - 64:17, 113:14, 210:10, 224:20, 250:6 spawns [1] - 136:21 speaking [5] - 8:7, 17:16, 230:20, 259:4, 259:16 speaks [1]-24:21 special [3]-253:12, 261:5, 266:5 species [1]-41:14 specific [5]-19:21, 104:5, 105:17, 261:4, 264:18 specifically [5] - 79:20, 89:19, 242:21, 262:21, 269:25 specified \({ }^{11]}-23: 12\) speculating [1] - 90:24 spell [1]-27:13 spellings [1] - 115:15 spending \([2]\) - 12:19, 15:15 spinning [1] - 22:4 spoken [1] - 141:2 spread [1] - 203:12 spreadsheet [2] - 21:1, 48:6 Sprint \({ }_{[1]}-66: 10\) squared [1] - 54:8 SS [5] - 63:4, 112:4, 209:4, 223:3, 249:4 stack [2]-127:15, 136:13 stage [7]-42:3, 140:12, 146:16, 151:14, 155:3, 203:6, 215:14 stake \({ }_{[2]}-51: 12\), 119:5 stall \({ }_{[1]}\) - 229:1 stamped [1] - 120:19 stand \([7]-87: 13\), 95:5, 95:20, 134:2, 189:9, 260:10, 264:2 standards [2] - 11:2,``` | ```11:25 standing [2]-23:5, 130:1 standpoint [4] - 124:25, 154:18, 156:5, 236:21 stands [3] - 26:14, 151:16, 258:7 start [19]-9:2, 32:19, 43:14, 58:23, 60:15, 65:6, 70:19, 90:19, 90:23, 107:1, 122:9, 129:11, 143:10, 180:18, 192:7, 211:21, 216:20, 217:11, 251:8 started [2] - 40:12, 117:1 starting [10] - 33:23, 37:15, 37:17, 54:17, 103:11, 126:18, 186:14, 235:15, 235:19, 242:15 state [9]-85:4, 100:18, 106:7, 130:8, 144:20, 161:22, 162:8, 213:17, 231:2 State [7] - 38:3, 38:15, 38:22, 201:13, 202:11, 224:10, 250:10 statement [9] - 47:12, 141:4, 149:6, 214:14, 214:24, 239:4, 239:8, 240:12, 241:5 statements [1] - 86:7 States [16]-91:25, 131:18, 131:23, 132:17, 132:23, 137:11, 137:16, 138:2, 139:9, 141:19, 142:2, 142:14, 142:22, 143:3, 161:22, 162:13 states [1] - 97:17 stating [1] - 246:19 status [17]-8:15, 12:14, 15:23, 75:2, 82:24, 95:1, 132:17, 138:2, 197:15, 204:24, 227:18, 260:10, 272:8, 272:16, 273:3, 274:11, 274:19 STATUS [9]-15:19, 63:12, 63:13, 94:24, 223:10, 223:15, 223:18, 231:17, 272:5``` |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |




$$
1 \text { - } 313
$$



| 162:24, 169:2, | 271:11, 271:15 | unsigned [2] | 162:11, 162:21 | viewpoint [1] - |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 170:15, 196:13, } \\ & \text { 196:16, 197:5, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 271: 16,274: 21 \\ & 275: 3 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 120:18, 121:1 } \\ & \text { untimely [2] - 184:3, } \end{aligned}$ | $214: 5,214: 16,216: 1$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 236:6 } \\ & \text { views [2] - } \end{aligned}$ |
| 197:21, 218:12 | ER [2] - 249:17 | 184 | 5:18, 84: | 25 |
| 220:23, 238:25 | 249 | up [93]-8:10, 12:22, | 89:12, 90:11, 122:11, | or [1] - 93:24 |
| 261:14, 265:8 two-edged | underlying [2] 25:11, 129:17 | 13:7, 13:10, 16:20 | $127: 13,127: 1$ | VINEYARD [13] - |
| 137:7 | -32:10 | 23:21, 27:20, 28:22, | 164:23, 165:20 | 12:16, 112:18 |
| two-thirds [1] | nding | 31:5, 38:25, $41: 6$ | 169:5, 171:5, 178:23, | :5, 122:8, 123: |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 97:24 } \\ & \text { type [8]-11:4, 11:5, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -32: 21 \\ \text { unde } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 41: 20,42: 14,43: 2 \\ & 48: 10,49: 21,52: 1 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { 232:8, } 246: 20 \\ \text { vastly }[1]-140 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 125:19, 189:18, } \\ & \text { 228:4, 249:12, } \end{aligned}$ |
| 38:17, 117:25, 118:1, | $88: 23,109: 17$ | 58:8, 66:4, 74:17, | VCS [32] - 73:6, | 252:15, 266:14 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 175:8, } 175: 25 \\ & \text { typically }{ }_{[1]}-74: 22 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { undertaken [1] } \\ & \text { 162:11 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 80: 24,82: 17,83: 1 \\ & 85: 12,87: 20,89: 1 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 73: 8,73: 9,83: 8, \\ & 84: 16,88: 15,90 \text { : } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Vineyard }[48]-7: 18, \\ & 8: 16,19: 10,61: 14 \end{aligned}$ |
|  |  | 100:5, 102:14, 103:9 | 124:15, 125:13, | 64:18, 65:18, 6 |
| U | 126:8, 126:13, 127:7, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 109:9, 123:23, 127:8, } \\ & 130: 22,136: 24, \end{aligned}$ | 139:8, 146:6, 149: | 22, 96:3, 113:1 |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { U.S [3] - 100:25, } \\ \text { 148:23, 233:2 } \\ \text { ultimate [4] - } \\ \text { 150:20, 150:22, } \\ \text { 202:16, 214:25 } \\ \text { Ultimately [1] - } \end{gathered}$ | unduly [2] - 176:7 | 13 | 153:21, 155:8 | 10, 123:5 |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 257:9 } \\ & \text { unequal }[1]-140: 7 \\ & \text { unexpected }[1]- \end{aligned}$ | 141:9, 149:17 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 155:15, 155:16, } \\ & \text { 172:7, 172:9, 17! } \end{aligned}$ | 123:18, 127:16, |
|  |  | 165:18, 166:3 | 183:18, 189:1 | :9, 164:17, 167:4, |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 236:10 } \\ & \text { unfairly }[1]-176: 7 \\ & \text { unfortunately }[4] \text { - } \end{aligned}$ | 171:18, 174:13 | 193:12, 194:2 | 172:3, 172:7, 178:10, |
|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 178: 9,185: 5,185: 18 \\ & 187: 16,188: 3,190: 4 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 196:6, 202:9, 203:21, } \\ & \text { 220:20, 256:19, } \end{aligned}$ | 179:15, 205:16, 207:8. 210:12. 212:9 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 45:18 } \\ & \text { ultimately }[6]-29: 2, \end{aligned}$ |  | 192:15, 192:21, | 271:1 | 219:10, 223:12, |
|  |  | 192:24, 193:1 | VCS's [4]-87 | 224:11, 224:22 |
| 40:2, 40:18, 40:25, | Unfort | 197:16, 199:1 | 87:6, 152:14, 172:10 | 26:24, 227:10 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 172:16, 241:8 } \\ & \text { um.. [1] - 17:19 } \\ & \text { unanimity }[1]- \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 96:10 } \\ & \text { unhappy }[3] \text { - 137:8, } \end{aligned}$ $137: 10,146: 18$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 201:2, 202:10, 204:4, } \\ & \text { 213:19, 214:8, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { vehicle }[5]-216: 3 \\ 235: 2,238: 24,239: 5 \end{gathered}$ 264:22 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 228:7, 250:8, 250:11, } \\ & \text { 251:13, 251:15, } \end{aligned}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 16:25 } \\ & \text { uncertainties }[1] \text { - } \end{aligned}$ | 137:10, 146:18 <br> UNIDENTIFIED [3] - <br> 52.24, 201.25 202.3 | 218:7, 218:13, | verbal [1] - 92:2 | 256:17, 261:18, |
| $\begin{aligned} & 23: 25 \\ & \text { unclear [6] - 77:9, } \\ & \text { 108:22, 124:14, } \\ & 181: 2,201: 4,244: 23 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { 52:24, 201:25, 202:3 } \\ \text { unified }[1]-16: 21 \\ \text { uniform }[1]-192: 16 \\ \text { United }[16]-91: 25, \end{gathered}$ | 218:23, 221:10 | 125:1 | olence [1] - 74: |
|  |  |  | verified [1] - 118:15 <br> Verizon [1] - 66:10 | 95 |
|  |  | 258:2, 261:10, 265:5, | version [2]-121:1, | 195:2 |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { 181:2, 201:4, 244:23 } \\ \text { Under [2] - 167:14, } \end{gathered}$ | 131:18, 131:23, | 265:18, 266:19 | 178 | voice [5] - 23:21 |
| $\begin{aligned} & 243: 14 \\ & \text { under }[64]-11: 19, \\ & 32: 25,43: 3,49: 18, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 132:17, 132:23, } \\ & \text { 137:11, 137:16, } \\ & \text { 138:2, 139:9, 141:19, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 266:22, 266:25 } \\ & \text { 267:1, 267:2, } 2 \end{aligned}$ | versus [12] - 7: <br> 25:8, 26:8, 65:3, | $28: 22,59: 1,265: 18$ |
|  |  | $270: 18,271: 23$ | $\begin{aligned} & 25: 8,26: 8,65: 3, \\ & 94: 5,114: 4,135: \end{aligned}$ | Volume [5] - 63:1, |
| $\begin{aligned} & 32: 25,43: 3,49: 18, \\ & 55: 23,70: 21,72: 9, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 138:2, 139:9, 141:19, } \\ & \text { 142:2, 142:14, } \end{aligned}$ | upholding [1] | 135:23, 145:6, | 112:1, 209:1, 223:1, |
| 73:19, 102:20, 129:7, | 142:22, 143:3 | 267:1 | 161:24, 211:1 | 249:1 |
|  | $\begin{gathered} \text { 161:22, } 162: 13 \\ \text { unity }[11]-10: 1, \\ \text { 10:21, } 76: 10,76: 19, \end{gathered}$ |  | 251: | [3] - 14 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 135:3, 154:3, 154:6, } \\ & \text { 154:8, 154:16, } \\ & \text { 154:19, 156:5, 156:7, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 10:21, 76:10, 76:19, } \\ & 79: 25,130: 18, \end{aligned}$ | $168: 19,215: 6,215: 8$ | $\text { via }[1]-68: 2$ | volunteered [1] - |
|  | 131:11, 131:13, | Utica ${ }^{[1]}$ - 135:9 | ble [1] - 238:2 | 146:23 |
| 156:8, 156:25, <br> 163:12, 163:13, <br> 163:25, 164:25, | 132:10, 133:19, | - 239 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { vicinity }[2]-27: \\ & \text { 142:17 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { vote }[1]-97: 24 \\ & \text { VT }_{[1]}-64: 15 \end{aligned}$ |
|  | unknown [1] - 90:11 | V | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { 142:17 } \\ \text { VICTORIA [3] - } \end{array}$ | VT [1] - 64:15 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 163:25, 164:25, } \\ & \text { 165:3, 165:5, 165:12, } \end{aligned}$ |  |  | 63:12, 66:20, 121 | W |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 166:16, 170:21, } \\ & \text { 175:5, 179:14, 184:9, } \\ & \text { 203:5, 203:15, } \end{aligned}$ | 105:11, 132:25, | valuable [1] - 177:1 | Victoria [4]-7:12, 64:8, 65:13, 66:19 |  |
| 218:12, 228:10, | 136:2, 150:11, | $\text { value }[1]-157: 2$ |  | Vait [1] - 180: |
| 230:1, 230:14,230:15, $230: 19$ | $23$ | Van [2]-254:2 | $46: 17,53: 11,78:$ | wait [10] - 19:1 |
|  | $\begin{array}{\|l} \text { Unless [3]-81:20, } \\ \text { 194:1, 273:7 } \end{array}$ | 254:1 | $\text { 87:19, 94:1, } 97: 1$ | 99:16, 109:10, |
| 241:25, 253:12, | unlikely [1]-84:24 | Vanderhoop [4] | 105:4, 106:1, 130:15, | 143:12, 150:8, |
| $\begin{aligned} & 259: 10,260: 5,260: 7, \\ & 261: 4,262: 2,262: 15, \end{aligned}$ | unquote [1] - 266 :5 | $\begin{aligned} & 181: 19,181: 2 \\ & 181: 22,182: 2 \end{aligned}$ | 133:14, 137:20, | 153:17, 188:7, 188:8, |
| 262:17, 263:14, | unrebutted [1] | nderhoop | 141:9, 141:11 |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 263:24, 264:17, } \\ & \text { 265:4, 265:7, 271:10, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 86:6 } \\ & \text { unrelated }[1]-272: 6 \end{aligned}$ | 181:20 |  | 197:21, 203:20, |
|  |  | variety [6]-118:17, |  | 273:14 |



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Volume: II of II Days 7 through 11 Pages: 1-212
Exhibits: None

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MARIA A. KITRAS, as Trustee of *
BEAR REALTY TRUST et al., *
Plaintiffs *
* No. 97-MISC-238738
V.
TOWN OF AQUINNAH et al.,
$\star$
Defendants *
$\star \star \star \star \star \star \star \star \star \star \star * * * * * *$
STATUS CONFERENCES, MOTIONS
BEFORE JUDGE CHARLES W. TROMBLY, JR.
APPEARANCES (see page following caption page for each date,
for complete information):

Boston, Massachusetts Courtrooms BKRoom3, 4, 6, BKRoom6 September 9, 2008, BKRoom3 4 September 30, 2008, Room 4 43 February 4, 2009, Room 6 58 June 21, 2010, Room 4123 September 8, 2010, BKRoom6 150

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I N D E X
Page:

```
September 9, 2008, BKRoom3 4
(Decoulos, Morse, Hall, Abair, Donnelly, Roberts,
Tillotson, Rappaport, Wice)
Status conference, motion
September 30, 2008, Room 4
                                    4 3
    (Decoulos, Morse, Roberts, Rappaport)
Motion to compel interrogatories, by Vineyard Conservation
Society
February 4, 2009, Room 6 58
(Decoulos, Morse, Hall, Roberts, Tillotson, Daniels,
Donnelly, Lewis, Rappaport)
Motions to strike; status conference
June 21, 2010, Room 4 123
(Hall, Roberts, Rappaport, Jordan-Price)
Motions to strike
September 8, 2010, BKRoom 6 150
(Decoulos, Morse, Tillotson, Roberts, Rappaport,
Jordan-Price, Donnelly, Hall)
Status conference, and motion on behalf of Gossamer Wing
and Baron's
```

                                    Volume: II Of II
                                    Day }7\mathrm{ of 11
                                    Pages: 3-42
                                    Exhibits: None
            COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
    DUKES, SS.
                                DEPARTMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT
                        LAND COURT DEPARTMENT
    * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    *ARIA A.RIRAS, (as Trustee * *
    MARIA A. KITRAS, as Trustee of *
        BEAR REALTY TRUST et al., *
        Plaintiffs *
                                * No. 97-MISC-238738
    V.
    TOWN OF AQUINNAH et al., *
        Defendants *
    * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
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\(\qquad\)
    STATUS CONFERENCE, MOTION
        BEFORE JUDGE CHARLES W. TROMBLY, JR.
    APPEARANCES (see next page) :
                    Boston, Massachusetts
                    BKRoom 3
                    September 9, 2008
                            Ellen H. Dibble
                Approved Court Transcriber

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Patched through by phone from 10:32 AM:
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For: David Wice and Betsy Wice

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(Time is 10:19:05 AM.)
COURT OFFICER: Hear ye, hear ye, hear ye, all parties having anything to do with the Honorable Justices of the Land Court, draw near, and you shall be heard. God save the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and this Court. You may be seated. Court is in session. If you have any cell phones, kindly turn them off at this time. Thank you.

THE CLERK: Miscellaneous case 238738, Maria Kitras versus the Town of Aquinnah. And miscellaneous case 299511; Anthony Frangos v. Town of Aquinnah.

THE COURT: Okay. Good morning, everyone.
ALL: Good morning, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Before we start, I'm going to try -- we're having a little trouble with our sound system, so please speak up. Okay? That's the main thing.

All right. Can we start off by identifying ourselves?
We'll start over here with Mr. Decoulos.

MR. DECOULOS: Nicholas Decoulos, representing the plaintiffs Kitras and Decoulos.

MS. MORSE: Leslie-Ann Morse representing the Eleanor P. Realty Trust and Mark D. Harding.

MR. HALL: Good morning, Your Honor. Defendant Gossamer Wing Realty Trust and Baron's Land Trust. I am Benjamin Hall, Jr.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ABAIR: Good morning, Your Honor. Jesse Abair, on behalf of defendant Caroline Kennedy individually, and Caroline Kennedy and Edwin (phonetic, pronounces this Edward) Schlossberg as guardians of their minor children. THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DECOULOS: I am -- oh, sorry.

MR. DONNELLY: John Donnelly, representing the Commonwealth.

MS. ROBERTS: Jennifer Roberts for the Vineyard Conservation Society.

MS. TILLOTSON: Diane Tillotson for the Martha's Vineyard Land Bank.

MR. RAPPAPORT: Ronald Rappaport for the Town of Aquinnah.

THE COURT: Okay. And Mr. Decoulos wanted to add something.

MR. DECOULOS: Yes. The Decoulos Realty Trust case that's across the street on a motion for...

THE COURT: That's Frangos?

MR. DECOULOS: Frangos, yes.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. And this is a status conference. We scheduled it, as you all know -- I'm the lucky guy -(Laughter.)

THE COURT: who took this over from Judge Lombardi,
compliments of Judge Brown, I guess, I guess.

And I've read the Brown decision.

I guess the question is: Where are we going. I think that's what everybody wants to know.

Yes?

MS. ROBERTS: I actually asked for the status conference, Your Honor, so maybe that's the step (indiscernible at 10:20:42 AM, simultaneous) --

THE COURT: Well, you go ahead. Then I'll talk.

Then I'll listen and -- go ahead.

MS. ROBERTS: Judge Lombardi had set several things in process over the last year, and the way the case was headed, he... if you've read the decision --

THE COURT: Yep.

MS. ROBERTS: -- you know there's an issue about whether there's an easement for some landlocked parcels or not.

If there's an easement, there's an issue about where it should be located on the ground.

Judge Lombardi bifurcated the case so that the first part deals only with is there an easement or not. And if we get past that and the court concludes that there is an easement, then the next part of the process will be: Where is it to be located? Because there will be a lot of engineering and a wetlands --

THE COURT: Right.

MS. ROBERTS: -- and endangered species stuff that we may never have to reach.

So with that in mind, we're focused on the issue of whether there was an easement. It all revolves around what was going on in the \(1870^{\prime}\) s, so we have, until now, been operating on the assumption that there would be no live testimony.

And Judge Lombardi had ordered the plaintiffs to put together a package of the documentation on which they would rely for their claim of an easement.

The defendants would have 30 days in which to take any discovery that might be necessary. And Judge Lombardi said, "If you need more time, come back."

And then, defendants would put together whatever additional documentation that they thought was relevant to the point.

There would then be some process by which the court would decide objections on both sides as to whether the evidence was admissible or not. Then the parties would brief it, and the Court would decide it.

The first step in that process was for the plaintiffs to pull together their set of documents. That was ordered by Judge Lombardi back in 2007 .

I asked for the status conference several months ago,
because as of that point we still hadn't received that set of documents. They were served on everybody at the end of July.

And so that kicked -- I think it was July 28th. So that kicked off the defendant's 30 days of discovery.

So in that 30 days we've taken the deposition of a surveyor. We've served some interrogatories which we are awaiting answers to.

And depending upon -- at the deposition of the surveyor a week or so ago, I learned for the first time from Mr. Decoulos that he may be calling as a witness one of the plaintiffs.

So we would obviously want the opportunity to depose that person, and to depose -- if there's anyone else that the plaintiffs are intending to call as a witness, we'd like the opportunity to depose them.

So originally, \(I\) ask for this to try to get the ball moving.

But the ball has started moving. I'm here today to ask the Court for an additional, I would suspect, 45 days of discovery. I need to receive the interrogatory answers and take whatever depositions are left, and, once discovery is done, respond to the package of materials that have been provided by the plaintiff, and which I would assume would be due in about 30 days.

So I'm looking for a schedule, finish discovery, provide whatever other documentation we think is relevant, and then have some kind of proceeding before the Court to determine what of this is ultimately going to be admissible so that the parties can then go, do the briefing.

Mr. Decoulos has sent around to everybody a fairly extensive proposed agenda which we in large measure don't agree with.

THE COURT: Heh.
MS. ROBERTS: I'll let him speak to that, and then would ask for permission to respond.
[MR. DECOULOS]: Thank you.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Decoulos.
MR. DECOULOS: Sure. Judge, I went ahead and drew up this agenda, and I sent a copy to all my fellow brother and sister attorneys. And the first thing that I have on my agenda, number one, is that -- was (phonetic 10:25:17 AM) was submitted to the Court containing all the documents --

THE COURT: Right.
MR. DECOULOS: -- that are on record at the registry of deeds down in Dukes County. And also some plans that are not there, that show various rights of ways through the property, which was subdivided by the commission commissioners - in 1878.

And the second question is, are there any other
documents which would be forthcoming from the defendants.
And I set this up quite some time -- not quite some time ago. I've got a letter here: August 29.

And so we're looking for more documents to come -come from them (phonetic at 10:26:06 AM), if there are any. And if there are any additional faxes (phonetic at 10:26:13 AM) - number three - or otherwise.

And so, wait to see if we can come to some kind of agreed statement of facts, which I doubt very much, but frang-would-do-it (phonetic at 10:26:29 AM, unclear), because nobody's going to change the facts from 1870. We're in 2008 now, you know.

THE COURT: Could I interrupt for one sec? Leslie had something she wanted to add, I guess.

MS. MORSE: One thing I wanted to make clear is, Mr. Decoulos sent out that book of documents. I may represent some of the plaintiffs, but \(I\) had no input in it whatsoever.

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. MORSE: So I would like also the opportunity to file any necessary documents that I see as necessary.

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. MORSE: I think the only thing in my file is the title for one of the lots, but that's...

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. DECOULOS: So we're at -- number four is a request to enter upon the land. And we filed a request from -- for all of the defendants. All of the defendants said, "You can't go on the land."

The reason that we want to go on the land is two reasons: One is to find out exactly where the wetlands are, so that we can avoid them; and secondly, file a notice of intent with the commission -- the conservation commission.

Now, the reason that they said no is because they just don't want us to go on their property. But there's no harm being done to their property, and it's not taking any of their resources. It's not taking any of the Court's resources. We just want to get on there and make our measurements and get out of there.

And there's another -- another matter that will be coming up thanks to Ms. Diane Tillotson, for in that case of the -- the lanwater (phonetic at 10:28:05 AM, unclear) -- wait a minute.
(Pause.)
MR. DECOULOS: So we need to be able to get on the land, and I'll be filing a motion too with the Court asking you to allow us to go onto the property so that we can conduct various surveys, which will involve, number seven: When they built the Moshup Trail, they installed a drain
(phonetic at 10:28:27 AM, slightly unclear) line under the -- in the Moshup Trail, or under the roadway. And we'd want to find out whether or not that is at its lowest point, because they created wetlands as a result of it.

This used to flow right to the ocean. And as a result of the road being there, they've taken all the water and channeled it into this pipe. And the pipe may be too high; the-number-of (phonetic at 10:29:58 AM, unclear) the pipe might be two or three...

But we don't know until we can get on there and find out about it.

So that's the -- that would set up a nuisance claim that I have in -- number seven.

We can go back a couple now.
The number five: The possible amended complaint. There's another case with one of the defendants in this matter that involves a right of way, and I've been told it's going to be settled so that that right of way will be in existence over some of these lots.

The next matter would be Barbara Vanderhoop. She's out in California someplace. I keep on sending her things. I sent her this book, and it came back in the mail. I talked with Eric Rothenberg (sic), who's her lawyer, a half a dozen times. I finally sent them a letter telling them that I was going to default her unless he started to accept
service. Mr. Rottenberg (sic) has told me that he has-started (phonetic at 10:29:52 AM, might be heard as "is not") accepting service of any documents that are generated in this case, just so he can keep an eye on what's going on. He doesn't want to get involved in it, because his position is that if the court findings an easement by necessity, or whatever other reasons we've been asking for, that he'll be a beneficiary of the Court's action.

And then \(I\) went ahead and got -- took a look at the rules of the Land Court on 8, 9, 10, and 11. And I'd like to set up some kind of a schedule. It took about 8 or 9 years to find out that this court had jurisdiction over this case, and I don't want to go another 8 or 9 years. And I think that if everybody cooperated, we could get here very, very quickly, provided we have some real meaningful dates on this discovery, and whatever they want -- whatever else they're asking for.

I don't think -- but that's beside what -THE COURT: But -- heh --

MR. DECOULOS: -- what -- what I think.

THE COURT: But just, you're talking about a pretrial conference in a month.

MR. DECOULOS: That's right.

THE COURT: That's awful soon.

Yeah, wait a minute. Frank. Sorry.
(Discussion off the record.)

THE COURT: Okay. Is there a Mr. Wice who's a party to this case? He was calling from Pennsylvania. If he -if he does, we may just put him on a speaker phone and let him listen to what's going on.
(Discussion off the record; a clerk or court officer is talking, aside, while proceedings continue.)

MR. DECOULOS: I understand it's very soon, but I'm of the opinion - and I could be very wrong - that there aren't any other things to discover in this matter. She took the deposition of a surveyor, of \(3-1 / 2\) hours. Didn't change anything. This is -- we want to get it over with for very -- for many -- very simple reasons. We've waited 8 or 9 years to get to the -- back to where we are now.

THE COURT: All right.
[CLERK OR COURT OFFICER, ASIDE]: Put him on a cell phone.

THE COURT: Yep.
(Mr. Wice being patched in by phone at 10:31:52 AM.)

MR. DECOULOS: She's served interrogatories on him. I don't remember telling her that one of the plaintiffs is going to testify.

I don't think it's going to be in our answers to interrogatories, but if it is, then let's get a hurry-up date on our depositions. We don't want to go on for 90
days. Everything should be done on a 10-day basis. Let's move it along and get it done with.

THE COURT: But why start moving it that fast now when it's been...

I realize it's been -- I really -- even Judge Brown's decision was 3 years ago. So, heh, it moves with the speed of a growing oak (phonetic at 10:32:18 AM, could be heard as "our growing old").
(Mirth.)
MR. DECOULOS: Well, that's the problem. We're all getting old. And I just want to get it over with, as quickly as possible.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.
MR. DECOULOS: It's our position, the faster the better, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay. Thanks. Jennifer or anybody at your table?

MS. ROBERTS: We don't disagree with the notion of getting it done really promptly. We're all for that.

I would suggest with respect to his first three items, we agree, we just want to get through discovery, and then let's put a deadline for us to produce anything else we think is relevant, and a deadline for both sides to object to whatever the other side has proposed.

So that's fine. It's just a timing issue there.

On number four, unless and until we get past this first phase of this case, and there's an adjudication that they that they actually have an easement, then the existence of wetlands is absolutely irrelevant to anything that this Court has to decide at this phase of the game.

I don't know why they want to go on. They have a number of other cases here. I suspect they're looking to go on for reasons that have to do with other proceedings. But certainly with respect to this proceeding, it is irrelevant where wetlands are until there's been an adjudication that they actually have an easement.

That all being said, the Rules of Civil Procedure say that if you get an objection to your Rule 34 request, you should file a motion to compel, which has not yet happened. And if he wants to go down that path, we'll happily respond to it, but I'm giving him a preview of what our response is going to be.

So I think it'll be futile in the end, but if he wants to pursue this Rule 34 entry, let him do it using the proper rules.

With respect to number 5, Judge Lombardi gave -- after the matter was remanded from the Appeals Court, Judge Lombardi handled at least two series of motions to amend. And the last time around, he said to everybody, "This is it." You know, "I'm going to give you a deadline; any
motions to amend you have, you bring them, and you bring them by December" -- I think it was 7th, 2007.

So I would respectfully suggest that the time for bringing amendments, if it hadn't passed in the preceding 10 years, it certainly passed by December of 2007 .

We take no position on the Barbara Vanderhoop issue.

With respect to number seven, the nuisance claim was a claim that the plaintiffs previously sought to bring, I think in their March 2007 complaint. And at that point, Judge Lombardi ruled that the Land Court didn't have jurisdiction over the nuisance claim. And so he has already ruled on that and told them to delete it from their complaint.

Nothing in this Ritter versus Bergmann decision, I would suggest, changes that result. But once again, if they want to do that, the proper procedure is to file a motion to which we'll respond, not to put it on an agenda for a status conference.

And then, with respect to 8, 9, 10, and 11, as I say, we're happy to move this case forward. As I said, as soon as we get interrogatory answers and see whether there are going to be any witnesses here, we'll know whether we need any further discovery or not.

So that's in the plaintiffs' ballpark. If they can get me that information, as soon as we get it, we'll know
whether we need more time or not.

So I would say 15 days? If he can get his answers to me. If he's actually going to call witnesses, I would say give us 30 days? If he's not going to call witnesses, I wouldn't expect that we'd need that amount of time.

And then, once that deadline goes by, I think that the next deadline would be for us to propose whatever additions we want to the booklet he provided. I know that I have some things that \(I\) might want to add. Ms. Morse just expressed that she may have some things she wants to add. So I would suggest that the next deadline would be for all parties to add whatever they want.

And then the deadline after that would be for all parties to object to whatever anyone else has put in there.

And then the Court can rule on those.

And then once that process is done, I think it's just a briefing schedule, assuming Mr. Decoulos isn't going to call any witnesses. Then it's just, have them brief the case, and then we'll respond.

THE COURT: What's wrong with that? Move it along. We were at warp speed here. That's...

MR. DECOULOS: Well, she's going to be getting the answers to the interrogatories within a couple of days, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DECOULOS: And I don't think there's going to be any witnesses. I'm going to try my best not to find any witnesses. That's for sure.

And she can -- then we can, you know, step this up for the next...

THE COURT: Yeah, you know, 'cause I'm all in favor of moving it along. I think this is, quite frankly, too fast.

MS. ROBERTS: Yep, but I would --

THE COURT: It's been here for a long time. I'm not going to do anything to drag it out. Let's get the thing decided before I retire. (Mirth.)

THE COURT: We're not that far away, you know. In a couple of years, I'll be out of here.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Uh-oh.

THE COURT: So let's not let happen. Or some poor bugger will be the next one.

So let's -- so you can have discovery within what, a couple of -- what did you say? A couple of?

MR. DECOULOS: I should have it in a couple of days. So she should be able to tell us whether she's going to conduct any depositions of these witnesses that we may or may not include. If there's no witnesses, then we can just skip right over that, and just keep moving along on it. But...

MS. ROBERTS: Why don't we just -- if we say 15 days to finish up whatever's out there after I get the answers to his interrogatories. Unless he -- you know, if he comes up with some -- I don't expect, based on everything Mr. Decoulos has said today. I mean, if he suddenly comes up with a list of 10 witnesses, maybe we'd ask for 30. But let's say 15 for now --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. ROBERTS: -- from the time I get his answers?

THE COURT: Okay. And you'll have your answers --

MR. DECOULOS: That's fine.

THE COURT: For -- okay.

MS. ROBERTS: Right.

MR. DECOULOS: Fifteen days.

MS. ROBERTS: And then \(I\) would say 30 days for all parties to supplement the record that's been pulled together by --

MR. DECOULOS: I -- why 30 days?

MS. ROBERTS: Because I at-least (phonetic at 10:38:50
AM; could be heard as "-- he's") provided survey
information. I just took the surveyor's deposition. I have gotten my own surveyor. We've got to go out in the field.

THE COURT: Yeah. At this point, a couple of weeks doesn't hurt, Nick. Thirty days is no -- that's not too
far out.

One thing you should all know, we're building four new courtrooms here. So hopefully they'll be done in December. So we'll each have our own room.

MR. DECOULOS: Hopefully --

THE COURT: So we'll each have our own room.

MR. DECOULOS: -- there won't be any lallycoak
(phonetic at 10:39:10 AM, simultaneous). I mean.
THE COURT: At least one in every one. Heh. But one of them had four. So I'm staying away from that one.

But hopefully by the end of the year we're going to have at least three new courtrooms, possibly four. They're working on it now. So. We are staying here.

All right. So 30 days. So 15 days for the answers to int's, 30 days to supplement.

Okay, Nick, you want to say something?

MR. DECOULOS: I'm going to file those, Rule 34. I said it in the agenda --

THE COURT: Okay. Yeah.

MR. DECOULOS: I'm going to file a Rule 34 --

THE COURT: Make it in the form of a motion.

MR. DECOULOS: Yes, I will. I'll -- they'll be --

THE COURT: I've looked at them. I've read your motion. I've read the oppositions from all the parties.

MR. DECOULOS: Yeah, fine.

THE COURT: I will consider it.

MR. DECOULOS: All right.

THE COURT: And you can find out --

MR. DECOULOS: You can skip over the 8 and 9 and 10 and 11, when we find out exactly where we're at in a couple of months.

THE COURT: Yeah. September 19th is kind of soon, but sometime in October, early November?

MS. ROBERTS: Your Honor, I would suggest, because we've been through this a few times now, if we -- everyone submits their documents, and then we have another deadline for everyone to submit whatever objections they have, and then we could set a hearing date on that, and at that point, talk about, you know, pretrial issues, what this is going to look like. So we could sort of combine those two things.

I don't know that this is the kind of case, in view of the fact that there aren't going to be witnesses who-are-really (phonetic at 10:40:43 AM, unclear) at trial. I'm not sure this is the kind of case where you really need like a pretrial memo and that kind of thing.

THE COURT: No, probably not.
MS. ROBERTS: Yeah. So.

THE COURT: No, as long as it's all on the papers.

MS. ROBERTS: Yeah. So I think it's sort of like a
summary judgment, but --

THE COURT: You're going to brief it anyway, so.

MS. ROBERTS: Yeah.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. ROBERTS: So I'm not sure that the joint pretrial memorandum or the pretrial conference is crucial (phonetic at 10:41:00 AM, simultaneous).

THE COURT: No, the main thing is we just want to keep it moving.

MS. ROBERTS: Right. Right.

THE COURT: That's the -- we're all in favor of that.

MS. ROBERTS: So if we get a hearing date on the evidentiary issues, we can, at that point, as \(I\) say, talk about if there are any further...

MR. DECOULOS: One of the interrogatories that she presented with, "Do you know anybody that knows any of these facts." And that's the only answers that we will be naming people. And that I might exclude as well, because the facts are all in the documents.

THE COURT: Okay. So that's -- we'll see that later.
So 15 days for answers to int's, right?

MS. ROBERTS: And I got --

THE COURT: Is that what I got? 30 days to
supplement?

MS. ROBERTS: Well, we'd like -- he's going to try to
answer his interrogatories in a couple of days. THE COURT: Okay.

MS. ROBERTS: And give me 15 days from that point -THE COURT: Okay.

MS. ROBERTS: -- to do whatever discovery needs to be done.

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. ROBERTS: It may be none.
THE COURT: All right. And then objections? Okay?
And --
MS. ROBERTS: And then 30 days that we'd submit -- the other parties would submit their own proposed documents -THE COURT: Right.

MS. ROBERTS: -- if they have additions to make.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. WICE: Your Honor, may I state?
THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. WICE: This is David Wice in Philadelphia.
THE COURT: Hi, Mr. Wice.
MR. WICE: Hello. I'm sorry I'm not there in person. I think I'm in the process of obtaining counsel so that I can be there, at least represented.

Have we passed over item one, the documents in the book that was prepared by Mr. Decoulos? I (indiscernible at 10:42:25 AM, simultaneous) --

THE COURT: Well, just the fact that --

MR. WICE: -- (indiscernible)connected by telephone.

THE COURT: Okay. But just the fact that everybody got though; did you get one?

MR. WICE: I got that, and I have some questions and objections.

And if there's...

And your ruling is now, is there time for us to make those objections?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. WICE: Or do I have to do that today?

THE COURT: Not -- not today, heh.

But what did we say? What were we...

MS. ROBERTS: We're going to do: Finish the discovery, and then everyone else gets to supplement that package in 30 days. And then \(I\) would suggest in another 30 days that everybody file whatever objections they have to everybody else's proposed evidence.

So Mr. Wice, that would be when that opportunity would arise. So it would be about --

MR. WICE: It's presuming that, that's already sulbmitted.

MS. ROBERTS: Yes. Yeah, every -- everything.

MR. WICE: That's fine.

MS. ROBERTS: Yeah, everything. So that would be
about two months out.

MR. WICE: Thank you.

THE COURT: So the main thing -- what we've decided so far, we're going to get this case rolling. It's been here too long anyway, but, you know, some of us want to move it more quickly than others. And there are some limits.

But we are going to get things rolling. And I'll be issuing an order, I guess.

So there are some interrogatories waiting to be answered. They're going to be answered within a few days. Parties have 30 days to supplement the documents.

And then we're going to have a hearing eventually on what should be or should not be included in that booklet.

So you have some time to put something together and send it up to us, with copies to everybody else.

And if you get counsel -- and I recommend it; I can't command it, but \(I\) recommend it strongly.

MR. WICE: Okay, thank you.

MS. ROBERTS: It looks -- it looks --

MR. WICE: I had counsel. One retired and one died. (Mirth.)

THE COURT: Oops. I don't want to be on that list. MS . ROBERTS: Right.
(Laughter.)

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.

MS. ROBERTS: It looks like sometime -- depending upon the Court's schedule, sometime in the first half of December would get us through all of this and to a hearing on the evidentiary issues.

MR. DECOULOS: We'll be back very quickly --
THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. DECOULOS: -- with two motions, Judge, the motion to amend and a motion on Rule 34. So we'll be before you within the month.

THE COURT: Yeah. Yeah. You can do that. But find out when I'm sitting.

MR. DECOULOS: Sure.
THE COURT: And that sort of...
But I think what Jennifer was talking about, a hearing in early December?

MS. ROBERTS: Yeah, on the evidentiary issues. If everyone has got their objections to any other -- we can resolve it.

THE COURT: Well, December 4th. Can everybody check their books? Is anybody going to traveling or anything?

MR. DONNELLY: Will this be a status conference (indiscernible at 10:44:58 AM, simultaneous)?

THE COURT: No, it'll be a hearing on -- a motion hearing -- make your respective motions on the booklet.

Leslie?

MS. MORSE: What time?

THE COURT: What time would be good for you folks? Ten or eleven o'clock?

MS. MORSE: I'd rather do it at 11:00. Traffic is a whole lot better --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. MORSE: -- at 11:00.

THE COURT: That's fine. Okay. That's fine.
All right. December 4, eleven o'clock, we'll have a hearing on that point, and if there's something else we can do that day, we'll -- looking-at (phonetic at 10:45:22 AM) the whole day, mark it up at the same time.

MR. DECOULOS: I might put those two motions on during the same date, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DECOULOS: Save some time.

THE COURT: All right. We can do that.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE [CLERK?]: When you send the motions in, on your markings, indicate that date and time. THE COURT: Yeah.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE [CLERK?]: Or the date and time that you really choose, (indiscernible at 10:45:39 AM).

THE COURT: Okay. No, it's a full...

No, December 4 -- let me write it down before I forget.

MR. WICE: Can you tell me which motions are on that date?

MS. ROBERTS: It will be the evidentiary motions to strike. If anyone is unhappy with anybody else's proposed documents.

MR. WICE: Okay.

MR. DECOULOS: Also the motion to amend, to include a nuisance and a Rule 34 motion to enter upon the land.

MR. WICE: Thank you.

MR. HALL: Your Honor, may I be heard?

THE COURT: Yeah, sure. Go ahead.

MR. HALL: Benjamin Hall, Your Honor.

Ms. Roberts summarized the case in a different way than \(I\) think had ever been sort of laid out before the Court before, and I didn't want you, as a new judge in the case, to get a sense that this is a little bit less of a complicated case in any respect.

The issues that Judge Lombardi decided to bifurcate were not simply whether or not there was an easement.

What he bifurcated and had the Court -- what the Court was going to decide first and foremost was whether or not there was evidence to overcome the presumed intent of this easement by necessity that the Appeals Court looked at.

And in Judge Brown's decision there was some suggestion that there might be evidence to show that there
was not an intent that every lot had some sort of access easement to it.

And that issue is the issue that was bifurcated, the issue of intent. Not whether or not there was an easement whatsoever.

There were two counterbalancing issues that came up before the Court that have quite a bit of technical and rules-based argument.

One was whether or not all the necessary parties have been before the Court.

That one, the Appeals Court looked at it, and it came back here, and that issue is still not to be -- not decided (time is 10:47:38 AM).

There were some motions that the Court heard, and then they were withdrawn. The issue of necessary parties was then subjugated to the issue of whether or not this issue of intent was present.

The other defendants have framed the case to the sense that it seems like they need -- they are trying to have this Court re-rule that the issue of intent is a burden that needs to be shown by the plaintiffs.

My parties are counter-claimants. We tried to put in cross-claims. They were struck by the Court based on Rule 8, failure to plead correctly.

We tried to plead -- re-plead the issue. The judge
found that our pleadings again did not meet the technical requirements of Rule 8, and then further ruled that our cross-claims were futile.

Ironically, the cross-claims were the same as the counterclaims, and yet the counterclaims remain in this case.

So my parties are in a strange kind of position here in that we weren't allowed to assert our cross-claims; they were struck. But our counterclaims for easements by necessity and prescription remain.

So we would like an opportunity to amend our complaint - our answer - to try to address the technicality issue that the Court had ruled we had failed and failed again to meet, at the same time as Mr. Decoulos would be serving his motion to amend.

It's simply -- I think it's a matter of artful drafting, in the way that we had drafted the complaint. We were referring to other parts of the complaint. We thought we had met the technical pleading requirements. Judge Lombardi didn't feel so. And then he ruled that our cross-claims were futile anyway.

And so we've appealed that. That's at the Appeals Court at this point.

But I don't think there's anything that says that we couldn't apply to amend our pleadings one more time, other
than the fact that Judge Lombardi had shut that door, at least at that time.

THE COURT: Do you say it's on appeal?
MR. HALL: It's currently on appeal, but it would moot the appeal if the Court were to allow our cross-claims, you know, if we were to try to amend to meet the technical requirements.

THE COURT: Okay. Where's -- okay.
Mr. Rappaport, let's get a different voice here. Go ahead.

MR. RAPPAPORT: Mr. Hall's motion to amend has been brought, argued, and denied twice by Judge Lombardi. And it's on appeal.

There's --

THE COURT: Yeah. Yeah, I know you --
MR. RAPPAPORT: I believe there's no two-ways-to-push
(phonetic at 10:50:22 AM, simultaneous) --
THE COURT: Yeah. Yeah, no, I know you -- I was going to ask Mr. Hall a question too.

You filed an appeal fairly recently or...
MR. HALL: Yes. We have two, two different appeals.
THE COURT: They're not -- the record hasn't been
assembled on at least one of 'em.

MR. HALL: No, it has not.
THE COURT: So we're waiting for a transcript, as --

MR. HALL: Yes, we are.
THE COURT: -- I recall --

MR. HALL: Yes.
THE COURT: -- as I understand it.
MR. HALL: Those are -- those are out. That's right.
THE COURT: Do you have any idea when she's going to file it?

MR. HALL: I believe...

THE COURT: Can you kind of sort of light a fire, for one thing.

MR. HALL: I will. Yes, Your Honor. Yes.
THE COURT: 'Cause I know I did some checking
yesterday, and \(I\) saw that the -- Ellen still has it to assemble the record. But we're kind of waiting for the transcript.

MR. HALL: Yes.
THE COURT: And it was the one that was recorded, not transcribed.

MR. HALL: Correct.
THE COURT: You sent it out to somebody down on the Cape.

MR. HALL: That's correct.
THE COURT: So we're still waiting for her to get back.

MR. HALL: Yes.

THE COURT: So at the very least, can you just give her a call?

MR. HALL: I will, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. But --

MR. HALL: However, Mr. Rappaport said that we moved to amend twice. No, we moved -- we had a cross-claim to amend, which the Court refused to address.

Even though it was filed under Rule 5, the Court said it was not filed in a proper fashion. So then, when he set the deadline for all amendments, we filed and moved to amend.

So technically we've only had one hearing on our motion to amend, even though he had struck our responsive answer to the Third Amended Complaint -- from last year.

So he had struck our cross-claims, did not strike our counterclaim. Our counterclaim is tantamount to the same exact claims.

So we're kind of in a funny situation, and the court has ample power to say, "No, I'm going to look at it again, and look at your pleadings and see if they meet the technical requirements."

The futility issue that Judge Lombardi addressed is the issue that we're going to probably have to ask the Appeals Court, if this Court does not allow some sort of addressing of our cross-claims.

We asked Judge Lombardi for a Rule 54 judgment, a separate judgment, saying, "No, that's it, you're out on your cross-claims"; he refused to do that.

So that leaves the issue still before this Court for the possibility that we could have an amendment.

After all, we're going to be hearing everybody's claims on this issue of easement by necessity; why shouldn't all the parties' rights be adjudicated in one forum?

It's not going to take a lot of extra time for the Court to review the couple-of-extra-ports (phonetic at 10:52:37 AM, simultaneous).

THE COURT: Okay. Could I ask if Mr. Rappaport spoke for everybody at that table?

MS. ROBERTS: Yes. Yes.

THE COURT: How about the people at this table?

MR. DECOULOS: I don't have anything to say about his motion.

THE COURT: You don't. Okay.

So plaintiffs say nothing. The defendants disagree with you, Mr. Hall. Okay. My inclination is, he's already decided it; it's on appeal. Let's let it -- let's see what happens on appeal.

And if -- but let's get the transcript in anyway. All right? Okay.

MR. HALL: Yes. So then we would not be allowed to file another motion to amend?

THE COURT: No. No. If you did, I'd deny it.
MR. HALL: (Indiscernible at 10:53:05 PM, simultaneous.)

MR. DECOULOS: Judge?

THE COURT: Mr. Decoulos.

MR. DECOULOS: Judge, on that Rule 34 motion, I'm going to file that immediately because of the weather conditions --

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. DECOULOS: -- will-happen-down (phonetic at 10:53:15 AM, simultaneous, indiscernible).

THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. I'm sitting -- every
couple of weeks I'm sitting. That's fine. No problem, even though it is --

MR. DECOULOS: (Indiscernible at 10:53:18 AM,
simultaneous)or-I-D (indiscernible) --

THE COURT: So we go from there.
MR. HALL: One other matter, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yeah, go ahead.

MR. HALL: And this has to do with, we were talking about evidence that's going to come into the case. We've recently become aware of another matter that was adjudicated partly and then settled, I believe, in the
superior court, a case by the name of Broscheit. And it's in this vicinity.

There was testimony given by various parties. The Vineyard Conservation Society was a party to that case. Certain admissions were made. And so we'd like to be able to put the transcript that we can get our hands on, from that trial, or at least portions of the transcript, and put those before this Court, because there's some fairly serious evidence of spoliation of some of the evidence on the ground that the Court could take heed of if the Court were inclined at some point to go down and take a view of this area.

Some of the old road beds were graded up and torn up by Vineyard Conservation Society at the time that this case, I believe, had been pending -- for a bit of time.

So I think that we've become aware of this case. We'd like to have an opportunity to kind of get into that record and present that record to the Court as well, 'cause I think there's some possibility that...

Well, I think I've said enough on that one matter.

THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Roberts? Go ahead.

MS. ROBERTS: I was trial counsel in the Broscheit matter, Judge, and it settled during trial.

The access issue there doesn't even abut Mr. Hall's property, so why he would want to be talking about a
roadway that doesn't give him any access I couldn't begin to tell you. But if he wants to pull together the record of that, we'll respond to it.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Okay.
Mr. -- you're traveling, I understand?
MR. ABAIR: Yeah, I'm off to Barcelona, so.
THE COURT: Good for you.
(Mirth.)
THE COURT: Okay. Tell you what. Just to make sure I got it right. Does somebody want to -- either Ms. Roberts or Mr. Decoulos -- Ms. Roberts, want to put together something, what we did this morning?

MS. ROBERTS: Sure. And we can all share it around and --

THE COURT: And circulate it with everybody.
MS. ROBERTS: -- I'll share it around and make sure everybody's got it.

THE COURT: And then I'll adopt it if it meets with my mind.

MS. ROBERTS: Yes.

THE COURT: And we'll go from there. And on December 4th, at eleven o'clock, we're here. All right. Thank you, all.

MS. ROBERTS: Thank you, Judge. My apologies for being late.

THE COURT: No. Not a problem. And Leslie's right; eleven o'clock's better. Here. Okay.

Thank you, Mr. Wice.
MR. WICE: Thank you, Your Honor. Appreciate it. THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WICE: Bye.
(Discussion basically off the record follows, included FYI.)

THE COURT: Anybody need any copies of this? These are the plans -- a blow-up of the plan that was in the Appeals Court reporter.

MS. ROBERTS: Oh. Yeah.

THE COURT: If anybody wants them...

ALL: Oh. Well. Yeah.

THE COURT: It's the same thing that was in the Appeals Court.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE SPEAKER: Nothing new.
(Discussion off the record.)

THE COURT: Is there enough here? I think I have one of 'em left, and we're just -- or there's the printer for you, if you want. Who didn't get -(Discussion continues off the record.) (Matter adjourned at 10:56:35 AM, to resume December 4, 2008, at 11:00 AM.)

\section*{C E R T I F I C A T O N}

I, Ellen H. Dibble, an Approved Court Transcriber, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript, from the audio recording provided to me by Attorney Wendy Sibbison of the Land Court proceedings in the above entitled matter.

I, Ellen H. Dibble, further certify that the foregoing is in compliance with the Administrative Office of the Trial Court Directive on Transcript Format.

I, Ellen H. Dibble, further certify that \(I\) neither am counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this hearing was taken, and further that I am not financially nor otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

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COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DUKES, SS. DEPARTMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT LAND COURT DEPARTMENT
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

MARIA A. KITRAS, as Trustee of * BEAR REALTY TRUST et al., * Plaintiffs *
* No. 97-MISC-238738
v.

TOWN OF AQUINNAH et al., * Defendants *

MOTION TO COMPEL INTERROGATORIES, BY VCS BEFORE JUDGE CHARLES W. TROMBLY, JR.

APPEARANCES (see next page) :

Boston, Massachusetts
Room 4
September 30, 2008

Ellen H. Dibble
Approved Court Transcriber

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(Time is 10:08:06 AM.)
THE COURT: Let them all introduce themselves, make sure you can hear them.

Start with Mr. Decoulos. You're the plaintiff.
MR. DECOULOS: Good morning. Nick Decoulos.
MS. MORSE: Leslie Morse.
MS. ROBERTS: Jennifer Roberts for the defendant, Vineyard Conservation Society.

THE COURT: Okay. And so you three, plus Ron Rappaport?

Could you hear that, Ron?
MR. RAPPAPORT: I could. Thank you, Judge.
THE COURT: Okay. All right. So we're here this morning on Ms. Roberts' motion to compel answer to interrogatories.

MS. ROBERTS: Have you had a chance to read --
THE COURT: I've read the motion, and I've -unfortunately I don't have the booklet with me. It's downstairs on Frank's desk, so we're all in trouble. But I've seen it before.

Do you have a copy? That would be helpful.
MR. DECOULOS: I've got two copies.
THE COURT: Okay. Just --

MR. DECOULOS: A copy of that and also a copy of the documents that were introduced -- I mean, produced, in

2006, I think.
THE COURT: Do you have a copy of that, Mr. Rappaport?
MR. DECOULOS: -- two thousand and six.
MR. RAPPAPORT: I have a copy of the motion. Yes, I do.

THE COURT: And of the booklet that Mr. Decoulos filed earlier?

MS. ROBERTS: 393-page --
THE COURT: 390-some-odd pages?
MR. RAPPAPORT: Oh, the booklet?
THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. RAPPAPORT: Yes. I don't have it in front of me, but --

THE COURT: Okay. Well --
MR. RAPPAPORT: -- I do have that document.
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Go ahead. Go ahead, Ms. Roberts.

MS. ROBERTS: Well, essentially, the complaint at this point consists of three counts: Count 1, for an easement by necessity; count 2, for an easement by prescription over Zack's Cliff Road; which if Your Honor recalls the map, that's set out on the map; and the count 3 is an easement by prescription over what we've been calling the Radio Tower Road.

The plaintiffs appear in several different capacities
as the trustees of realty trusts which own different trusts.

I served a set of interrogatories to them in their separate capacities, because I wanted to get from them the facts on which they relied with respect to particular lots, since the lots are in different areas; and I assume, certainly with respect to the easement by prescription, that there would be different evidence with respect to that.

The answer that \(I\) got back was essentially for all of -- for all of my interrogatories, was a reference to this 393-page document. And that was it.

So the basis for the motion is that that is an inadequate response.

With respect to the easement by necessity, the Appeals Court, when it had this case, has already said that that's a very fact-intensive exercise, to determine the intent with respect to the easement by necessity.

I would respectfully suggest that the time has now come for the plaintiffs to list what facts they rely on to support their contention that the easement by necessity exists.

The problem becomes even more severe with respect to interrogatories addressed to the easements by prescription.

As Your Honor knows, an easement by prescription
requires that you show 20 years of adverse use by you and your predecessors in title. And so my interrogatories were directed towards getting from the plaintiffs the facts that support that claim. I would be expecting them to come back and say, "Well, we've used this road to do \(X, Y\), and \(Z\) on it to benefit this particular lot; and the predecessor in title with respect to this particular lot used it to do whatever," as factual support for the claim.

Again, all that they did --

Well, I would also note for the Court that some of these lots don't even abut the particular ways that the plaintiffs are claiming an easement by prescription over.

So what we got instead was the same reference to this 393-page document, which has something to do with what was going on in the 1870 s. But \(I\) would respectfully suggest there's nothing in there that gives you - at least that I could find - that would give you a description of the 20 years of use by the record owners of these various lots.

So we would suggest that the interrogatory answers are completely inadequate.

I would note that Mr. Decoulos contacted me yesterday to refer me to some interrogatory answers that the plaintiffs had filed back in 2000 .

And when I looked those up, I called Mr. Decoulos back and said that these interrogatory answers had been so
inadequate that \(I\) had brought a motion to compel back in 2000, which was granted by Judge Green at that time, with an order dated August 8th, 2000, in which he ordered that the plaintiffs provide further answers to interrogatories, and in fact even invited me to seek my costs, which was something that I declined to do.

So -- so these answers from back in 2000 are completely inadequate -- the response. And unfortunately I didn't bring a copy.

The plaintiffs did file a subsequent answer, pursuant to Judge Green's order, in which they waived their claims to prescriptive easements at that phase of the proceedings.

So, as I said to Mr. Decoulos yesterday, if you want to waive your claims under counts 2 and 3, we don't have to come today. But if you still intend to pursue those claims, we're entitled to know the facts on which you rely that support them.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Decoulos.
MR. DECOULOS: Judge, there are several cases that are in the decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court that talk about ancient ways. In particular there's a recent one in 345 Mass., Puffer against the City of Beverly, that shows an ancient way along the coastline of Beverly, where it's -- with the Atlantic Ocean.

And this is an 1870 way; it was in existence in 1870, and has been continued to date. It's called Zack's Cliffs Road. And we don't have any evidence that would say that -- we've walked (phonetic at 10:14:35 AM, could be heard as "walk") the property. We're relying on rights that were created in 1870 as a result of Zack's Cliffs Road, which went from the center of -- from State Road, I think it is, all the way to the Atlantic Ocean.

It's there now. Recently we had a survey made of a particular lot, 178, and they found, on the ground, they could locate Zack's Cliffs Road.

So what we're relying on is not our own -- our rights to travel over it, but on -- since they've owned it, but relying on the rights of since 1870, that this is what the Indians used to get down to the ocean.

And on one side of Moshup Trail, the Kennedy holdings shut -- have placed a barrier across it. But on the other side of Moshup Trail, which travels to where all the lots are, that's open and still in existence.

So that's what we're relying on, and we've got a booklet of -- the book there, of 300 -some-odd pages, that show the roads.

Go downstairs into the atlas room; it's shown there. I don't know what else she wants. But we did tell her if she wanted persons, and we did tell her that there's a

William Vanderhoop that lives in Aquinnah who says that he traveled it all the way down.

And not only is it in that booklet, but there's a second booklet that we have given you, Judge, that was produced in the -- a long time ago, when there was a production of documents.

So we've laid out all of the documentary evidence that we have. It's impossible for us to say that in 1870 Vanderhoop was there and did the walking.

So we're relying exactly on what was there in 1870. They used it to travel from the State Road all the way down to the Atlantic Ocean. And we have no other documentation.

We have no oral testimony except Vanderhoop's. That's all.

THE COURT: How old is he, if I might ask?
MR. DECOULOS: Oh, it's great. He's up and about. As I understand it, he runs an operation down there. My client gave me a picture of him with Professor Ogletree from Harvard, fishing for bass down there last month. So there's some -- he's up and about.

MS. ROBERTS: He's about my age, Judge. Somewhere in his 50s (chuckles).

THE COURT: Okay. I'm not going to say a word.
MS. ROBERTS: Okay. (Chuckles.)
THE COURT: He could be about my age. (Chuckling.)

So you have no -- or you have one -- no oral testimony except perhaps Mr. Vanderhoop.

MR. DECOULOS: Yeah.
THE COURT: So what do you rely on, if (phonetic at 10:17:27 AM, unclear word) the prescription is use?

MS. ROBERTS: He just needs -- he needs to file an interrogatory answer which says that. If he says, "All I'm relying on is the existence of Zack's Cliffs Road since 1870," then he needs to give me an interrogatory answer that says that.

And then I'm going to file a motion for summary judgment, because that doesn't cut the mustard for an easement by prescription.

If he -- you know, I can't -- whatever his theory is here, he's pleaded an easement by prescription.

There's no such thing as an ancient way by prescription, that \(I\) know of. So --

MR. DECOULOS: Oh, there isn't? Then you ought to read the cases --

MS. ROBERTS: So. So. So --

THE COURT: Okay. All right.
MS. ROBERTS: So he needs to identify the facts on which he relies to support his claim.

And referring me to one stack of booklet or two booklets is not going to cut the mustard.

THE COURT: Yeah. No, you've got to be more specific, definitely.

I'll issue an order. But you've got to be more specific than saying, "Look at the book."

It's -- I have read it. Sorry I can't put my fingers on mine this morning, but \(I\) have -- and I haven't read it word for word, but \(I\) have read it when it came in.

But you've got to be more specific.

And just -- as she said, maybe just say what you said, that there's no -- hardly a man is now alive, except Mr. Vanderhoop. He can -- if you're saying he can go back 50 or 60 years, then he probably can say that.

But prescription. Necessity's another thing. But this is -- we're talking prescription, though.

MR. DECOULOS: I understand. I understand. That's all we've got, is what \(I\) told you. We don't have anything else. And that's what we're going to rely on.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, give her an answer. Then she'll do whatever she's going to do. If you make a motion, fine. Then I'll deal with it, and we'll be going on with this thing.

But be specific. Don't just say --
MR. DECOULOS: I am --

THE COURT: -- "Look at the book."

Where do we go from here now? I saved December 4th
for you folks.

MS. ROBERTS: We had them -- if he could -- it's sort of up to Mr. Decoulos how quickly he could now answer these interrogatories.

MR. DECOULOS: I'm not going to give you...
THE COURT: Just give us an answer similar to what you just said.

MR. DECOULOS: What do you want me to do, just itemize the pages for you?

MS. ROBERTS: I want you to say that: The fact on which \(I\) rely for the claim of an easement by prescription is the existence of Zack's Cliff Road from 1870 to the present, used by -- whoever you say used it, to benefit whatever particular lots your plaintiff owns.

If that's what you rely on, that's what we need.
THE COURT: Yeah, that's fair.

MR. DECOULOS: And we'll give you page numbers. We'll refer to the pages.

THE COURT: Okay. And give us page numbers.

MR. DECOULOS: Yeah.

THE COURT: Say what you said, and give us -- if you can say pages 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9, fine, say that.

MR. DECOULOS: No problem.

MS. ROBERTS: But the basic fact is, the existence of that Zack's Cliffs Road, that's what you need in your
interrogatory answer.

MR. DECOULOS: All right.

THE COURT: All right. And then, the next point, of course, is going to be your motion, I would imagine, about the entry --

MR. DECOULOS: For the view, yeah.

THE COURT: We'll deal with that when it comes out. I'm not going to deal with it today.

MS. ROBERTS: And I guess the other point. We've addressed ourselves mostly here to the easement by prescription claims.

But the easement by necessity I would --

THE COURT: Same thing.

MS. ROBERTS: -- respectfully suggest --

THE COURT: Just --

MS. ROBERTS: -- he needs to list what the facts are that he relies on for that claim.

THE COURT: Yep, and I agree.

MR. DECOULOS: Okay.

THE COURT: You've got to be more specific.

MR. DECOULOS: Fine.

THE COURT: And then we'll go. All right?

MR. DECOULOS: Yep.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, all.

Okay, Ron?

MR. RAPPAPORT: Thank you. Thank you very much for letting me participate.

THE COURT: Okay. Good. Glad to do it. Bye-bye. (Matter adjourned at 10:20:43 AM.)

\section*{C E R T I F I C A T O N}

I, Ellen H. Dibble, an Approved Court Transcriber, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript, from the audio recording provided to me by Attorney Wendy Sibbison of the Land Court proceedings in the above entitled matter.

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Volume: II of II
Day 9 of 11
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DUKES, SS.
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DEPARTMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT
LAND COURT DEPARTMENT
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
M,**
BEAR REALTY TRUST et al., *
Plaintiffs *
* No. 97-MISC-238738
v.
TOWN OF AQUINNAH et al., *
Defendants *
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
ANTHONY FRANGOS et al., *
Plaintiffs *
* MISC. No. 299511
v.
TOWN OF AQUINNAH et al., *
Defendants *
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
MOTIONS TO STRIKE; STATUS CONFERENCE
BEFORE JUDGE CHARLES W. TROMBLY, JR.
APPEARANCES (see next page):
Boston, Massachusetts
Room 6
February 4, 2009.
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For: David Wice and Betsy Wice
(Time is 11:04:31 AM.)
THE CLERK: Case number 238738, Maria Kitras et al. versus the Town of Aquinnah et al.

Case number 299511, Anthony Frangos et al. versus the Town of Aquinnah et al.

THE COURT: Okay. Hi. Good morning, folks. For the record, let's introduce ourselves as if we don't know each other. We'll start with you.

MR. DECOULOS: Nicholas Decoulos representing the plaintiff, Maria Kitras et al.

MS. MORSE: Leslie-Ann Morse representing Mark D. Harding and Charles Harding and Sheila Besse as they are the trustees of Eleanor \(P\). Harding Realty Trust.

MR. HALL: Good morning, Judge. Benjamin Hall, Jr., representing Gossamer Wing Realty Trust and Baron's Land Trust.

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. ROBERTS: Jennifer Roberts for the Vineyard Conservation Society.

And Judge, I just would note that I think we're supposed to be conference-calling Mr. Rappaport.

THE COURT: Are you going to call him? I thought he was going to call us.

MS. ROBERTS: I don't know where it was left with the Court.

THE COURT: No, it was left with us that he was going to call us at five minutes past 11:00.

MS. ROBERTS: Okay. Great.

THE COURT: So if he doesn't call, then we'll call him.

MS. ROBERTS: Okay.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. TILLOTSON: Good morning, Your Honor. Diane Tillotson for the Martha's Vineyard Land Bank.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. DANIELS: Good morning, Your Honor. Cara Daniels, for Caroline Kennedy and Edwin Schlossberg.

MR. DONNELLY: John Donnelly for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

THE COURT: Okay. Good morning.

MS. LEWIS: Good morning, Your Honor. Christina Lewis here for David and Betsy Wice.

THE COURT: Okay. No room at the table? Or... (Mirth.)

MS. TILLOTSON: There actually is.

MS. LEWIS: I could squeeze in there. I wanted to give counsel a (indiscernible at 11:05:56 AM).

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. TILLOTSON: All right.

THE COURT: As I said, Mr. Hall was able to get off
the island, I guess, one way or the other. How did you come up? By boat?
[MS. TILLOTSON]: He swam.
MR. HALL: Yes, Your Honor. I took the first ferry and then the first bus.

THE COURT: Okay. And Ron Rappaport was at the airport, and he called us about 9:30, quarter of 10:00, and he said, "I'm not sure I'm going to make it."

And then he called back and he said, "I'm not going to make it; they haven't plowed the runways yet."

MR. HALL: That's why I don't take the plane whenever there's a snow.

THE COURT: So we told him to call back a little bit after 11:00. So we're kind of... we'll sit here and wait for him. It should be any minute.

Is everybody else here other than that? Okay. (Pause.)

THE COURT: The boats were running, I gather, huh?

MR. HALL: Oh, yeah. Right on time. There's no wind or anything, so, typically --

THE COURT: Were they running yesterday? In the morning?

MR. HALL: Well, I wasn't on them, so I...

THE COURT: No, 'cause I had a motion yesterday, and by prearrangement it was by telephone 'cause it was
somebody on the Vineyard.

MR. HALL: Well, they may not...

THE COURT: I forget who it was. He said there wasn't anybody in that office, and he said, "I'm not sure I could have got off this morning anyway."

MR. HALL: Well, \(I\) don't know if -- a lot of people didn't go in to work because the roads were icy, and they canceled school. So.

THE COURT: Mmm.

MR. HALL: Doing it by boat is the wise thing to do. THE COURT: Even in God's country, huh?

MR. HALL: Oh, yeah. Moshup's country. Heh.

THE COURT: Okay. So we'll wait just a minute for Mr. Rappaport.
(Pause.)
(Attorney Rappaport patched in at 11:09:03 AM.)

THE COURT: Ron?

MR. RAPPAPORT: Yes.

THE COURT: You're there. Okay.

This is Judge Trombly. Present are the usual cast of characters. I'll just remind everybody to keep their voice up while we talk so you can hear it and so we can hear you.

All right. So we're here this morning on -- it's motions to strike the evidence and what not, as I read the order? How many sides --

Who submitted packages of what deeds they want to put in? I know Nick did.

MR. DECOULOS: Yes.

THE COURT: I noticed Leslie did.

MS. MORSE: Yes.

THE COURT: And...

MR. HALL: Baron's Land Trust and Gossamer Wing Realty Trust submitted documents.

THE COURT: Okay. How about you?
[MS. TILLOTSON]: Yes. And the defendants.

THE COURT: Oh, you all did too.

MS. ROBERTS: I don't know that we've actually...

THE COURT: One volume with everybody?

MS. ROBERTS: I don't know that we've actually
submitted the documents themselves. I -- it would...

We certainly gave them to the opposing party. But I present on behalf of Vineyard Conservation Society, I don't think I actually filed copies of the documents, on the theory that we wouldn't be relevant until the Court ruled on it.

THE COURT: Till we do the -- set up the briefing schedule and go from there? Okay.

MS. ROBERTS: Yeah. Yeah.

THE COURT: Okay. And what we've got motions today by various parties to strike things from various people's --
this is kind of unwieldy, but I want to -- how to do it, how we should do it.

We'll start with -- Nick's the plaintiff. Go ahead.

MR. DECOULOS: Well, Your Honor, this is a two-count complaint: One for prescription on certain ways that are located -- were located on the property and that have been continued in use since that time; at least that's what we're alleging.

And a second count is for easement by necessity.

And yesterday I received this - I don't know - a complete 14-page objection to the documents that we submitted, from day one to the other day -- not to the other day.

And I think that to burden you with a motion to strike at this time is not practical to do. What we should do is file our briefs, and in our briefs set forth our objections to their -- or our memorandums as it relates to all of these documents that they've objected to.

And before we even do that, I think that we should be able to have a meeting of all of the attorneys and go over all of this, because \(I\) don't understand some of their objections. We've put in five or six titles to some of the lots, and they said "it's not relevant," but they don't dispute the back (phonetic at 11:11:45 AM, could be heard as "bank") title.

I don't understand what that means, but \(I\) think that a meeting with all of the lawyers, we can narrow the issues down and narrow the documents down to something, submit an agreed statement of facts on all of the documents that they have no objection to, and possibly after the conference they wouldn't have any more objections, and maybe we wouldn't have any objection.

But to try and burden you with going over some - I don't know; we submitted at least - it must be over 100 documents here. And I don't think that we should be burdened with that without memorandums, without meetings of the parties, so that we could then report back to you and say that these documents are agreeable, on agreed statement of facts.

And this is all a statement -- this is a case that there isn't going to be any evidence introduced.

And put it down into one neat package for you so that you can then decide whether or not their objections and our objections are relevant, or meaningful, and then go on from there.

THE COURT: Aren't there always going to be deeds and things that are put in to -- submitted to the Court which may or may not be relevant?

I took a look at some of the objections, and I didn't go into detail. But the objection was relevancy, 'cause it
didn't pertain to a certain lot, that may or may not still be involved?

MR. DECOULOS: Well, we would agree to that. You know, like lot 79; I don't know why it's in there, but it's there. It's got no relevance at this particular moment. But I think at a conference - a two or three-hour conference amongst the attorneys - we could come to a lot of agreed statements or agreed facts for the court to consider.

THE COURT: Okay. Anybody -- you? Diane?

MS. TILLOTSON: Your Honor, I'm all for not burdening - overburdening - the Court.

THE COURT: Thank you, heh.

MS. TILLOTSON: -- but I think... (chuckles.)

I think that on the present record, at least given the documents, the number of documents that have been submitted, I do think that there are a number that are just not relevant to the issue before the Court.

And rather than... I think we need -- everybody, the Court and all the parties to the case need to understand, before we submit our briefs, what our playing field is, what the Court is going to accept into evidence, assuming that we're going forward on a case-stated -- which I think is everybody's intention here: That there will be no live evidence offered.

And essentially, the issue before the Court is the one that was remanded to this Court by the Appeals Court.

I think that perhaps what might make sense, in the interests of if Mr. Decoulos believes that we can reach agreement and is willing to concede that certain things, in his record, are not relevant, perhaps we could argue the motions this morning and then set a date for, you know, not terribly far from here, you know three or four days or by the end of next week, for advising the Court as to whether we're able to reach agreement on any of the objections that have been made.

But I think we should move ahead and argue the objections. And then I think you need to make a ruling as to what's in and what's out, and then the parties need to set a briefing schedule.

THE COURT: Then we can do the briefing.
MS. TILLOTSON: And I'm happy --
THE COURT: Jennifer? Leslie? Or Ben. Go ahead.
Can you hear us, Ron, by the way?
MR. RAPPAPORT: I can hear about three quarters of it, but I've heard -- I've followed what everybody's saying.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Mr. Hall's going to speak. Go ahead.

MR. HALL: Thank you, Your Honor.
Several matters. First, I'm a little confused exactly
what it is that we're doing here today because, the nature of the motions to strike.

First of all, I did not receive any motions to strike until I was -- one of the plaintiffs, actually, was kind enough to e-mail me a copy of the objections after five o'clock last night. So I was coming up here assuming that there were no objections and everything was coming in.

I was a little surprised to find out that there were objections, and I did not have any opportunity to really prepare very well, and look at all the documents in the case.

The second issue is, the motions that were filed with the Court I think are in a vacuum. And I think there's going to be a problem with Your Honor even beginning to review these, because the documents that they're objecting to were not provided to the Court.

So the Court's going to look at a bunch of objections on relevance but not be able to actually look at the documents themselves to determine whether they're relevant or not.

THE COURT: Well, a lot of them were. Mr. Decoulos submitted two binder - and Leslie did too - binders with things in them. Maybe you didn't get them, but we have them.

MR. HALL: No. No, I got them, but the instructions
of the order were not to submit them to the Court. And I think we didn't want to be submitting what were supposedly, in my mind, were essentially discovery-type materials that we were proposing and exchanging back and forth.

So Jennifer is quite right; I think there are a lot of documents that the Court doesn't have before it that need to be kind of looked at in the context of the relevance issue.

So I mean, I would like to be able to submit at least the ones that the Town has objected to, and also have an opportunity to really respond to some of the stuff that's said.

I mean, that being said, I can -- I'm prepared to sort of argue the motion to strike some of my evidence, today, but would like the opportunity to actually put it in writing and provide a memorandum of law in response.

I think that having the status conference, the motions to strike, heard in such a quick fashion after they were sent doesn't really give anybody the opportunity to prepare an opposition, because they were sent out -- it looks like the Town sent theirs on the 30 th, but as of yesterday, with the snowstorm on the island, I don't know what happened to the mail, but \(I\) didn't get anything.

And then to find out that the Land Bank, Town of Aquinnah, the Kennedys, the Wices, the Commonwealth, the

VCS provided a joint opposition to documents that the plaintiffs had proposed: Was submitted late. I mean, this wasn't filed on January 31 st or the 30 th, but was submitted on February 2nd. So albeit, that is a weekend day, and it would necessarily roll over to Monday.

But now to have a hearing two days later on it, it's a little quick -- quick draw.

So that was some of my concerns about where we are.
And I was under the impression that we were sort of heading toward a case-stated basis. And in that respect, I wasn't quite sure what objections to anticipate from an evidentiary basis. I was considering a lot of the documentation to be under the rubric of a summary judgment type application. And I anticipated, as we had before, motions to strike based on hearsay and affidavit hearsay and so on and so forth, much as before, and earlier in the case, where some of the statements in some affidavits were struck by the Court, by Judge Green originally.

So here we are today, and I think the issue is - that we're looking at, at the trial that we're looking at, or whatever fact-finding procedure we're following - is going to be under the issue of intent, and the intent to landlock the property -- whether there was an intent to landlock the property.

Not whether there's an intent to create an easement by
necessity, because the law is quite clear -- and Judge Green recited that; it's part of the law of the case. It's Davis v. Sikes. It's all the cases that that Judge Green himself went into under the very first order in this case, much of which remains the law of this case, that was not reversed in the Appeals Court.

And essentially that says that there's a presumption -- once you sever property into a multiple of lots, if there's a unity of title, that there's a presumption that there's access to those lots.

Now, that presumption can be overcome, because that shifts the burden of proof over to the parties that are saying that no, there was an intent to landlock.

And I think the Court has been acting as if no, the burden of proof on intent is actually on the plaintiffs, or the parties that are claiming it.

And that isn't actually the way the law reads. It's that -- the law is that you merely show that there's a division of the property in 1878 -- I think that's almost a fact that everybody can agree on. Whether it's 1871 or 1878: There was a division of property.

And at that point that creates the presumption of an intent to create an easement by necessity.

Now, that can be overcome. And it's up to the defendants to prove that it has been overcome.

And in several documents that we've proposed, there's a judicial admission - virtual judicial admission - that in fact there is no evidence of intent to landlock.

So I'm a little confused about where we're going and why there's a need to actually provide a whole case and all these documents, because the Court could simply hone in on a couple of judicial admissions, and say, "Why are we here? There's clearly -- that this presumption cannot be overcome; you've admitted it, defendants" - the Town in particular, in one devastating interrogatory answer, where they're asked specifically, "Provide all evidence that shows that there's an intent to landlock," and they provide nothing.

So I think the Court could almost cut through all these documents, hone in on a couple of judicial admissions; and now we're to the next level of the case, which is: What parties are supposed to be before the Court.

THE COURT: Mr. Rappaport, you want to be heard on that?

MR. RAPPAPORT: It's -- I'm just looking at the Appeals Court decision, at page 354, Mass. Appeals Court at 300, where the decision explicitly says that -- and I'm reading, "Remain mindful that it is the proponent's burden to prove the existence of an implied easement,"
quote-unquote. And there's a cite to another case.

So this really is, in large part, a burden of proof question. And the Appeals Court has said that the burden rests with the proponent seeking to establish an easement by necessity.

That's an issue that's already been adjudicated by the Appeals Court.

THE COURT: Okay. Anybody else? Jennifer?
MS. ROBERTS: Just really quickly, Judge. You've got eight lawyers in front of you today, and at least the lawyers on this side of the courtroom understood we were here on motions to strike evidence.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. ROBERTS: And we have sort of yet to get to the meat of that.

And I would also point out that while I'm sympathetic with Mr. Hall's position, it was because of Mr. Hall's schedule that we rejiggered all of this briefing schedule, to meet his vacation schedule. So we did that back in early December, and everybody's had plenty of time to address this.

So I would respectfully suggest that let's hear the motions to strike.

I have no objection to going out in the Hall afterwards with Mr. Decoulos to see if we can report
something to the Court on some of these issues, but I'd like to get the motions heard, get a schedule for Your Honor to make a decision, and then get a briefing schedule so that we can get this case behind us.

THE COURT: Okay. I agree. I do. Yeah.
MS. MORSE: Your Honor, can I make...

THE COURT: Yeah. Leslie, go ahead.

MS. MORSE: Your Honor, I guess my big problem with this is: I never got this. I mean, you're asking us to argue motion \(I\) have glanced at. This was sent out February 2nd. I don't have it. This is the one from the Kennedys, the Land Bank, Town of Aquinnah.

I mean, that's grossly unfair, to send it out on -this is dated the 2 nd, which was Monday, and we're here today.

I mean, I think that raises --
THE COURT: It is late, but everybody's here. I don't want to make everybody come back. It's hard enough getting everybody together.

But let's do it, argue it generically, then.

Motions -- safe (phonetic at 11:24:09 AM, could be heard as "seem") to say that -- are relevance.

Let's not go through it one at a time. Let's just say, what's the basic arguments.

MS. ROBERTS: Your Honor, the way we divvied this up,

Ms. Tillotson handled the Kitras exhibits, and

Mr. Rappaport handled the Mr. Hall exhibits. So they'd be principally arguing --

THE COURT: Let's go through it. I'll give everybody a chance to reply if we get there.

Go ahead.

MS. TILLOTSON: Your Honor, most respectfully, I don't think that anything that I'm going to say is going to be a surprise to anybody sitting on the other side of the room. Nor do \(I\) think that it's anything that is not capable of a response, because what we sulomitted, although we went through item by item, frankly, so the Court would have the benefit of having a list of all the proposed exhibits that we were objecting to.

And then the basis for the objection, for the most part, the memorandum that we submitted, with the objections, was generic in nature, and basically broke up... the primary -- our primary objection to many of these proposed exhibits is relevance.

And I would just start, again, with the fact -- \(I\) know when Mr. Decoulos got up he talked about a two-count complaint, and the first count being one for prescription.

From my perspective, what we're trying, and what the Court - Judge Lombardi - focused on in the motion to bifurcate, was the issue that was remanded by the Appeals

Court in 2005 .

And the essential question for the court to determine, in accordance with the Appeals Court's decision, is whether or not there being be an easement implied for lots above 189 or 190, depending on whether you include lot 189 as previously owned individually, or as part of the common lands.

In any event, \(I\) don't think that there's any question, if you read the Appeals Court decision carefully, that lots before -- that the lots from 1 to 188 are... The Appeals Court ruled conclusively with respect to those lots, so I don't think there's any question that any material submitted with respect to those lots is not relevant to this Court's inquiry.

With respect the lots above those, I think it is also clear, as Mr. Rappaport indicated, that both the Appeals Court and Judge Lombardi, when he bifurcated - when he acted on the motion to bifurcate - clearly stated that the burden of proof is on the proponents, i.e., the plaintiffs, to prove that there is an easement by implication.

And the Appeals Court went on to say what would be relevant and what the standard was in looking at that issue.

And the issue is really, if you went back to 1878, which is the year that the commissioners acted, what was in
the minds of the commissioners when they severed that lot -- when they severed those lots? And can you make a determination, as of 1878, that if you, the finder of fact, put yourself in the position of those commissioners, would you have intended to create an easement?

So what is really relevant is what it can properly said to have been in the minds of those commissioners back in 1878.

And I think, on this side of the room, essentially we're saying that all of the information that has been submitted to you from 1920, 1940, 1960, 1980 - and there's a lot of it even post-1980 - is simply not relevant, because how can plans and correspondence and statements that were made 125 years after the fact possibly shed light on what those commissioners had in their mind back in 1878, and prior to 1878.

And again, what the Appeals Court said, and what Judge Lombardi...

This case is very difficult. And one of the reasons that \(I\) think it is going to be submitted on a case-stated, is that there is no person who is live today who could possibly testify - who is possibly competent to testify as to what those commissioners had in their minds back then.

What the Appeals Court stated in the Kitras decision
was that they considered relevant historical sources of information on tribal use, common custom applicable at the time.

And with respect to those exhibits, the ones that suggest tribal use and custom, or the actual documents that divided up the land in question, I think that the defendants have no objection to those documents. And we've indicated that in our filing.

But with respect to all of the information that post-dates that, I think it's very difficult for the Court to make a determination. And I don't think that that information is probative as... you know, for example, an 1848 plan showing, or an aerial photograph showing what the land looked like in 18- -- excuse me, in 1948, or 1950, how can that possibly be probative of what the commissioners had in their minds in 1878?

On the other hand - and this goes to address one of Mr. Decoulos's objections to our proposed exhibits - and Your Honor, I don't know that you actually need physical copies of the exhibits to make these rulings, but I think that if you'd like to have them, \(I\) think we can all provide you with a set.

We've certainly provided them -- we've circulated them amongst counsel. But \(I\) think it's true that you haven't received the ones that we sulomitted, the Land Bank
submitted, or that Ms. Roberts submitted. And again, it's not -- there are not that many documents. We can certainly provide the Court with a copy.

In any event, \(I\) do think it's relevant, because anything that predated - particularly by a relatively short period of time - the 1878 time period can be said to be probative of what the commissioners had in their minds in 1878, for the simple reason that they would have known about it.

Obviously the commissioners can't know about something that happened in 1920 or 1930, but they can certainly know about something that happened in 1860 or 1850 , because they were -- obviously, that was part of the history that they were aware of at the time that they made the set-off of 1878.

And with respect to particularly the Chappaquiddick set-off that Mr. Decoulos objects to, it's the defendants' position that that set-off very specifically articulated that there were certain easements granted or reserved in setting off the lots for the Chappaquiddick set-off.

Again, the commissioners who did the Gay Head set-off would have been aware of that Chappaquiddick set-off when they were doing the later set-off, and we submit that the fact that they did not include any reference to any easements in their set-off is pertinent and significant in
defending the plaintiffs' case here.

And the Appeals Court likewise found that to be the case. The Appeals Court stated, at page 299 of the Appeals Court decision: "Particularly noteworthy in our estimation is the commissioners' silence on this issue, as is the fact that even the most cursory glance at a contemporaneous plot map shows that the vast majority of the set-off lots had no frontage or obvious access."

So the Appeals Court found the fact that there was no mention made of easements particularly significant.

The defendants believe that in light of that notation, it is relevant and probative to point out the fact that in another set-off that was done relatively contemporaneously and prior to this one - that the commissioners would have known about at the time - that that is probative, where in fact easements were noted in the set-off document.

The fact that there is that particular set-off, when compared to this one, is relevant and probative of the commissioners' intent.

I think that that essentially sums up my argument. I'm happy to, you know, have anybody else on our side of the table chime in, or to answer any of the questions that the Court might have. And again, that's without going item by item.

The other thing I would note is that no one -- there
have been several documents submitted that are the complete titles of various lots, both lots before lot numbered 189 and lots after 189.

I don't think the record title is in dispute here. I mean, obviously those documents are... you know, we don't have an objection on the basis of authenticity on with respect to those documents. But no one is disputing the title.

And there's nothing in any of those documents - I think the parties can agree - that suggests what the intent of the commissioners in 1878 might have been.

So again, \(I\) can't possibly see the relevance of those documents to what's relatively a fairly narrow issue that's facing the Court.

And the only other real objection - or the only other objection we make - is to the composite plans that were presented to the Court showing the ownership.

And we would object to those on a number of bases which are included in the motion.

But we don't have any objection to their use as a chalk. In fact, we find that they may be useful as a chalk, so to the extent that the court wants to look at those plans that have been submitted...

But there's no real basis or foundation for establishing them as actual evidence in the case.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Do you want to reply, Mr. Decoulos?

MR. DECOULOS: I heard nothing about prescription, Your Honor, in their argument. And that's one of the counts.

And the reason that any of the evidence after 1878 was introduced was to show where the location of all of the roads were.

And we used aerials; we used everything else possible.

And that's why we wanted to include those in the case.

Now, the Appeals Court had -- there's two parts to the Appeals Court decision.

There's a part that they go on and talk about all of the intent. And then they get involved in the facts.

And they're mistaken as to the facts. And that's the second part of the decision. And it's really dicta, because that wasn't what the issue was before the court.

For example, you take lot 178: Lot 178 -- the first time there was ever a lot 178 was in 1878. It wasn't in existence prior to that. And that's between that 174 and 189.

There's no 178.

The only time we found out that there was a lot 178 was because of the set-off plans that were found just last year down at the -- last year or the last couple of years.

So those are in dispute. And that's why we needed all of those documents that we're putting in there.

It's -- nobody -- it just never was in existence prior to that, so how do they know 178... how can they realistically say that 178 is excluded when the first time it ever shows up is in the set-off plan?

Now, our contention is that we want to show every piece of common -- every...

Our contention is that the common land should be specifically identified, and that's the reason for the plans before 1878.

And there's a presumption, as Mr. Hall stated, that the subdividing of the land, without any easements or access to get to the other lots held in common, there's a presumption.

Presumptions are rebuttable, but we've got a step-up (time is 11:37:47 AM) on that.

When I think that we've got a presumption that there was an intent, let them rebut the presumption.

That's the way \(I\) understand the rules of evidence, is that it's there; it's not prima facie, but it's there, according to all of the cases that I've read. And they've got to rebut that presumption.

So having said that, I still suggest, Your Honor, that we ought to have a meeting, whether it be this afternoon or
some other day next week, so that we can give you a package, that will then, you'll be able to say, "All right, they're agreeable to all of these things; they're not agreeable to these," and then you can take a look at them. But keep in mind that there's several parts in this case. And I don't want to repeat myself. There's the presumption count, and then there's the necessity count. And if we've got a presumption, the rules of evidence say that they've got to rebut it. That's the way I understand it.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MS. ROBERTS: Just want to point out --

THE COURT: Ms. Roberts.

MS. ROBERTS: -- to the Court, this is Judge Lombardi's order allowing the motion to bifurcate, in which he says -- this is with respect to the Appeals Court: "In issuing its decision, the Appeals Court assumed, for lots number 189 or 190 and above, the intent to create easements. The assumption may ultimately be found to be factually correct, but this is not inevitable. The first task for this Court, therefore, is to decide whether there is a factual or legal base for that assumption."

So we've all been assuming, heh, based on Judge Lombardi's order --

THE COURT: What's the date of the order?

MS. ROBERTS: That is August 14, 2006.

THE COURT: Mm-hmm?

MS. ROBERTS: -- that we were focusing here on the easement by necessity and whether there's an intent to create that easement.

That's what we thought the exercise was. I now hear from Mr. Decoulos that he thinks we're also going down the prescription path.

THE COURT: I'll be honest with you, I'm -- as a -I'll have to read it again myself.

I was on the assumption, like you, that we were talking the implication and necessity argument right now.

MS. ROBERTS: Yeah. We can regroup on that.

Frankly, there is no evidence of 20 years of adverse use benefitting any of the plaintiffs' lots. We deposed Mr. Decoulos, and that doesn't exist. So I'm not -- we'll talk afterwards, but --

THE COURT: We'll talk about that, but...

MS. ROBERTS: But -- and that would, I would suspect, be open to summary judgment brief.

But for the present purposes, our exercise, and the evidence we've designated, is on the issue of intent with respect to the easement by necessity.

THE COURT: Yeah. Go ahead, Nick.

\footnotetext{
'Cause I was thinking the same thing they were.
}

MR. DECOULOS: All right. But that's not fact. The fact is that we've got a prescription claim, and we've also got that claim.

THE COURT: But is it on the table right now, I guess, that's the question.

MR. DECOULOS: I think it is. I mean, it's count number 2 in our complaint. If they all want to overlook come if they all want to overlook it, that's perfectly all right by me, and agree that there is a roadway network that's in existence down there, since 1878 and forward.

THE COURT: I don't think they're going to admit to that.

MR. DECOULOS: They're not -- I know they won't agree to that.

MS. TILLOTSON and others: Well -- well, I think -(everybody speaking up) --

THE COURT: But that's not the question, now. The question is, are we --

MR. DECOULOS: Can I just say one thing about the Appeals Court decision?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DECOULOS: -- that I...

Judge Lombardi asked me - and I can remember it distinctly - "Do you think the Appeals Court was wrong in saying 174 and 189."

Those things were not in existence.

And I told him I think they were wrong, and they should never have delved into that part of the case in their decision.

You read the decision, and it stops right there, and they say, "Well, wait a minute; we want to talk about the facts."

And that wasn't before them.

Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. ROBERTS: Judge, I would just say, if we're going to include the prescription issue now, then we need to designate evidence for that, 'cause we haven't done that.

THE COURT: No, as I say, the way I read it, that's not on the table right now. It may be someday, but it isn't now. Okay.

Mr. Donnelly?

MR. DONNELLY: I was just going to...

There's specific evidence, for example, orders of taking some of the lots.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. DONNELLY: That would be relevant in a prescriptive argument. And obviously they weren't included, because that we were under Judge Lombardi's order, so I just add that.

THE COURT: Mr. Rappaport, I don't want to forget about you.

MR. RAPPAPORT: No, I'm listening, and I must say I agree with what Attorney Tillotson and Attorney Roberts have said.

And again, I go back to that explicit language in the Appeals Court that it is really in part is coming down to a burden of proof claim, but it rests with the proponents.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Hall.

MR. HALL: Yes, Your Honor. First of all, there's nothing inconsistent with the Appeals Court decision and Judge Lombardi's bifurcation order with respect to shifting the burden of proof, because, as the Appeals Court said and as Judge Lombardi said in his bifurcation order, quoting from the Appeals Court - that "the assumption" with respect to intent to create easements for lots 189 or 190 and above "may ultimately be found to be factually correct, but this is not inevitable."

But the Court says: "Factually correct."

And so in the fact-finding, the first fact that the Court needs to look at, under the law not only of this case but under over a hundred years of jurisprudence, going back to 1817, the Gayetty versus Bethune case, which was cited by Judge Green, and is the law - has not been overruled in any respect; it's 14 Mass. at 49 , page 56 ; it's an 1817
case - is that once you show a division of the property and again, this goes back to the Appeals Court - is that the fact of the division, while Judge Green found it, they -- they wanted to send it back to find out what the facts were with respect to that.

So once the Court finds that there was a division and I think there's pretty much a concession here that there was a division in 1878, at least as to that one minute but important fact - once the Court findings that fact, automatically, if anybody is landlocked, the burden then shifts to the other side, under the presumption that's noted in Davis v. Sikes, the Gayetty versus Bethune, all the ca- -- Flax versus Smith; these are all cases that Judge Green cited in his June 2001 decision, that were never overruled, and not addressed in the Appeals Court decision.

So yes, we have -- the burden of proof initially is on the proponents to show that there is an intent. However, once you show that there's a division of the property, that intent automatically becomes a presumption that the landlocked parcels should not have been landlocked and that there was an easement by necessity. And the burden shifts to the other side, to show that there was an intent to leave them landlocked.

And I think that the other side is trying to take
almost 200 years worth of jurisprudence, and chuck it, and say, "Oh, no, no, no; the Appeals Court said specifically the intent is on them."

Well, they said that, but \(I\) think they said it from a fact-finding point of view.

And once we established this division and landlocked properties, boom, the burden shifts to the other side, and they've already admitted that there is no evidence of an intent to landlock.

So if the Court will focus in on that simple issue, all these other documents go out the window, and I don't think there's anything inconsistent with the shifting of the burden after the Court finds that initial fact and the intent issue, because what they're trying to do is trying to unfairly shift of the burden onto us.

And I just want to point out something that, it sounds so crazy that \(I\) don't think anybody in this day and age in Massachusetts would even suggest or breathe a word that the Massachusetts government authorities, the commissioners appointed by the probate court, would go ahead and landlock newly enfranchised members, citizens of our state.

Remember, in 1869 the legislature gave citizenship to all tribal members in the state. It took them several years after Lincoln had proclaimed all the slaves - in the South at least - to be emancipated. But these folks were
wards of the state. And they wanted to be enfranchised. They wanted to be equal citizens.

In 1869 the State said yes; and in 1870 , they passed law and said, "And here's how you do it in Gay Head."

And so all these people began the process of being enfranchised.

And to suggest that the courts of this state - in enfranchising these people as equal partners and owners of land in this state - would give them land that they can't even get to, is absolutely and utterly insane.

THE COURT: We're getting into argument now.

MR. HALL: Well, but it is -- it goes to the relevance argument, because what they're saying is that the burden is on the proponents to prove conclusively, essentially, that there was an intent to provide an easement.

And what we're saying is that the law already says that they get the easement, and the burden's on the other side, and it's shifted to the other side, under the case law, that's been established not only in this case but for almost 200 years: That the other side has to prove the landlocked part of it; and they can't do it.

The second part of it is, what the Chappaquiddick commissioners did was a different case, under different sets of rules. They were not the Gay Head set-off. They were not governed by the 1870 statute. Though what the
commissioners did in that case has nothing to do with what happened in Gay Head. Nothing whatsoever. The fact that they articulated easements over there, good for them; they were lucky.

In Gay Head, there it's silent. Absolutely silent.
So I think the Court has to find that with the division in 1878, at least, that there is this shift of the burden, and that there was an intent to actually -- there's a presumption of an intent to give them property that they could get to and use and till and use for whatsoever productive purpose that any other nontribal member would have had at the time.

And the other question that keeps coming up and keeps getting pointed to - and it's not accurate - is that I don't believe that the Land Court ruled conclusively that lots 1 to 188 or 189 are not subject to further findings of fact. They remanded the case for further findings.

I think what they ruled was that because there was a question as to the unity of title that is required to provide for these easements by necessity --

THE COURT: You're talking about the Appeals Court decision.

MR. HALL: The Appeals Court decision.
THE COURT: Judge Brown. All right.
MR. HALL: Right. That Judge Brown said that you
can't burden those lots, because they were severalty lots.

But I think it was left open to a question as to whether or not they really were severalty lots, because I think there's a little bit of unsureness in the decision. Moreover, I think that the issue that they were out of actually benefitting from an easement by necessity since they were severalty lots, and they were given out by these commissioners and recognized, from their possessory interests -- I think there's many questions with respect to possessory interests at the time, whether people were alive at the time, whether they were entitled to it; there's many factual questions that govern lots 1 to 189. But in particular lots 174 to 188 or 189 , because there's -again, in the commissioner's 1878 report, which is the first time these are even mentioned, is that these were run out and given to other people, as part of that whole statutory process.

But it didn't take place until 1878, when admittedly, the report, the final report of Richard Pease, under the severalty designations, occurred in 1871, much earlier.

So for them to try to append something under that report -- these clearly came down through the 1870 statute, and therefore there are many factual questions that remain, with respect to lots at least 173 to 189 , because they were part of that 1878 set-off.

So I think for their to say that they are out is just not true.

If the Court would go back and look at that decision, I think you'll find that it's not clear that it's true. And I think what they say is, you can't burden those severalty lots with an easement by necessity. But they still could benefit from one from the earlier division.

And lastly, later evidence -- it was stated that later evidence is not relevant to the findings on intent.

Argue -- establish...

If the Court were to decide that the burden was wholly on the proponents to prove this intent and that there was no rebuttable presumption of an intent to provide an easement, the extrinsic evidence is clearly available for the proponents to put in on the issue of intent, because you look at the four corners of the deeds, essentially the set-off deeds - and you look at that, and then you can look at later evidence to imply that there's a great exception...

And you look at the four corners of the deed, and that's all you get, in theory. Those all the interests you get.

But there's an exception, is that: You can provide extrinsic evidence on the issue of an easement by necessity. And I can cite several cases for the Court. I
don't have them with me at the moment. But that's clearly allowed under the case law of the state. You can put in all kinds of extrinsic evidence to show intent that occurred years before.

So all this additional evidence that they're moving to object to on the basis of relevance is clearly relevant and probative of information that people acted upon, when they received their land and so forth, to show what the intent was.

And the fact that there have been very few instances, and many -- very few instances where people have actually sought to block people from getting to their property, and many instances where the Land Court itself, in registering lots in Gay Head, has come forward and said, "Subject to the rights that may exist over these lands," presumably because of an easement by necessity.

THE COURT: Subject to the rights that "may" exist.

MR. HALL: Right. But they didn't adjudicate what those interests were, but they -- in the registry --

THE COURT: I've-seen (phonetic at 11:52:09 AM, simultaneous) that over the years.

We're not saying that there are any. We're saying that there might be.

MR. HALL: Right. So they left it open for later adjudication, that there may be ways that could be placed
over these particular lots. So they did not foreclose that possibility. They left it open. So that possibility has been left open.

THE COURT: Okay. Anybody at this table? Go ahead. Diane.

MS. TILLOTSON: Your Honor, you know, most respectfully to Mr. Hall, I think he is not correct in terms of his statement that the Appeals Court left open any possibility as to lots prior to 188 or 189.

On page 293 of the Appeals Court decision, the Court states unequivocally that -- they go through the fact of the -- the way the title was divided, and then come to the conclusion: "However title is described" - and that's after they've given the benefit to the complainants, or to the plaintiffs in this case - "However title is described, each lot was owned by a different individual, and the unity of title required to imply an easement by necessity fails."

And you know, it can't be any clearer than that.
Now, you know, the question as to whether or not the Appeals Court made a mistake...

I mean, I think everybody in this courtroom probably has a view that the Appeals Court has made a mistake on one or more occasion. But \(I\) think we are -- you know, for want of better word, we're stuck, all of us, with what the Appeals Court decided.

This case was -- I think all sides, as I understand it, looked for further appellate review. The Supreme Judicial Court denied further appellate review.

So we are -- talk about law of the case: We are left with what the Appeals Court remanded back to this court. And I don't think there's any ambiguity at all with respect to those lots, prior to 188 or 189.

I think most of the rest of what Mr. Hall stated is really argument, which presumably is going to be briefed by both sides, as -- you know, there's no question but there's a presumption. I would challenge Mr. Hall that the presumption isn't -- that the burden isn't on us to show that there was an intent to landlock.

Although there is a presumption that does benefit, I think there that there is evidence in the record already that rebuts that presumption.

But that's all material that you're going to have to sort through, for better or worse, when we make our arguments.

What I don't think it changes is the universe of documents that are relevant in the inquiry, and \(I\) don't disagree that if you can establish contemporaneous use and evidence of contemporaneous use of a particular roadway that may be the subject of a claim of easement by necessity or easement by implication, that that would be relevant.

And for that reason, we haven't challenged the evidence that they seek to admit of contemporaneous use, or use shortly after the 1878 time period. But \(I\) don't think that that extends to use in the 1940 s and the 1950s, because again, contemporaneous use, it all goes back to, is it probative of the intent of the commissioners?

And that -- you know, contemporaneous use - or use shortly thereafter - the courts have determined can be probative, because presumably the commissioners would have known, recognized, seen that.

But in sum, I don't think that there's... other than the Chappaquiddick question, which I've already addressed, I don't think there's a great deal of question as to the relevant time period of inquiry and what would be relevant or not to the issue of the easement by implication or necessity.

I think when you get to the prescriptive claim that Mr. Decoulos raised, I would suggest that that - at least it was my understanding - is not part of the case and not part of the present inquiry before the Court.

So at least for purposes of this argument, I would suggest that all of those later documents are not relevant.

And again, \(I\) think -- again, the notion that somehow the plaintiffs could establish 20 years of continuous use that benefits a particular lot...

And we haven't even gotten into the sort of the second phase of the Appeals Court inquiry, which is -- they make it -- you know, assuming -- the Appeals Court goes on to say at the very end of the decision that: If the intent can be established...

No question that the burden of proof is on the plaintiffs. There is a presumption. If somehow they get to the fact that they can establish their intent, then you go on to the question of whether or not any of these easements have been lost through merger, the eminent domain proceedings and so forth that have happened.

Then, I think, at that point, some of the other documents, some of the latter title documents, do become relevant when you look at those issues.

But again, for purposes of what we're briefing before the Court, hopefully in the next couple of months, what we're looking to is whether or not there can be or has been established an easement by implication or necessity.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
MR. DECOULOS: Judge?
THE COURT: Mr. Decoulos.

MR. DECOULOS: Just a couple of other observations.
To listen to the defendants talk, the only critical
time in this case was 1878.

If it wasn't for the Moshup Trail, they wouldn't be
sitting there.

And the Moshup Trail was put up -- it was created in 1954. That's the only way they got access to the properties.

And it's NIMBY of the highest order. That's what it is. They're there. And I'm not attacking them. It's just a fact. But they're there because of the Moshup Trail. They're not there because of any other reason.

And they would be subjected to the same proofs that they're trying to place on us.

There's no vacuum here. This is a -- it's -- the vacuum started, maybe, in 1878, but it ended that date too, because there's been continuous use of all of these properties.

There's ancient way law, with our prescriptive claim.

And it's just unbelievable that they think that we should only stay in 1878 and not go forward. Things have changed down there. The Moshup Trail is the most evident change, and as I just stated, that's the reason that we're all here: Because the Moshup Trail is there.

Because certainly nobody would be able to develop that property down there without the benefit of the Moshup Trail.

So you've got to take that into consideration. And the Moshup Trail -- Zack's way goes right through the

Moshup -- you know, is located where the Moshup Trail is. The Moshup Trail put a culvert there. They created wetlands. All kinds of things have happened down there as a result of the Moshup Trail.

Thank you very much, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Jennifer?

MS. ROBERTS: The Vineyard Conservation Society, Martha's Vineyard Land Bank, we'd be perfectly happy if there was no Moshup Trail, 'cause we want to leave it undeveloped. (Mirth.)

MS. ROBERTS: That being said --

MR. DECOULOS: Oh, yeah. Then we wouldn't be here.

THE COURT: Like that's going to happen, heh?

MS. ROBERTS: Yeah.

Well, you know, between the two entities, we've acquired a fair amount of that property.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. ROBERTS: Unfortunately, we still have Mr. Rappaport's motion with respect to Mr. Hall's exhibits to be addressed. And I think we had left it to Mr. Rappaport to do that. So that -- I just want to point out to the Court --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. ROBERTS: -- we still haven't hit that target. THE COURT: All right. Mr. Rappaport?

MR. RAPPAPORT: Just on that, Your Honor --
THE COURT: I wouldn't want to be paying your phone bill.
(Mirth.)
MR. RAPPAPORT: -- we set-it (phonetic at 12:00:15 PM, simultaneous)forth in our motion which was filed up on behalf of various of the other parties as well. And essentially Mr. Hall designated two different steps. The first step purports to admit - so we're moving to strike five different pleadings or discovery; and four of them are by the Vineyard Conservation Society, and one of them is by the Town.

We cite the applicable statute, 231, section 87 , and pleadings are in evidence. And we also cite various cases. And least-recently-Arcose (phonetic at 12:00:51 PM, unclear): That you can't designate discovery on that. If there's something in particular that you want to draw the Court's attention to, you have to do that.

So in any event, they don't -- we don't see how they're relevant. We don't understand why they're being designated, and they're not entitled to come in en masse. The second part of what Mr. Hall filed dealt with a page of a certification by a stenographer, and we don't
understand why that's being offered, or why that's relevant. It relates to a proceeding that occurred fairly recently.

And let's see...

Oh, yeah. He sought to designate an opposition to a motion to amend an answer in (phonetic at 12:01:38 PM) cross-claims.

And again, as we cite, pleadings are in evidence. We don't understand why it's being designated. He hasn't pointed to anything, and we don't know why it's relevant, so that's why we move to strike.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Hall?

MR. RAPPAPORT: And I would also say, we also have addressed the issues of the title of Harding.

And I know this has been spoken to by other counsel, but the motion does address that, that there's no dispute here as to title, that the-neat-outcome-of-the-set-off (phonetic at 12:02:03 PM) is fine, but everything else really is irrelevant, because no one's making a dispute as to title.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Hall.

MR. HALL: Well, I gather, then, there that all the opponents, the defendants, are waiving all questions with respect to the title for purposes of why we're here today. It seems like everybody's said that that title is not an
issue.

Is that agreed?

MS. ROBERTS: Well, with respect to Mr. --

MR. RAPPAPORT: It -- it's agreed as to Harding.

MS. ROBERTS: With respect to Mr. Hall, he doesn't have any cross-claims or claims in this case anymore, so. And there's major questions about Mr. Hall's title, but they're not part of this case.

MR. RAPPAPORT: And they're not being offered -- and they haven't been offered.

I'm sorry to interrupt.

THE COURT: The... quick response.

MR. HALL: Judge, we are in this case. There seems to be this decision that's nowhere in the record that controverted by Judge Lombardi's decision that dismissed my cross-claims -- that dismissed my clients' cross-claims.

The judge specifically retained counterclaims.

So the claims going over the plaintiffs' properties remain in this case. And I know the judge in a December order did say that our cross-claims sought to maintain easements by necessity over the plaintiffs'. But that isn't entirely correct, because our cross-claims really are against the co-defendants.

And our counterclaims, which Judge Lombardi specifically retained, in his order that's dated September

14th of 2007, and it's at page 5: "The motions to dismiss brought by" Martha's Vineyard Commission -- MVC -- must be the Land Bank, I guess. I don't know if -- the Land Bank wasn't in it then. I'm not sure who MVC is, but by -THE COURT: Commission, I would imagine. (Time is 12:04:01 PM; document not found to verify.)

MR. HALL: -- Aquinnah --
He meant, maybe, the Vineyard Conservation Society.
-- "Aquinnah and the Kennedys are allowed. As noted above, those motions do not relate to the counterclaims asserted against plaintiffs.... The Court has no motion, and finds no basis to act sua sponte."

So the Court specifically said our counterclaims remain in this case. Therefore we were entitled -- without going into too much reconsideration, we were entitled to take some discovery in this case, but the Court did not allow us to go forward on that basis.

But I just want to make it clear, we have counterclaims; they are still in the case; we have arguments on those counterclaims. We're entitled to provide evidence that deals with those counterclaims, wherever that evidence comes from.

And in the case of many of the documents that the other parties are seeking to strike of ours -- and again, I
only got this document at five o'clock last night. But they are trying to say that they are irrelevant because we have no claims in the case.

Well, we have counterclaims in the case. So clearly, documents that relate to our counterclaims and having the easement across the lands of the plaintiffs do remain in the case.

So we've submitted a number of documents from -- of discovery in other litigation that are directly related to the issues in this case. And the questions that were raised have to do with the issue of intent.

And while it's true that under normal circumstances, one would - in the course of proffering evidence to the Court - that one would designate why one was proffering it, and show what parts of the document are relevant to that question, when we are in the process of producing documents to each other, under the Court's order, there was nothing about why we are proffering the evidence; there was nothing about limiting the documentation to specifically those areas; and there was nothing about designating exactly why you were offering the document in any of the order.

So these documents were produced, in total, because the rule is: In discovery, that you don't excise documents; you produce the entire document.

So we were following essentially the spirit of
discovery, and producing documents to them that we intended to provide as evidence in this case that were relevant to issues. And many of those issues were judicial admissions that were made in those documents.

So for them to say that they aren't relevant, when we have counterclaims, and that they cannot be put in en masse, is simply a smoke screen, because you're required to produce the entire document so that they know exactly what the context is of what you're offering, so that they have fair notice of it.

And arguably, in our briefing schedule, when we were going to brief these issues, had I had this before - I would have had a better opportunity to brief it - I would have pointed out those particular aspects of each of the documents that we intended to show were relevant because of judicial admission.

So an opposition paper that Mr. Rappaport has sought to strike, in that opposition paper, they clearly say that this road, Zack's Cliffs Road, was clearly on the ground at the time.

So they've admitted that that was on the ground, and that it crosses over some of the lots that are before the Court; that it crosses over 177 and 242.

And so these are before the Court.
And even if the Court were to accept the argument that
we're not looking at up to 189 -- or 188 or 189 , that 242 is still in the case. So the fact that Zack's Cliffs Road goes over that way is critically important, because they've admitted that it was there.

And lastly, the issue of a transcript. Now, I don't -- I didn't understand that Mr. Rappaport received a transcript. It sounds like he just received a certification, but he was also sent the transcript in the Broscheit case, where the parties, the Vineyard Conservation Society, and several witnesses as to things that occurred in the 1990 , there was a great deal of testimony that comes in, as judicial admissions again them. They were made under oath. These were statements made to a Court in a court of law.

And these issues, some of the issues in that case, relate directly to whether or not the conditions on the ground - at the time that they looked at it in 1997 - were such that the Court could draw an inference that the use of those ways, particularly Zack's Cliffs Road and other roads in the vicinity, were in use for a great deal of time, from the beginning, from 1878, and forward.

So I think there are a lot of inferences that the Court can draw from those documents.

And I think it would be exceedingly unfair. Since we had been barred from the discovery that we sought, to now
say that discovery that's already been produced in other cases that bears directly on the questions before the court here, that we can't use that would basically be to shove us aside when we still have counterclaims in the case, and say, "Well, you're not really participating in the case," and yet we are. We still have a footing in the case, and we intend to pursue that.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Rappaport?

MR. RAPPAPORT: There's nothing that \(I\) say other than what \(I\) said before. And I think that this stunt -- what has been designated as not discovery...

Well, I've... Let me say that twice.

He's designated documents that are discovery
documents, but they're not desig- -- but we're not in the midst of discovery here. We're responding to the order, which all parties agreed to, to designate documents they intend to offer into evidence. And the rules are clear, you can't just designate blanket designation of discovery en masse. You have to specifically identify what it is that you wish to have, and that has not been done, and for all the other reasons that we have put forward, which I've argued earlier, we think they should all be stricken.

THE COURT: Okay. Anybody else have anything to add? Have we said enough? Okay.

One last thing. Got to be quick. Go on.

MR. HALL: Ms. Tillotson read an excerpt from the Appeals Court decision. And I just -- I think that the Court ought to look at it and hone in on it again, 'cause that -- she quoted that, and she stated, "However title is described, each lot was" - I think 1 to 189; I'm not sure quite sure exactly what she said because I don't have the case directly in front of me - "was owned by a different person, so unity of title to imply an easement by necessity fails."

I think that sentence is taken out of context. When you read the body of the decision and how they got to that statement, \(I\) think what they're saying is that the unity of title to imply an easement by necessity over those lots -because they were not owned by the Commonwealth, arguably, in 1878, so they couldn't imply an easement over them.

But that does not say that those lots do not have their own easement by necessity, from their prior conveyances.

It does not say that they don't have easements, because they -- Judge Green himself had even found - and was never overruled - that those lots had an easement over the common land that remained at the time, because they were inasmuch as co-owners of the common land that remained. When these severalty lots were taken out of the lands, essentially, the rest of the property was common
lands held in the Commonwealth.

And so these common lands, arguably, all these people, that's how they got to their property.

So I think that to say that there's no easement by necessity, it fails in one respect, but it does not fail in another respect.

So I think the Court should look at the Appeals Court decision, clearly. And I think you will conclude that what they were saying was, that you can't put an easement by necessity over those lots, but never addressed the question of whether they didn't, on their own, have a different type of easement by necessity.

They were trying to deal with specifically 188 or 189 and above, to focus their decision.

But I think that this was all remanded back to the Court for further fact-finding. And I think now, once that remand occurred, that there was never discovery, new complaints filed, amended complaints.

So it was almost like we were starting anew with certain sets of facts that could yet be proven, newly discovered evidence, sectional plans at the registry of deeds that were never considered to be public record until the register of deeds recognized that these sectional plans - that had been a book floating around the registry of deeds for many decades - were actually part of the
original 1878 -- the 1878 decision by the commissioners. He refers right to it.

So anyway, I think that the Court should look back at that.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Are we done? Heh. All right. I'll take it under advisement. Thank you. And I will try to --

I'm sorry. Diane Tillotson, what about it?

MS. TILLOTSON: All right. And this is not argument at all. I just wanted to get back -- I think there's a couple of questions that we just need to answer scheduling-wise that would be helpful to all of us.

I think the first thing on my list was to get back to you by a date certain as to any agreement that we've been able to come up with, on any of these motions.

And I would suggest a week from Friday on that?

I don't know. Does that...

THE COURT: Nick?

MR. DECOULOS: Wait a minute. Next week I'm very busy

THE COURT: You can stay here for a while if you want. (Everyone mutters at once.)

MS. TILLOTSON: I mean, I think we --

MR. DECOULOS: If we could do it on February --

If we could meet any day during the week of the 16th --

MS. TILLOTSON: I don't think we need to meet. I mean, I think we need to -- we can meet now --

MR. DECOULOS: Oh, you'd be surprised.
MS. TILLOTSON: -- or just talk.
THE COURT: Well, you can stay here for a little while, if you want.

MR. DECOULOS: That's -- I'm glad to --
THE COURT: Got to get her permission, but I think it's going to be all right for half an hour.

MR. DECOULOS: I'm glad to do that, but I think that a meeting is very important.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, at least --
MR. DECOULOS: You know --
THE COURT: Well, maybe kind of reduce the controversy before you meet, so that when you do, it'll be quicker.

MR. DECOULOS: Well, possibly.
But I think a meeting is very important. That is that everybody gets their views out there. It's not voice-mail and e-mail and mail, and all the other malarkeys that we now deal with in the modern age.

So I think that if we sat down around a table and went over each one of them, and let us all express what the reasons are that we want it in there, and they might decide
that their reasons aren't valid, or they might decide that they are valid.

But this is a case that certainly can be -- although it seems complicated, it's not that complicated if everybody wants to agree as to what the facts are.

MS. TILLOTSON: I don't -- I mean, I don't think we need to set another time to meet. I think we're all of a view that we need to move ahead with this, but I do think -- \(I\) can't stay very long after, today.

But Ms. Roberts and I generally are on the same page with all of these. We represent clients with very similar interests.

So I think if we can sit and go through some of this right afterwards; but \(I\) wouldn't want to hold out, you know, much beyond...

I mean, I would even propose if next week is undoable, maybe getting back to the Court by Friday of this week to let you know whether or not there's any possibility of agreement on some of this.

But I think once we get beyond that, I think it's then important - I think the next question, a very mundane question for you - it was raised as to whether or not you feel it would be helpful in ruling on these motions to have a complete set of the documents, because you don't now, but we can certainly provide you with that.

THE COURT: It probably would be.

MS. TILLOTSON: Okay. So we'll provide you with that by Friday.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. TILLOTSON: So that you'll have those.

And then I also think it's important to just, you
know, giving you whatever adequate time you feel you need to rule on these motions to strike. I think it would be helpful to us to start, you know, setting the schedule for actually briefing in this case.

And we would ask, you know, whether you want to do it today or as part of -- you know, part of an order that comes out when you rule on the motions to strike, or whether you want suggestions from the parties.

THE COURT: I'll take suggestions. I'll can do this -- I'll try to get this order out within a couple of weeks, but in the meantime, if you can agree on anything, fine. If you can't --

MR. DECOULOS: Judge, can I just call to the attention: I can meet tomorrow, Friday, or Monday.

MS. ROBERTS: Judge, it's that the billing rate on this side of the room is staggering, so we're here today -THE COURT: I know.

ALL: (Everyone commenting, chuckling.)

THE COURT: Nick -- Nick does pretty well too, I
think.

MS. ROBERTS: We're here today. I'm happy to meet with him.

MR. DECOULOS: I'll meet with you now.

THE COURT: Why don't you meet now for...

I'll -- I'll -- can they stay for half an hour or so?

Just try to limit it for half an hour or so, 'cause she -- 'cause then we'll have union problems. Heh.

MS. ROBERTS: Or we'll go to a conference room so we don't need to tie her up.

MR. DECOULOS: It's much easier in here.

THE COURT: All right. Do it here if you want. Till quarter of 1:00, all right? Half an hour?

MS . ROBERTS: Great.

THE COURT: See what you can come up with. All right.

MR. HALL: Your Honor, I think that's fine with respect to the plaintiffs and their opponents. But with respect to Gossamer Wing and Baron Land, Mr. Rappaport's on the Vineyard.

THE COURT: Oh.

MR. HALL: I didn't receive his motion until five o'clock last night, so \(I\) have my --

THE COURT: Okay. Well, just do what you can. That's all right. If you can't, you can't.

MR. HALL: Well, I'd have to --

THE COURT: Ron, you don't have to be here. You don't even have to stay on the line if you want.

MR. RAPPAPORT: I -- I --

THE COURT: Can you give your proxy to...

MR. RAPPAPORT: I don't have much (indiscernible at 12:17:32 PM) to that. I doubt if (indiscernible) could. But...

THE COURT: Can you give your proxy Ms. Roberts? Or to Ms. Tillotson?

MR. DECOULOS: He's done it before.

THE COURT: It's up to you. I'm not making you.

MR. RAPPAPORT: Right. So you're just simply saying that you guys are going to meet, and somebody will tell me later what happened.

MS. ROBERTS: Yeah. We'll meet, and we'll get back to the Court by Friday.

THE COURT: That's fine. Friday or Monday, that's fine.

MS. ROBERTS: I don't -- you're mad -- I mean, if Ron or Diane thinks what I've done is completely terrible, they'll have an opportunity to... (Mirth.)

THE COURT: No, no. If you can agree on something, fine. If you can't, just let me know. We'll go from there.

MS. ROBERTS: All right.
MR. HALL: Would I be able to provide -- well, two things. Would I be able to provide a response to this motion to strike so that \(I\) can put something --

THE COURT: Yeah, by Monday, all right?
MR. HALL: By Monday.
THE COURT: Yep.
MR. HALL: And secondly...
THE COURT: By the end of business Monday.
MR. HALL: So that we're providing the Court with a complete set of documents or the documents that they're asking to strike?

THE COURT: Do I have -- don't I have them? Aren't they in -- are they in anybody else's package?

MS. TILLOTSON: Yeah -- no --
THE COURT: If I already have them --
MS. TILLOTSON: -- they don't have yours. And they don't have ours.

MR. HALL: No, they wouldn't have mine that they're moving to strike, so I'll provide the ones that they're moving to strike.

THE COURT: Yeah, do that. Yeah, same thing, Monday.
MR. DECOULOS: I'd like till the \(23 r d\) to respond to their memorandum -- you know, their objections.

MS. TILLOTSON: Your Honor, it's a five-page memo.

And it was -- I argued it today.

THE COURT: Are you going away?

MR. DECOULOS: No, but \(I\) have a -- well, I -THE COURT: Well, you'll have a week to do it. MR. DECOULOS: I did it -- I'll get it done next week, but I just want to be able to mail it to you for the 23 rd, yeah.

THE COURT: All right. 23rd with that; that's it. Then I'll rule. I'll be working on it in the meantime, anyway. All right. Thank you, all.

ALL: Thank you. Thank you, Your Honor.
(Matter adjourned at 12:19:12 PM.)

\section*{C E R T I F I C A T I O N}

I, Ellen H. Dibble, an Approved Court Transcriber, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript, from the audio recording provided to me by Attorney Wendy Sibbison of the Land Court proceedings in the above entitled matter.

I, Ellen H. Dibble, further certify that the foregoing is in compliance with the Administrative Office of the Trial Court Directive on Transcript Format.

I, Ellen H. Dibble, further certify that I neither am counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this hearing was taken, and further that I am not financially nor otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

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Volume: II of II Day 10 of 11 Pages: 123-148 Exhibits: None

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DUKES, SS. DEPARTMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT LAND COURT DEPARTMENT
\(\star \star \star \star \star \star \star \star \star \star \star \star \star \star \star \star *\)
MARTA * BEAR REALTY TRUST et al., * Plaintiffs *
* No. 97-MISC-238738
V.

TOWN OF AQUINNAH et al., * Defendants \(\star\)
\(\star \star \star \star * * * * * * * * * * * * *\)

MOTIONS TO STRIKE
BEFORE JUDGE CHARLES W. TROMBLY, JR.

APPEARANCES (see next page) :

Boston, Massachusetts
Room 4
June 21, 2010

Ellen H. Dibble
Approved Court Transcriber
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(Time is 11:42:10 AM.)

COURT OFFICER: Hear ye, hear ye, hear ye, all parties having anything to do with the honorable justices of the Land Court draw near, give your attendance, and you shall be heard. God save the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and this Court. You may be seated, ladies and gentlemen. If you have cell phones, kindly shut them off.

THE CLERK: Good morning, today is Monday, June 21st, 2010. Judge Trombly, hearing miscellaneous case number 238738, Kitras v. Town of Aquinnah.

THE COURT: Okay. Et al.

THE CLERK: Et al.

THE COURT: There are many et al.'s.
Okay. Morning, folks. For the record, you want to introduce yourselves? Is Mr. Decoulos here? No?

MS. ROBERTS: He's not.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. You go ahead.

MR. HALL: Yes. Benjamin Hall for Gossamer Wing

Realty Trust and Baron's Land Trust.

MS. MORSE: Leslie-Ann Morse for Mark Harding and

Sheila Harding, as she is trustee of the Eleanor P. Harding Realty Trust.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. ROBERTS: Jennifer Roberts for the Vineyard Conservation Society.

MR. RAPPAPORT: Ronald Rappaport for the Town of Aquinnah.

MS. JORDAN-PRICE: Good morning, Your Honor. Kelley Jordan-Price for defendants Betsy and David Wice.

THE COURT: Okay. Where do we begin?
MS. ROBERTS: As I understand it, Judge, we have two motions before you this morning, and I'm going to make short work of mine by withdrawing it. .

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. ROBERTS: I had a motion to strike three exhibits that Mr. Hall had attached to his serve (time is 11:42:10 AM) reply, which were not part of the procedure we've been engaged in over the last year and a half about designating evidence.

The problem was that he hadn't designated them before, including them. And the copies that he'd served around were really of such poor quality that you couldn't read them.

Since I filed the motion to strike, he's shipped around legible copies, and having viewed those copies, I don't see that admitting them would be prejudicial to us.

So while I object to the process by which they came before the Court, I'm not going to pursue that objection. THE COURT: Well, those are the copies of -- what do they call them, partition plans? Or...

MS. ROBERTS: There's an 1828 -- the act of 1828 , a statute.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. ROBERTS: And a report, the so-called Child (time is 11:42:10 AM) report --

THE COURT: Right.

MS. ROBERTS: -- which was also submitted to the legislature, and it's about a two-page largely handwritten petition to, I believe, the probate court regarding the Chappaquiddick set-off.

THE COURT: Okay. When was it? 1827/1828?

MR. HALL: Yes. The House report, 1827; the statute 1828. Those involve --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. HALL: -- the Chappaquiddick set-off that the Court already had in the record, which was 1850.

And then there's an 1869 partition of Chappaquiddick, that we submitted two pages, what was in the record at the probate court in Edgartown.

THE COURT: Well, some of those plans -- and I did look at this. Some of these plans were the ones that Diane Powers -- all of a sudden they appeared?

MR. HALL: That's right, Your Honor.

MS. ROBERTS: That's -- that's -- that's a separate thing.

THE COURT: That's a separate issue?

MS. ROBERTS: Separate thing, right.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

MS. ROBERTS: Yup.

THE COURT: All right. So that leaves us with you, Mr. Hall. Go ahead.

MR. HALL: Yes, Your Honor. I filed -- with all due respect, \(I\) filed a motion to try to clarify some of the issues that \(I\) was finding as we proceeded down the road toward fact-finding in this case.

So I filed, in April, a motion to clarify.

I haven't received any opposition papers, so -- I was kind of surprised that \(I\) didn't get any opposition, but there was no opposition submitted. So I don't know if there is any opposition.

But let me lay out a few of the questions that came up.

First was: We're going through a process. The Court asked us to designate some documents for inclusion in a record. The Court made some rulings on that, and one of the rulings that the Court made, in particular with respect to the 1850 Chappaquiddick set-off that the Court allowed to stay in the record, the plaintiffs had moved to strike that 1850 set-off.

The Court in ruling that way said that it "could be"
relevant, but it didn't say whether it "was" relevant.

So there's sort of this question of okay, so if we're going to through a process of designating documents in a record, when are we actually going to determine the relevance?

So in looking further into that, those questions, it became apparent -- there's a case called the Frati case. And I've cited it in the brief, and it lays out three particular ways that you can resolve disputes of fact. And two of the ways involve an agreement as to the essential facts, and agreement as to the documentation, neither of which we have in this case. We've both argued about documents; documents have been submitted over objection, and documents have been allowed in over those objections.

It appears that nobody agrees on many of the inferences that can be drawn from the facts.

So that leaves us with a trial. And it appears, from the way that we've sort of been going down this road with a briefing schedule, I'm not sure what those briefs are, what they're intended to do, and what the questions that are to be resolved; are they sort of pretrial briefs?

So I asked the Court if the Court could clarify what is exactly the procedure that we're going through, and where are we headed.

Judge Lombardi anticipated a trial at one point, but
he did discuss with us at length. At various oral -- at various hearings that we had before him, he discussed this other avenue of documents and stuff. But I think once it became clear that there was no real agreement as to those, I think the case law prohibits us from having any fact-finding without a trial.

So. And then also the Appeals Court itself, in their decision, at page 300, talked about what's to be resolved by trial.

So I think we have certain aspects that need to be resolved, and one of them in particular is: What is the evidentiary weight; and what is the admissibility of some of the documents.

So that's the first question that \(I\) thought needed to be clarified.

The second was the issue of intent, and where we are with respect to that, and - while Judge Lombardi did order bifurcation in this issue of intent - sort of what exactly is the question that we're trying to resolve? And that question comes down to: What the Appeals Court ordered on remand.

And what the Appeals Court said - again at page 300 of the decision - was that it wanted the Court to determine whether there was an intent for an "easement by necessity" with respect to all lots "carved" from the common lands.

And the Court has made some rulings about what those lots include.

However, even the defendants themselves have submitted documentary evidence, which is the plans that they submitted with their brief. It was a two-page set of plans, which I actually annexed to my opposition to their motion to strike.

It's the plan of Gay Head showing the partition of the common lands. And \(I\) guess it's a copy of exhibit -- I believe it's 68. And it shows all the plans in Gay Head. It's a two-page plan, Your Honor.

But it actually shows lots 177 and 178. And I know the Court has ruled that the Appeals Court had made a decision that prohibited lots 174 and above from having an easement by necessity.

But if the Appeals Court has already ordered that: All lots carved from the common lands are to be looked at by this Court in a trial; then the proof is this plan, among other documents that have been submitted, that in fact lots 174 and above -- or excuse me, lots...

The Court had ruled that lots 1 through 189 -- 88 or 89 --

THE COURT: 88 or 89.

MR. HALL: -- had been subject to the Appeals Court ruling, seeing that there wasn't unity of title sufficient.

But there's new evidence that's come in.

Remember, the Appeals Court was looking at a summary judgment record. And a trial record in a trial or any other proceeding beyond a summary judgment, particularly on a remand, there's case law - ample case law - that suggests that you can put in all kinds of additional evidence.

Now, there's certain documents that weren't before the Court: This plan; there's sectional plans; even the Pease report, which is the key item, which was written in 1871, that fully and finally determined the boundaries of the common lands. And that included the homestead lots and only lots 1 through 173.

But for the petition to partition under the 1870 statute - which is evidenced by this map, which eventually occurred in 1879 - lots 174 and above would never have been created, because Pease himself said, "I've fully and finally determined the boundaries of the common lands."

So the common lands are everything, 173 and below, and the homestead lots.

So what we're suggesting is that the question has been squarely put before the court that part of the fact-finding expressed by the Appeals Court is to look at what was carved from the common lands; there's new evidence to show that the common lands included 174 through 189.

So that includes the two lots that are in issue before
the Court, which is 177 and 178.

Then we have to look at the intent of the legislature in 1870. And the legislature is talking in their 1869 report about settling the ownership of the common lands and giving the right to each of the new citizens their opportunity to do so as the new landed citizens of the Commonwealth.

So if these people -- the intention of the legislature is to have the common lands -- if they decide to break up the common lands, that each of them be given land, obviously, I think, that they could use, and not land that they could never access and could never use. Clearly the legislative intent was that they be given land that they could use, and therefore that there has to be an implied easement, or an easement by necessity, to that.

I don't want to get too far into the substance of the briefs or the substance of the case. But just from a question point of view: What is the question that we're looking at?

And we have the new documents that come in.

And so what's the intent that the legislature has set forth, is one of the main areas.

I've proposed an order, at the back of my motion to clarify, that expresses some language and some potential findings for the Court. And essentially we're asking that
the Court determine whether under the 1870 statute, when the final division of the common lands occurred in 1878, was it then intended to landlock, by the legislature, the probate court, or the commissioners appointed -- was that the intention: To landlock any of those individual lots, thereby created, intentionally withholding an access easement, barring any use of the properties?

That, I believe, is one of the main questions that we have to resolve. And I think that's the question on intent that has to be determined here, given the case law and the facts that are before the Court.

Then lastly, there's this issue of the burden shifting.

The case law on easements by necessity, I think the Court could virtually, at this point, take notice of the prior decisions that have shown that we have this 1878 partition that occurred. The property was owned -according to the 1870 statute and the Pease report itself, the property was then owned - and had to be owned - by the Town of Gay Head, because all the common lands -- after Mr. Pease determined what the common land bounds were, everything but lots 173 and below and the homestead lots, that that land was owned by the Town.

And but for the 1870 statute that provided for a petition to partition, which then was undertaken, through
the probate court, we have the necessary finding of a breaking up of a unity of title of one parcel of land, effectively "the common lands," that has been broken up.

That meets the prima facie burden of shifting the burden of production from the plaintiffs - which initially it's with - or the proponent of the fact. And it shifts, under section 301 of the evidence guide, over to the other defendants, who are opposing this.

And they have to provide ample evidence to shift -- to overcome that burden.

Now, there's been several cases that have decided -even Judge Green, on the prior record, had found that there was no evidence to suggest that there was an intent to landlock; in the Black case, no evidence of an intent to landlock. And you know, in this case, I would suggest that there's barely any evidence at all - I mean, none of it relevant evidence - of an intent to landlock.

So given the fact that the burden of production under the case law has shifted to the other defendants, I think that we need to have some sort of ruling and guidance on that. But that's sort of the jumping-off point that we're getting into here, and what a trial is to resolve.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. HALL: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Ms. Roberts?

MS. ROBERTS: Respectfully, there's no need to clarify what's going on here, Judge. I will take each of Mr. Hall's points in turn.

He first asserts that he doesn't -- that the process that we've been undertaking for the last year and a half needs to be clarified. Respectfully, I think everyone else has fully understood, for the last year and a half, what the process was, which was that both sides would designate evidence and then have a chomp on whether they agreed that the other parties' evidence was admissible or not, and would also, at that time, submit whatever they felt they needed for rebuttal evidence.

We all have agreed from the get-go that there aren't going to be any witnesses testifying here, because no one's alive from 1878 to testify.

So in effect, we're having what -- Mr. Hall cites to the Frati case. Frati essentially says the first way of adjudicating a matter is to have a trial. In this case there's no need for us all to show up here, because we're not going to have any witnesses. So in effect we're having the trial, but we're doing it by agreeing to submit the evidence to the Court, the Court is issuing rulings on that evidence, and then we've gone and briefed the case based on that evidence.

So respectfully, I don't see any need to clarify
what's gone on, and it falls well within option number one of the Frati decision.

So there's no need to clarify that issue.
Next -- and this has been a continuous refrain from Mr. Decoulos and Mr. Hall, about what lots are covered by -- what lots are part of the original set-off.

The Appeals Court has already ruled that those lots go to lot 18- -- from 1 to 188 or 189, and those lots cannot be lumped with the higher numbered lots for purposes of an easement by necessity, because there's no unity of title there.

The Appeals Court has spoken on it. Your Honor issued a decision -- has also weighed in on that. And I would point to Your Honor's order of January 21, 2010, in which you said that (reading), "It's clear from the 2005 Appeals Court decision in this case that the Court properly considered and foreclosed the issue of which lots were held separately and which lots were held in common ownership."

So that -- the plaintiff and Mr. Hall keep going back to it. But I would respectfully suggest that the Appeals Court and this Court have determined multiple times now that the lots below 188 or 189 are not available for this case any longer.

The third point, Mr. Hall has asked for clarification on what the issue is here. And again, I would respectfully
suggest that everyone else understands the issue to be whether there was an intent to create an easement.

That's what the case law says. That's what the parties to this proceeding have been aiming for over the last several years.

Mr. Hall has attempted to phrase it in terms of whether there was an intent to landlock or not. There's no case law -- he cites no case law for that proposition. And I'm not aware of any. So I would again suggest there's no need to clarify. I think everyone else understands that the issue here is whether there's an intent to create an easement or not.

Mr. Hall has also referenced as new evidence, to the extent it's relevant here, the sectional plans. And that -- there is an affidavit from the register of deeds attached to my motion to strike, in which Ms. Powers says she -- prior to being register of deeds, she was title examiner on the Vineyard since I believe the 1970's.

And she was always aware and believed that these sectional plans -- all of the title examiners were generally aware of these plans. And I believe they're still in the same place in the registry, although Mr. Rappaport may be able to speak to that.

So there's no -- and \(I\) in fact can represent to the Court that \(I\) had a set of these plans in my possession in
the 1990's when \(I\) got involved in this matter. So they've plainly been available.

So there is no new evidence here.
And finally, Mr. Hall has asked the Court to clarify issues related to the presumption in this case. We've already briefed that issue in our main briefs. I would respectfully suggest, once again, that there's no need for clarification here.

The issue's squarely before the Court now to decide whether the presumption applies at all in this kind of case. We would assert that it does not, and have in our briefs.

And if the Court does find that it applies, whether in fact it has dropped out because of the evidence submitted by the defendants (time is 11:42:10 AM).

Again, that's a matter that's before the Court. It's been briefed by the parties. There I don't see any need for clarification on what the issues are. They've been briefed.

So respectfully, we believe that Mr. Hall's motion for clarification should be denied in all respects.

THE COURT: Thank you.
Ms. Morse, would you like to...
MS. MORSE: I don't want to weigh in at this point, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Rappaport?

MR. RAPPAPORT: Your Honor, we've all had to grapple with the decision from the Appeals Court, which we've all done, including Your Honor, the best we can with it.

Since the bifurcation order, Your Honor has issued six different orders, all of which dealt with the time to submit documents, the time to object, a briefing schedule --

THE COURT: For everything there is a season --

MR. RAPPAPORT: Yes.

THE COURT: -- it sounds like.

MR. RAPPAPORT: Yes.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. RAPPAPORT: And there've been objections to
documents. You've ruled on those. There've been issues about admissions. You've ruled on those.

The one constant here is that everyone agreed there was going to be no trial. And that is reflected in your six different orders. It was, "Here are the documents; write your briefs." And Your Honor will decide it.

Everyone's written their briefs. Everyone's submitted the documents. Everyone has had a chance to move to strike whatever they didn't like, to offer rebuttal documents if they thought they were necessary.

This case could not be more ripe for adjudication. And there is nothing to be clarified. I mean, the issues are clear as could be. No party had any difficulty writing briefs, reply briefs, all consistent with your orders where a briefing schedule was set up. There's absolutely nothing to do clarified.

And I think if you'll just take a brief look, Your Honor, at the filing that the various defendants made on May 24 , where we respond to some issues raised by Mr. Hall. It's entitled -- I'm sorry. It's entitled, "A response to certain issues raised by the defendants Gossamer Wing and Baron's Land Trust."

That's the response as to why there's no need for Your Honor to do anything further in terms of clarification.

The burden of proof issue has been there since day one. It's been fully briefed.

All that's left is for Your Honor to rule. I'm not saying that's a small matter. (Laughs.)

THE COURT: No, no, I know. No.

MR. RAPPAPORT: That's all that's left.

THE COURT: Okay. Now, the briefs were due May 21 st.

MR. RAPPAPORT: Yes. And we have -- Your Honor has been very accommodating about extensions and schedules. It's been out there. The briefs are all in. This case is ripe to be decided, based on what's been submitted.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MS. JORDAN-PRICE: I have nothing further to add.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Hall, do you want to reply, or Ms. Morse?

MR. HALL: Yes, Your Honor. Just a couple of points.

There was an effort to incorporate in the record some deposition testimony that did not make its way in.

There are witnesses that were offered. Mr. Decoulos's brother was a -- who's a surveyor, who had gone down to the Vineyard and made certain findings about the possibility of enclosure, which is one of the methods by which the tribal custom indicated whether property could be owned in severalty or not.

These are issues that were raised, and the court would not incorporate those. So there are witnesses with respect to the case.

Since there is --

And Mr. Rappaport himself said yes, there had been objections to the evidence.

Well, if the evidence is not in agreement, then under the Frati case, the Court has to have some sort of trial.

Now, the trial could incorporate much of what has been agreed as evidence, to come before the Court as a simple single-almost document submission. The briefs could almost be pretrial briefs.

But there are other issues, such as this issue about the 1850 Chappaquiddick set-off. The Court said specifically it could be relevant, but it didn't rule yet.

So obviously there are some issues that rulings have not yet been made.

And Judge Lombardi, who wrote the bifurcation order himself, suggested that a trial would be necessary, at least to comply -- he didn't suggest the Frati case. But at least to comply with Frati.

My concern is, I'd hate to have to go through a full appeal on this, which I anticipate. Nobody's going to be happy with the decision. I figure, you know, no matter how wonderfully Your Honor rules for one side or the other, the other side's going to be unhappy, and I anticipate there'll be an appeal.

And I'd hate to have to go through the whole process, and have the Appeals Court turn around, and say, "Oop (claps), you didn't comply with Frati; you've got to go through the whole thing all over again."

Rather than let the Appeals Court deal with the substance -- the substantive matters.

I don't want to get sidetracked at the appellate level on some other issue which -- those guys are as busy as anybody over here, and they want to kick cases back down as fast as they possibly could.

And the Frati case is just one of those cases that is an impediment, and is going to be a problem for everybody here. We're just going to waste an enormous amount of judicial and legal resources in that.

So at least maybe we could fashion something that makes it appear so that there is a trial in some sort of shortened fashion.

But I think the Court - if we think about it a little bit - could come up with machination of a trial that would work for everybody, so that there'd be offers of proof, and stuff, so that there'd be a full and complete record of a trial for the Appeals Court.

The other thing that Ms. Roberts pointed out: She said that an intent to create an easement -- that I'm trying to reframe the issue into an intent to landlock.

Well -- and she said I cited no case law.
Judge Green - the law of this case, heh - found that there was no evidence of an intent to landlock. He's the one that framed the case as one of whether there should be -- the decision on intent should be an intent to landlock.

The Appeals Court turned around and said: Yes, it's the plaintiff's initial burden of proof, to prove that there's an intent to create an easement.

But all we need to show under the presumption of law -
which is section 301 of the evidence guide, and is the presumption of law cited in Buss versus Dyer and Davis versus Sikes, which are in my papers, and throughout the record: Judge Green's decision, the Appeals Court decision - that once that presumption is raised, which it is, by the fact that we have broken up unity of title... Whether it includes lots 174 and above or 188 or 189 and above, there was a unity of title in the town; it got busted up.

I think that could almost be judicially noticed at this point as the law of the case.

The presumption then shifts. And we've shown ample, ample basis for that.

As for the sectional plans, heh, in Exhibit 20 of the packet, and starting in 2006, when this book, that \(I\) had never seen before, and \(I\) had been indexing Aquinnah titles and Gay Head titles before that for many years -- there was never an annotation or marginal reference anywhere in the official records to indicate that these sectional plans were part of the official record.

And on May 22nd, 2007, Ms. Powers herself said she had decided that this was now part of the official record, and she was going to make sure that there was going to be marginal -- indexed -- marginal index notes on the proper pages in the record.

So before that date, the sectional plans, while they may have been in there somewhere, and while people may have had access to them, they were never directed, by way of title research, to those records in any fashion whatsoever.

So they were not official records in any way until 2007. And they were not apparent that they were available as official records until May of 2007.

So these are clearly new documents. Whether they're new documents, new records, for the purposes of this case, I think is borne out by the fact that if you look at the record on appeal, and the record of the summary judgment motion before you, you will find that those sectional plans were never brought to the attention of the Court by either party.

So inasmuch as the case law allows you to put in all kinds of additional evidence, particularly after a remand, which only dealt with a summary judgment record at the appellate level, you can certainly supplement that with additional documentation.

And the sectional plans are one of the key elements that show in fact that a different framework with respect to what lots are to be looked at and were carved out of the common land, which was the directive of the Appeals Court in terms of making a determination.

They had one point of view on their limited record.

Now there's new evidence to show that in fact, "Oh, geez, maybe 174 to 189 are in fact part of the common lands that were carved out and are part of the remand."

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything? Go ahead.

MS. ROBERTS: Just very briefly, 'cause I really don't want to come back after an appeal: To the extent that -and this is something that the plaintiffs have already done as a part of the process of submitting evidence and having Your Honor rule on it.

To the extent that the plaintiffs had some evidence that Your Honor ruled was not admissible, Mr. Decoulos filed an offer of proof on that.

And I would urge Mr. Hall - so that we don't have any issues like that - if he feels that some evidence has been excluded by Your Honor, that really the burden is on him to file an offer of proof, and he should do so promptly.

THE COURT: I do want to get going on this. So I'm not waiting for anything from you guys now, right?

MS. ROBERTS: Correct.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yep.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Correct.

THE COURT: The last briefs were due on May 21 with -MS. ROBERTS: Correct. It's all been briefed and it's waiting for you. Yep.

THE COURT: Everything's briefed. I've got 'em all. Right. Okay. Thank you.

ALL: Thank you. Thank you, Your Honor. (Matter concluded at 12:13:36 PM.)

> C E R T I F I CATI O N

I, Ellen H. Dibble, an Approved Court Transcriber, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript, from the audio recording provided to me by Attorney Wendy Sibbison of the Land Court proceedings in the above entitled matter.

I, Ellen H. Dibble, further certify that the foregoing is in compliance with the Administrative Office of the Trial Court Directive on Transcript Format.

I, Ellen H. Dibble, further certify that I neither am counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this hearing was taken, and further that I am not financially nor otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

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Volume: II of II Day 11 of 11 Pages: 150-186 Exhibits: None

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DUKES, SS.
DEPARTMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT LAND COURT DEPARTMENT
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MARIA A. KITRAS, as Trustee of *
BEAR REALTY TRUST et al., *
Plaintiffs *
* No. 97-MISC-238738
v.
TOWN OF AQUINNAH et al., *
Defendants *
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
ANTHONY C. FRANGOS, and JAMES J. *
DECOULOS as they are the * Land Court Misc. Case
TRUSTEES OF BRUTUS REALTY TRUST * No. 299511
v.
TOWN OF AQUINNAH, ELLEN ROY *
HERZFELDER as she is SECRETARY *
OF THE MASSACHUSETTS EXECUTIVE *
OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS, *
ELIZABETH O'KEEFE, SOUTH SHORE *
BEACH, INC., DAVID H. SMITH *
FOUNDATION and VINEYARD *
CONSERVATION SOCIETY, INC., *
Defendants *

*     *         *             *                 *                     *                         *                             *                                 *                                     *                                         *                                             *                                                 *                                                     *                                                         *                                                             *                                                                 * 

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ON 238738, STATUS CONFERENCE, and MOTION
ON BEHALF OF GOSSAMER WING AND BARON'S; STATUS CONFERENCE ON 299511, FRANGOS

BEFORE JUDGE CHARLES W. TROMBLY, JR.
APPEARANCES (see next page):
Boston, Massachusetts BKRoom 6
September 8, 2010
Ellen H. Dibble Approved Court Transcriber

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(Time is 11:04:50 AM.)

THE CLERK: Miscellaneous case number 238738, Kitras v. Aquinnah. And miscellaneous 299511, Frangos v. Aquinnah.

THE COURT: Okay. Good morning, folks.
ALL: Good morning. Good morning, Judge.
THE COURT: We get the full complement, I see. You want to introduce yourselves for the record, just -- go ahead.

MR. DECOULOS: Nicholas Decoulos, representing -THE COURT: Don't stand up. Sorry. Go ahead.

MR. DECOULOS: Nicholas Decoulos representing the plaintiff Maria Kitras in the case against Aquinnah, and Decoulos versus the Commonwealth of Massachusetts -- the other matter, Frangos case.

THE COURT: Frangos, right.
MS. MORSE: Leslie-Ann Morse representing Mark D. Harding and Sheila Besse and Charles Harding as they are trustees of the Eleanor P. Harding Realty Trust.

THE COURT: This is not a test.
(Laughter.)
THE COURT: Just state who you are.
Okay. Go ahead.
MS. TILLOTSON: Diane Tillotson, representing the Martha's Vineyard Land Bank in the Kitras matter only.

MS. ROBERTS: Jennifer Roberts representing the Vineyard Conservation Society in the Kitras matter and representing the Vineyard Conservation Society and the Cedar Tree Foundation in the Frangos matter.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RAPPAPORT: I'm Ronald Rappaport representing the Town of Aquinnah in both matters.

THE COURT: Okay. And you've got a cheering section behind you there. Go ahead.
[MR. ABAIR]: I-know (phonetic at 11:16:06 AM), Your Honor, representing Caroline Kennedy and Ed Schlossberg in the main matter, the Kitras matter, and South Shore Beach in the Frangos matter.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. JORDAN-PRICE: Good morning, Your Honor. Kelley Jordan-Price representing defendants David and Betsy Wice in the Kitras matter only.

MR. DONNELLY: I'm John Donnelly representing the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

THE COURT: Commonwealth, okay.
And Ben Hall, are you on board?

MR. HALL: (By phone): Yes, I am. Thank you, Your Honor. Benjamin Hall for Gossamer Wing Realty Trust and Baron's Land Trust.

THE COURT: Okay. Give us a second to adjust the
sound, okay?
What are we here for? It sounds like a biblical thing. We're here for a status conference on Frangos, 'cause that just popped on my "under advisement" list.

I've a kind of a status conference on Kitras, and we're got a motion from Mr. Hall on Kitras. Motion for -I take it like a motion to reconsideration or a motion to alter or amend, Mr. Hall?
(Pause.)
THE COURT: Oops?
MR. HALL: I'm sorry, Your Honor. Were you speaking to me? I could barely hear you.

THE COURT: Okay. We have status conferences on two cases, the Frangos case and the Kitras case. And we have a motion from you to alter or amend, or to reconsider, however we characterize it. That's how I understand it.

MR. HALL: That's right, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Who wants to speak first -- where are we going on...

Let's hear Kitras.
Do you want to go, Diane? Go ahead.
MS. TILLOTSON: Well, it's Mr. Hall's motion. I'm happy to --

THE COURT: Okay. Yeah, we'll start -- okay.

MS. TILLOTSON: -- respond to it, but --

THE COURT: All right.

MS. TILLOTSON: -- perhaps he should start.

THE COURT: All right, yeah. Ben, you go ahead.

MR. HALL: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.
The first thing that we received a few weeks ago, with all due respect, Your Honor, I think may have picked up some of the facts that have been presented on the prior record by the Court, used as a model for its -- for its fact-finding, a lot of the findings that Judge Green had entered back in 2001.

But subsequent to that Judge Green decision, there were some other factors that came into play, and some other information, that came before the Court. And eventually we came down to the Third Amended Complaint, that listed -which was actually an attempt to try to narrow the parties down to only those that were essential to resolve the issues at hand that were sort of under Judge Lombardi's tutelage, and with the Third Amended Complaint, there were a more limited number of parties that were involved.

And in that numbers that were described in that Third Amended Complaint as being owned by various parties, were adjusted from the time that Judge Green had rendered his decision.

So one of the main factors that Gossamer Wing found to
be a problem was that Gossamer Wing is listed in your decision, Your Honor, as a plaintiff. And Gossamer Wing Realty Trust has always been a defendant. Following Judge Green's decision, he -- he moved up to the Appeals Court; and then Judge Lombardi took over the case and we moved to have Gossamer Wing Realty Trust corrected to be stated as a defendant in the matter, which Judge Lombardi did.

So Gossamer Wing Realty Trust is a defendant in the matter. And the decision indicates that it is a plaintiff. That's the first point.

The second point is that the lot numbers for Gossamer Wing Realty Trust set forth in the Third Amended Complaint declared or sought declaration of right only over lot 710 and 242 .

The Third Amended Complaint, Your Honor, has some maps attached to it that are kind of handy to kind of look at.

The original matter, going way back, included lot 302, which was way to the north along Moshup Trail, and sort of disconnected from the locus of the area that's that is in the Third Amended Complaint.

So in the Third Amended Complaint, the lot number 302, owned by Gossamer Wing Realty Trust, it even -- the declaration of right had not been sought with respect to that, either by the plaintiffs or by Gossamer Wing in its counterclaims -- remembering that the cross-claims of

Gossamer Wing Trust were dismissed by Judge Lombardi, on which we reserve our rights.

So the two points so far: Gossamer Wing's a defendant; and it has lots 710 and 242. Even though it does own lot 302 , lot 302 is not within the context of the controversy as stated in the Third Amended Complaint.

The third point is Baron's Land Trust is a defendant and is not mentioned in the decision, so how the facts apply to Baron's Land Trust are undecided.

And Baron's Land Trust - according to Third Amended Complaint, paragraph 7, sort of lists who owns what - owns lot 177.

So now we have, Baron's Land Trust has not had its rights adjudicated at all, according to the decision or the judgment.

My next point is - and it's probably one, I think, that most of the other parties, according to my information, seem to agree - is the declaration of rights under the claim (phonetic at 11:12:09 AM) for prescriptive easement were not part of or incorporated within Judge Lombardi's bifurcation order which got us to the last round of briefing.

The briefs, according to Judge Lombardi's order, were to deal with the issue of intent on the easement by necessity alone, and had no bearing whatsoever with respect
onto prescriptive claims.

So the Court, in a footnote in its decision, did decide that there was no evidence of prescriptive easement presented in the papers, but that was an issue that was not to be adjudicated within the context of the decision.

So I think all the parties are going to agree with me that this prescriptive easement claim issue needs to be corrected and needs to be adjudicated in some sort of other fashion. And I guess we'll take that up during the status conference.

And finally, the last point - and I know there'll be some argument that they're asking for some sort of reconsideration on some of these other fact findings - but the Town was the grantor in the 1871 set-off -- excuse me, in the 1878 set-off, because by virtue of the 1870 statute that forms Gay Head, when Mr. Pease filed his report in 1871, he finally, fully and finally, established the boundaries of the common lands. And those common lands were the lands that were to be set off under the 1870 statute, and that was what was done in 1878.

So all of those lots, 174 and above, were part of the common lands that had been given to the Town under the 1870 statute, and then - by virtue solely of the petition to partition in the probate court under that 1870 statute did those lots get broken up - did the common lands get
broken up - and create lots 174 and above, all at the same time.

We have to remember that after 1869 all the tribal members were made full citizens. As of mid June of 1869, they were full citizens of Massachusetts with the benefit of and subject to all the laws of the Commonwealth, which meant that their new citizenship overwhelmed any right to come in and start enclosing land and taking new possessory interests, especially against the Town, which then, in 1870, was given these common lands, which then, a year later, were defined by Mr. Pease.

So all of a sudden you have the Town creating, albeit broken-up, as it were, the common lands -- the Town's lands being broken up into these lots, 174 and above.

And but for that petition action, all of that land would still be Town land.

So there could be no new severalty lots created after Mr. Pease filed his report in 1871 (sic at 11:15:44 AM).

So no matter how you read it, all the lots were created from the common lands that were then given to the Town, and the Town was the grantor, under that -- as such, under the 1878 set-off.

And the last point \(I\) want to reach, for oral purposes, is that the burden of production, the Court ruled, had been overcome, essentially, by these profits a prendre that the
other defendants had identified in the materials: Some fishing rights and some peat rights.

But if the Court were to look at those, actually, the Court would find that while they are profits a prendre, even those rights, the fishing rights and the peat rights, do not describe any access rights to get to the lots so they might be able to exercise those very rights.

So there was left an easement by implication even as to those rights -- a silent easement by implication that had to be determined and set forth at some later date, by which one could even exercise those rights.

So as such, all of those common lands that were broken up in 1878 were left without any access easements at all.

And I know the Court found that this burden of presumption was overcome, and that the presumption was overcome, but I just wanted to point that out, because I think that the Court may have miscomprehended and not recognized that those very lots did not have an easement to get through them so that one could exercise the profits that were granted by the commissioners and the Town.

Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Ms. Tillotson wants to reply?
MS. TILLOTSON: Certainly. Thank you, Your Honor. Again, Diane Tillotson for the Martha's Vineyard Land

Bank. And we did file a response, or a reply, on behalf of several of the defendants. And I understand that at least one of the other defendants joined or added a joinder to that reply.

I want to work backwards through Mr. Hall's arguments, and start first with the issue, the Joyce versus Devaney issue, that he raised in terms of the profits a prendre.

First of all, I would assume -- and I think the decision clearly bespeaks the fact that the Court did go very carefully through the exhibits that were submitted by the parties and all of the deeds and all of the documentary evidence that was submitted. And that is reflected in the decision.

What Mr. Hall neglects to say is that the access rights with respect to certain of the fishing rights that were granted in the profits a prendre did contain a specific reference to the right of access, in order to get to the stream to do the fishing.

So, again, I think that his statement that there was no access right included in the evidence that was presented by the defendants in the case is just wrong. And I'm assuming that the Court found those same references when the Court examined the evidence prior to ruling in this case.

Secondly, just as a quick note, I think that Joyce
versus Devaney shouldn't be as narrowly construed as Mr. Hall suggests.

So again, I don't want to go into too much detail on either that or the argument with respect to the merits of the case, because again, I think the Court -- the record demonstrates and the decision demonstrates, that the court went through the evidence very carefully, probably document by document, and rejected, essentially, arguments that Mr. Hall made, as persuasively as he could have, in the earlier submissions, and which we responded to.

So again, \(I\) don't think that there is a basis for any review of this decision on the merits or any reconsideration.

Mr. Hall cites no new cases that have come down since the time of the Court's decision in August. Nor has he cited to any change of facts that would be the basis of appropriately a motion for reconsideration in this case.

With respect to the other issues that are raised by Mr. Hall, I think that we are in agreement that the inadvertent reference to Mr. Hall or Gossamer Wing Realty Trust was an error, that Gossamer Wing Realty Trust is and should be listed as a defendant rather than a plaintiff.

We are also in agreement that the cross -- excuse me, the counterclaims and the plaintiffs' claims for prescriptive rights should not have been adjudicated.

And the reason for that is twofold.

I think the parties tend to agree that Judge Lombardi's order originally determined that the case should be bifurcated in such a way that the court would determine first whether the plaintiffs had met their burden of proof in establishing that there was an intention to create an easement by necessity.

I think that the Court, while not specifically reserving the prescriptive counterclaims, focused on the adjudication of that one question that was remanded by the Appeals Court.

Secondly, it is true, and I think the parties agree, that when the parties were assembling the evidence, the documentary evidence, to submit to the Court, certainly many of the defendants, including my client, objected to certain evidence that Mr. Decoulos proposed on the basis that it was part of the prescriptive claim argument, and that the Court was not going to be adjudicating that prescriptive claim argument.

And we included a very brief excerpt from one of the pleadings that was submitted to just demonstrate that, again, that particular issue was at least on the minds of all the parties, and I think, at least, in Judge Lombardi's mind, reserved for later adjudication.

I would note, however, that those are principally
claims of the plaintiffs in this action and not a claim of the Gossamer Wing Realty Trust.

The Gossamer Wing Realty Trust's cross-claims, to the extent that they included prescriptive claims, were all dismissed by Judge Lombardi.

In the order that dismissed those claims, Judge Lombardi also indicated that he believed that the counterclaims that Gossamer Wing submitted on the prescriptive basis against the plaintiffs were similarly flawed and should likely also be dismissed.

But because there wasn't a motion in front of him at the time, he declined to act on that.

So although technically they are still out there, the counterclaims by Gossamer Wing against the plaintiff, Judge Lombardi has already indicated that he believes that those claims are without merit.

It may be that the plaintiffs may wish to have those claims dismissed.

Again, it appears that Judge Lombardi gave that some careful thought.

With respect to the remaining claims for prescriptive rights that the plaintiffs have in this case, again, that is the subject that we were requesting a status conference on. To the extent that those need to be adjudicated, we would suggest that they be adjudicated in the relatively
near future.

We don't see that there would be any, certainly any testimonial evidence that would come in on that. But if there is, so be it. And we would respectfully ask that the Court set a trial date - we wouldn't expect that it would be more than a one-day trial - to adjudicate finally those claims, prescriptive easement claims, to the extent that they exist.

And I know that the Court will take that up further.

With respect to the claims regarding Baron's Land Trust: Baron's Land Trust is listed in the Third Amended Complaint as the owner of lot 177. And this Court has previously ruled, on numerous occasions, lot 177 was determined by the Appeals Court not to have any rights of easement by necessity.

The Appeals Court made that determination.

The Baron's Land Trust has tried repeatedly to bring lot 177 back into the case. The Court did not adjudicate lot 177 for the simple reason that lot 177 has already been adjudicated by the Appeals Court; it was not part of remand order. And so the Court, quite appropriately, did not adjudicate the rights of Baron's Land Trust or lot 177.

So we do not believe that there is any issue there.

With respect to the other lots that were owned by Gossamer Wing Realty Trust: Gossamer Wing owned four lots,
lots 242, 302, 707, and 710. The decision determined that lots 707, 710, and 302 did not have the benefit of an easement by necessity.

Mr. Hall is correct that lot 302 was not included as a lot owned by Gossamer Wing in the Third Amended Complaint. However, in the counterclaims and cross-claims, Hall refers to quote, "Hall's land," which did include all four lots.

This is not a major issue for the defendants, whether or not the Court includes lot 302 or not. However, I would respectfully suggest that the evidence and arguments submitted by the trust and by Mr. Hall in regard to lots 242 and lot 710, which have been fully adjudicated, apply equally to lots 302 and 707, and that therefore, we would respectfully suggest that they are appropriately part of the judgment.

Again, lot 302 stands on a slightly different footing, because it is not part of the Court's -- it was not part of the Third Amended, ah, counterclaim.

We would respectfully ask that the Court amend the complaint and the judgment to conform to the evidence presented, pursuant to Rule \(15(\mathrm{a})\), which permits the Court to amend, to conform to the evidence, even where a specific issue was not raised by the pleading.

And we would respectfully suggest that both lots 302 and lot 707 - particularly lot 707 - falls into that
category.

Finally, I'd just like to comment briefly on the notion that Gossamer Wing raises, that the issues involved in this case were not properly adjudicated on the basis of the documentary evidence that was submitted by all parties to the Court.

And I think those of us, certainly on the defendants' side of the table, other than Mr. Hall, find that argument somewhat ludicrous.

Although this perhaps may not be technically a case-stated, because the parties did not agree on all the evidence, what the parties did agree on was that there would be absolutely no testimony involved by any live witness in this case.

The Court set a briefing schedule, after numerous hearings, and, after input from all the parties, including Mr. Hall, heard arguments on various evidentiary issues that were submitted. The parties worked long and hard to come up with a list of exhibits that were agreed to -- and many of the exhibits were agreed to. And with respect to the ones that weren't agreed to, there was extensive briefing on both sides of the table: Motions to strike, motions to reconsider -- all of which the Court ruled on before finally adjudicating this case this past summer.

So we would respectfully suggest that there is
absolutely no basis in the record for an evidentiary hearing or a trial on any of the matters that are covered in the Court's August 12th decision.

Did I leave anything out?

THE COURT: Doesn't...

MS. TILLOTSON: I think that's it.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Okay, Mr. Decoulos?

MR. DECOULOS: Thank you, Your Honor.

On August 14th, 2006, Judge Lombardi issued an order that the matter be bifurcated, and it was supported by all of the defendants. And we believe that that was done; we got our evidence in, and we got a judgment, and we don't want to have to come in here on a second time for a second issue. There is nothing in the order by Judge Lombardi that said that the claim for prescriptive rights should also be heard.

So we set aside everything. His order is the foundation for why we were here. He said that we're going to find out whether or not we can prove the existence of an implied easement in the last page of his order.

According to your judgment, we failed to prove that, and we want to go on with an appeal as we did with -- we filed an appeal on your judgment, and we just want to progress with the matter.

We don't have to go back to find out about prescriptive rights until we find out whether or not there is an implied easement. And if we find out that there is an implied easement, then we don't have to worry about any prescriptive rights.

So the orderly way to handle this is to adopt what the defendants wanted. They got it. They got their bifurcation order. And we're there. So let's just move on. Let's see whether or not your rationale is proper or not. And if the Court finds otherwise, then we can -- if the Court sustains what you did, then we'll come back here and try the prescriptive rights.

This case was filed in 1997. Besides the plaintiffs and Mr. Hall's clients, there are people that own lots down there that were not included in this case, and they are also affected by it. We're not going to bring that up anyplace, but I'll just let you know that not only -there's a vast amount of people that would be interested in the outcome of this case as it relates to whether or not all of us have a easement to (indiscernible at 11:32:36 AM, simultaneous).

THE COURT: So your idea is go ahead with it, appeal what I've just done, see what Justice Brown or whoever does in the Appeals Court. And then if he comes down one way, case is over. If he comes down the other way, then we do
step three, or four or five or whatever it is.

MR. DECOULOS: This is a great foundation for your reason to deny any request to have another trial. We don't want another trial. We want to find out whether or not we have an implied easement or not, and we didn't find -- we found out what your thoughts were, that we didn't have --

THE COURT: In my opinion, you don't. Okay.

MR. DECOULOS: We just want to take an appeal on that and move right along.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.
And then -- I'll get -- I'll give it to you in a minute, if you want.

Go ahead.

MS. MORSE: We do.

MS. ROBERTS: We haven't had much opportunity to discuss this before, but it would be my view that the case has been around for a long time. I want to get it done as efficiently, cost-effectively, as I can.

As things stand right now, if essentially Mr. Decoulos is asking for a \(54(\mathrm{~b})\) certification out of this court, because it's -- we all agreed that the record would show that the adverse possession claim, while the court addressed it, we all agree that it hasn't been properly brought before the Court.

So the worst possible outcome here is that it goes up
to the Appeals Court, and then it gets shipped back down here to deal with the adverse possession claim.

So in terms of efficiency, I would be asking the Court, as Ms. Tillotson has, to set down a quick trial date for the adverse possession claims.

I say that, Your Honor, is the full expectation that you will not change your decision, because there isn't going to be any evidence of adverse possession.

So -- but that will clean this up, and it will get sent to the Appeals Court on a clean record, and we won't have these procedural problems.

So I think that the time is now for them to either waive those claims or come forward with the evidence that supports them. We've done discovery. There is no evidence to support the adverse possession claim. But -- but that's procedurally defective right now.

So we'd ask to get that taken care of, and then ship the whole case up.

THE COURT: Mr. -- Nick? Mr. Decoulos?

MR. DECOULOS: Yes.

THE COURT: Pardon me. I'll ask you a quick question. Then (indiscernible at 11:35:02 AM, unclear).

What evidence would there be on a prescriptive -- on an easement or adverse possession or prescriptive?

MR. DECOULOS: Not with my tongue in my cheek.

THE COURT: No.

MR. DECOULOS: But she testified, in the deposition that we conducted, that that she walked those roads; I'm talking about Jennifer.

And then we've got all kinds of old plans and old maps that show the roads in existence. So that there would be some evidence. And there would be evidence that people have blocked it off, with no right to...

It's just a -- it's just something that's -- they were in favor of the bifurcation. Now they're not in favor of the bifurcation. I think they ought to be consistent in their argument.

THE COURT: Okay. Attorney Morse.

MS. MORSE: Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, my clients are the Hardings. My clients don't claim any prescriptive easements. So if this thing gets tried -- and \(I\) know they say "quick trial," but let's be honest, we're going to be stuck here for another 2 years, at a minimum, while my clients twiddle their thumbs. I would like the \(54(\mathrm{~b})\) certification so that we can take this, now, to the Appeals Court.

Because it's unfair to my clients to get tied up for a couple of years.

THE COURT: Okay. Anybody who hasn't spoken yet, that wants...

Mr. Donnelly, go ahead.

MR. DONNELLY: I'm only adding that we did not -- the Commonwealth did not sign on with defendants' motion, but we do agree with the -- the indefeasible (time is 11:36:33 AM) fee holders, being the Town and the Vineyard Conservation Society, and that we would adopt and agree with their outcome (time at 11:36:43 AM, away from microphone) •

THE COURT: Anybody else? Mr. Hall?

MR. HALL: Yes, Your Honor?

THE COURT: You've been listening to this?

MR. HALL: I could barely -- I couldn't really hear

Mr. Donnelly --

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Donnelly's saying --
MR. HALL: -- but I don't really think it matters.

THE COURT: That's not a nice thing to say.
(Laughter.)

THE COURT: I know you didn't mean it that way.

MR. HALL: No.
(Mirth.)

MR. HALL: Your Honor, it's different matters --

THE COURT: Okay. No, no, but he was just saying he --

MR. HALL: -- (indiscernible, simultaneous) record in --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HALL: -- but \(I\) would like to respond to some of Ms. Tillotson's comments.

THE COURT: Go ahead. Very briefly if you can. I have another -- people come in from Pittsfield are here waiting for us to finish. So.

MR. HALL: Okay.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. HALL: Ms. Tillotson tried to paint Judge

Lombardi's order dismissing the cross-claims of Baron's Land Trust in a particular fashion, as if they were not favored; and that may be the case.

Regardless, those counterclaims with respect to easement by prescription and easements by necessity did remain in the case.

And so if the Court were simply to - in an amended judgment - indicate that Baron's Land Trust owned lot 177, but that the Court had ruled that the Appeals Court -- had previously ruled that the Appeals Court had drawn the line at unity of title at a point that included 177; therefore 177 was not able to have an easement by necessity, I think that would address my concerns in respect to the easement by necessity counterclaim.

However, the prescriptive counterclaim does remain for Baron's Land Trust, and in fact Zack's Cliffs Road does
cross along the boundary of lot 177.
And Zack's Cliffs Road -- Judge Green, in fact, in his decision did find that Zack's Cliffs Road did provide, apparently, a convenient way for some sort of easement to this general vicinity and general area.

So that was, I believe -- I'm not sure exactly if the record of the prior case was totally included in this case, but I would venture to guess that it probably is.

As for lot 302, and Ms. Tillotson's request that the Court amend the pleadings to show that lot 302 should have been adjudicated, and lot 707, neither of which actually -- lot 707 was not in the Third Amended Complaint either.

So 707 and 302 were not sought to have any declaration of right. And there was no notice to the parties, to Gossamer Wing Trust or Barons Land Trust, that either of those lots were going to be part of the declaration of rights. And it's completely unfair to all of a sudden try to conform pleadings to include a declaration of right on lots that were never before the Court in the current proceedings.

Moreover, how can a defendant seek to have the complaint amended? I don't think they have standing to do so.

And lastly, the Frati issue, which gets down to
whether we were technically a case-stated or not. And she claimed that all parties knew that there would be no testimony.

Well, that isn't quite true, because the plaintiffs wanted to put in some deposition testimony that was excluded, in lieu of oral testimony, because the Court had requested that everything be put in, in a documentary fashion.

So there is some oral testimony to be had.

And lastly, on the easement by prescription issue, if this were to be set aside for a trial, I believe that there's a new discovery period required, because the discovery order that was issued, the time for the discovery, related solely to this bifurcated issue on the issue of intent on an easement by necessity.

And there was never any indication that the discovery period provided was supposed to be on all claims. It was limited to the easement by necessity claims and the issue of whether or not there was intent. And the other parties argued that discovery on issues beyond that were irrelevant at that time and could not go forward.

So I ask the Court to -- if we are going to be getting into a status conference about setting a trial date, and the Court does decide that we're going to take this easement by necessity claim and put it back on the burner,
that we go down that road again, in a proper format and fashion, so to enable people to collect what discovery they need.

I'm not anticipating there's much, but I would like to at least see what kind of documents that my adversaries have with respect to that.

THE COURT: This case has been before the Court for a long time, Mr. Hall. 1997? How much discovery do we need?

Ms. Roberts, go ahead.

MS. ROBERTS: We did do discovery on the issue of adverse possession. And we didn't do any discovery with Mr. Hall because his claims were dismissed against the defendants. But we've done the discovery. We took Mr. Decoulos's deposition and the surveyor's deposition and asked for documents.

And it was our understanding that all discovery in the case was to be completed. And we did it.

So there's nothing standing between us and a prompt trial date.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Decoulos.

MR. DECOULOS: I've just got to say, we relied on Judge Lombardi's bifurcation order; that was requested by the defendants. And we got a decision on the bifurcation order. Let's go on with the appeal.

THE COURT: Okay. Anybody else?

Then we have to do the Frangos case quickly, where we stand with that.

Jennifer Roberts, go ahead.

MS. ROBERTS: I've been deputized on that.

The Frangos matter involves --

THE COURT: Ben? Ben, you're not involved in this one?

MS. ROBERTS: Mr. Hall is not.

MR. HALL: No, I'm not, Your Honor.
(The Kitras matter is only referred to tangentially from this point at 11:42:44 AM, forward.)

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Go ahead. Jennifer, go ahead.

MS. ROBERTS: This involves lots that are the other side of Moshup Trail, between Moshup Trail and the Atlantic Ocean. The complaint asserts three claims, an easement by necessity, and then two counts for takings, under the state and federal constitutions.

There was an attempt by the plaintiffs to consolidate the actions, which was denied by Judge Lombardi, but they've been on the same track.

And in fact, where this case left off was at the same point as in the Kitras case, where we were supposed to finish discovery and then pull together a set of documents, which were going to be the basis for a ruling on the
easement by necessity claim.

There's an order in the Frangos case which is comparable to the order in the Kitras case saying: Pull together a set of trial exhibits.

And in fact in Judge Lombardi's order, he notes that the Kitras plaintiffs said that they would be using the same documents in the Frangos case that they were using in the Kitras case.

And they in fact - in discovery, interrogatory answers - provided a list of documents that were similar.

Technically, I guess, we need to file the identical motion in this case that was filed in the Kitras case, and have the plaintiff respond to that.

But we're not going to be saying anything different. It's all lots that are above the 178 number.

It's going to be the same issue. So we would expect the same result.

So procedure, we just need to decide, do we need to jump through those hoops, or is the plaintiff going to agree that the same thing's going to happen here?

And then of course the other issue is, do they want to pursue their takings claims. I don't see any state action that's going to support any of that; certainly there's no takings of claims against my private clients.

THE COURT: What do you think, Nick?

I just want to get it back on track. It's one of my pending cases.

MR. DECOULOS: Well, you would apply the same reasoning that you applied on the Kitras matter.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. DECOULOS: But there's still a takings claim there in the wings. So if we don't have access, then we've lost a lot that is right on the Atlantic Ocean, so we're talking a sizeable damage claim as a result of our inability to...

What's happened here is that the Commonwealth set up a kind of a restriction to use the property that abuts Moshup Trail, but they didn't make a taking of that particular lot.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. DECOULOS: So their action has deprived us of access to our lot and the Atlantic Ocean, so to speak.

THE COURT: So do we bifurcate it? Do we want to separate the takings claim from the merits, so to speak?

MR. DECOULOS: I would think that would be the proper way to go.

THE COURT: How does anybody else feel about that?

MS. ROBERTS: Well, with respect to the takings claim, and certainly with respect to my clients, they're private entities; \(I\) can't imagine that there's a valid claim there. So I would like my clients to be out of this. Heh.

THE COURT: All right. But the Commonwealth --

MR. DECOULOS: Well, it wasn't a taking by eminent domain. But they participated in depriving us of access to the property.

THE COURT: Mr. Donnelly?

MR. DONNELLY: I believe -- and Mr. Rappaport can correct me on this, if you think it's incorrect, Judge (time is 11:46:38 PM, away from microphone): The town parcel was taken by eminent domain, and it would be an eminent domain claim, which actually this Court has no jurisdiction over.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. DONNELLY: So.

THE COURT: Yeah. Mr. Rappaport? Do you concur?

MR. RAPPAPORT: I do.

That's my memory, sitting here today.

THE COURT: All right. No, the case was here a long time.

MR. RAPPAPORT: That's right.

THE COURT: It just got put aside while this other one was going through. And it shows up on my tickler list, so I thought, we're going to -- can't leave it here. Got to do something with it. So whether we -- I separate it, and if there is an issue about description or implication or whatever, do that part.

But is your main theme, the taking theme, Nick?

MR. DECOULOS: We'd like to have the lot.

THE COURT: All right. All right. Well, let me --

MR. DONNELLY: Well, then I have -- I also have an eminent domain taking. The only damage -- they can only have damages and can only get (phonetic at 11:47:31 AM, away from microphone) monetary damages, so that-take-once (phonetic).

MR. DECOULOS: I cannot hear you, Mr. Donnelly.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DECOULOS: I didn't hear you.

MR. DONNELLY: In an eminent taking, you can only get monetary damages, so \(I\) don't know if that's what you're asking for.

MR. DECOULOS: Well, we want access, and if we don't get access, we want money.

THE COURT: You want access. But if you don't get access, you want money.

MR. DECOULOS: Right.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DECOULOS: It's as simple as that.

MS. TILLOTSON: Your Honor, aren't they in the wrong court?

THE COURT: Well, that's what the issue is. If it's -- they're fighting over eminent domain, yeah, they
are.
MS. TILLOTSON: You're in the wrong court and you're --

THE COURT: But if he wants to push the fact that he's got a easement by implication or whatever we've already discussing, then he's probably in the right court.

MR. DONNELLY: The superior court has exclusive jurisdiction.

THE COURT: On the eminent domain.
MR. DONNELLY: On eminent domain.
THE COURT: But on the easement by implication or prescription or whatever, we can do that.

MS. ROBERTS: So how should we tee that up for you, I guess is the question. You have the easement by necessity issue.

THE COURT: Do you want to me to...
MS. ROBERTS: Do I deal with (indiscernible) -- just ask him that (indiscernible at 11:48:30 AM) --

THE COURT: Bifurcate it again?
MS. ROBERTS: Just on the same facts
(indiscernible) --

THE COURT: Do it on the same -- could we do it on the facts?

MS. ROBERTS: -- (indiscernible) that we would ask that the Court issue an order in this case --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. ROBERTS: -- on the (indiscernible at 11:48:39

AM) --

THE COURT: That will be the quickest way.

MS. ROBERTS: -- Mr. Decoulos the opportunity to respond to that.

THE COURT: That would be the quickest way.

MR. DECOULOS: I have no problem --

THE COURT: Tee it up and get it moving.

MS. ROBERTS: Okay. And I'll do that.

THE COURT: And give notice to everybody and we'll go
from there.

MS. ROBERTS: Yep, will do that.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?

MR. DECOULOS: Nope. Thank you very much.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you all.

Thanks, Mr. Hall.

MR. HALL: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Talk to you soon.

MR. HALL: Okay.
(Matter concluded at 11:49:04 AM.)

\section*{C E R T I F I C A T I O N}

I, Ellen H. Dibble, an Approved Court Transcriber, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript, from the audio recording provided to me by Attorney Wendy Sibbison of the Land Court proceedings in the above entitled matter.

I, Ellen H. Dibble, further certify that the foregoing is in compliance with the Administrative Office of the Trial Court Directive on Transcript Format.

I, Ellen H. Dibble, further certify that I neither am counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this hearing was taken, and further that I am not financially nor otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

ElV. \(\mathscr{A}\) GBEGE.
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\hline 78:10, 94:16, 95:12, & 11:36:33 [1] - 174:4 & 1827 [1]-127:12 & 81:11 & 24 [1] - 141:9 \\
\hline 112:5, 131:21, & 11:36:43 [1] - 174:7 & 1827/1828 [1] - & 1930[1]-81:11 & 242 [6]-109:23, \\
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127: 11
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1828[3]-127:
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127: 13
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\hline 123:1 & 139:15 & 1848 [1]-80:13 & 1950 [1] - 80:14 & 60:4, 124:13, 151:17 \\
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\hline 106 [4]-44:14, 60:4, & 11:47:31 [1] - 183:6 & 128:24, 143:2 & 1960 [1] - 79:11 & 28th [1] - 10:4 \\
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\hline 10:08:06 [1] - 45:1 & 11:49:04[1]-185:21 & 93:3, 127:17, 133:3, & 1990's [1] - 139:1 & 299 [1]-82:3 \\
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50: 1,50: 6,50: 14
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\hline 10:20:42 [1] - 8:8 & 12:00:15 [1] - 104:7 & 51:8, 51:10, 52:9, & 19th [1] - \(24: 7\) & 2nd [3]-72:4, 76:11, \\
\hline 10:20:43 [1] - 56:4 & 12:00:51 [1]-104:17 & 54:12, 93:3, 93:25, & 1:00 [1] - 118:13 & 76:14 \\
\hline 10:25:17 [1] - 11:17 & 12:01:38[1] - 105:6 & 95:22, 132:13, 133:3, & & \\
\hline 10:26:06 [1] - 12:5 & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 12:02:03 }{ }_{[1]}-105: 18 \\
& \text { 12:04:01 [1] - 107:6 }
\end{aligned}
\] & 134:1, 134:18, & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}


\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline assumed [1] - 86:17 & bank [1] - 66:25 & 91:20 & Bifurcate [1] - & 124:13, 151:13, \\
\hline \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { assuming [6] - } \\
\text { 20:17, 68:22, 70:6, }
\end{gathered}
\] & \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { Bank [12] - 7:12, } \\
59: 16,62: 9,71: 24,
\end{gathered}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { beds [1] }-39: 13 \\
& \text { been.. [1] - 17:4 }
\end{aligned}
\] & \begin{tabular}{l}
184:19 \\
bifurcate [5]-31:18,
\end{tabular} & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 151:17, 152:8 } \\
& \text { break [1] - 133:9 }
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline 86:23, 101:3, 162:22 & 76:12, 80:25, 103:9, & BEFORE [4]-43:12, & 77:25, 78:18, 86:15, & aking [1] - 135:2 \\
\hline [5] - & 107:3, 151:10, & 58:16, 123:13, & 181 & athe \({ }_{[1]}-92: 18\) \\
\hline 9:7, 86:19, 86:22, & 153:25, 162:1 & 150:2 & rcated [7] - 8:20, & Brewster [2]-59:18, \\
\hline 87:11, 90:15 & Barbara [2]-14:20, & began [1] - 93:5 & 31:20, 32:3, 78:17, & 151:20 \\
\hline at-least [1] - 22:19 & 19:6 & begin [2]-40:1, & 164:4, 169:11, & brief [10] - 9:2 \\
\hline Atlantic [6]-49:25, & Barcelona [1] - 40:6 & 126:5 & 177:14 & \[
20: 18,25: 2,87: 20
\]
109:12, 109:13, \\
\hline \[
50: 8,51: 12,179: 15
\]
181:8, 181:16 & \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { barely [3]-135:1 } \\
\text { 155:13, 174:12 }
\end{gathered}
\] & \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { beginning [2 } \\
70: 14,110: 21
\end{gathered}
\] & \[
1
\] & 109:12, \\
\hline atlas [1]-50:23 attached [3] - & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { Barnes [2]-59:15, } \\
& \text { 151:9 }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { BEHALF }_{[1]}-150: 20 \\
& \text { behalf }[4]-7: 2,
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 140:6, 143:6, 158:21, } \\
& \text { 170:8, 173:10, }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 164:20 } \\
& \text { briefed [8] - 99:9 }
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline 126:11, 138:16, & Baron [1] - 118:18 & 65:17, 104:9, 162:1 & 173:11, 178:22, & 136:23, 139:6, \\
\hline 157:16 & Baron's [20]-6:23, 59:10, 61:15, 65:7, & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { behind }[2]-76: 4, \\
& 154 \cdot 9
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{array}{|l|}
\hline 178: 23 \\
\text { big }_{[1]}-76: 8
\end{array}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 139:17, 139:19, } \\
& \text { 141:16, 147:24, }
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline attempt [2] - 156:16, & 124:4, 125:19, & ve.. [1] - 35: & bill [1] - 104:5 & 148:1 \\
\hline 179:19 & 141:12, 152:9 & ieves [2]-69:4 & billing [1] - 117:2 & briefing [16] - \\
\hline attempted & 154:24, 158:7, 158:9, & 165:15 & der \({ }_{[1]}-70: 2\) & 20:17, 65:21, 69:1 \\
\hline 138:6 & 158:10, 158:13, & elow [3] - & binders [1] - 70:22 & 69:16, 75:18, \(76: 3\) \\
\hline attendance [1] & 166:10, 166:11, & 134:22, 137:2 & bit [6]-31:16, 32:7, & 01:15, 109:11 \\
\hline 125:4 & 166:17, 166:22, & 69:18 & 39:15, 63:13, 95:4, & 117:10, 129:19, \\
\hline attention [3] & 175:10, 175:17 & 154:21, 156:4, 179:6 & 144:9 & 40:8, 141:5, 158:22, \\
\hline 104:20, 117:20, & 175:25 & beneficiary [1] - & BKRoom [1] & 168:15, 168:22 \\
\hline 146:13 & BARON'S \({ }_{[1]}\) & 15:8 & 150:23 & briefly [3] - 147:6, \\
\hline Attorney [12] - 42:5, & 150:20 & enefit \([9]-48: 6\), & Black [1] - 135:14 & 168:2, 175:4 \\
\hline 57:5, 59:20, 59:21, & Barons [1] - 176:16 & 54:13, 77:13, 96:7 & blanket [1] - 111:18 & briefs [18]-66:16, \\
\hline 64:16, 90:4, 122:5, & red \({ }_{[1]}\) - 110:25 & 98:14, 99:14, 102:22, & block [1] - 97:12 & 68:21, 129:19 \\
\hline 149:5, 152:2, 152:3, & barrier [1] - 50:17 & 160:5, 167:2 & ocked [1] - 173:8 & 129:21, 133:17 \\
\hline 173:13 & barring [1] - 134:7 & enefits [1] - 100:25 & low [1] - 41:11 & 39:6, 139:12 \\
\hline attorneys [3] - & base [1] - 86:22 & benefitting [2] & low-up [1] - 41:11 & 140:21, 140:2 \\
\hline 11:16, 66:20, 68:7 & based [7]-22:4 & 87:15, 95:6 & ard [1] - 154:21 & 141:4, 141:21 \\
\hline audio [4]-42:4, & 32:8, 32:23, 72:15 & Benjamin [8] - 6:24, & oat [2] - 63:2, 64:10 & 141:24, 142:24, \\
\hline 57:4, 122:4, 149:4 & 86:23, 136:23, & 31:12, 59:9, 61:1 & oats [1] - 63:1 & 142:25, 147:23, \\
\hline August [6]-12:3, & 141:25 & 124:2, 125:18, 152:7, & \[
\text { ody }[1]-112: 11
\] & 158:23 \\
\hline 49:3, 87:1, 163:15, & bases [1] - 83:18 & 154:23 & book [8] - 12:1 & bring [6] - 19:1, \\
\hline 169:3, 169:10 & basic [2] - 54:24, & Bergmann [1] & \[
14: 22,26: 24,50: 21
\] & 19:8, 49:9, 166:17, \\
\hline authenticity \({ }_{[1]}\) - & 76:24 & 19:14 & 53:4, 53:24, 113:24, & 170:16 \\
\hline \begin{tabular}{l}
83:6 \\
authorities [1] -
\end{tabular} & \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { basis }[18]-17: 1, \\
47: 13,72: 10,72: 12,
\end{gathered}
\] & \begin{tabular}{l}
beside [1] - 15:18 \\
bespeaks [1] - 162:9
\end{tabular} & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 145:15 } \\
& \text { booklet [10] - 20: }
\end{aligned}
\] & bringing [1] - 19:4 broke [1]-77:17 \\
\hline 92:19 & 77:15, 83:6, 83:24, & Besse [4]-59:7, & 28:13, 29:24, 45:18, & broken [7]-135:3, \\
\hline automatically [2] - & 97:6, 107:13, 107:18, & \[
61: 12,151: 6,153: 18
\] & \[
46: 6,46: 10,50: 21,
\] & 145:6, 159:25, 160:1, \\
\hline \[
\text { 91:10, } 91: 20
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 145:13, 163:11, } \\
& \text { 163:16, 164:16, }
\end{aligned}
\] & best \({ }_{[2]}-21: 2,140: 5\) & \[
51: 3,51: 4,52: 24
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 160:13, 160:14, } \\
& 161: 12
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { avallable [4]-96:14, } \\
\text { 137:22, 139:2, 146:6 }
\end{gathered}
\] & 165:9, 168:4, 169:1, & 91:12 & \[
\text { oks [1] - } 29:
\] & broken-up [1] - \\
\hline avenue [1] - 130:3 & 179:25 & Betsy [6] - 59:25 & oom [1] - 92:7 & 160:13 \\
\hline avoid [1] - 13:7 & bass [1] - 51:19 & 62:17, 124:17, 126:4, & orne [1] - 146:10 & Broscheit [3] - 39:1, \\
\hline awaiting \({ }_{[1]}-10: 8\) & BEACH [1] - 150:16 & 151:25, 154:16 & Boston [13]-43:17, & 39:22, 110:9 \\
\hline aware [7] - 38:24, & Beach [2]-151:22, & better [6] - 17:15 & 58:22, 59:16, 59:19, & brother [2]-11:15 \\
\hline 39:16, 81:14, 81:22, & 154:12 & \[
30: 5,41: 2,98: 24,
\] & 59:22, 59:25, 123:18, & 142:9 \\
\hline 138:9, 138:19, & BEAR [4] - 43:7 & 99:18, 109:13 & 124:17, 150:22, & brought [5] - 34:12, \\
\hline 138:21 & 58:7, 123:7, 150:7 & between [4]-84:20, & 151:10, 151:21 & 49:1, 107:2, 146:13, \\
\hline awful [1] - 15:24 & Bear [6] - 44:3, 44:4, & 103:17, 178:18, & \[
151: 25,152: 4
\] & 171:24 \\
\hline & \[
44: 4,59: 3,59: 4,59: 4
\] & 179:15 & boundaries & Brown [5]-8:1, 8:2, \\
\hline B & bearing [1]-158:25 & Beverly [2]-49:23, & 132:10, 132:17, & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 94:24, 94:25, 170:23 } \\
& \text { Brown's [2] - 17:5, }
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline & \begin{tabular}{l}
bears [1] - 111:2 \\
became [2] - 129:7
\end{tabular} & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 49:24 } \\
& \text { beyond [3] - 116:20, }
\end{aligned}
\] & 159:18 boundary [1] - 176:1 & 31:24 \\
\hline backwards [1] - & 130:4 & 132:4, 177:20 & bounds [1] - 134:21 & BRUTUS [1] \\
\hline 162:5 & become [3] - 38:24, & beyond.. [1] & Box [11] - 44:10, & 150:13 \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { ball [2]-10:17, } \\
& \text { 10:19 }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
39: 16,101: 13
\] & 116:15 & \[
44: 15,59: 9,59: 12,
\] & bugger [1] - 21:17 building [1]-23:2 \\
\hline ballpark [1] - 19:24 & becomes [2] - 47:23, & biblical [1] - 155:2 & 60:4, 124:3, 124:9, & building [1]-23:2 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline & & & & \\
\hline bunch [1]-70:17 & 151:21, 154:11 & 180:2, 180:3, 180:7, & Chappaquiddick & 159:7, 164:17, \\
\hline burden [35] - 32:20, & carved [5] - 130:25, & 180:8, 180:12, & [10] - 81:16, 81:20, & 164:19, 165:1, \\
\hline 66:14, 67:8, 73:12, & 131:17, 132:23, & 182:17, 184:25 & 81:22, 93:22, 100:12, & 169:16, 171:22, \\
\hline 73:15, 74:24, 75:2, & 146:22, 147:3 & Case [3]-61:2, 61:4, & 127:10, 127:15, & \[
172: 2,172: 15
\] \\
\hline 75:3, 78:19, 90:8, & case [163] - 6:8, 6:9, & 150:12 & 127:17, 128:22, & 173:16, 177:25, \\
\hline 90:13, 91:10, 91:17, & 7:17, 8:12, 8:20, & case-stated [5] - & 143:2 & 180:1, 181:6, 181:9, \\
\hline 91:22, 92:7, 92:13, & 13:17, 14:16, 15:4, & 68:23, 72:10, 79:20, & characterize [1] - & 181:18, 181:22, \\
\hline \[
92: 15,93: 13,94: 8,
\]
95:1, 96:5, 96:11. & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 15: 13,16: 3,18: 2 \\
& 19: 20,20: 19,24: 1
\end{aligned}
\] & 168:11, 177:1 & \[
155: 17
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 181:24, 182:10 } \\
& \text { claimants [1]-32:22 }
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline 99:12, 101:6, 134:12, & \[
24: 20,28: 4,31: 13
\] & \[
49: 20,52: 19,73: 3
\] & \[
64: 21
\] & claimed [1] - 177:2 \\
\hline 135:4, 135:5, 135:10, & 31:16, 31:17, 32:18, & 85:22, 91:13, 96:25, & CHARLES [4] - & claiming [2]-48:12, \\
\hline 135:18, 141:15, & 33:6, 38:23, 39:1, & 104:16, 111:2, & 43:12, 58:16, 123:13, & 73:16 \\
\hline 144:23, 147:16, & 39:4, 39:15, 39:16, & 135:11, 143:24, & 150:21 & claims [47] - 32:23, \\
\hline 160:24, 161:14, & 47:16, 67:15, 68:20, & 144:1, 155:15, & Charles [4] - 59:7, & 33:3, 33:4, 33:8, \\
\hline 164:5 & 68:23, 70:11, 72:10, & 163:14, 181:2 & 61:12, 151:6, 153:18 & 33:21, 34:5, 36:15, \\
\hline burden's [1] - 93:17 & 72:17, 73:2, 73:4, & cast [1] - 64:20 & check [1] - 29:19 & 36:17, 36:25, 37:3, \\
\hline burdened [1] - 67:11 & 73:5, 74:5, 74:16, & category [1] - 168:1 & checking [1] - 35:12 & 37:7, 49:11, 49:14, \\
\hline burdening [1] - & 75:1, 76:4, 79:19, & Cedar [2]-151:15, & cheek [1] - 172:25 & 49:16, 55:11, 105:7, \\
\hline 68:12 & 79:20, 82:1, 82:3, & 154:4 & cheering [1] - 154:8 & 106:6, 106:16, \\
\hline burner [1] - 177:25 & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 83:25, 84:10, 86:6, } \\
& \text { 8a•3 an•21 an•2? }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\text { cell }[3]-6: 6,16: 16,
\] & Child [1] - 127:4 & 106:18, 106:20, \\
\hline bus [1] - 63:5 & 89:3, 90:21, 90:23, & 125:7 & children [1] - 7:4 & 106:22, 108:3, \\
\hline Business [8] - & 91:1, 93:18, 93:19, & center [1]-50:7 & chime [1] - 82:22 & 157:25, 159:1, \\
\hline 42:20, 42:22, 57:20, & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 93: 23,94: 1,94: 17 \\
& 97: 2,98: 15,99: 1
\end{aligned}
\] & Certain [1] - 39:5 & chomp [1] - 136:9 & 163:24, 165:1, 165:3, \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 57:22, 122:20, } \\
& \text { 122:22, 149:20, }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 97:2, 98:15, 99:1, } \\
& 99: 4,100: 19,101: 24,
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { certain [12] - 66:5, } \\
68: 1,69: 5,81: 19,
\end{gathered}
\] & choose [1] - 30:22 & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 165:4, 165:6, 165:16, } \\
& \text { 165:18, 165:21, }
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline 149:22 & 106:6, 106:8, 106:13, & 113:20, 114:14, & Christina [2] - 59:23,
62:16 & 166:7, 166:10, 167:6, \\
\hline business [1] - 120:9 & 106:19, 107:15, & 130:10, 132:7, & chuck [1] - 92:1 & 172:5, 172:13, \\
\hline Buss [1] - 145:2 & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 107:17, 107:20, } \\
& \text { 107:24, 108:3, 108:4, }
\end{aligned}
\] & 141:11, 142:10, & Chuckles [1] - 51:24 & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 175: 10,177: 17 \\
& 177: 18,178: 12,
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline busted [1] - 145:9 & \[
108: 7,108: 10,109: 2,
\] & \[
162: 15,164: 16
\] & chuckles [1] - 68:14 & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 177: 18,178: 12, \\
& 179: 16,180: 22,
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { busy [2] - 114:20, } \\
& \text { 143:23 }
\end{aligned}
\] & 110:2, 110:9, 110:15, & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { certainly [16]-18:9, } \\
& \text { 19:5, 47:7, 65:16, }
\end{aligned}
\] & chuckles) [1] - 51:22 & 180:24 \\
\hline but.. [1] - 87:18 & 111:4, 111:5, 111:6, & 80:23, 81:2, 81:11, & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { chuckling [1] - } \\
& \text { 117:24 }
\end{aligned}
\] & claps [1] - 143:18 \\
\hline But.. [2]-21:25, & 112:7, 116:3, 117:10, & 102:21, 116:3, & Chuckling [1] - & clarification [5] - \\
\hline 119:7 & \[
129: 12,130: 5,132: 5
\] & 116:25, 146:18, & \[
51: 25
\] & 137:24, 139:8, 139:18, 139:21, \\
\hline \[
B Y_{[1]}-43: 12
\] & 129:12, 130:5, 132:5,
133:17, 134:10, & 164:14, 166:2, 168:7,
180:23, 181:23 & circulate [1] - 40:15 & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 139: 18,139: 21, \\
& 141: 14
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline bye [1]-56:3 & \[
134: 14,135: 14
\] & Certainly [1] - & circulated [1] - & clarified [4] - \\
\hline Bye [2]-41:6, 56:3 & 135:15, 135:19, & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { Certainly [1] - } \\
& \text { 161:24 }
\end{aligned}
\] & 80:23 & 130:15, 136:6, 141:2, \\
\hline Bye-bye [1] - 56:3 & 136:17, 136:18, & certification [4] - & circumstances [1] - & 141:6 \\
\hline C & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 136:23, 137:16, } \\
& \text { 137:23, 138:3, 138:8, }
\end{aligned}
\] & \begin{tabular}{l}
104:25, 110:8, \\
171:20, 173:20
\end{tabular} & cite [5] - 75:1, 96:25, & clarify [9] - 128:8, \\
\hline & 139:5, 139:11, 141:1, & certify \(\qquad\) & \[
104: 15,104: 16
\] & 133:24, 136:1, \\
\hline ca [1]-91:13 & 141:24, 142:16, & \[
42: 7,42: 10,57: 3
\] &  & 136:25, 137:3, \\
\hline California [1] - 14:21 & 142:21, 143:8, 144:1, & \[
57: 7,57: 10,122: 3
\] & \[
91: 14,129: 8,144: 16
\] & \[
138: 10,139: 4
\] \\
\hline canceled [1] - 64:8 & \begin{tabular}{l}
144:16, 144:17, \\
144:19, 145:11
\end{tabular} & 122:7, 122:10, 149:3, & \[
145: 2,163: 16
\] & clean [2] - 172:9, \\
\hline \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { cannot }[4]-74: 8 \text {, } \\
\text { 109:6, 137:8, 183:9 }
\end{gathered}
\] & 146:9, 146:15, 151:3, & \[
149: 7,149: 10
\] & cites [3] - 136:16, & 172:10 \\
\hline capable [1] - 77:10 capacities [2] - & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 151:4, 153:2, 153:13, } \\
& \text { 153:15, 155:15, }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 83:22 } \\
& \text { challenge }[1]-99: 11
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 138:8, } 163: 14 \\
& \text { citizens [6] - 92:21, } \\
& 93: 2,133: 5,133: 6
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 73: 1,78: 16,96: 4 \\
& \text { 107:19, 111:17, }
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline 46:25, 47:4 & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 157: 5,162: 21, \\
& 162: 24 . \\
& \text { 163:5. }
\end{aligned}
\] & challenged [1] - & 160:4, 160:5 & \[
130: 4,137: 15,141: 3
\] \\
\hline \begin{tabular}{l}
Cape [1]-35:21 \\
Cara [2]-59:17,
\end{tabular} & 163:17, 164:3, & \[
100: 1
\] & citizenship [2] - & \begin{tabular}{l}
clearer [1] - 98:18 \\
clearly [12] - 74:8,
\end{tabular} \\
\hline \[
62: 11
\] & 165:22, 166:18, & \[
77: 5,140: 23
\] & 92:22, 160:7 & 78:18, 95:22, 96:14, \\
\hline Cardinal [4] - 44:9, & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 168:4, 168:11, } \\
& \text { 168:14, 168:24, }
\end{aligned}
\] & change [5] - 12:11, & \begin{tabular}{l}
City [1] - 49:23 \\
Civil [1] - 18:12
\end{tabular} & \[
97: 1,97: 6,108: 4
\] \\
\hline 59:12, 124:9, 151:12 & 170:13, 170:15, & 16:11, 102:19, & claim [35] - 9:11, & 109:18, 109:19, \\
\hline care [1] - 172:17 & 170:19, 170:25, & 163:16, 172:7 & 14:12, 19:7, 19:8, & \[
113: 8,146: 8,162: 9
\] \\
\hline careful [1] - 165:20 &  & changed [1] - & 19:11. 36:6. 48:4. & Clearly [1] - 133:12 \\
\hline carefully [3] - 78:9, & \begin{tabular}{l}
171:16, 172:18, \\
175:12, 175:15
\end{tabular} & 102:18 & 19:11, 36:6, 48:4, & clerk [1] - 16:6 \\
\hline 162:10, 163:7 &  & changes [2]-19:15, & 55:17, 88:2, 88:3, & CLERK [8] - 6:8, \\
\hline Caroline [6]-7:2, & 178:17, 179:1, & 99:20 & & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 16: 16,30: 18,30: 21 \\
& 61: 2,125: 8,125: 12
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline \begin{tabular}{l}
108:13, 180:21 court [16] - 15:12, 16:6, 39:1, 92:20, 99:5, 110:14, 127:9, 127:19, 134:4, 135:1, 159:24, 171:20, 183:23, 184:2, 184:6, 184:7 \\
COURT [378] - 6:2, 6:11, 6:13, 6:25, 7:5, 7:15, 7:19, 7:21, \\
7:25, 8:9, 8:14, 9:1, 11:9, 11:13, 11:19, 12:13, 12:19, 12:22, 12:25, 15:19, 15:21, 15:24, 16:2, 16:15, 16:16, 16:18, 17:3, 17:13, 17:16, 20:20, 20:25, 21:6, 21:9, 21:13, 21:16, 22:8, 22:10, 22:12, 22:24, 23:6, 23:9, 23:19, 23:21, 23:23, 24:1, 24:3, 24:7, 24:22, 24:24, 25:2, 25:4, 25:8, 25:11, 25:20, 25:23, 26:2, 26:4, 26:7, 26:9, 26:13, 26:15, 26:17, 26:19, 27:1, 27:3, 27:10, 27:12, 28:3, 28:22, 28:25, 29:6, 29:10, 29:13, 29:19, 29:23, 30:2, 30:6, 30:8, 30:15, 30:17, 30:20, 30:23, 31:11, 34:3, 34:8, 34:15, 34:18, 34:22, 34:25, 35:2, 35:4, 35:6, 35:9, 35:12, 35:17, 35:20, 35:23, 36:1, 36:4, 37:13, 37:16, 37:19, 38:3, 38:7, 38:11, 38:14, 38:19, 38:21, 39:21, 40:4, 40:7, 40:9, 40:15, 40:18, 40:21, 41:1, 41:5, 41:10, 41:14, 41:16, 41:20, 43:4, 43:4, \(45: 2,45: 9,45: 13\), 45:17, 45:23, 46:2, 46:6, 46:9, 46:11, 46:14, 46:16, 49:18, 51:15, 51:23, 51:25, 52:4, 52:21, 53:1, 53:18, 53:24, 54:6, 54:16, 54:19, 54:21, 55:3, 55:7, 55:13, 55:15, 55:18, 55:20, 55:22, 55:24, 56:3, 58:4, 58:4, 61:6, 61:17, 61:22, 62:1,
\end{tabular} & 62:4, 62:7, 62:10, 62:15, 62:18, 62:23, 62:25, 63:6, 63:13, 63:18, 63:21, 63:24, 64:3, 64:9, 64:11, 64:13, 64:17, 64:19, 65:4, 65:6, 65:9, 65:11, 65:13, 65:21, 65:24, 67:21, 68:10, 68:13, 69:16, 69:18, 69:22, 70:21, 74:19, 75:8, 75:13, 76:5, 76:7, 76:17, 77:4, 84:1, 86:11, 86:13, 86:25, 87:2, 87:9, 87:18, 87:24, 88:4, 88:11, 88:17, 88:21, 89:10, 89:14, 89:21, 90:1, 90:9, 93:11, 94:21, 94:24, 97:17, 97:20, 98:4, 101:19, 101:21, 103:6, 103:15, 103:19, 103:25, 104:2, 104:4, 105:12, 105:21, 106:12, 107:5, 111:8, 111:23, 114:5, 114:18, 114:21, 115:7, 115:10, 115:14, 115:16, 117:1, 117:4, 117:15, 117:23, 117:25, 118:5, 118:12, 118:15, 118:20, 118:23, 119:1, 119:4, 119:8, 119:11, 119:17, 119:23, 120:5, 120:7, 120:9, 120:13, 120:16, 120:22, 121:2, 121:4, 121:8, 123:4, 123:4, 125:2, 125:11, 125:13, 125:17, 125:23, 126:5, 126:9, 126:24, 127:3, 127:6, 127:11, 127:14, 127:20, 128:1, 128:3, 128:5, 131:23, 135:23, 135:25, 139:22, 140:1, 140:10, 140:12, 140:14, 141:19, 141:21, 142:1, 142:3, 147:5, 147:18, 147:23, 148:1, 150:4, 150:4, 153:5, 153:7, 153:11, 153:16, 153:20, 153:22, 154:5, 154:8, 154:14, 154:20, 154:25, 155:11, 155:14, 155:19, 155:25, & \begin{tabular}{l}
156:2, 156:4, 161:22, 169:5, 169:7, 170:22, \\
171:7, 171:10, \\
172:19, 172:21, \\
173:1, 173:13, \\
173:24, 174:9, \\
174:11, 174:14, \\
174:16, 174:18, \\
174:22, 175:1, 175:4, \\
175:8, 178:7, 178:20, \\
178:25, 179:6, \\
179:12, 180:25, \\
181:5, 181:14, \\
181:17, 181:21, \\
182:1, 182:5, 182:12, \\
182:14, 182:17, \\
182:20, 183:3, \\
183:10, 183:17, \\
183:20, 183:24, \\
184:4, 184:9, 184:11, \\
184:16, 184:19, \\
184:22, 185:1, 185:4, \\
185:7, 185:9, 185:11, \\
185:14, 185:16, \\
185:19 \\
Court [287] - 6:4, \\
6:5, 6:6, 8:22, 9:18, \\
9:21, 10:20, 11:3, \\
11:18, 13:22, 15:6, \\
15:10, 18:5, 18:22, \\
19:10, 20:15, 31:15, \\
31:20, 31:23, 32:7, \\
32:10, 32:11, 32:14, \\
32:20, 32:23, 33:13, \\
33:23, 34:5, 36:7, \\
36:8, 36:18, 36:24, \\
37:4, 37:11, 39:8, \\
39:10, 39:18, 41:12, \\
41:17, 42:2, 42:5, \\
42:9, 42:16, 43:22, \\
47:16, 48:10, 49:21, \\
57:2, 57:5, 57:9, \\
57:16, 58:24, 61:25, \\
65:19, 67:22, 68:8, \\
68:12, 68:18, 68:20, \\
68:22, 69:1, 69:2, \\
69:9, 70:13, 70:16, \\
71:1, 71:6, 72:18, \\
73:6, 73:14, 74:6, \\
74:14, 74:18, 74:22, \\
75:3, 75:7, 76:1, \\
77:12, 77:24, 78:1, \\
78:2, 78:9, 78:11, \\
78:17, 78:21, 79:17, \\
79:25, 80:10, 81:3, \\
82:2, 82:3, 82:4, \\
82:9, 82:23, 83:14, \\
83:17, 83:22, 84:11, \\
84:12, 84:17, 86:14, \\
86:16, 86:17, 86:21, \\
88:20, 88:24, 90:7, \\
90:11, 90:13, 90:15,
\end{tabular} & 90:19, 90:21, 91:2, 91:6, 91:9, 91:15, 92:2, 92:10, 92:13, 94:6, 94:15, 94:21, 94:23, 96:3, 96:11, 96:25, 97:13, 98:8, 98:10, 98:20, 98:22, 98:25, 99:3, 99:5, 100:20, 101:2, 101:3, 101:16, 103:24, 107:12, 107:14, 107:17, 108:14, 109:23, 109:24, 109:25, 110:14, 110:18, 110:23, 111:2, 112:2, 112:3, 113:7, 113:16, 114:3, 116:17, 119:16, 120:10, 122:2, 122:5, 122:9, 122:16, 123:22, 125:4, 125:6, 126:23, 127:16, 128:18, 128:20, 128:21, 128:22, 128:25, 129:22, 130:7, 130:20, 130:22, 130:23, 131:1, 131:13, 131:16, 131:18, 131:21, 131:24, 132:2, 132:8, 132:21, 132:22, 133:1, 133:25, 134:1, 134:11, 134:15, 136:22, 137:7, 137:12, 137:16, 137:21, 138:25, 139:4, 139:9, 139:13, 139:16, 140:4, 142:14, 142:21, 142:23, 143:2, 143:17, 143:20, 144:8, 144:12, 144:22, 145:4, 146:13, 146:23, 149:2, 149:5, 149:9, 149:16, 150:12, 150:24, 156:9, 156:14, 157:4, 159:2, 160:24, 161:3, 161:4, 161:14, 161:17, 162:9, 162:22, 162:23, 163:5, 163:6, 164:4, 164:8, 164:11, 164:14, 164:18, 166:5, 166:9, 166:12, 166:14, 166:16, 166:18, 166:20, 166:21, 167:9, 167:19, 167:21, 168:6, 168:15, 168:23, 170:10, &  \\
\hline
\end{tabular}



\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline fee [1] - 174:5 & \[
70: 3,90: 10,128: 18
\] & forms [1] - 159:16 & 144:11, 153:7, 160:4, & 152:9, 154:23, \\
\hline fellow [1] - 11:15 & 162:8 & forth [8]-66:16, & 160:5, 172:6 & \[
156: 25,157: 1,157: 2,
\] \\
\hline felt [1] - 136:11 & rst [27] - 8:20, 9:22, & 71:4, 72:16, 97:8, & full.. [1] - 30:2 & 157:6, 157:8, 157:11, \\
\hline ferry [1] - 63:4 & 10:10, 11:16, 17:20, & 101:11, 133:22, & fully [6] - 132:10, & 157:22, 157:24,
\[
158: 1 \quad 158: 3 \quad 163: 20
\] \\
\hline few [6] - 24:10, & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 18: 2,29: 2,31: 21 \\
& 63: 4,63: 5,73: 4
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { 157:12, 161:10 } \\
\text { forthcoming [ }
\end{gathered}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 132:16, 136:7, } \\
& 141: 16,159: 17
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 158: 1,158: 3,163: 20 \\
& 163: 21,165: 2,165: 3
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline 128:16, 156:6 & 77:22, 84:18, 85:5 & 12:1 & 167:12 & 165:8, 165:14, \\
\hline field [2] - 22:23, & 86:20, 90:20, 95:15, & forum [1] - 37:9 & funny [1]-36:18 & \[
166: 25,167: 5,168: 3
\] \\
\hline 68:21 & 104:11, 114:13, & forward [11] - 19:20, & further.. [1] - 25:14 & 176:16 \\
\hline Fifteen [1] - 22:14 & 130:14, 136:4, & 68:23, 88:10, 97:14, & futile [3] - 18:18, & govern [1] - 95:12 \\
\hline fighting [1] - 183:25 & 136:17, 155:20, & 102:17, 107:18, & 33:3, 33:21 & governed [1] - 93:25 \\
\hline figure [1] - 143:12 & 156:6, 157:10, 162:6, & 110:21, 111:21, & futility [1] - 36:22 & government [1] - \\
\hline file [18]-12:21, & 164:5 & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 172: 13,177: 21, \\
& 179: 11
\end{aligned}
\] & future [1] - 166:1
\[
\mathbf{F Y I}_{[1]-41: 8}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 92:19 } \\
& \text { graded [1] - 39:13 }
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 12:23, 13:7, 18:14, } \\
& \text { 19:16, 23:17, 23:20, }
\end{aligned}
\] & 161:2, 161:5, 162:15, & FOUNDATION [1] - & YI [1] - 41 & granted [4] - 49:2, \\
\hline 27:17, 35:7, 38:2, & 162:18 & 150:17 & G & 81:19, 161:20, \\
\hline 52:11, 66:16, 147:17, & \[
108: 1,11
\] & \[
\text { 83:24, 169:19, } 171 \text { : }
\] & game [1]-1 & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { grantor [2]-159:14, } \\
& 160: 21
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline filed [23] - 13:2, & 120:25, 171:1 & \[
151: 15,154: 4
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { gather [2]-63:18, } \\
& \text { 105:22 }
\end{aligned}
\] & grapple [1] - 140:3 \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& 34: 20,36: 8,36: 9 \\
& 36: 10.46: 6.48: 23
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { five-pag } \\
& \text { 120:25 }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { four [12]-13:1, 18:1, } \\
& 23: 2,23: 10,23: 12,
\end{aligned}
\] & Gay [11] - 81:2 & great [6]-51:16, 96:18, 100:13, \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& 36: 10,46: 6,48: 23, \\
& 65: 18,70: 12,72: 3
\end{aligned}
\] & flawed [1] - 165:10 & 69:8, 96:16, 96:20, & \[
93: 4,93: 24,94: 2,
\] & 110:11, 110:20 \\
\hline 104:8, 104:24, & Flax [1] - 91:13 & 104:12, 166:25, & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 94: 5,97: 14,131: 8, \\
& \text { 131:10, 134:20, }
\end{aligned}
\] & 171:2 \\
\hline 113:18, 126:19, & floating [1]-113:24 & 167:7, 171:1
framed [2] - \(32 \cdot 18\), & 145:17, 159:16 & Great [2] - 62:3, \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 128:7, 128:8, 128:11, } \\
& \text { 147:13, 159:16, }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { Floor [4]-59:21, } \\
\text { 124:16, 151:24, }
\end{gathered}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { framed [2]-32:18, } \\
& 144: 19
\end{aligned}
\] & Gayetty [2] - 90:23, & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 118:14 } \\
& \text { Green [14] - 49:2 }
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline 160:18, 169:24, & 152:4 & framework [1] - & 91:12 & 72:18, 73:2, 73:3 \\
\hline 170:13, 180:12 & flow [1] - 14:5 & 146:21 & \begin{tabular}{l}
geez [1]-147:1 \\
general [2] - 176:5
\end{tabular} & \[
90: 24,91: 3,91: 14
\] \\
\hline filing [3]-13:22 & focus [2] - 92:10 & frang [1] - 12:10 & general [2] - 176:5 & 112:20, 135:12, \\
\hline \[
80: 8,141: 8
\] & \begin{tabular}{l}
113:14 \\
focuse
\end{tabular} & \begin{tabular}{l}
frang-would-do-it \\
[1] - \(12 \cdot 10\)
\end{tabular} & \[
59: 21,152: 2,152: 3
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 144:17, 156:10, } \\
& \text { 156:12, 156:23, }
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { final [2] - 95:19 } \\
& \text { 134:2 }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
77: 24,164: 9
\] & [1] - 12:10
FRANGOS [3] & generally [2] - & 176:2 \\
\hline Finally \({ }_{[1]}\) - 168:2 & focusing [1] - 87:3 & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 58: 12,150: 12 \\
& 150: 20
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 116:10, 138:21 } \\
& \text { generated }[1]-15: 3
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { Green's [3] - 49:11, } \\
& \text { 145:4, 157:4 }
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline 132:10, 132:17 & 61:6, 92:25, 125:14, & angos [17] - 6:10, & generic [1] - 77:17 & grossly [1] - 76:13 \\
\hline 139:4, 159:11 & 153:5 & 7:19, 7:20, 61:4, & generically [1] - & ground [6]-8:19 \\
\hline 159:17, 166:6, & followed [1] - 69:21 & 151:15, 151:22 & 76:20 & 39:10, 50:10, 109:19, \\
\hline 168:24 & following & 153:3, 153:15 & gentlemen [1] - & 109:21, 110:17 \\
\hline financially [4] - & 72:21, 108:25 & 153:16, 154:4, & 125:6 & growing [2] - 17:7, \\
\hline 42:13, 57:13, 122:13, & Following [1] & 154:13, 155:4, & get-go [1] - 136:13 & 17:8 \\
\hline 149:13 & 157:3 & 155:15, 179:1, 179:5, & given [13] - 39:3, & guardians [1] - 7:4 \\
\hline der [1] - 79:3 & follows [1] - 41:7 & 180:2, 180:7 & 51:4, 68:15, 95:7, & guess [15] - 8:1, 8:3, \\
\hline findings [9]-15:6, & footing [2] - 111:6 & Frank [1] - 15:25 & \[
95: 16,98: 14,133: 10
\] & 12:14, 28:8, 55:9, \\
\hline 91:9, 94:16, 94:17, & 167:16 & Frank's [1] - 45:19 & 133:13, 134:10, & 63:1, 76:8, 88:4 \\
\hline 96:9, 133:25, 142:10, & footnote [1] - 159:2 & Frankly [1] - 87:14 & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 135: 18,159: 22, \\
& 160 \cdot 10 \text { 160 }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
107: 3,131: 9,159: 9
\] \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 156:10, } 159: 13 \\
& \text { fine }[16]-17: 25 .
\end{aligned}
\] & for.. [2]-7:18, 118:5 & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { frankly }[2]-21: 7 \text {, } \\
& 77: 12
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{array}{r}
\text { 160:10, 160:20 } \\
\text { Glad [1] }-56: 3
\end{array}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 176:8, 180:11, } \\
& 184: 14
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { fine }[16]-17: 25, \\
22: 11,23: 25,27: 24,
\end{gathered}
\] & \begin{tabular}{l}
foreclose [1] - 98: \\
foreclosed [1] -
\end{tabular} & Frati [10] - 129 & glad [2] - 115:9, & guidance [1] - \\
\hline 30:8, 38:14, 38:15, & 137:17 & 136:17, 137:2, & 115:12 & 135:20 \\
\hline 53:20, 54:22, 105:18, & foregoing [8] - 42:3, & 142:21, 143:8, 143:9, & glance [1] - 82:6 & guide [2] - 135:7, \\
\hline 117:18, 118:16, & \[
42: 7,57: 3,57: 7
\] & 143:18, 144:1, & glanced [1] - 76:10 & \[
145: 1
\] \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 119:17, 119:18, } \\
& 119: 24
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 122:3, 122:7, 149:3, } \\
& 149: 7
\end{aligned}
\] & 176:25 & \begin{tabular}{l}
God [2] - 6:4, 125:5 \\
God's [1] - 64:11
\end{tabular} & guy [1] - 7:23 \\
\hline Fine [1] - 55:21 & foremost [1]-31:21 & 116:17, 117:3, & \begin{tabular}{l}
Gorda [4]-44:4, \\
44.5,59.4,59.5
\end{tabular} & 143:23, 147:19 \\
\hline fingers [1] - 53:5 & forget [3]-30:25, & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 117:20, 119:16, } \\
& 119: 17
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
44: 5,59: 4,59: 5
\]
GOSSAMER [1] - & \\
\hline \[
22: 2,175: 6,179: 24
\] & 64:3, & fron & \[
150: 20
\] & \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { Finish }[1]-27: 14 \\
& \text { fire }[1]-35: 9 \\
& \text { First }[5]-69: 25,
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { format }[1]-178: 1 \\
& \text { Format }[4]-42: 9, \\
& 57: 9,122: 9,149: 9
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{gathered}
75: 10,112: 7,165: 11 \\
\text { frontage }[1]-82: 8 \\
\text { full }[6]-143: 10,
\end{gathered}
\] & \begin{tabular}{l}
Gossamer [31] - \\
6:23, 59:10, 61:15, \\
65:7, 118:18, 124:4, \\
125:18, 141:11,
\end{tabular} & \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { Hackney }[4]-44: 14, \\
60: 3,124: 12,151: 16 \\
\text { Half }[1]-118: 13
\end{gathered}
\] \\
\hline
\end{tabular}


\[
2-200
\]
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline K & \[
\text { laid }[2]-31: 14,51: 7
\] & language [2] - 90:6, & \[
128: 5,129: 17
\] & \[
16: 5,101: 23
\] \\
\hline & land [25] - 13:2, & lanwater [1] - 13:18 & 41:21, 61:24, 62:1, & 174:11 \\
\hline Kaplan [4] - 44:14, & 13:4, 13:5, 13:22, & large [2] - 11:7, 75:2 & 95:2, 97:24, 98:2, & lists [1] - 158:11 \\
\hline 60:3, 124:12, 151:16 & 31:8, 80:6, 80:14, & largely [1] - 127:8 & 98:3, 98:8, 99:4, & litigation [1] - 108:9 \\
\hline keep [7]-14:21, & 85:9, 85:13, 93:9, & last [20]-8:12, & 103:22, 141:17, & live [4]-9:7, 68:24, \\
\hline 15:4, 21:24, 25:8, & 97:8, 112:22, 112:23, & 18:24, 36:14, 51:19, & 141:20, 161:8, & 79:21, 168:13 \\
\hline 64:21, 86:5, 137:19 & 133:10, 133:11, & 70:6, 84:24, 84:25, & 161:13, 179:22 & lives [1] - 51:1 \\
\hline keeps [2] - 94:13 & 133:13, 134:21, & 108:1, 111:25, & legal [2]-86:22, & LLC [4]-44:14, \\
\hline Kelley [4]-124:15, & 134:23, 135:2, & 118:22, 126:13, & \[
144: 4
\] & \[
60: 3,124: 12,151: 16
\] \\
\hline 126:3, 151:23, & \[
146: 23,160: 8 \text {, }
\] & 136:5, 136:7, 138:5, & legible [1] - 126:20 & LLP [3] - 59:15, \\
\hline 154:15 & 160:15, 160:16, & 147:23, 158:21, & legislative [1] - & 59:24, 151:9 \\
\hline Kennedy [7] - 7:2, & 167:7 & 159:11, 160:23, & 133:13 & locate [1] - 50:11 \\
\hline 7:3, 50:16, 59:19, & LAND [4] - 43:4, & 169:21 & legislature [7] - & located [5] - 8:19, \\
\hline 62:12, 151:21,
154:11 & 58:4, 123:4, 150:4 & lastly [5] - 96:8, & 92:22, 127:8, 133:2, & \[
8: 24,66: 6,103: 1
\] \\
\hline 154:11 & Land [45]-6:4, 6:23, & 110:5, 134:12, & 133:3, 133:8, 133:21, & location [1] - 84:7 \\
\hline Kennedys [3] - & 7:12, 15:10, 19:10, & 176:25, 177:10 & 134:3 & locus [1] - 157:19 \\
\hline \[
71: 25,76: 11,107: 10
\] & 42:5, 57:5, 59:10, & late [3]-40:25, 72:2, & length [1] - 130:1 & Lombardi [33] - \\
\hline key [2] - 132:9, & 59:16, 61:15, 62:9, & 76:17 & Leslie [15] - 6:20, & \[
7: 25,8: 11,8: 20,9: 9
\] \\
\hline 146:20 & 65:7, 71:24, 76:12, & latter [1] - 101:13 & 12:13, 29:25, 44:6, & \[
9: 13,9: 24,18: 21,
\] \\
\hline kick [1] - 143:24 & 80:25, 94:15, 97:13, & Laughs [1] - 141:18 & 45:6, 59:6, 61:11, & 18:23, 19:10, 31:18, \\
\hline kicked [2] - 10:4, & 103:9, 107:3, 118:18, & Laughter [4] - 7:24, & 65:4, 69:18, 70:22, & 33:20, 34:1, 34:12, \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 10:5 } \\
& \text { kind }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 122:5, 124:4, 125:4, } \\
& \text { 125:19, 141:12, }
\end{aligned}
\] & 28:24, 153:21, & 76:7, 124:5, 125:20,
151:5, 153:17 & \[
36: 22,37: 1,77: 24,
\] \\
\hline 12:8, 15:11, 24:7, & 149:5, 150:12, & law [30] - 71:16, & Leslie's [1] - 41:1 & 106:24, 129:25, \\
\hline 24:17, 24:20, 24:21, & 151:10, 152:9, & 73:1, 73:2, 73:5, & Leslie-Ann [8] - & 130:17, 143:6, 157:5, \\
\hline \(33: 7,35: 9,35: 14\),
\(36.18,39: 17,63: 14\) & \(153: 25,154: 24\),
\(158 \cdot 7,158 \cdot 9,158 \cdot 10\) & 73:17, 73:18, 90:21, & 6:20, 44:6, 59:6, & \[
157: 7,158: 1,165: 5
\] \\
\hline 36:18, 39:17, 63:14, & 158:7, 158:9, 158:10, & 90:24, 93:4, 93:16, & 61:11, 124:5, 125:20, & 165:7, 165:15, \\
\hline 115:16, 128:13, & \begin{tabular}{l}
158:13, 161:25, \\
166:10, 166:11
\end{tabular} & 93:19, 97:2, 99:4, & 151:5, 153:17 & 165:19, 169:10, \\
\hline 139:10, 155:6, & 166:17, 166:22, &  & less [1] - 31:16 & 169:15, 179:20 \\
\hline 157:16, 178:5, & 175:11, 175:17, & 134:14, 135:19, & \[
14: 24
\] & \[
86: 15,86: 24,89: 24
\] \\
\hline \begin{tabular}{l}
\[
181: 11
\] \\
kindly [2] - 6:7,
\end{tabular} & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 175:25, 176:16 } \\
& \text { landed }[1]-133: 6
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 138:3, 138:8, 144:16, } \\
& \text { 144:17, 144:25, }
\end{aligned}
\] & \begin{tabular}{l}
letting [1] - 56:2 \\
level [3]-74:16,
\end{tabular} & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 90: 12,106: 15, \\
& \text { 156:18, 158:21, }
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline 125:7 & landlock [17] - & 145:2, 145:11, & 143:22, 146:18 & 158:23, 164:3, \\
\hline kinds [5] - 97:3, & 72:22, 72:23, 73:13, & \[
146: 15
\] & LEWIS [2] - 62:16, & 164:23, 175:10, \\
\hline 103:3, 132:6, 146:16, & 74:3, 74:12, 92:9, & laws [1] - 160:6 & 62:21 & 178:22, 180:5 \\
\hline 173:5 & 92:20, 99:13, 134:3, & lawyer [1] - 14:23 & Lewis [2]-59:23, & Lombardi.. [1] - \\
\hline KITRAS [4] - 43:7, & 134:5, 135:14, & lawyers [3]-67:2, & 62:16 & 79:18 \\
\hline 58:7, 123:7, 150:7 & 135:15, 135:17, & 75:10, 75:11 & lieu [1] - 177:6 & Look [2] - 53:4 \\
\hline Kitras [31] - 6:8, & 138:7, 144:15, & lay [1] - 128:16 & light [3]-35:9, & 53:24 \\
\hline 6:19, 44:3, 59:3, & \[
144: 18,144: 21
\] & lays [1] - 129:8 & 79:14, 82:11 & look [27] - 15:9, \\
\hline 61:2, 61:10, 77:1, & landlocked [7] - & learned [1] - 10:10 & likely [1] - 165:10 & 24:15, 36:19, 36:20, \\
\hline 79:25, 125:10, 151:3, & 8:16, 91:10, 91:21, & least [30] - 18:23, & likewise [1] - 82:2 & 67:24, 70:10, 70:17, \\
\hline 151:10, 151:14, & 91:24, 92:6, 93:21 & \[
22: 19,23: 9,23: 12
\] & limit [1] - 118:7 & \[
70: 18,83: 22,86: 4
\] \\
\hline 151:21, 151:25, & Landreth [4]-44:9, & 26:22, 34:2, 34:23, & limited [3] - 146:25, & 90:21, 96:3, 96:16, \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& 153: 2,153: 13 \\
& \text { 153:25, 154:2, }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
59: 12,124: 8,151: 12
\]
lands [31] - 78:7, & \[
36: 1,39: 7,48: 16
\] & \[
156: 20,177: 18
\] & 96:17, 96:18, 96:20, \\
\hline 154:12, 154:17, & \[
97: 15,108: 6,112: 25
\] & 66:7, 67:9, 68:15, & limiting [1] - 108:19 & 101:14, 112:3, 113:7, \\
\hline 155:6, 155:7, 155:15, & 113:1, 113:2, 130:25, & 71:9, 75:10, 91:8, 92:25, 94:7, 95:24 & limits [1] - 28:6 & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 114:3, 127:21, } \\
& \text { 132:22, 133:2, 141:7, }
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline 155:21, 179:10, & 131:9, 131:17, & 100:18, 100:21, & \begin{tabular}{l}
Lincoln [1] - 92:24 \\
line [3]-14:1, 119:2,
\end{tabular} & 146:10, 157:16, \\
\hline 179:23, 180:3, 180:6, & 132:11, 132:17, & 104:17, 115:14, & 175:19 & 161:3 \\
\hline \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { 180:8, 180:12, 181:4 } \\
\text { known [3]-81:8, }
\end{gathered}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 132:18, 132:23, } \\
& \text { 132:24, 133:4, 133:9, }
\end{aligned}
\] & 143:8, 143:9, 144:5, & list [10] - 22:6, & looked [10] - 23:23, \\
\hline known [3]-81:8,
82:15, 100:10 & 132:24, 133:4, 133:9,
133:10, 134:2, & \begin{tabular}{l}
162:2, 164:22, \\
164:23, 178.5
\end{tabular} & \[
28: 22,47: 20,55: 16
\] & \[
31: 23,32: 11,48: 24,
\] \\
\hline knows [2] - 25:16, & \[
134: 20,135: 3,147: 2,
\] & 164:23, 178:5 least-recently- & \[
77: 13,114: 13,155: 5,
\]
168:19, 180:10, & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 71: 7,80: 14,99: 2 \\
& 110: 17,131: 17
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline 47:25 & \[
159: 18,159: 19
\] & Arcose [1] - 104:17 & 182:21 & 146:22 \\
\hline & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 159: 22,159: 25 \\
& 160: 10,160: 13
\end{aligned}
\] & leave [4] - 91:24, & listed [4] - 156:15, & looking [13]-11:1, \\
\hline L & \begin{tabular}{l}
160:10, 160:13, \\
160:20, 161:12
\end{tabular} & 103:10, 169:4, & 157:1, 163:22, & 12:4, 18:7, 30:11, \\
\hline ladies [1] - 125:6 & \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { Lane }[4]-44: 9, \\
59: 12,124: 9,151: 12
\end{gathered}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 182:22 } \\
& \text { leaves }[3]-37: 4,
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 166:11 } \\
& \text { listen [3] - 8:10, }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 72: 20,74: 21,78: 22 \\
& \text { 101:17, 110:1, 129:6, } \\
& \text { 132:2, 133:19 }
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline looking-at [1] - & \multirow[b]{31}{*}{\begin{tabular}{l}
```

59:3, 61:2, 61:10,
151:3, 153:13
Mark [8] - 6:21, 44:7,
59:7, 61:11, 124:6,
125:20, 151:6,
153:17
mark [1] - 30:12
markings [1] - 30:19
Martha's [8] - 7:11,
59:16, 62:9, 103:9,
107:2, 151:10,
153:25, 161:25
Mass [3] - 49:23,
74:22, 90:25 <br>
MASSACHUSETTSNone

```
\end{tabular}} & 141:2, 174:18 & 40:19, 71:3, 79:15 & \[
2: 2
\] \\
\hline \[
30: 11
\] & & meaningful [2] - & 86:5, 164:24 & 6, 61:11, 65 \\
\hline oks [4] - 28:19 & & \[
15: 16,67: 19
\] & I [1] - 74:2 & \[
5: 5
\] \\
\hline  & & means [1]-67:1 meant [2] - 107:9, & \[
79: 7,79: 23,80: 1
\] & 139:24, 153:17, \\
\hline 81 & & 160:7 & 81:7, 164:2 & 173 \\
\hline 0: & \multirow[t]{8}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { mark }[1]-30: 12 \\
& \text { markings }[1]-30: 19 \\
& \text { Martha's }[8]-7: 11, \\
& 59: 16,62: 9,103: 9, \\
& \text { 107:2, 151:10, } \\
& \text { 153:25, 161:25 } \\
& \text { Mass }[3]-49: 23, \\
& 74: 22,90: 25
\end{aligned}
\]} & meantime [2] - & 53: & Morse [13]-6:20, \\
\hline 31 & & \multirow[t]{4}{*}{```
117:17, 121:9
    measure [1]-11:7
    measurements [1] -
13:15
```} & \multirow[t]{5}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& 120: 19,126: 8 \\
& \text { minimum [1] - } \\
& 173: 19 \\
& \text { minor }[1]-7: 4 \\
& \text { minute }[8]-13: 19,
\end{aligned}
\]} & \multirow[t]{3}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 59:6, 61:11, 124:5, } \\
& \text { 125:20, 139:23, }
\end{aligned}
\]} \\
\hline 14 & & & & \\
\hline lucky [2]-7:23, 94:4 & & & & \\
\hline ludicrous [1] - 1 & & & & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\begin{tabular}{l}
142:4, 151:5, 153:17,
173:13 \\
Moshup [20] - 13:25,
\end{tabular}} \\
\hline lumped [1] - 137:9 & & \multirow[t]{3}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& 13: 15 \\
& \text { meat }[1]-75: 15 \\
& \text { meet }[16]-33: 1, \\
& 33: 14,34: 6,36: 20, \\
& 75: 19,115: 1,115: 3,
\end{aligned}
\]} & & \\
\hline & & & & \[
14: 2,50: 16,50: 18
\] \\
\hline & & & & \\
\hline & MASSACHUSETTS & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 115:4, 115:17, 116:7, } \\
& \text { 117:20, 118:2, 118:4, }
\end{aligned}
\] & minutes [1] - 62:2 & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 102: 18,102: 20 \\
& 102: 22,102: 25
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline 44:3, 44:7, 44:10 & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\begin{tabular}{l}
150:3, 150:15 \\
Massachusetts [14]
\end{tabular}} & 118:5, 119:13, & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{21:12, 28:21, 40:8,} & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 102:22, 102:25, } \\
& \text { 103:1, 103:2, 103:4, }
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline 44:15, 57:19, 59:3 & & 119:15 & & \\
\hline 59 & & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{meeting [5] - 66:20,} & 119:22, 174:20 & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{Moshup's [1] -} \\
\hline 59 & & & \multirow[b]{3}{*}{\begin{tabular}{l}
\[
\text { MISC }_{[1]}-58: 13
\] \\
Miscellaneous [2] -
\end{tabular}} & \\
\hline 59:25, 60:5, 122:19, & & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
115: 19
\]} & & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{64:12} \\
\hline 124:3, 124:6, 124:10, & & & & \\
\hline 124:13, 124:17, & & \begin{tabular}{l}
meetings [1] - 67:11 \\
meets [2]-40:18,
\end{tabular} & \[
6: 8,153: 2
\] & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\begin{tabular}{l}
77:15, 82:6, 98:6, \\
99:8, 102:18, 158:17
\end{tabular}} \\
\hline 149:19, 151:3, 151:6, & & \[
135: 4
\] &  & \\
\hline 151:10 & & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{member [1] - 94:11 members [3]-} & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 6:9, 125:9, 153:3 } \\
& \text { miscomprehended }
\end{aligned}
\]} & \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { 99:8, 102:18, 158:17 } \\
\text { mostly }[1]-55: 10
\end{gathered}
\] \\
\hline 15 & & & & motion [58]-7:18, \\
\hline \[
\begin{gathered}
151: 25,152: 4,152: 8 \\
\text { machination [1] - }
\end{gathered}
\] & & \[
\begin{gathered}
92: 21,92: 23,160: 4 \\
\text { memo [2]-24:21, }
\end{gathered}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& {[1]-161: 17} \\
& \text { mistake }[1]-98: 22
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 13: 22,18: 14,19: 17 \\
& 23: 21,23: 24,29: 7
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline 144:9 & materials [3]- & 120:25 & mistake.. [1] - 98:20 & 29:8, 29:23, 31:7, \\
\hline d [1] & & memorandum [4] - & mistaken [1] - 84:15 & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& 31: 8,33: 15,34: 11 \\
& 36: 13,37: 18,38: 2
\end{aligned}
\]} \\
\hline mail [11]-14:22, & & 25:6, 71:16, 77:16, & model [1] - 156:9 & \\
\hline 42:24, 57:24, 7 & & 120:24 & modern [1] - 115:22 & 36:13, 37:18, 38:2, 38:8, 45:14, 45:17 \\
\hline 71:23, & & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} & moment [2] - 68:5, & \[
46: 4,47: 13,49: 1
\] \\
\hline 11 & & & & \[
52: 11,53: 20,55: 4
\] \\
\hline 122:24, 149:24 & & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} & 97:1 & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{63:24, 66:14, 71:14,
\[
76: 10,77: 24,78: 18
\]} \\
\hline in [3]-59:9 & & &  & \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 124:2, } 152: 7 \\
& \text { main }[9]-6: 15,25: 8,
\end{aligned}
\]} & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& 38: 24,39: 20,39: 23 \\
& 42: 6,57: 6,122: 6
\end{aligned}
\]} & mentioned [2] - & 119:17, 120:5, 120:6, & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{104:8, 105:6, 105:16,} \\
\hline & & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
95: 15,158: 8
\]} & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} & \\
\hline 28:3 & & & & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 107:12, 118:21, } \\
& \text { 120:4, 126:10, }
\end{aligned}
\]} \\
\hline 139:6, 154 & & merger [1] - 101:10 & & \\
\hline 156:25, 18 & & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{money [2] - 183:16,} & 126:19, 128:8, \\
\hline maint & & & & 128:11, 131:7, \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{106:20
major} & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& 151: 15,151: 22, \\
& 151: 25,153: 15,
\end{aligned}
\]} & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} & month [3] - 15:22 & 133:23, 138:16 \\
\hline & & & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
29: 9,51: 19
\]} & 139:20, 146:12 \\
\hline 167:8 & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 151: 25,153: 15, \\
& \text { 153:25, 154:2, 154:4, }
\end{aligned}
\] & 164:5 & & 155:7, 155:8, 155:16, \\
\hline d & & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{methods [1] -} & 24:6, 28:1, 101:16 & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{165:11, 174:3,} \\
\hline ke.. [1] - 7 & & & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\begin{tabular}{l}
moot [1] - 34:4 \\
Moreover [2] - 95:5,
\end{tabular}} & \\
\hline malar & & microphone [2] - & & 180:12 \\
\hline 115:21 & & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { microphone [2] - } \\
& \text { 182:8, 183:7 }
\end{aligned}
\] & Moreover [2] - 95:5, & MOTION [2] - 43:12, \\
\hline MALE [3]-30:18,
30:21, 41:18 & & microphone) [1] - & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{Morning [1] - 125:14 morning [25]-6:11,} & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { MOTION [2] - 43:12, } \\
& \text { 150:19 }
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline man [1] - 53:1 & & 174:8 & & \[
150: 19
\]
MOTIONS [2] - \\
\hline \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{\multirow[t]{9}{*}{\begin{tabular}{l|l} 
map [4]-46:21, & 11 \\
46:22, 82:7, 132:14 & \(174: 21,169: 2,174: 15\), \\
maps \([2]-157: 15\), & \multicolumn{1}{|c}{ mean [20] - 22:5, } \\
173:5 & \(23: 8,45: 25,71: 9\), \\
March [1]-19:9 & \(71: 13,72: 2,76: 9\), \\
marginal [3] - & \(76: 13,76: 16,83: 5\), \\
145:18, 145:24 & \(88: 6,98: 21,114: 24\), \\
MARIA [4]-43:7, & \(115: 4,116: 6,116: 16\), \\
\(58: 7,123: 7,150: 7\) & \(119: 19,135: 16\),
\end{tabular}}} & \multirow[t]{9}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \operatorname{mid}_{[1]}-160: 4 \\
& \text { midst }[1]-111: 15 \\
& \text { might }[15]-9: 13, \\
& 14: 9,15: 2,20: 9, \\
& 25: 18,30: 13,31: 25, \\
& 51: 15,69: 3,82: 23, \\
& 83: 11,97: 23,115: 25, \\
& 116: 1,161: 7 \\
& \text { mind }[6]-9: 4,
\end{aligned}
\]} & 6 & 58:16, 123:13 \\
\hline & & & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 40: 12,45: 5,45: 1 \\
& 53: 6,61: 6,61: 14
\end{aligned}
\] & motions [28]-18:23, \\
\hline & & & & 19:1, 29:7, 29:2 \\
\hline & & & & 30:13, 30:18, 31: \\
\hline & & & \[
64
\] & 31:3, 32:14, 64:24, \\
\hline & & & & 65:24, 69:7, 70:2, \\
\hline & & & \[
153: 6,15
\] & 70:3, 70:12, 71:17 \\
\hline & & & 153.6, 154 & 72:15, 75:12, 75:23, \\
\hline & & & & 2, 107:1, 107:11, \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\(114: 15,116: 23\),
\(117: 8,117: 13,126: 7\),
\(168: 23\) 168:23
Motions [2] - 76:21, 168:22
move [9]-17:2,
19:20, 28:5, 69:12, 105:11, 116:8, 140:23, 170:8, 171:9
Move [1] - 20:20
moved [6] - 36:5,
36:6, 36:10, 128:23, 157:4, 157:5 moves [1]-17:6 moving [11] - 10:18, 10:19, 17:3, 21:7, 21:24, 25:9, 97:5, 104:11, 120:20, 120:21, 185:9
MR [249] - 6:18, 6:22,
7:1, 7:6, 7:7, 7:13, 7:17, 7:20, 11:12, 11:14, 11:20, 13:1, 13:21, 15:20, 15:23, 16:8, 16:20, 17:10, 17:14, 20:22, 21:1, 21:20, 22:11, 22:14, 22:18, 23:5, 23:7, 23:17, 23:20, 23:22, 23:25, 24:2, 24:4, 25:15, 26:16, 26:18, 26:20, 27:2, 27:5, 27:11, 27:21, 27:24, 28:2, 28:18, 28:20, 29:5, 29:7, 29:12, 29:21, 30:13, 30:16, 31:1, 31:6, 31:7, 31:9, 31:10, 31:12, \(34: 4,34: 11,34: 16\), 34:21, 34:24, 35:1, \(35: 3,35: 5,35: 8\), 35:11, 35:16, 35:19, \(35: 22,35: 25,36: 3\), \(36: 5,37: 17,38: 1\), \(38: 4,38: 6,38: 8\), 38:12, 38:17, 38:20, 38:22, 40:6, 41:4, 41:6, 45:5, 45:12, 45:22, 45:24, 46:3, 46:4, 46:10, 46:12, 46:15, 49:20, 51:16, 52:3, 52:18, 53:15, 53:23, 54:5, 54:8, 54:17, 54:20, 54:23, 55:2, 55:6, 55:19, 55:21, 55:23, 56:1, 61:9, 61:14, 62:13, 63:4, 63:11, 63:19, 63:23, 64:2, 64:6, 64:10, 64:12, 64:18, 65:3, 65:7, 66:4, 68:3, 69:20, 69:24,

70:25, 74:21, 84:3, 88:1, 88:6, 88:13, 88:19, 88:22, 89:18, 89:22, 90:3, 90:10, 93:12, 94:23, 94:25, 97:18, 97:24, 101:20, 101:22, 103:14,
104:3, 104:7, 105:13, 105:22, 106:4, 106:9, 106:13, 107:8, 111:9, 112:1, 114:19, 114:25, 115:5, 115:9, 115:12, 115:15, 115:18, 117:19, 118:4, 118:11, 118:16, 118:21, 118:25, 119:3, 119:5, 119:10, 119:12, 120:2, 120:6, 120:8, 120:10, 120:19, 120:23, 121:3, 121:5, 125:18, 126:1, 127:12, 127:15, 127:23, 128:7, 131:24, 135:24, 140:3, 140:11, 140:13, 140:15, 141:20, 141:22, 142:5, 153:10, 153:12, 154:6, 154:10, 154:18, 154:22, 155:12, 155:18, 156:5, 169:9, 171:2, 171:8, 172:20, 172:25, 173:2, 174:2, 174:10, 174:12, 174:15, 174:19,
174:21, 174:24, 175:2, 175:7, 175:9, 178:21, 179:9, 181:3, 181:6, 181:15, 181:19, 182:2, 182:6, 182:13, 182:15, 182:19, 183:2, 183:4, 183:9, 183:11, 183:12, 183:15, 183:19, 183:21, 184:7, 184:10, 185:8, 185:15, 185:18, 185:20
MS [170] - 6:20, 7:9, 7:11, 8:6, 8:11, 8:15, 9:2, 11:10, 12:15, 12:20, 12:23, 17:18, 21:8, 22:1, 22:9, 22:13, 22:15, 22:19, 24:9, 24:23, 24:25, 25:3, 25:5, 25:10, 25:12, 25:22, 25:25, 26:3, 26:5, 26:8, 26:11, 26:14, 27:14, 27:23, 27:25, 28:19,

28:23, 29:1, 29:16, 30:1, 30:4, 30:7, \(31: 3,37: 15,39: 22\), \(40: 13,40: 16,40: 20\), 40:24, 41:13, 45:6, 45:7, 45:16, 46:8, 46:18, 51:21, 51:24, 52:6, 52:20, 52:22, 54:2, 54:10, 54:24, 55:9, 55:14, 55:16, 61:11, 61:18, 61:24, 62:3, 62:6, 62:8, 62:11, 62:16, 62:20, 62:21, 62:24, 63:3, 65:5, 65:10, 65:12, 65:14, 65:23, 68:11, 68:14, 69:17, 75:9, 75:14, 76:6, 76:8, 76:25, 77:7, 86:12, 86:14, 87:1, 87:3, 87:13, 87:19, 88:15, 89:11, 98:6, 103:8, 103:13, 103:16, 103:20, 104:1, 106:3, 106:5, 114:9, 114:24, 115:3, 115:6, 116:6, 117:2, 117:5, 117:21, 118:2, 118:9, 118:14, 119:15, 119:19, 120:1, 120:15, 120:17, 120:25, 125:16, 125:20, 125:24, 126:3, 126:6, 126:10, 127:1, 127:4, 127:7, 127:24, 128:2, 128:4, 136:1, 139:24, 142:2, 147:6, 147:20, 147:24, 153:17, 153:24, 154:1, 154:15, 155:23, 156:1, 156:3, 161:24, 169:6, 171:14, 171:15, 173:14, 178:10, 179:4, 179:8, 179:14, 181:22, 183:22, 184:2, 184:13, 184:17, 184:20, 184:24, 185:2, 185:5, 185:10, 185:13
multiple [2]-73:8,
137:21
mundane [1] -
116:21
must [3] - 67:9, 90:3, 107:2
mustard [2] - 52:12, 52:25
mutters [1] - 114:22
MVC [2] - 107:2,
107:4
\begin{tabular}{|c} 
\\
\(\mathbf{N}\) \\
\\
name [1] - 39:1 \\
Name [4] - 42:16, \\
\(57: 16,122: 16\), \\
\(149: 16\) \\
naming [1] - 25:18 \\
narrow [4] - 67:2, \\
\(67: 3,83: 13,156: 16\) \\
narrowly [1] - 163:1 \\
nature [2] - 70:1, \\
\(77: 17\) \\
near [3] - 6:4, 125:4, \\
166:1 \\
neat [2] - 67:17, \\
\(105: 17\) \\
necessarily [1] - \\
\(72: 5\)
\end{tabular}
necessary [8] - 9:13, 12:21, 32:9, 32:15, 135:1, 140:25, 143:7 necessity [52] 15:7, 31:23, 33:10, 37:7, 46:20, 47:15, 47:18, 47:21, 55:12, 66:9, 73:1, 73:23, 75:5, 86:7, 87:4, 87:12, 87:23, 91:22, 94:20, 95:6, 96:6, 96:25, 97:16, 98:17, 99:24, 100:16, 101:18, 106:21, 112:8, 112:13, 112:17, 113:5, 113:10, 113:12, 130:24, 131:15, 133:15, 134:14, 137:10, 158:25, 164:7, 166:15, 167:3, 175:14, 175:21, 175:23, 177:15, 177:18, 177:25, 179:17, 180:1, 184:14

\section*{Necessity's [1] -}

53:13
need [43]-9:14, 10:21, 13:21, 19:22, 20:1, 20:5, 24:20, 32:19, 41:10, 54:15, 54:25, 68:19, 68:20, 69:13, 69:14, 71:6, \(74: 5,80: 19,89: 12\), 114:11, 115:3, 115:4, 116:7, 116:8, 117:7, 118:10, 130:10, 135:20, 136:1, 136:19, 136:25, 137:3, 138:10, 139:7, 139:17, 141:13, 144:25, 165:24,

178:3, 178:8, 180:11, 180:18
needed [3] - 85:1, 130:14, 136:12
needs [11] - 26:5,
32:21, 52:6, 52:9,
52:22, 55:16, 90:21,
136:6, 159:7, 159:8
neglects [1] - 162:14
network [1] - 88:9
never [18]-9:3,
76:9, 85:3, 89:3,
91:15, 112:21,
113:10, 113:17, 113:22, 132:15, 133:12, 145:16, 145:18, 146:3,
146:13, 176:20, 177:16
new [21]-23:2,
23:12, 31:15, 41:18, 113:17, 132:1, 132:23, 133:5, 133:6, 133:20, 138:13, 139:3, 146:8, 146:9, 147:1, 160:7, 160:8, 160:17, 163:14,
177:12
newly [2] - 92:21, 113:20
Next [2] - 114:19,
137:4
next [18]-8:23,
14:20, 20:7, 20:11,
21:17, 43:14, 55:3,
58:18, 69:9, 74:16,
86:1, 101:16, 116:16,
116:21, 121:5,
123:15, 150:22,
158:16
next. [1]-21:5
nice [1] - 174:16
Nicholas [7]-6:18,
44:2, 59:2, 61:9,
151:2, 153:10,
153:12
Nick [11] - 22:25,
23:16, 45:5, 65:2,
87:24, 114:18,
117:25, 172:19,
180:25, 183:1
Nick's [1] - 66:3
night [3]-70:6,
108:1, 118:22
NIMBY [1] - 102:5
nobody [3] - 85:3,
102:21, 129:15
nobody's [1] - 12:11

\section*{Nobody's [1] -}

143:11
none [2]-26:8,
\[
2-203
\]
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline \[
135: 16
\] & 0 & 123:4, 123:10, 150:3, & 113:5, 115:24, & \[
89: 25,90: 12,90: 14
\] \\
\hline \multirow[t]{6}{*}{\begin{tabular}{l}
None [4] - 43:2, \\
58:2, 123:2, 150:2 \\
nontribal [1] - 94:11 \\
normal [1] - 108:12 \\
north [1] - 157:18 \\
Northampton [4] - \\
42:19, 57:19, 122:19,
\end{tabular}} & & 0:1 & & \\
\hline & o'clock [6] - 30:3, & 150:15, 150:15 & 134:8, 135:2, 137:1, & 108:21, 111:15, \\
\hline & 30:9, 40:22, 70:6, & 150:20 & 140:18, 141:16, & 117:12, 117:16, \\
\hline & 108:1, 118:22 & of.. [2]-29:13, 63:14 & 142:11, 143:13, & 130:17, 133:23, \\
\hline & o'clock's [1] - 41:2 & offer [4] - 111:17 & 144:1, 144:19, & 137:14, 140:6, 143:6, \\
\hline & O'KEEFE [1] - & 140:24, 147:13, & 146:20, 146:25, & 158:21, 158:23, \\
\hline \[
149: 19
\] & 150:16 & 147:17 & \[
156: 25,158: 16,
\] & 162:17, 164:3, 165:6, \\
\hline not.. [1] - 64:2 notation [1] - & oath [1] - 110:13 & \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { offered [5] - 68:25, } \\
\text { 105:1, 106:9, 106:10, }
\end{gathered}
\] & 162:3, 164:10, & 169:15, 169:18, \\
\hline note [6] - 48:10, & object [6]-17:23, & 142:8 & 164:20, 166:6, & 169:21, 170:8, \\
\hline 48:21, 61:20, 82:25, & 20:14, 83:18, 97:6, & offering [2] - 108:21, & 170:24, 179:7, 181:1, & 175:10, 177:13, \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 162:25, 164:25 } \\
& \text { noted }[3]-82: 16,
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 126:22, 140:8 } \\
& \text { objected }[3]-66: 18,
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 109: 9 \\
& \text { offers [1] - 144:10 }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 182:20 } \\
& \text { one's [2] - 105:19, }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 178:22, 178:24, } \\
& \text { 180:2, 180:3, 180:5, }
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 91:12, 107:10 } \\
& \text { notes [2]-145:24, }
\end{aligned}
\] & 71:10, 164:15 objecting [2] - & office [1] - 64:4 Office [6] - 42:8, & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 136:14 } \\
& \text { one-day [1] - 166:6 }
\end{aligned}
\] & 184:25 ordered [5] - 9:9, \\
\hline \begin{tabular}{l}
180:5 \\
noteworthy
\end{tabular} & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 70:15, 77:14 } \\
& \text { objection [15] - }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 57: 8,59: 21,122: 8, \\
& 149: 8,152: 3
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { ones [6] - 71:10, } \\
80: 4,80: 25,120: 20,
\end{gathered}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 9: 23,49: 3,130: 20 \\
& 131: 16
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline 82:4 & 18:13, 66:11, 67:5, & OFFICE [1] - 150:15 & 127:21, 168:21 & orderly [1] - 170:6 \\
\hline nothing [16]-37:20, & 67:7, 67:25, 75:24, & OFFICER [3] - 6:2, & Oop [1] - 143:17 & orders [4] - 89:19, \\
\hline 48:16, 74:13, 83:9, & 77:15, 77:18, 80:7, & 16:16, 125:2 & Oops [2] - 28:22, & 140:7, 140:20, 141:5 \\
\hline 84:3, 90:11, 94:1, & \[
83: 6,83: 15,83: 16
\] & officer [1] - 16:6 & \[
155: 11
\] & original [3]-114: \\
\hline 108:17, 108:18, & 129:13 & \begin{tabular}{l}
official [5] - 145:19, \\
145.20, 145.22
\end{tabular} & \[
87: 20,95: 2,97: 2
\] & originally [3] - \\
\hline 141:6, 142:2, 169:15, & objections [26] - & \[
146: 5,146: 7
\] & \[
98: 2,98: 3,98: 8
\] & \[
10: 17,72: 18,164: 3
\] \\
\hline \begin{tabular}{l}
178:18 \\
Nothing [3]-19:14,
\end{tabular} & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 9: 19,24: 12,26: 9, \\
& 27: 6,27: 9,27: 17
\end{aligned}
\] & Ogletree [1] - 51:18 old [5]-17:11, & operating [1]-9:7 operation [1]-51:17 & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { Orleans [4]-44:10, } \\
& 59: 13,124: 10,
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline \[
41: 18,94: 2
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 29:17, 66:16, 66:22, } \\
& 67: 6,67: 18,67: 19,
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
39: 13,51: 15,173: 5
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { opinion [2] - 16:9, } \\
& \text { 171:7 }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 151:13 } \\
& \text { otherwise }[6]-12: 7,
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline 109:10, 134:15, & 67:24, 69:10, 69:13, & ON [3] - 150:19 & opponents [2]- & 42:13, 57:13, 122:13, \\
\hline 176:15, 185:11 & 70:5, 70:7, 70:9, & \[
150: 20,150: 20
\] & 105:23, 118:17 & 149:13, 170:10 \\
\hline noticed [2] - 65:4, & 70:17, 72:11, 77:17, & on.. [1] - 155:20 & opportunity [15] - & \[
\text { ought }[4]-52: 18,
\] \\
\hline \[
145: 10
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 80: 18,120: 24 \\
& \text { 129:14, 140:15, }
\end{aligned}
\] & once [17] - 10:22, & \[
10: 13,10: 16,12: 20
\]
\[
27: 19,33: 11,39: 17,
\] & \[
85: 25,112: 3,173: 11
\] \\
\hline \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { notion [ } \\
\text { 100:23, } 1
\end{gathered}
\] & \[
142: 19
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 19: 15,20: 6,20: 16, \\
& 73: 8,91: 1,91: 6,
\end{aligned}
\] & 70:9, 71:11, 71:15, & \[
55: 10,61: 7
\] \\
\hline November [5] - 24:8, & \begin{tabular}{l}
objects [1] - 81:17 \\
observations [1] -
\end{tabular} & 91:9, 91:19, 92:6, & 71:19, 109:13, & outcome [8] - 42:14, \\
\hline 42:17, 57:17, 122:17, & observations [1] -
101:22 & 113:16, 114:22, & 119:21, 133:6, & 57:14, 105:17,
122:14. 149:14 \\
\hline 149:17 & \begin{tabular}{l}
101:22 \\
obtaining [1] - 26:21
\end{tabular} & \[
116: 20,130: 3,139: 7,
\]
\[
145: 5,183: 7
\] & \[
171: 15,185: 5
\]
opposing [2] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 122: 14,149: 14 \\
& 170: 19,171: 25
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { nowhere [1] } \\
& \text { 106:14 }
\end{aligned}
\] & obvious [1] - 82:8 & \[
145: 5,183:
\] & \[
65: 16,135: 8
\] & 174:7 \\
\hline nuisance [4]-14:12, & obviously [6] & 13:6, 23:2, 25:15, & opposition [10] - & overburdening [1] - \\
\hline 19:7, 19:11, 31:8 & 10:13, 81:13, 83:5, & 28:20, 32:9, 38:20, & 71:20, 72:1, 105:5, & 68:12 \\
\hline number [25] - 11:17, & 89:23, 133:11, 143:4 & 59:21, 65:13, 66:5, & 109:17, 109:18, & overcome [9]- \\
\hline 12:7, 13:1, 13:24, & Obviously [1] - & 111:25, 152:3 & 128:12, 128:13, & \[
31: 22,73: 11,73: 24,
\] \\
\hline 14:8, 14:13, 14:15, & 81:10 & one [81]-10:11, & 128:14, 128:15, & \[
73: 25,74: 9,135: 10
\] \\
\hline 18:1, 18:7, 18:21, & occasion [1] - 98:23 & \[
11: 17,12: 13,12: 24
\] & 131:6 & 160:25, 161:15, \\
\hline 19:7, 61:2, 61:4, & \begin{tabular}{l}
occasions [1] - \\
\(166 \cdot 13\)
\end{tabular} & 14:16, 16:21, 21:17, & oppositions [1] - & 161:16 \\
\hline \[
68: 16,68: 17,83: 18
\] & 166:13 & 23:9, 23:10, 26:23, & 23:24 & overlook [2] - 88:7, 88:8 \\
\hline 86:18, 88:7, 108:8,
\[
125: 9,137: 1,153: 2
\] & \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { occurred }[8]-95: 2 \\
97: 4,105: 2,110: 11,
\end{gathered}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 27: 4,28: 20,32: 11 \\
& 33: 25,34: 23,35: 10
\end{aligned}
\] & \begin{tabular}{l}
option [1] - 137:1 \\
OR [1] - 16:16
\end{tabular} & 88:8 overruled [3] - \\
\hline \[
156: 20,157: 21 \text {, }
\] & 113:17, 132:15, & \[
35: 17,36: 12,37: 8,
\] & Or.. [2] - 62:18, & 90:24, 91:15, 112:21 \\
\hline 180:15 & 134:2, 134:17 & 39:20, 41:20, 49:22, & 126:25 & overwhelmed [1] - \\
\hline numbered [2] - 83:2, & Ocean [6]-49:25 & 50:16, 52:1, 52:24, & or.. [1] - 34:20 & 160:7 \\
\hline 137:9 & 50:8, 51:12, 179:16, & 63:1, 66:12, 67:17, & oral [6]-51:13, 52:1, & own [10]-22:22, \\
\hline numbers [4]-54:17, & 181:8, 181:16 & 69:1, 70:4, 74:10, & 130:1, 160:23, 177:6, & 23:4, 23:6, 26:12, \\
\hline 54:19, 156:21, & ocean [2]-14:5, & 76:11, 76:23, 77:22, & 177:9 & 47:1, 50:12, 112:17, \\
\hline 157:11 & 50:15 & \[
79: 19,80: 17,82: 14
\] & order [45] - 28:8, & 113:11, 158:5, \\
\hline numerous [2] - & October [1]-24:8 & 82:18, 82:25, 83:7, & 49:3, 49:11, 53:3, & 170:14 \\
\hline & OF [18] - 43:3, 43:4, & 84:4, 88:19, 91:8, & 64:25, 71:1, 73:4, & owned [16] - 50:13, \\
\hline & 43:10, 58:3, 58:4 & 96:7, 98:22, 104:13, & 86:15, 86:24, 86:25, & 78:6, 98:16, 112:7, \\
\hline & 58:10, 58:14, 123:3, & 108:13, 108:14, & & 112:14, 134:17, \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline & & & & \multirow[t]{12}{*}{```
106:18, 106:21,
163:24
    plaintiffs... [1] -
107:12
    plan [7]-41:11,
80:13, 85:6, 131:8,
131:11, 131:18,
132:8
    plane [1] - 63:11
    plans [26]-11:21,
41:11, 79:13, 83:16,
83:23, 84:24, 85:11,
113:21, 113:24,
126:25, 127:20,
127:21, 131:4, 131:6,
131:10, 132:8,
138:14, 138:20,
138:21, 138:25,
145:14, 145:19,
146:1, 146:12,
146:20, 173:5
    play [1] - 156:13
    playing [1] - 68:21
    plead [3] - 32:24,
32:25
    pleaded [1] - 52:15
    pleading [2]-33:19,
167:23
    pleadings [9]-33:1,
33:25, 36:20, 104:12,
104:16, 105:8,
164:21, 176:10,
176:19
    plenty [1] - 75:20
    plot [1] - 82:6
    plowed [1]-63:10
    plus [1] - 45:9
    PM [9] - 38:4, 104:7,
104:17, 105:6,
105:18, 107:6,
121:12, 148:4, 182:8
    PM)to [1] - 119:6
    PO [11] - 44:10,
44:15, 59:9, 59:12,
60:4, 124:3, 124:9,
124:13, 151:13,
151:17, 152:8
    point [41] - 9:17,
10:1, 14:4, 19:9,
22:24, 24:14, 25:13,
26:3, 30:10, 33:23,
39:11, 46:19, 55:3,
55:9, 73:22, 75:16,
82:12, 86:12, 92:5,
92:16, 101:12,
103:23, 129:25,
133:18, 134:15,
135:21, 137:14,
137:24, 139:24,
145:11, 146:25,
157:10, 157:11,
158:7, 158:16,
```} \\
\hline 142:12, 156:22 & \multirow[t]{45}{*}{```
176:17, 182:25
    participate [1] - 56:2
    participated [1] -
182:3
    participating [1] -
111:5
    particular [22] -
47:5, 48:6, 48:7,
48:11, 49:22, 50:10,
54:14, 68:5, 74:10,
82:17, 95:13, 98:1,
99:23, 100:25,
104:19, 109:14,
128:21, 129:9,
130:11, 164:22,
175:11, 181:12
    Particularly [1] -
82:4
    particularly [7] -
81:5, 81:16, 82:10,
110:19, 132:4,
146:16, 167:25
    parties [51] - 6:2,
9:20, 11:5, 20:12,
20:14, 22:16, 23:24,
26:12, 32:9, 32:15,
32:22, 33:7, 39:3,
42:11, 57:11, 65:25,
67:12, 68:20, 69:14,
73:12, 73:16, 74:17,
83:10, 104:9, 107:25,
110:9, 111:16,
117:14, 122:11,
125:2, 138:4, 139:17,
149:11, 156:16,
156:20, 156:22,
158:17, 159:6,
162:11, 164:2,
164:12, 164:13,
164:23, 168:5,
168:11, 168:12,
168:16, 168:18,
176:15, 177:2,
177:19
    Parties [1] - 28:11
    parties' [2] - 37:8,
136:10
    partition [7] -
126:25, 127:17,
131:8, 132:13,
134:17, 134:25,
159:24
partly [1] - 38:25
partners [1] - 93:8
parts [4]-33:18,
84:11, 86:5, 108:15
party [5] - 16:2,
39:4, 65:16, 141:3,
146:14
passed [4] - 19:4,
19:5, 26:23, 93:3
```} & \multirow[t]{29}{*}{```
62:2, 168:24
    patched [3] - 16:19,
60:2, 64:16
    path [2]-18:15, 87:8
    Pause [4] - 13:20,
63:17, 64:15, 155:10
    paying [1] - 104:4
    PC[6] - 44:9, 59:12,
59:18, 124:8, 151:12,
151:20
    Peabody [3] - 44:3,
59:3, 151:3
    Pease [8] - 95:19,
132:8, 132:16,
134:18, 134:21,
159:16, 160:11,
160:18
    peat [2] - 161:2,
161:5
    pending [2] - 39:15,
181:2
    Pennsylvania [1] -
16:3
    people [18]-25:18,
37:16, 64:6, 93:5,
93:8, 95:10, 95:16,
97:7, 97:11, 97:12,
113:2, 133:8, 146:2,
170:14, 170:18,
173:7, 175:5, 178:2
    people's [1] - 65:25
    perfectly [2] - 88:8,
103:9
    perhaps [5] - 52:2,
69:3, 69:6, 156:3,
168:10
    period [6]-81:6,
100:3, 100:14,
177:12, 177:17
    permission [2] -
11:11, 115:10
    permits [1]-167:21
    person [4]-10:14,
26:20, 79:21, 112:8
    persons [1] - 50:25
    perspective [1] -
77:23
    persuasively [1] -
163:9
    pertain [1]-68:1
    pertinent [1]-81:25
    petition [5]-127:9,
132:13, 134:25,
159:23, 160:15
    phase [4]-18:2,
18:5, 49:12, 101:2
Philadelphia [1] -
26:18
phone [9] - 16:4,
16:17, 16:19, 44:12,
```} & 154:22 & \\
\hline 22 & & & phones [2]-6:7, & \\
\hline 166:25, 167:5, & & & 125:7 & \\
\hline 5: & & & phonetic [30]-7:3 & \\
\hline owner [1] - 166:12 & & & 11:17, 12:5, 12:6, & \\
\hline owners [3] - 48:18 & \multirow[t]{6}{*}{```
111:5
    particular [22] -
47:5, 48:6, 48:7,
48:11, 49:22, 50:10,
54:14, 68:5, 74:10,
82:17, 95:13, 98:1,
99:23, 100:25,
```} & \multirow[t]{3}{*}{\[
\begin{gathered}
63: 17,64: 15,155: 10 \\
\text { paying }[1]-104: 4 \\
\text { PC }[6]-44: 9,59: 12
\end{gathered}
\]} & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{12:10, 13:18, 14:1,
\[
14: 8,15: 2,17: 7
\]} & \\
\hline 93:8, 112:23 & & & & 132:8 \\
\hline ownership [3] - & & & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\begin{tabular}{l}
plane [1]-63:11 \\
plans [26]-11:21,
\end{tabular}} \\
\hline 83 & & 59:18, 124:8, 151:12, & & \\
\hline owns [3]-54 & & \[
151: 20
\] & & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& 41: 11,79: 13,83: 16 \\
& 83: 23,84: 24,85: 11
\end{aligned}
\]} \\
\hline 15 & & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
59: 3,151: 3
\]} & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{97:20, 104:7, 104:17,} & \\
\hline & & & & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 113: 21,113: 24 \\
& 126: 25,127: 20
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline & & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { Pease [8]-95:19, } \\
& 132: 8,132: 16
\end{aligned}
\] & \begin{tabular}{l}
105:6, 105:18, \\
154:10, 158:19,
\end{tabular} & 127:21, 131:4, 131:6, \\
\hline \multirow[b]{2}{*}{package [6]-9:10} & & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{134:18, 134:21,} & 183:6 & 131:10, 132:8, \\
\hline & & & phonetic) [1] - 183:8 & 138:14, 138:20, \\
\hline 10: & & \[
160: 18
\] & photograph [1] - & 138:21, 138:25, \\
\hline 8 & & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { peat }[2]-161: 2 \text {, } \\
& \text { 161:5 } \\
& \text { pending }[2]-39: 15 \text {, }
\end{aligned}
\]} & \[
80: 13
\] & 146:1, 146:12, \\
\hline [ [1] - 14 & & & \begin{tabular}{l}
phrase [1] - 138:6 \\
physical [1] - 80:19
\end{tabular} & \[
146: 20,173: 5
\] \\
\hline page [20]-43: & & & picked [1] - 156:7 & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { play [1] - 156:13 } \\
& \text { playing [1] - } 68: 21
\end{aligned}
\]} \\
\hline 54:17, & & & picture [1] - 51:18 & \\
\hline 74:22, 82:3, & & & piece [1]-85:8 & plead [3]-32:24, \\
\hline 5, 107: & & & \[
\text { pipe }[3]-14: 7,14: 8
\] & 32:25 \\
\hline 116:10 & & & Pittsfield [1] - 175:5 & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\begin{tabular}{l}
pleaded [1] - 52:15 \\
pleading [2] - 33:19,
\end{tabular}} \\
\hline 123:15, 127:8, & & & Place [2]-59:21, & \\
\hline 1 & & & 152:3 & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 167:23 } \\
& \text { pleadings [9] - 33:1, }
\end{aligned}
\]} \\
\hline 131:11, 150:22 & & & place [3]-95:18, & \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{pages [7]-46:9} & & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 170:14, 170:18, } \\
& \text { 173:7, 175:5, 178:2 }
\end{aligned}
\]} & \[
102: 10,138: 22
\] & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{33:25, 36:20, 104:12,
104:16, 105:8,} \\
\hline & & & placed [2] - 50:17, & \\
\hline 50:21, 54:9, 54:18 & & & \[
97: 25
\] & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 164:21, 176:10, } \\
& 176: 19
\end{aligned}
\]} \\
\hline 54:22, 127:18 & & & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{plainly [1] - 139:2} & \\
\hline 145:25 & & & & plenty [1] - 75:20 \\
\hline 58.2 & & & \[
45: 4,54: 14,61: 10,
\] & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { plot [1] - 82:6 } \\
& \text { plowed [1] - } 63: 10
\end{aligned}
\]} \\
\hline 58:2, 123:2, 150:2 & & & 66:3, 137:19, 153:13, & \\
\hline 1] - 17 & & & 157:2, 157:9, 163:22, & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { plus [1] - 45:9 } \\
& \text { PM [9] - } 38: 4,104: 7,
\end{aligned}
\]} \\
\hline paper [2] - 109:17 & & & 165:14, 180:13, & \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{109:18
papers [4]-24:24,} & & & \[
180: 19
\] & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 104:17, 105:6, } \\
& \text { 105:18, 107:6, }
\end{aligned}
\]} \\
\hline & & & plaintiff's [1] - & \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
128: 12,145: 3,159: 4
\] paragraph [1] -} & & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { permission [2] - } \\
& 11: 11,115: 10
\end{aligned}
\]} & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 144:23 } \\
& \text { Plaintiffs [5] - 43:8, }
\end{aligned}
\]} & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{gathered}
\text { 121:12, 148:4, 182:8 } \\
\text { PM)to [1] - 119:6 }
\end{gathered}
\]} \\
\hline & & & & \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} & & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 11:11, } 115: 10 \\
& \text { permits }[1]-167: 21
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { Plaintiffs [5]-43:8, } \\
58: 8,58: 12,123: 8,
\end{gathered}
\] & PO [11] - 44:10, \\
\hline & & & 150:8 & \multirow[b]{2}{*}{44:15, 59:9, 59:12, 60:4, 124:3, 124:9,} \\
\hline & 177:19 & \[
26: 20,79: 21,112: 8
\] & plaintiffs [40] - 6:19, & \\
\hline rcels & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { Parties [1] - 28:11 } \\
& \text { parties' [2] - 37:8, }
\end{aligned}
\]} & persons [1] - 50:25 & \[
9: 9,9: 22,10: 12,
\] & 124:13, 151:13, \\
\hline 91:21 & & perspective [1]- & 10:15, 12:17, 16:21, & 151:17, 152:8 \\
\hline Pardon [1]-172:21
part [39]-8:21, 8:23, & & 77:23 persuasively [1] - & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 19: 8,32: 21,37: 20 \\
& 46: 25,47: 20,48: 3
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
10: 1,14: 4,19: 9
\] \\
\hline 73:2, 75:2, 77:16, & & 163:9 & \[
48: 12,48: 23,49: 4
\] & 22:24, 24:14, 25:13, \\
\hline 78:6, 81:13, 84:13 & & pertain [1] - 68:1 & \[
49: 10,70: 4,72: 2,
\] & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} \\
\hline 84:16, 89:3, 90:7 & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{159:24} & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { pertinent }[1]-81: 25 \\
& \text { petition }[5]-127: 9 \text {, }
\end{aligned}
\]} & \[
73: 15,78: 19,98: 15
\] & \\
\hline 93:21, 93:22, 95:16, & & & 100:24, 101:7, 108:6, & 55:0, 73:22, 75:16 \\
\hline 95:25 & partly [1] - 38:25 & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { petition [5] - 127:9, } \\
& 132: 13,134: 25,
\end{aligned}
\] & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{118:17, 128:23,} & \\
\hline 100:20 & & \[
159: 23,160: 15
\] & & 82:12, 86:12, 92:5,
92:16, 101:12, \\
\hline 106:8, 113 & & & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 135: 5,147: 8,147: 11, \\
& 157: 24,164: 5,165: 1,
\end{aligned}
\] & 103:23, 129:25, \\
\hline & & & \[
165: 9,165: 17
\] & \\
\hline 145:20, 145:2 & & & 165:22, 170:13, & \\
\hline 147:2, 147:3, 147:9, & & & \begin{tabular}{l}
177:4, 179:19, 180:6 \\
plaintiffs' [6] -
\end{tabular} & \\
\hline & & & \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { plaintiffs' [6] - } \\
\text { 19:24, 82:1, } 87: 15,
\end{gathered}
\] & \\
\hline & & & 19.24, 82.1, 87.15, & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline 159:11, 160:23, & 71:13 & \[
142: 2,154: 15
\] & 94:11 & 164:16 \\
\hline 161:16, 175:20, & prescription [24]- & prima [2]-85:21, & Professor [1] - & [1] - 71:4 \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 179:11, 179:23 } \\
& \text { pointed }[4]-94: 14,
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 33: 10,46: 20,46: 23, \\
& 47: 7,47: 24,47: 25,
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 135:4 } \\
& \text { primary }[2]-77: 18
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{array}{|l|}
\hline 51: 18 \\
\text { proffering }
\end{array}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { proposition }[1] \text { - } \\
& \text { 138:8 }
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline 105:10, 109:14, & 48:12, 52:5, 52:13 & principally [2] & 108:13, 108:14, & prove [9]-73:25, \\
\hline \begin{tabular}{l}
144:13 \\
points [3] - 136:3
\end{tabular} & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 52: 15,52: 17,53: 13, \\
& 53: 14,54: 11,55: 11,
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 77: 3,164: 25 \\
& \text { printer }[1]-41: 2
\end{aligned}
\] & 108:18 profits [5] - 160:25, & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 74: 25,78: 20,93: 14 \\
& 93: 20,96: 12,144: 23,
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 142:5, 158:3 } \\
& \text { poor [2]-21:16, }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 66: 5,77: 22,84: 3, \\
& 87: 8,88: 2,89: 12,
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { private [2]-180:24, } \\
& \text { 181:23 }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 161:4, 161:19, 162:7, } \\
& \text { 162:16 }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 169:20, 169:22 } \\
& \text { proven }[1]-113: 2
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline 126:17 & 175:14, 177:10, & probate [6] - 92:20, & progress [1] & Provide [1] - 74:11 \\
\hline \begin{tabular}{l}
popped [1] - 155:4 \\
portions [1] - 39:7
\end{tabular} & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 184:12 } \\
& \text { prescriptive [24] - }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 127:9, 127:19, 134:4, } \\
& 135: 1,159: 24
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 169:25 } \\
& \text { prohibited }{ }_{[1]}-
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { provide [20] - 11:2, } \\
\text { 49:4, 71:16, 74:5, }
\end{gathered}
\] \\
\hline \begin{tabular}{l}
ports [1] - 37:11 \\
position [7]-15:6,
\end{tabular} & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 49:12, 89:23, 100:17, } \\
& \text { 102:15, 158:19, }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { probative [9] - } \\
80: 12,80: 15,81
\end{gathered}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 131:14 } \\
& \text { prohibits [1] - 130:5 }
\end{aligned}
\] & \begin{tabular}{l}
74:12, 80:21, 81:3, \\
93:15, 94:20, 96:13
\end{tabular} \\
\hline 17:14, 19:6, 33:7, & 159:1, 159:3, 159:7, & 82:12, 82:15, 82:18, & prompt \({ }_{[1]}\) - 178:18 & 96:23, 107:22, 109:2, \\
\hline 75:17, 79:4, 81:18 possession [8] - & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 163:25, 164:9, } \\
& \text { 164:17, 164:19, }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { 97:7, 100:6, 100:9 } \\
\text { problem [11] - }
\end{gathered}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { promptly [2] - 17:19, } \\
& \text { 147:17 }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 116: 25,117: 2,120: 2, \\
& 120: 3,120: 20,135: 9
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline 138:25, 171:22, & 165:4, 165:9, 165:21, & 17:10, 38:15, 41:1, & pronounces [1] - & 176 \\
\hline 172:2, 172:5, 172:8, & 166:7, 169:16, 170:2, & 47:23, 54:23, 70:14, & 7:3 & provided [14] - \\
\hline 172:15, 172:24, & 170:5, 170:12, & 76:8, 126:15, 144:2, & proof [15]-73:12, & 10:24, 15:15, 20:8, \\
\hline 178:11 & 172:23, 172:24 & 157:1, 185:8 & 73:15, 75:2, 78:19, & 22:20, 42:4, 57:4 \\
\hline possessory [3] - & 173:16, 175:24 & problems [2] & 90:8, 90:13, 91:17, & 70:16, 72:1, 80:23 \\
\hline 95:8, 95:10, 160:8 possibility [7] - & \[
\begin{array}{r}
\text { present }[7]-32: 17, \\
39: 18,54: 13,65: 17,
\end{array}
\] & \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { 118:8, 172:11 } \\
\text { procedural [1] }
\end{gathered}
\] & 101:6, 131:18, & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 122:4, 134:24, 149:4, } \\
& \text { 177:17, 180:10 }
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline 37:5, 39:19, 98:2, & 68:15, 87:21, 100:20 & 172 & 144:23, 147:13 & providing [1] - \\
\hline \[
\begin{array}{r}
98: 9,116: 18,142: 10 \\
\text { possible }[4]-14: 15,
\end{array}
\] & Present [1] - 64:20 presented [6] - & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { procedurally }[1] \text { - } \\
& \text { 172:16 }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 147:17, 164:5 } \\
& \text { proofs }[1]-102: 9
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 120:10 } \\
& \text { proxy }[2]-119: 4,
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline 17:12, 84:9, 171:25 possibly [9]-23:12, & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 25: 16,83: 17,156: 8, \\
& 159: 4,162: 20,
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { procedure }[5]- \\
19: 16,72: 21,12
\end{gathered}
\] & \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { proper }[7]-18: 20, \\
19: 16,36: 9,145: 24,
\end{gathered}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 119:8 } \\
& \text { public }_{[1]}-113: 2
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline 67:5, 79:14, 79:22, & 167:21 & 129:23, 180:18 & 170:9, 178:1, 181:19 & Puffer [1] - 49:23 \\
\hline 80:15, 83:12, 115:18, & presumably [3] - & Procedure [1] & properly [4]-79:6, & Pull \({ }_{[1]}\) - 180:3 \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 143:25 } \\
& \text { post }[1]-80: 10
\end{aligned}
\] & 97:15, 99:9, 100:9 presumed [1] - & \begin{tabular}{l}
\[
18: 12
\] \\
proceeded [1]
\end{tabular} & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 137: 16,168: 4, \\
& 171: 23
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { pull [3] - 9:23, 40:2, } \\
& \text { 179:24 }
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline post-1980 [1] - & 31:22 & 128:9 & properties [5] - 92:7, & pulled [1]-22:16 \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 79:12 } \\
& \text { post-dates }[1] \text { - }
\end{aligned}
\] & presuming [1] -
27:21 & \[
\begin{array}{r}
\text { proceeding [5] - } \\
11: 3,18: 9,105: 2,
\end{array}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 102:4, 102:14, } \\
& \text { 106:18, 134:7 }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { purports [1] - } \\
& \text { 104:11 }
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline \begin{tabular}{l}
80:10 \\
potential \({ }_{[1]}\) -
\end{tabular} & presumption [29] 73:8, 73:10, 73:11, & \begin{tabular}{l}
132:4, 138:4 \\
proceedings
\end{tabular} & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { property [25] - } \\
& \text { 11:23, 13:11, 13:12, }
\end{aligned}
\] & purpose [1] - 94:11 purposes [7] - \\
\hline 133:24 & 73:22, 74:8, 85:12 & 16:7, 18:8, 42:5, & 13:23, 39:25, 50:5, & 87:21, 100:21, \\
\hline power [1] - 36:19 & 85:15, 85:18, 85:19, & 49:12, 57:5, 101:11, & 66:6, 72:23, 72:24, & 101:15, 105:24, \\
\hline Powers [3]-127:22, & 85:23, 86:7, 86:8, & 122:5, 149:5, 176:21 & 73:8, 73:19, 73:21, & 137:9, 146:9, 160:23 \\
\hline 138:16, 145:21 & 91:11, 91:20, 94:9, & process [16]-8:12, & 91:1, 91:19, 94:9, & pursuant [2]-49:10, \\
\hline pppegp@verizon. & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 96: 13,99: 11,99: 12, \\
& 99: 14,99: 16,101: 7,
\end{aligned}
\] & \begin{tabular}{l}
\[
8: 23,9: 18,9: 22,
\] \\
20:16, 26.21, 93:5
\end{tabular} & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 97: 12,102: 22, \\
& \text { 103:18, 112:25, }
\end{aligned}
\] & 167:21 \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { net }[4]-42: 23,57: 23 \text {, } \\
& 122: 23,149: 23
\end{aligned}
\] & 99:14, 99:16, 101:7,
139:5, 139:10, & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 20:16, 26:21, 93:5, } \\
& 95: 17,108: 16,
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 103:18, 112:25, } \\
& \text { 113:3, 134:17, }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{array}{|c}
\text { pursue }[5]-18: 19, \\
49: 15,111: 7,126: 23,
\end{array}
\] \\
\hline practical [1]-66:15 & \[
144: 25,145: 2,145: 5
\] & \[
126: 22,128: 18
\] & \[
134: 19,142: 1
\] & \[
\begin{array}{|l|}
\hline 49: 15, \\
180: 22
\end{array}
\] \\
\hline prearrangement [1] & \[
145: 12,161: 15
\] & 129:3, 136:4, 136:8, & 181:11, 182:4 & push [2]-34:16 \\
\hline - 63:25 & Presumptions [1] 85:16 & 143:16, 147:9 & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { proponent [2] } \\
& 75: 4,135: 6
\end{aligned}
\] & 184:4 \\
\hline \begin{tabular}{l}
preceding [1] - 19:4 \\
predated [1]-81:5 \\
predecessor [1] -
\end{tabular} & \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { pretrial }[7]-15: 21, \\
24: 14,24: 21,25: 5,
\end{gathered}
\] & 92:24
\[
\text { produce }[3] \text { - 17:22, }
\] & proponent's \({ }_{[1]}\) 74:24 & \[
\begin{array}{r}
\text { put }[34]-9: 9,9: 15, \\
16: 4,17: 22,19: 17,
\end{array}
\] \\
\hline 48:6 predecessors [1] - & \[
\begin{gathered}
25: 6,129: 21,142: 25 \\
\text { pretty }[2]-91: 7,
\end{gathered}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 108:24, 109:8 } \\
& \text { produced [4] - }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { proponents [6] - } \\
78: 19,90: 8,91: 18,
\end{gathered}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 20:14, 28:14, 30:13, } \\
& 32: 22,39: 6,39: 7,
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline 48:2
prejudicial [1] - & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 117:25 } \\
& \text { preview }[1]-18: 16
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 45: 25,51: 5,108: 22 \\
& 111: 1
\end{aligned}
\] & 93:14, 96:12, 96:15 propose [2] - 20:7, & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 40: 11,53: 5,65: 1 \\
& 66: 22,67: 17,67: 22,
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline 126:21 & \begin{tabular}{l}
previously [4] - \\
19:8, 78:6, 166:13,
\end{tabular} & producing [2] & 116:16 & 71:15, 79:4, 96:15, \\
\hline prendre [4] - 160:25, & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 19:8, 78:6, 166:13, } \\
& \text { 175:19 }
\end{aligned}
\] & 108:16, 109:1 & \begin{tabular}{l}
proposed [12] - \\
11:7, 17:24, 26:12,
\end{tabular} & \begin{tabular}{l}
\[
97: 2,102: 2,103: 2 \text {, }
\] \\
109:6, 111:21, 113:9
\end{tabular} \\
\hline 161:4, 162:7, 162:16 prepare \([2]-70: 10\), & Price [4] - 124:15, & \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { production }[4] \text { - } \\
51: 6,135: 5,135: 18,
\end{gathered}
\] & \begin{tabular}{l}
11:7, 17:24, 26:12, \\
27:18, 31:4, 72:2,
\end{tabular} & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 109:6, 111:21, 113:9, } \\
& \text { 120:4, 132:6, 132:21, }
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline 71:19 & 126:4, 151:23, & 160:24 & 74:1, 77:13, 77:19, & 146:15, 177:5, 177:7, \\
\hline prepared [2] - 26:24, & \begin{tabular}{l}
154:16 \\
PRICE [3] - 126:3,
\end{tabular} & & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\[
2-206
\]
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline putting [1] - 85:2 & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { Rappaport [34] - } \\
& 7: 13,34: 9,36: 5, \\
& 37: 13,44: 13,44: 14
\end{aligned}
\]} & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& 151: 7,152: 9,153: 19 \\
& \text { 154:23, 157:3, 157:6, } \\
& 157: 8,157: 12
\end{aligned}
\]} & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 153:8, 156:9, 163:5, } \\
& \text { 169:1, 171:21, } \\
& 172: 10,176: 7
\end{aligned}
\]} & \multirow[t]{3}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { relevancy }[1]-67: 25 \\
& \text { relevant }[39]-9: 16, \\
& 11: 2,17: 23,65: 19, \\
& 66: 23,67: 19,67: 23,
\end{aligned}
\]} \\
\hline & & & & \\
\hline \multirow[b]{3}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { quality [1] - 126:17 } \\
& \text { quarter [2] - 63:7, } \\
& \text { 118:13 }
\end{aligned}
\]} & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 45: 10,46: 2,60: 3 \\
& 60: 3,61: 21,63: 6
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 157: 22,163: 20 \\
& 163 \cdot 21 \quad 165 \cdot 2
\end{aligned}
\] & orded [1] - 35: & \\
\hline & 60:3, 61:21, 63:6, 64:14, 64:16, 74:19 & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 163 \\
& 166
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
57: 4,122: 4
\] & 9:6, 70:19, \\
\hline & 77:2, 78:16, 90:1 & realty [1]-47: & records [5] - 145:19, & \[
79: 12,80: 1,81: 4
\] \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 118:13 } \\
& \text { quarters [1] }-69: 20
\end{aligned}
\]} & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 103:23, 104:2, } \\
& \text { 109:17, 110:6, 111:8, }
\end{aligned}
\]} & reason [11] - 13:5 & 146:4, 146:5, 146:7, & 82:12, 82:18, 89:2 \\
\hline & & 13:10, 81:8, 84:6, & 146: & 96:9, 97:6, 99:21 \\
\hline questions [14]- & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 109:17, 110:6, 111:8, } \\
& \text { 124:11, 124:12, }
\end{aligned}
\] & 85:10, 100:1, 102:8 & uce [1] - 115:16 & 99:25, 100:1 \\
\hline \[
27: 5,82: 22,95: 9
\] & 126:1, 138:23, 140:2, & 102:19, 164 & fer [2] - 48:2 & 100:22, 101:14 \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& 95: 12,95: 23,105: 23, \\
& 106: 7,108: 10,111: 2,
\end{aligned}
\]} & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 142:18, 151:16, } \\
& \text { 151:16, 154:6, 182:6, }
\end{aligned}
\]} & 166:19, 171:3 & 54:18 & 104:22, 105:2, \\
\hline & & soning [1] & fer & 105:10, 108:15 \\
\hline & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\begin{tabular}{l}
182:14 \\
Rappaport's [2] -
\end{tabular}} & 181: & 47:11, 48:13, 81:2 & 109:2, 109:5, 109:1 \\
\hline \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { 129:6, 129:20, 134:8 } \\
\text { quick [9]-71:18, }
\end{gathered}
\] & & reasons [8] - 13:6 & 145:18, 162:17, & 129:1, 135:17, \\
\hline 72:7, 106:12, 111:25, & \begin{tabular}{l}
rate [1] - 117:21 \\
Rather [1] - 143:20
\end{tabular} & \[
79: 19,111: 2
\] & referenced [1] & relied [2] - 47:5, \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& 162: 25,172: 4 \\
& 172: 21,173: 17 \\
& \text { quicker }[1]-115: 17
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { Rather [1]-143:20 } \\
& \text { rather }[3]-30: 4,
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 115: 25,116: 1 \\
& \text { rebut }[3]-85: 19
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
138: 13
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 178:21 } \\
& \text { relies [2] - 52:23, }
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline \begin{tabular}{l}
quicker [1]-115:17 \\
quickest [2]-185:4,
\end{tabular} & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 68:19, 163:22 } \\
& \text { rationale }[1]-170: 9
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{gathered}
85: 23,86: 9 \\
\text { rebuts [1] - }
\end{gathered}
\] & 162:22 & 55:17 \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{185:7} & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { re [2]-32:20, 32:25 } \\
& \text { re-plead [1] - 32:25 }
\end{aligned}
\]} & rebuttable [2] & referring [2] - 33:18, & \[
49: 16,52: 4,53: 17
\] \\
\hline & & 85:16, 96:13 & \[
52: 24
\] & 54:11, 54:15 \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\(17: 12,28: 6,29: 5\),
\(54: 3,75: 9,179: 1\)} & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\begin{tabular}{l}
re-rule [1] - 32:20 \\
reach [4]-9:3, 69:4,
\end{tabular}} & rebuttal [2] - 136:12 & refers [2]-114: & relying [6] - 50:5 \\
\hline & & 140:24 & 167:6 & 50:12, 50:14, 50:20 \\
\hline \[
\begin{array}{r}
54: 3,75: 9,179: 1 \\
\text { quite }[10]-12: 2
\end{array}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { reach }[4]-9: 3,69: 4, \\
& 69: 10,160: 23
\end{aligned}
\] & receive [3]-10:21 & refle & 51:10, 52:8 \\
\hline 21:7, 32:7, 71:5, & read [20] - 8:2, 8:13, & 70:3, 118:2 & 140:19, 162:1 & remain [8]-33: \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& 72: 11,73: 1,112: 6 \\
& 166: 21,177: 4
\end{aligned}
\]} & 23:23, 23:24, 45:16, & received [8] - 10: & refrain [1] & 33:10, 95:23, 106:19 \\
\hline & 45:17, 52:19, 53:5, & \[
66: 10,80: 25,97: 8
\] & frame [1] - 144:15 & 107:15, 108:6 \\
\hline quote [2]-75:1, & 53:6, 53:7, 64:24, & 110:6, 110:7, 128:12 & refused [2]-36:7, & 175:15, 175:2 \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\begin{tabular}{l}
167:7 \\
quote-unquote [1] -
\end{tabular}} & \[
78: 9,85: 22,87: 10
\] & 156:6 & & Remain [1] - 74:2 \\
\hline & 89:5, 89:14, 112:1, & recent [1] - 49:2 & regard [1]-167 & remained [2] - \\
\hline \multirow[t]{3}{*}{```
75:1
    quoted [1] - 112:4
    quoting[1] - 90:15
```} & \multirow[t]{3}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 112:11, 126:17, } \\
& \text { 160:19 } \\
& \text { reading }[2]-74: 24,
\end{aligned}
\]} & recently [4] - 34:20, & regarding [2] - & \[
112: 22,112: 24
\] \\
\hline & & \[
38: 24,104: 17,105: 3
\] & 127:9, 166:10 & remaining [1] - \\
\hline & & Recently [1] - 50:9 & gardless [1] & \[
165: 21
\] \\
\hline &  & recited [1]-73:2 & 175 & \[
\text { emand }[6]-113:
\] \\
\hline & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
83: 15,83: 24,130: 4
\]} & 95:8, 100:10, 113:23 & 138:15, 138:1 & 130:21, 132:5 \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { Rackemann [2] - } \\
& \text { 59:18, 151:20 }
\end{aligned}
\]} & & 161:18 & registering [1] - & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 146:16, 147:3, } \\
& 166: 20
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline & 83:15, 83:24, 130:4 realistically [1] - & recommend [2] & \[
97: 13
\] & \begin{tabular}{l}
166:20 \\
remanded [7] -
\end{tabular} \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { Radio [1] - 46:23 } \\
& \text { raised }[10]-100: 18,
\end{aligned}
\] & realize [1] - 17:5 & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 28:16, 28:17 } \\
& \text { reconsider [2] - }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { registry [5] - 11:20, } \\
& 97: 19,113: 21,
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { remanded }[7] \text { - } \\
\text { 18:22, } 69: 2,77: 25,
\end{gathered}
\] \\
\hline 108:11, 116:22, & really [24]-17:5,
\(17 \cdot 19,24 \cdot 19,24 \cdot 20\) & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 155:16, 168:23 } \\
& \text { reconsideration [5] }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
113: 24,138: 22
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 94: 17,99: 5,113: 15 \\
& \text { 164:10 }
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 141:9, 141:11, } \\
& \text { 142:14, 145:5, 162:7, }
\end{aligned}
\] & 17:19, 24:19, 24:20, & reconsideration [5]
- 107:16, 155:8, & \begin{tabular}{l}
regroup [1] - 87:13 \\
rejected [1] - 163:8
\end{tabular} & Remember [2] - \\
\hline 142:14, 145:5, 162:7, & 30:22, 70:9, 71:11, & 159:13, 163:13, & rejected [1] - 163:8 rejiggered [1] - & 92:22, 132:2 \\
\hline raises [2] - 76:16, & \[
78: 24,79: 6,84: 16,
\] & 163:17 & \[
75: 18
\] & remember [3] \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { raises [2]-76:16, } \\
& \text { 168:3 }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
90: 7,95: 3,99: 9
\] & record [46]-11:20 & relate [3] - 107:1 & 16:21, 88:23, 160:3 \\
\hline RAPPAPORT [32] - & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{111:5, 126:17, 147:6,} & 16:1, 16:6, 22:16 & 108:5, 110:1 & remembering [1] - \\
\hline 7:13, 34:11, 34:16, & & 34:22, 35:14, 39:17 & related [7]-42:11 & 157:25 \\
\hline \[
45: 12,46: 4,46: 10
\] & 111:5, 126:17, 147:6,
147:16, 174:12, & 39:18, 40:2, 41:7, & 57:11, 108:9, 122:11, & remind [1]-64:2 \\
\hline \[
46: 12,46: 15,56: 1,
\] & 174:15 & 41:19, 41:23, 48:18 & 139:5, 149:11, & rendered [1] - \\
\hline \[
64: 18,69: 20,74: 21,
\] & REALTY [5] - 43:7, & \begin{tabular}{l}
61:7, 68:15, 69:6, \\
83.4, 99:15, 106.14
\end{tabular} & 177:14 & 156:23 \\
\hline 90:3, 104:3, 104:7, & 58:7, 123:7, 150:7, & 83:4, 99:15, 106:14, & relates [3]-66:17, & repeat [1]-86:6 \\
\hline 105:13, 106:4, 106:9, & 150:13 & 113:22, 125:14,
127:16. 127:18. & \[
105: 2,170: 19
\] & repeatedly [1] -
\[
166: 17
\] \\
\hline 111:9, 119:3, 119:5, & Realty [36] - 6:21, & 128:20, 128:23, & \begin{tabular}{l}
relatively [4] - 81:5, \\
82:13, 83:13, 165:25
\end{tabular} & reply [8] - 77:5, 84:2, \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 119:12, 126:1, 140:3, } \\
& \text { 140:11, 140:13, }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
44: 4,44: 5,59: 3
\] & \[
129: 4,132: 3,135
\] & relevance [9] - 68:5, & 126:12, 141:4, 142:3, \\
\hline 140:15, 141:20, & 59:4, 59:5, 59:8 & 142:6, 144:11, 145: & 70:18, 71:7, 76:22, & 161:23, 162:1, 162:4 \\
\hline \multirow[t]{3}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 141:22, 154:6, } \\
& 182: 15,182: 19
\end{aligned}
\]} & 59:10, 61:13, 61:15, & 145:20, 145:22, & & report [14]-67:12, \\
\hline & 65:7, 124:4, & 14 & & 75:25, 95:14, 95:19, \\
\hline & 125:19, 125:22, & 146:17, 146:25, & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\[
2-208
\]
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline ```
162:25, 164:12
    secondly [1] - 13:7
    secondly.. [1] -
    120:8
    SECRETARY [1] -
    150:14
    section [4] - 104:15,
    135:7, 145:1, 154:8
    sectional [10] -
    113:21, 113:23,
    132:8, 138:14,
    138:20, 145:14,
    145:19, 146:1,
    146:12, 146:20
    see [22]-12:8,
    12:21, 19:21, 25:20,
    36:20, 37:22, 43:14,
58:18, 75:25, 83:12,
    104:21, 123:15,
    126:21, 136:25,
    139:17, 150:22,
    153:7, 166:2, 170:9,
    170:23, 178:5,
    180:22
    See [1] - 118:15
    see.. [1] - 105:4
    seeing[1] - 131:25
    seek [3] - 49:5,
    100:2, 176:22
    seeking [2] - 75:4,
    107:25
    seem [2]-76:22,
    158:18
    send [4]-28:15,
    30:18, 76:13, 91:4
    sending[1] - 14:21
    sense [3]-31:16,
32:18, 69:3
    sent [12] - 11:6,
    11:15, 12:16, 14:22,
    14:24, 35:20, 71:19,
71:20, 71:21, 76:10,
    110:8, 172:10
    sentence [1] -
112:10
    Separate [1] - 128:2
    separate [6] - 37:2,
47:4, 127:24, 128:1,
    181:18, 182:23
    separately [1] -
137:18
    September [4] -
24:7, 43:18, 106:25,
150:23
series [1] - 18:23
serious [1] - 39:9
serve [1] - 126:11
served [5]-10:2,
10:7, 16:20, 47:3,
126:16
service [2] - 15:1,
``` & ```
15:3
    serving[1] - 33:15
    session [1]-6:6
    set [61] - 8:11, 9:23,
10:1, 12:2, 14:12,
15:11, 24:13, 36:9,
46:22, 47:3, 65:21,
66:16, 69:7, 69:15,
80:22, 81:14, 81:17,
81:18, 81:20, 81:21,
81:22, 81:23, 81:25,
82:7, 82:13, 82:16,
82:17, 84:24, 85:6,
93:24, 95:25, 96:17,
104:7, 105:17, 116:7,
116:24, 120:11,
127:10, 127:15,
128:22, 128:24,
131:5, 133:21, 137:6,
138:25, 141:5, 143:2,
157:12, 159:14,
159:15, 159:19,
160:22, 161:10,
166:5, 168:15,
169:18, 172:4,
177:11, 179:24,
180:4, 181:10
    set-it [1] - 104:7
    set-off [26] - 81:14,
81:17, 81:18, 81:20,
81:21, 81:22, 81:23,
81:25, 82:7, 82:13,
82:16, 82:17, 84:24,
85:6, 93:24, 95:25,
96:17, 127:10,
127:15, 128:22,
128:24, 137:6, 143:2,
159:14, 159:15,
160:22
    sets [2]-93:24,
113:20
    setting[3] - 81:20,
117:9, 177:23
    settled [3] - 14:18,
38:25, 39:23
    settling [1] - 133:4
    seven [3]-13:24,
14:13, 19:7
    sever [1]-73:8
    Several [1]-69:25
    several [13]-8:11,
9:25, 46:25, 49:20,
74:1, 83:1, 86:5,
92:23, 96:25, 110:10,
135:11, 138:5, 162:2
    severalty [8]-95:1,
95:3, 95:7, 95:20,
96:6, 112:24, 142:13,
160:17
    severe [1] - 47:23
severed [2] - 79:1,
79:2
``` & ```
    shall [2] - 6:4, 125:4
    share [2]-40:13,
40:16
    shed [1] - 79:14
    Sheila [6] - 59:7,
61:12, 124:6, 125:21,
151:6, 153:18
    shift [3] - 92:15,
94:7, 135:9
    shifted [2] - 93:18,
135:19
    shifting [4] - 90:12,
92:12, 134:13, 135:4
    shifts [6] - 73:12,
91:11, 91:22, 92:7,
135:6, 145:12
    ship [1] - 172:17
    shipped [2] -
126:19, 172:1
    SHORE [1] - 150:16
    Shore [2]-151:22,
154:12
    short [2] - 81:5,
126:8
    shortened [1] -
144:7
    shortly [2] - 100:3,
100:8
    shove [1] - 111:3
    show [24] - 11:22,
31:25, 48:1, 50:22,
73:18, 84:7, 85:7,
91:1, 91:18, 91:19,
91:23, 97:3, 97:8,
99:12, 108:15,
109:15, 132:23,
136:19, 144:25,
146:21, 147:1,
171:21, 173:6,
176:10
    showing [4] - 80:13,
83:17, 131:8
    shown [4]-32:21,
50:23, 134:16,
145:12
    shows [7] - 49:23,
74:12, 82:7, 85:6,
131:10, 131:12,
182:21
    shut [3] - 34:1,
50:17, 125:7
    Sibbison [4] - 42:5,
57:5, 122:5, 149:5
    sic [3]-14:23, 15:1,
160:18
    side [18] - 17:24,
50:16, 50:18, 75:11,
77:9, 79:9, 82:21,
91:11, 91:23, 91:25,
92:7, 93:18, 93:20,
117:22, 143:13,
``` & ```
168:8, 179:15
    side's [1] - 143:14
    sides [7] - 9:19,
17:23, 64:25, 99:1,
99:10, 136:8, 168:22
    sidetracked [1] -
143:22
    sign [1] - 174:3
    significant [2] -
81:25, 82:10
    Sikes [3] - 73:3,
91:12, 145:3
    silence [1] - 82:5
    silent [3] - 94:5,
161:9
    similar [3] - 54:6,
116:11, 180:10
    similarly [1] - 165:9
    simple [6] - 16:13,
81:8, 92:10, 142:23,
166:19, 183:21
    simply [7]-31:19,
33:16, 74:6, 79:12,
109:7, 119:12,
175:16
    simultaneous [7] -
8:8, 26:25, 29:22,
34:17, 38:5, 38:13,
97:21
    simultaneous) [4] -
23:8, 25:7, 37:12,
170:21
    simultaneous)
forth [1]-104:8
    simultaneous)or [1]
- 38:18
    simultaneous)or-I-
D[1] - 38:18
    simultaneous)
record [1] - 174:24
    single [1] - 142:24
    single-almost [1] -
142:24
    sister [1] - 11:16
    sit [2]-63:14,
116:13
sitting[6] - 29:11,
38:14, 38:15, 77:9,
102:1, 182:16
situation [1] - 36:18
six [4] - 46:3, 66:22,
140:6, 140:20
sizeable [1] - 181:9
skip [2] - 21:24, 24:4
slaves [1] - 92:24
slightly [2]-14:1,
167:16
small [1] - 141:18
Smith [1] - 91:13
SMITH [1] - 150:16
smoke [1] - 109:7
``` & \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { snow }[1]-63: 12 \\
\text { snowstorm }[1]- \\
71: 22 \\
\text { Snyder }[3]-59: 24, \\
124: 15,151: 23 \\
\text { so-called }[1]-127: 4 \\
\text { Society }[19]-7: 10, \\
39: 4,39: 14,44: 11, \\
45: 8,59: 13,61: 19 \\
65: 17,103: 8,104: 13, \\
107: 9,110: 10, \\
124: 10,125: 25, \\
151: 14,151: 14, \\
154: 2,154: 3,174: 6 \\
\text { SOCIETY }[1]- \\
150: 17 \\
\text { solely }[2]-159: 23, \\
177: 14 \\
\text { someday }[1]-89: 15 \\
\text { someplace }[1]- \\
14: 21 \\
\text { sometime }[3]-24: 8, \\
29: 1,29: 2 \\
\text { somewhat }[1]- \\
168: 9 \\
\text { Somewhere }[1]- \\
51: 21 \\
\text { somewhere }[1]- \\
146: 2 \\
\text { soon }[6]-15: 24, \\
16: 8,19: 20,19: 25, \\
24: 7,185: 19 \\
\text { sorry }[6]-7: 6, \\
26: 20,106: 11,114: 8, \\
141: 10,155: 12 \\
\text { Sorry }[3]-15: 25, \\
53: 5,153: 11 \\
\text { sort }[27]-24: 15, \\
24: 25,29: 13,31: 14, \\
32: 1,35: 9,36: 24, \\
54: 2,71: 13,72: 9, \\
75: 14,99: 18,101: 1, \\
129: 2,129: 18, \\
129: 21,130: 18, \\
135: 20,135: 21, \\
142: 21,144: 6, \\
156: 18,157: 18, \\
158: 11,159: 8, \\
159: 12,176: 4 \\
\text { sought }[9]-19: 8, \\
97: 12,105: 5,106: 20, \\
109: 17,110: 25, \\
157: 13,157: 23, \\
176: 14 \\
\text { sound }[2]-6: 14, \\
155: 1 \\
\text { sounds }[4]-92: 16, \\
110: 7,140: 12,155: 2 \\
\text { sources }[1]-80: 1 \\
\text { souTH }[1]-150: 16 \\
\text { South }[3]-92: 25, \\
\hline
\end{gathered}
\] \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

151:22, \(154: 12\)
Spaulding [4] - 44:9,
59:12, 124:8, 151:12
speaker [1] - 16:4
SPEAKER [4] -
21:15, 41:18, 147:21, 147:22
speaking [2]-88:16,
155:12
species [1]-9:2
specific [8]-53:1,
53:4, 53:8, 53:22,
55:20, 89:19, 162:17, 167:22
specifically [12] -
74:11, 81:18, 85:10,
92:2, 106:17, 106:25,
107:14, 108:19,
111:19, 113:13,
143:3, 164:8
speed [2] - 17:6,
20:21
spirit [1] - 108:25
spoken [3] - 105:15,
137:12, 173:24
spoliation [1] - 39:9
sponte [1] - 107:13
squarely [2] -
132:21, 139:9
squeeze [1] - 62:21
SS [4] - 43:4, 58:4,
123:4, 150:4
stack [1] - 52:24
staggering [1] -
117:22
stand [3]-153:11,
171:19, 179:2
standard [1] - 78:22
standing [2] -
176:23, 178:18
stands [1] - 167:16
start [12] - 6:13,
6:16, 6:17, 17:3,
61:8, 66:3, 77:20, 117:9, 155:25, 156:3, 160:8, 162:6
Start [1] - 45:4
started [4] - 10:19,
14:25, 15:2, 102:12
starting [2] - 113:19, 145:15
state [8]-26:16,
92:21, 92:23, 93:7, 93:9, 153:22, 179:17, 180:22
State [10]-50:7,
51:11, 59:15, 59:24,
93:1, 93:3, 97:2,
124:16, 151:9,
151:24
statement \([7]-12: 9\),
\(67: 4,67: 13,67: 15\)
\(98: 8,112: 12,162: 19\)
statements
statements [4] -
68:8, 72:17, 79:13, 110:13
states [1]-98:11
status [12] - 7:21,
8:6, 9:25, 19:18, 29:21, 71:17, 155:3, 155:6, 155:14, 159:9, 165:23, 177:23
STATUS [3] - 58:16,
150:19, 150:20
statute [13]-93:25,
95:22, 104:15, 127:2,
127:12, 132:14, 134:1, 134:18,
134:24, 159:15,
159:20, 159:23,
159:24
statutory [1] - 95:17 stay [7]-102:17,
114:21, 115:7, 116:9, 118:6, 119:2, 128:23 staying [2] - 23:10,
23:13
stenographer [1] -
104:25
step [6]-8:7, 9:22,
21:4, 85:16, 104:11, 171:1
step-up [1] - 85:16
steps [1] - 104:10 still [20] - 10:1,
32:12, 35:13, 35:23,
37:4, 49:15, 50:19,
68:1, 85:24, 96:7,
103:20, 104:1,
107:20, 110:2, 111:4,
111:6, 138:22,
160:16, 165:13,
181:6
stops [1] - 89:5
strange [1] - 33:7
stream [1]-162:18
street [1] - 7:18
Street [21]-42:19,
44:2, 44:14, 57:19,
59:2, 59:9, 59:15, 59:18, 59:24, 60:4,
122:19, 124:2,
124:12, 124:16,
149:19, 151:2, 151:9,
151:17, 151:20,
151:24, 152:7
stricken [1] - 111:22
STRIKE [2] - 58:16,
123:13
strike [29]-31:4,
36:15, 64:24, 65:25,
66:14, 70:2, 70:3,

71:14, 71:18, 72:15,
75:12, 75:23, 104:11,
105:11, 107:25,
109:18, 117:8,
117:13, 120:4,
120:12, 120:20,
120:21, 126:10,
126:19, 128:23,
131:7, 138:16,
140:23, 168:22
strongly [1] - 28:17
struck [5] - 32:23,
33:9, 36:13, 36:15,
72:18
stuck [2] - 98:24,
173:18
stuff [4]-9:2, 71:11,
130:3, 144:11
stunt [1] - 111:10
sua [1] - 107:13
subdivided [1] -
11:23
subdividing [1] -
85:13
subject [5] - 94:16,
99:24, 131:24, 160:6,
165:23
Subject [2] - 97:14,
97:17
subjected [1] -
102:9
subjugated [1] -
32:16
submission [1] -
142:24
submissions [1] -
163:10
submit [12] - 24:12,
26:11, 26:12, 67:3,
68:21, 71:1, 71:9,
81:23, 136:11,
136:21, 140:8,
164:14
submits [1] - 24:11
submitted [39] -
11:18, 27:22, 65:1, 65:8, 65:15, 66:12,
67:9, 67:22, 68:17,
70:22, 72:2, 72:3,
77:11, 77:16, 78:13,
79:11, 79:20, 80:25,
81:1, 83:1, 108:8, 127:7, 127:18, 128:14, 129:13, 131:3, 131:5, 131:19, 139:14, 140:22, 141:25, 162:10,
162:12, 164:21, 165:8, 167:11, 168:5, 168:18
submitted.. [1] -
83:23
submitting [2] -
71:2, 147:9
subsequent [2] -
49:10, 156:12
substance [3] -
133:16, 133:17,
143:21
substantive [1] -
143:21
sudden [3] - 127:22,
160:12, 176:18
suddenly [1] - 22:5
sufficient [1] -
131:25
suggest [30] - 17:20,
19:3, 19:15, 20:11,
24:9, 27:16, 47:19,
48:15, 48:19, 55:14,
75:22, 80:5, 85:24,
92:18, 93:7, 100:18,
100:22, 114:16,
135:13, 135:15,
137:20, 138:1, 138:9,
139:7, 143:8, 165:25,
167:10, 167:14,
167:24, 168:25
suggested [1] -
143:7
suggesting [1] -
132:20
suggestion [1] -
31:25
suggestions [2] -
117:14, 117:15
suggests [3] -
83:10, 132:5, 163:2
sum [1] - 100:11
summarized [1] -
31:13
summary [8] - 25:1,
52:11, 72:13, 87:20,
132:2, 132:4, 146:11,
146:17
summer [1] - 168:24
sums [1] - 82:20
superior [2]-39:1,
184:7
supplement [6] -
22:16, 23:15, 25:24,
27:15, 28:11, 146:18
support [7]-47:21,
48:4, 48:8, 49:17,
52:23, 172:15,
180:23
supported [1] -
169:11
supports [1] -
172:14
supposed [4] -
61:21, 74:17, 177:17,
179:23
supposedly [1] -
71:2
Supreme [2]-49:21,
99:2
surprise [1] - 77:9
surprised [3]-70:8,
115:5, 128:13
survey [2]-22:20,
50:9
surveyor [5] - 10:7,
10:10, 16:11, 22:22,
142:9
surveyor's [2] -
22:21, 178:14
surveys [1] - 13:24
suspect [3]-10:20,
18:7, 87:19
sustains [1] - 170:11
swam [1] - 63:3
sympathetic [1] -
75:16
system [1]-6:14
\begin{tabular}{|c|}
\hline \(\mathbf{T}\) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
table [11] - 17:17,
37:14, 37:16, 62:18,
82:22, 88:4, 89:15,
98:4, 115:23, 168:8, 168:22
takings [6] - 179:17,
180:22, 180:24,
181:6, 181:18,
181:22
tangentially [1] -
179:10
tantamount [1] -
36:16
Tanzi [4]-44:9,
59:12, 124:8, 151:12
target [1] - 104:1
task [1] - 86:21
technical [5] - 32:7,
33:1, 33:19, 34:6,
36:21
technicality [1] -
33:12
Technically [1] -
180:11
technically [4] -
36:12, 165:13,
168:10, 177:1
tee [1]-184:13
Tee [1]-185:9
Telephone [4] -
42:22, 57:22, 122:22,
149:22
telephone [2]-27:2,
63:25
Ten [1] - 30:3
tend [1]-164:2
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline terms [6] - 98:8, & 40:18, 40:21, 41:1, & 127:20, 128:1, 128:3, & there've [1] - 140:15 & 114:8, 119:9, 151:8, \\
\hline 138:6, 141:14, & 41:5, 41:10, 41:14, & 128:5, 131:23, & There've [1] - 140:16 & 153:24, 161:23, \\
\hline 146:24, 162:7, 172:3 & 41:16, 41:20, 43:4, \(45: 2,45: 9,45: 13\), & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 135:23, 135:25, } \\
& 139: 22, ~ 140: 1
\end{aligned}
\] & thereafter \({ }_{[1]}-100: 8\) & \[
161: 25,172: 4,175: 9
\] \\
\hline terribly [1] - 69:8 & \[
45: 17,45: 23,46: 2,
\] & \[
140: 10,140: 12
\] & therefore [5] - 86:21, & 175:3, 176:9 \\
\hline test [1]-153:20 & 46:6, 46:9, 46:11, & 140:14, 141:19 & 95:23, 133:14, & timing [1]-17:25 \\
\hline testified [1]-173:2 & 46:14, 46:16, 49:18, & 141:21, 142:1, 142:3, & 167:13, 175:20 & title [30]-12:24, \\
\hline testify [4]-16:22, & 51:15, 51:23, 51:25, & 147:5, 147:18, & Therefore [1] - & 48:2, 48:7, 66:25 \\
\hline \begin{tabular}{l}
\[
79: 22,136: 15
\] \\
testifying [1]
\end{tabular} & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 52:4, 52:21, 53:1, } \\
& \text { 53:18, 53:24, } 54: 6,
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 147:23, 148:1, 150:4, } \\
& \text { 150:15, 153:2, 153:5, }
\end{aligned}
\] & \begin{tabular}{l}
107:15 \\
They've [1]
\end{tabular} & \begin{tabular}{l}
73:9, 83:4, 83:8, \\
94:19, 98:12, 98:13,
\end{tabular} \\
\hline 136:14 & 54:16, 54:19, 54:21, \(55 \cdot 355 \cdot 755 \cdot 13\) & & they've [11] - 14:6, & 98:15, 98:17, 101:13,
105:14. 105:17 \\
\hline testimonial [1] - & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 55: 3,55: 7,55: 13, \\
& 55: 15,55: 18,55: 20,
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 153:16, 153:20, } \\
& \text { 153:22, 154:5, 154:8, }
\end{aligned}
\] & 50:13, 66:18, 85:22, & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 105:14, 105:17, } \\
& \text { 105:20, 105:24, }
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 166:3 } \\
& \text { testimony }[11]-9: 8,
\end{aligned}
\] & 55:22, 55:24, 56:3, & 154:14, 154:20, & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 86:9, 92:8, 98:14, } \\
& \text { 109:21, 110:3, 139:1, }
\end{aligned}
\] & 105:25, 106:7, 112:4, \\
\hline 39:3, 51:13, 52:1, & 58:4, 61:2, 61:6, & 154:25, 155:11 & 179:21 & 112:8, 112:13, \\
\hline 110:12, 142:7, & 61:17, 61:22, 62:1,
62:4, 62:7, 62:10, & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 155:14, 155:19, } \\
& \text { 155:25, 156:2, 156:4, }
\end{aligned}
\] & thing's [1] - 180:20 & 131:25, 135:2, \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 168:13, 177:3, 177:5, } \\
& 177: 6,177: 9
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 62:4, 62:7, 62:10, } \\
& \text { 62:15, 62:18, 62:23, }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 155: 25,156: 2,156: 4 \\
& 161: 22,169: 5,169: 7
\end{aligned}
\] & think.. [1] - 68:14 & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 137:10, 138:17, } \\
& \text { 138:20, 145:8, 146:4, }
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline 177:6,
than.. [1] - 68:19 & 62:25, 63:6, 63:13, & 170:22, 171:7, & thinks [2]-87:7, & 175:20 \\
\hline t's.. [1] - 12:24 & 63:18, 63:21, 63:24, & 171:10, 172:19 & 119 & title.. [1] - 145:6 \\
\hline That's.. [1]-20:21 & 64:3, 64:9, 64:11, 64:13, 64:17, 64:19, & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 172:21, 173:1, } \\
& \text { 173:13, 173:24 }
\end{aligned}
\] & Third [14]-36:14, & \begin{tabular}{l}
titles [4]-66:22, \\
83:2, 145:16, 145
\end{tabular} \\
\hline that-take-once [1] -
183:7 & 65:4, 65:6, 65:9, & 174:9, 174:11, & 156:15, 156:19, & TO [3] - 43: 12, \\
\hline that.. [2]-39:19, & 65:11, 65:13, 65:21, & 174:14, 174:16,
\(174: 18,174 \cdot 22\) & 157:15, 157:20, & 58:16, 123:13 \\
\hline 114:17 & 65:24, 67:21, 68:10, & 174:18, 174:22, & 157:21, 158:6, & to.. [7]-89:18, \\
\hline THE [377]-6:8, 6:11, & 68:13, 69:16, 69:18, \(69 \cdot 22,70 \cdot 21,74: 19\) & 175:1, 175:4, 175:8
\(178: 7,178 \cdot 20\) & 158:10, 166:11, & 119:4, 119:21, \\
\hline 6:13, 6:25, 7:5, 7:15, & \begin{tabular}{l}
69:22, 70:21, 74:19, \\
\(75: 8,75 \cdot 13,76 \cdot 5\)
\end{tabular} & \begin{tabular}{l}
178:7, 178:20, \\
178:25 179:6
\end{tabular} & 167:5, 167:18, & 139:23, 173:8, 181:9, \\
\hline \(7: 19,7: 21,7: 25,8: 9\),
\(8: 14,9: 1,119\) & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 75: 8,75: 13,76: 5, \\
& 76 \cdot 776 \cdot 1777 \cdot 4
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 178:25, 179:6, } \\
& \text { 179:12, 180:25 }
\end{aligned}
\] & 176:12 & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 184:16 } \\
& \text { today [21] - 10:19, }
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline 11:13, 11:19, 12:13, & 84:1, 86:11, 86:13 & 181:5, 181:14 & 158:7 & 22:5, 27:11, 27:12, \\
\hline 12:19, 12:22, 12:25, & 86:25, 87:2, 87:9, & 181:17, 181:2 & Thirty \({ }_{[1]}-22: 25\) & 49:15, 55:8, 65:24, \\
\hline 15:19, 15:21, 15:24, & 87:24, 88:4 & 182:1, 182:5, 182:1 & thoughts [1] - 171:6 & 70:1, 71:14, 72:19, \\
\hline 16:2, 16:15, 16:18, & 88:11, 88:17, 88:21, & 182:14, 182:17 & thousand [1] - 46:3 & 75:10, 76:15, 79:21, \\
\hline 17:3, 17:13, 17:16, & 10, 89:14, 89:2 & 182:20, 183:3 & three [12] - 12:7, & 105:24, 116:9, \\
\hline 20:20, 20:25, 21:6, & 94:21, 94:24, 97:17 & \[
183: 20,183: 24
\] & 17:20, 23:12, 45:9, & 117:12, 117:2 \\
\hline 21:9, 21:13, 21:16,
\(22.8,22 \cdot 10,22 \cdot 12\), & 97:20, 98:4, 101:19, & 184:4, 184:9, 184:11, & 46:19, 68:6, 69:8, & 118:2, 121:1, 125
182:16 \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 22:8, 22:10, 22:12, } \\
& 22: 24,23: 6,23: 9,
\end{aligned}
\] & 101:21, 103:6, & 184:16, 184:19, & 69:20, 126:10, 129:8, & together [10] - 9: \\
\hline 23:19, 23:21, 23:23, & 103:15, 103:19 & 184:22, 185:1, 185:4, & e-ho & 9:15, 9:23, 22:17, \\
\hline 24:1, 24:3, 24:7, & 103:25, 104:2, 104:4, & 185:7, 185:9, 185:11, & ree.. [1] - 14: & 28:14, 40:2, 40:11 \\
\hline 24:22, 24:24, 25:2, & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 105:12, 105:21, } \\
& \text { 106:12, 107:5, 111:8, }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 185:14, 185:16, } \\
& 185: 19
\end{aligned}
\] & throughout [1] - & 76:19, 179:24, 180:4 \\
\hline 25:4, 25:8, 25:11, & 106:12, 107:5, 111:8,
\[
111: 23,114: 5
\] & \begin{tabular}{l}
185:19 \\
the-neat-outcome-
\end{tabular} & 145:3 & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { tomorrow [1] - } \\
& \text { 117:20 }
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline 25:20, \(25: 23,26: 2\),
\(26: 4,26: 7,26: 9\), & 114:18, 114:21, & of-the-set-off [1] & umbs [1] - 173:19 & \[
\text { tongue }{ }_{[1]}-172
\] \\
\hline 26:13, 26:15, 26:17, & 115:7, 115:10, & 105:17 & & took [10] - \\
\hline 26:19, 27:1, 27:3, & 115:14, 115: & -number-of [1] - &  & 15:9, 15:11, 16:10, \\
\hline 27:10, 27:12, 28:3, &  & & OTSO & 22:21, 63:4, 67:24, \\
\hline 28:22, 28:25, 29:6, & 117:23, 117:25, & he.. [1] - 106:12 & \[
7: 11,62: 8,62: 20
\] & 92:23, 157:5, 178:13 \\
\hline 29:10, 29:13, 29:19, & 15, 118:20 & eirs [1] - 71:21 & \[
62: 24,63: 3,65: 10,
\] & torn [1] - 39:13 \\
\hline 29:23, 30:2, 30:6, & 18:23, 119:1, 119:4, & 41:1 & 68:11, 68:14, 69:17, & total [1]-108:22 \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& 30: 8,30: 15,30: 17 \\
& 30: 20,30: 23,31: 11
\end{aligned}
\] & 119:8, 119:11, & & \[
77: 7,88: 15,98: 6
\] & totally \([1]\) - 176:7 \\
\hline \[
34: 3,34: 8,34: 15,
\] & 119:17, 119:23 & \[
45: 2,65: 15,70: 19,
\] & 5:3, & 128:1 \\
\hline 34:18, 34:22, 34:25, & 120:5, 120:7, 120:9 & 13 & & towards [1] - 48 \\
\hline 35:2, 35:4, 35:6, & 0:16 & theory [3]-52:14, & & wer [1] - 46:24 \\
\hline 35:9, 35:12, 35:17, & & 65:19, 96:21 & \[
153: 24,155: 23
\] & TOWN [6] - 43:10, \\
\hline 35:20, 35:23, 36:1, & & [2] - 144:10, & 156:1, 156:3, 161:24, & 58:10, 58:14, 123:10, \\
\hline 36:4, 37:13, 37:16, & :13, 125:17 & 144:11 & 169:6, 183:22, 184:2 & \[
150: 10,150: 14
\] \\
\hline \begin{tabular}{l}
37:19, 38:3, 38:7, \\
38:11, 38:14, 38:19,
\end{tabular} & 125:23, 126:5, 126:9, & there'Il [2] - 143:14, 159:11 & Tillotson [15]-7:11, & Town [29]-6:9, \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& 38: 11,38: 14,38: 19, \\
& 38: 21,39: 21,40: 4,
\end{aligned}
\] & 126:24, 127:3, 127:6, & there's.. [2]-27:7, & 13:17, 59:14, 62:9, & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 6: 10,7: 13,44: 16, \\
& 60: 5,61: 3,61: 5,
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline
\end{tabular}



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    xx excellent

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\(\qquad\)
``` good fair poor TAPE \(x x\) CD TIME STAMP or INDEX NUMBER
(check all that apply)
background noise
low audio
low audio at sidebar
simultaneous speech
speaking away from microphone (done with CourtSmart)
COMMENTS: Those dates where four channels were used were much easier and quicker to transcribe, and allowed people speaking over the phone to be isolated and heard, or people on the plaintiff side to be isolated and heard, or people on the defendant side to be heard; if no one was on the phone. With multiple speakers, this was a huge advantage, even when they were speaking one at a time.
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